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Abstract 
 
The research question that this thesis seeks to address is how contemporary liberal 
states, that are characterised by cultural diversity, should respond to cultural heritage. 
The argument of this thesis is that liberal states are fundamentally obliged to ensure 
that individuals have the greatest freedom possible to engage with their own cultural 
heritages. Cultural heritage and practices play a crucial role in the construction and 
maintenance of individual and group identity, and thus a response of non-
intervention in cultural heritage provides the best means of respecting this 
significance. Although a government may not be sympathetic to certain ideas and 
ways of living, this does not give it a right to destroy or damage any cultural artifacts 
and objects, unless these objects or practices actively incite violence or harm to 
others, because doing so would necessarily violate the liberal proviso to abstain for 
interfering in conceptions of the good. 
 
Liberal states do not have an obligation to preserve a national heritage, nor do they 
have a duty to preserve a diversity of (minority) cultural heritages. However, 
contemporary nation-states – liberal and otherwise – will necessarily possess certain 
attributes of cultural heritage, such as a national flag, language, symbols etc., that are 
likely to reflect the experiences of a dominant, national group. While this 
acknowledgement entails a diversion from ideal liberal theory and poses problems 
for the cultural neutrality of the liberal state, I argue that it is in the liberal states’ 
interest to maintain some objects of cultural heritage as these have instrumental value 
in fostering an understanding of the shared political community and respect for 
liberal values. However, liberal governments are obliged to ensure that existing 
public heritage does not unduly discriminate against minority cultural groups; thus 
sustaining political neutrality. The liberal response that I have outlined thus attempts 
to sustain liberal values whilst remaining mindful of contextual issues such as power 
relations between and within groups, and the necessary constraints of contemporary 
statehood. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
The inspiration for this research is derived from the experiences of my homeland, 
Hong Kong, where barely a day passes without some mention of the threat to cultural 
heritage in the city’s newspapers. An incredibly dense population, shortage of land 
and constant redevelopment combined with an uncertainty about its post-colonial 
Hong Kong or Chinese identity, has resulted in significant changes to Hong Kong’s 
cultural heritage over the past decade and a half that has elapsed since Hong Kong’s 
return to China. The residents of Hong Kong have seen changes to their currency, 
national anthem, street names, post-boxes, public holidays and buildings, to name 
but a few changes. In 2006, after much discussion, dissent and delay, Queen’s Pier 
on Hong Kong Island was destroyed to make room for redevelopment. In addition to 
its use as a public pier, Queen’s Pier had also been a ceremonial site for the arrival of 
all colonial governors since 1925, and on June 30th 1997 the last governor of Hong 
Kong, Chris Patten, departed the island accompanied by Prince Charles, only a few 
hundred metres away. This site had clearly played a key role in the history of Hong 
Kong but was not worth preserving over redevelopment. Similarly, at the time of 
writing, the current heritage controversy in Hong Kong concerns Government Hill, 
which has, since colonial times, been the administrative centre of Hong Kong, 
containing the Central Government Offices, West Wing and Court of Final Appeal. 
Much like Queen’s Pier, Government Hill also has great historical significance for 
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Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Government, however, wishes to sell this land to 
property developers. Yet, at the same time, the Government refuses to ban the cruel 
and unsustainable practices of capturing and selling sharks’ fins, which traditionally 
play a role in most celebratory banquets and forms part of a Chinese culinary 
heritage, citing the harm that this would do to Hong Kong’s long established shark 
fin industry.   
 
It is stories such as these that prompted me to begin researching cultural heritage. A 
lot of people in Hong Kong feel as strongly about the threats to Hong Kong’s built 
heritage as they do about the continuation of shark finning; resulting in public 
speeches, protest rallies, signature campaigns and even hunger strikes. Yet, setting 
these highly emotive responses to one side, it was unclear what the philosophical 
implications of preservation and destruction were, and whether and how one might 
articulate a reasoned response to cultural heritage. This is an issue that is a lot bigger 
outside of Hong Kong and threats to cultural heritage are nothing new. Revolution 
and social conflict, in 18th Century France as in 1960s-70s China and beyond, have 
all too frequently resulted in the destruction of cultural heritage. Urban development, 
as we have seen, but also globalisation and global tourism, threaten the existence of 
indigenous languages, knowledge and practices. The threat to cultural heritage has 
also been reflected in a rapidly expanding literature on heritage conservation, policy 
and management. Coinciding with the 1983 UK Heritage Act, heritage first became a 
major subject of academic enquiry in the 1980s, with many scholars writing about 
the nature of heritage and its relationship to national identity and class. Most 
recently, however, heritage scholars have been turning to issues such as cultural 
diversity and human rights and exploring how these topics can influence cultural 
heritage. Yet, very few of the resulting works have engaged with the deeper 
theoretical and normative issues and debates concerning identity, multiculturalism 
and the politics of diversity. The promotion of diversity through the preservation of 
minority and indigenous heritages, far from being viewed as one possible response to 
cultural heritage, has instead been generally recognised as a necessary goal for 
cultural heritage. This consensus has been reflected in a number of UNESCO treaties 
and conventions, most notably the 2003 Convention Concerning the Safeguarding of 
Intangible Heritage which notes that:  
Introduction 
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‘cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly 
recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their 
interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of 
identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and 
human creativity. ‘1   
 
Yet, it is far from clear how communities and groups engaging with their own 
cultural heritages can ‘promote respect for cultural diversity.’ Responding to issues 
of identity and history, cultural heritage is a subject that is fraught with symbolism 
and emotion, with some scholars even going so far as to describe the threats to 
indigenous languages as ‘linguistic genocide.’ The lack of debate in the literature 
about diversity and how best to respond to it emphasises the need for reasoned 
arguments that explore the normative consequences of the politics of identity. It is 
for this reason that this thesis considers how to respond to cultural heritage with the 
assistance of existing works on multiculturalism and diversity from within the field 
of political theory. 
 
However at the same time, it is also striking that, despite a burgeoning sub-field of 
multiculturalism, citizenship and identity studies within political theory, and while a 
great deal has been written within these topics on the issue of culture, surprisingly 
little is said explicitly about cultural heritage. It is true that scholars often address 
questions concerning heritage when they take a stance on how the state ought to 
respond to minority cultural practices that clash with dominant norms, and questions 
of public heritage can arise tangentially in discussions about national symbols, 
holidays and scheduled work-weeks. Yet, culture in these instances is often taken as 
a given, ahistorical and most problematically, static. Cultures are described as though 
they were largely homogenous, bounded communities and cultural practices are 
taken to be unchanging, unchangeable and held equally by all members of the group. 
This conception of cultural practices can largely be attributed to the fact that many 
political theorists, writing on issues of multiculturalism and diversity, work within a 
broadly liberal framework. It is not difficult to understand why liberalism has proven 
so popular in scholarly work about diversity. Liberalism provides a good guide for 
                                                       
1 Emphasis added. UNESCO (2003): Convention for the safeguarding of intangible heritage, 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?pg=00006, Article 2, (accessed November 4th 2008). 
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responding to questions about culture because it grows out of a need to accommodate 
difference. Liberalism’s reluctance to demonstrate any explicit preference for a 
particular form of the good life, combined with its commitment to universalism, 
renders it a strong contender for offering a sound solution for responding adequately 
to a diversity of cultural goods. Yet, liberalism’s commitment to objectivity, 
universalism and cultural indifference is both its defining feature and greatest vice. 
Indeed, because of these commitments, a common charge levelled again liberalism is 
that it is blind to historical experience and incapable of recognising the inherent 
particularism of its own beliefs and traditions. 
 
A growing awareness of these problems has led an increased engagement with the 
nature of culture and community. As Patten and Kymlicka write:  
 
‘much of the work in political theory in the last 20 years can be seen as 
attempting to break down these stark dichotomies between 
individual/community and universalism/particularism…even if we start with 
liberal assumptions about universal value of individual freedom and 
democracy, these values can in fact be upheld only if they are embodied 
within the institutions and traditions of particular political communities.’2 
 
Writing about cultural heritage, therefore, as opposed to simply culture is part of this 
research agenda. It marks a conceptual shift and signifies a commitment to 
conceiving of cultures as the outcome of accumulated historical experiences. 
Heritage provides a means of tracing cultures and engaging with their processes of 
development, as well as factoring in experience. By engaging with cultural heritage, 
it becomes possible to acknowledge the significance of historical experience in the 
construction of personal, and hence group, identity. Furthermore, accepting the 
historical contingency of identity should also force us to reconsider our own liberal 
and supposedly universal beliefs. Thus, while this research is based on the premise 
that liberal accounts of diversity are able to provide answers to some of the problems 
of cultural heritage, cultural heritage, with its emphasis on particular experiences, 
can also highlight and possibly resolve some of the existing problems with 
contemporary liberalism. 
                                                       
2 Kymlicka, W. and Patten, A. (2003): eds. Language Rights and Political Theory, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), p.11. 
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The fundamental research question that this thesis seeks to address, therefore, is how 
contemporary liberal states, that are characterised by cultural diversity as well as a 
diversity of power relations within and amongst groups, should respond to cultural 
heritage. This is a question that is concerned with the representation of history and 
experience in public spaces, as well as the treatment of cultural and historical beliefs 
and practices within ‘private’ spaces. It is a question not only about whether or not to 
preserve cultural heritage, but also about whose heritage. It is concerned with 
multiculturalism and how the state ought to treat cultural minorities with traditions 
that often differ quite sharply from the majority, as well as a question about how to 
resolve the cultural prejudices of the majority or dominant group. This is also, 
however, fundamentally a question about liberalism and the prerogatives, rights and 
limits of the liberal state. The aim of this thesis is thus to construct a general theory 
of how states should respond to cultural heritage, remaining consistent on the broad 
spectrum of heritage issues which can range from public holidays, monuments and 
symbols, to personal and collective rituals, practices and objects. Nevertheless, while 
the role and limits of government are the primary subjects of this research, this also 
highlights the scope and boundaries of individual and cultural toleration.    
 
 
Methodology 
The strategy, or method, of this thesis is to outline a response to cultural heritage by 
exploring how liberal principles affect cultural heritage, and vice versa. As noted 
above, I am also concerned with the significance of national identity and dominant 
norms and thus situate this exploration of liberal principles within the context of 
contemporary nation-states that are characterised by a diversity of cultures, heritages, 
conceptions of the good and social relations. The liberal position advanced here is 
outlined and defended by comparing and contrasting it with a number of different 
liberal responses to cultural diversity, namely: libertarianism (as advanced by 
Chandran Kukathas), liberal egalitarianism (Brian Barry), liberal multiculturalism 
(Will Kymlicka), liberal nationalism (David Miller), and constitutional partiotism 
(Juergen Habermas). The thesis is also largely structured around this comparison.  
Jacob Levy’s classification of different types of cultural claims provides a good 
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framework for viewing, at a glance, how the position established here differs from 
these alternate approaches, and is illustrated on the next page.3 
 
 
The Argument of this Thesis 
The argument of this thesis is that liberal states are fundamentally obliged to ensure 
that individuals have the greatest freedom possible to engage with their own cultural 
heritages. Cultural heritage and practices play a crucial role in the construction and 
maintenance of individual and group identity, and thus a response of non-
intervention in cultural heritage provides the best means of respecting this 
significance. Indeed, the more the state intervenes in cultural heritage, the less 
freedom individuals have to engage meaningfully with their own histories. 
Consequently, however, while there is no general principle or obligation to preserve 
or promote cultural heritage, states do not have a general right to destroy or prohibit 
cultural heritage either. 
 
The liberalism defended here is thus broadly sympathetic toward what is known as 
negative liberty – or freedom from interference – with an emphasis on limited 
government in order for individuals to have as much space as possible to exercise 
choice and engage with their own conceptions of the good. In this regard, it is most 
sympathetic to the work of contemporary liberals such as Brian Barry and Chandran 
Kukathas. However the conception of individual liberty defended here also finds that 
governments have a role to play in the creation of this space - such that it is 
meaningful and worthwhile to individuals. Thus, while I start out from a position of 
non-intervention, it is these two theorists who unfortunately also receive the brunt of 
my criticisms when outlining how the position established here also deviates from 
‘benign neglect.’ In terms of cultural heritage, this means that the liberal government 
may, at times, be obliged to intervene when it is found that individuals have not been 
given the freedom to exercise choice over their cultural heritage. Individuals are 
occasionally forced to follow certain cultural practices against their will and, in these 
instances, the liberal state must intervene in order to uphold respect for individual 
                                                       
3 Levy, J. (2000): The Multiculturalism of Fear, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.127. NB I have 
ommitted ‘Self-government’ and ‘Representation’ as I do not deal with these questions in this thesis. 
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Category Example4 Argument 
presented here 
Libertarianism Liberal 
Egalitarianism 
Liberal 
Multiculturalism 
Liberal 
Nationalism 
Constitutional 
Patriotism 
Exemptions from laws 
which penalise or 
burden cultural 
practices 
Sikh/motocycle helmet 
laws, indians/peyote, 
indigenous 
peoples/hunting laws, 
Amish/schooling 
No cultural 
exemptions. 
Some individual 
exceptions 
No No in 
principle, but 
some cultural 
exceptions in 
practice 
Yes No No 
Assistance to do those 
things the majority can 
do unassisted 
Multilingual ballots, and 
other public information 
Yes, but severely 
restricted. 
No No Yes No No 
External rules 
restricting non-
member’s liberty to 
protect members’ 
culture 
Quebec/restrictions on 
English language, 
Indians/restrictions on 
whites voting 
Yes. State 
intervenes to 
uphold toleration 
of cultural 
practices. 
No No Yes Yes, in the 
sense of 
protecting 
the national 
heritage. 
No 
Internal rules for 
members’ conduct 
enforced by ostracism, 
excommunication 
Mennonite shunning, 
disowning children who 
marry outside the group 
Yes, but limited 
by respect for 
toleration and 
autonomy . 
Yes No No No No 
Recognition/enforceme
nt of traditional legal 
code by the dominant 
legal system 
Aboriginal land rights, 
traditional or group-
specific family law 
No No No Yes No No 
Symbolic claims to 
acknowledge the worth, 
status, or existence of 
various groups 
Name of polity, official 
name of ethnic groups, 
national holidays, 
teaching of history and 
historical justice 
Yes No No Yes No No. But some 
(e.g. Cecile 
Laborde) 
allow. 
                                                       
4 Most of these are taken from Levy (2000): op cit., p.127 – however, I have amended some of these in order to fit my arguments. 
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autonomy. Sometimes, however, it is the dominant cultural group that prevents 
individuals from engaging with their own (minority) cultural practices on the basis 
that these practices clash with the norms of the dominant culture. In these instances, 
the liberal state intervenes to uphold toleration. In short: interventions in cultural 
heritage within the liberal state are only justifiable on liberal grounds. 
 
Given these principles, it might seem somewhat surprising, therefore, that the view 
outlined in this thesis also defends the existence of a public heritage – specifically, a 
public heritage which is likely, in part, to reflect the experiences of a dominant 
national group. While undoubtedly a deviation from the ideal of cultural neutrality, a 
significant premise, upon which this thesis is based, is the continued importance of 
the nation-state for liberal political theory. Indeed, the argument presented here also 
attempts to take the existence of power relations amongst and within groups more 
generally. Evidence for the importance of nations and nationalism extends far 
beyond the realm of academic enquiry. A cursory survey of recent political, 
economic, social, sporting and entertainment events indicate that, from the Arab 
Spring and crisis of the Euro; to the Olympics, Oscars and Eurovision; nationalism 
and national identity continue to play a significant role in structuring our perceptions 
of the world around us. The works of Craig Calhoun and Margaret Canovan – both 
of whom stress the continued significance of national identity for political theory – 
have been particularly crucial in shaping this feature of my work. Yet, although 
many liberal political theorists remain reluctant to acknowledge the presence, 
nevermind significance, of nations and national identity, many scholars of 
nationalism are equally sceptical of normative work and, in particular, liberal 
political theory. While liberal theorists often remain blind to the fact of nationalism, 
very few scholars of nationalism are unable to look beyond this fact to explore the 
normative consequences of national identity for the state and political principles. I 
thus attempt to draw these two approaches together and account for the continued 
significance of nation-states and national identity by acknowledging the 
consequences of dominant national groups.  
 
Therefore, in addition to defending a right to engage with heritage, the liberal 
position that I outline also attempts to come to terms with the necessary existence of 
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cultural heritage which is likely to be biased toward the experiences of a dominant 
national group; such as a national anthem, flag, public holidays, curriculum, and so 
on. These biases in public heritage raise important normative issues to which I have 
tried to do justice in this thesis and, unlike some liberal scholars, I do believe that 
they can have significant bearing on individual welfare. By no means, however, is 
the position adopted here a variant of liberal nationalism. Indeed, the political 
theorists that do recognise the significance of national identity have the tendency to 
take this too far by imbuing it with normative significance. Thus, in recognising the 
continued significance of dominant (national) groups within the liberal state, I have 
been very careful not to rely on any nationalist arguments. The position on public 
heritage adopted here is thus best described as ‘nation-conscious liberalism.’ While I 
accept an inevitable bias in public culture toward a dominant national group, public 
heritage within a liberal state is distinguished by the fact that liberal governments 
nevertheless attempt to uphold political neutrality by remaining conscious of this 
cultural bias (and recognising that ‘our’ norms aren’t necessarily everyone’s norms) 
and undermining significant instances of cultural bias where possible (for example, 
by broadening the scope of official languages or improving access to translated 
materials concerning public services). Thus, while the continued significance of 
nationhood necessarily undermines a liberal government’s ability to maintain 
cultural neutrality, political neutrality and respect for individual freedom and choice 
remains intact. 
 
My defence of a public cultural heritage is not made purely on grounds of political 
realism, however. In this thesis I attempt to demonstrate how a necessary public 
cultural heritage can be used to promote liberal values such as respect for autonomy 
and toleration of cultural diversity. In this sense, a public heritage also helps to 
sustain solidarity and an understanding of difference within the political community. 
Indeed, the importance of solidarity, albeit minimal, is something which has been 
overlooked (if not altogether rejected) by many theorists of multiculturalism and 
diversity. Yet, as Joseph Raz and others have pointed out, those who defend the 
interests of minority groups, against a dominant culture, ultimately presuppose the 
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existence of a shared public culture in order for their arguments to have resonance.5 
In other words, a degree of solidarity is necessary to uphold respect for a diversity of 
cultural goods and in this thesis I attempt to demonstrate how a shared public 
heritage can help to generate this solidarity.  
 
Crucially, however, what distinguishes a liberal public heritage from the sorts of 
heritage policies potentially envisaged by liberal nationalists and constitutional 
patriots, is the fact the it cannot aim to inculcate any political loyalty to liberalism 
itself or, indeed, to the liberal state. Furthermore, a liberal cultural heritage is also 
rendered distinct by the fact that it is necessarily minimal because, as I have pointed 
out above, a liberal response to cultural heritage must remain fundamentally 
characterised by non-intervention such that individuals are free to engage with their 
own cultural heritages. Although cultural heritage, in the form of a national 
language, flag and so on, exists in the public realm, liberal governments must 
vigilantly limit public expressions of cultural heritage to politically necessary 
attributes and make efforts to ensure that these attributes, in turn, represent liberal 
values.  
 
 
The Structure of this Thesis 
The first two chapters of this thesis set out the parameters of my research by 
providing a framework of important definitions and concepts. In the first chapter, I 
demonstrate the significance of cultural heritage by showing how it is crucial to 
individual and group identity. I begin by defining an ‘historical’ identity, that is, an 
awareness of the past that plays a significant role in the construction and 
maintenance of personal identity, and demonstrate how this identity often ties us to 
particular groups. Crucially, an historical identity is not only manifested in memory 
but can be conveyed through certain objects and practices, which we regard as 
cultural heritage. In the second half of the chapter, I therefore set out to define 
cultural heritage and argue that it is rendered distinct from other artistic and 
intellectual concerns by the fact that it is defined through recognition. Cultural 
                                                       
5 See Raz, J. (1994): Ethics in the Public Domain, (New York: Clarendon Paperbacks), p.187; 
Calhoun (2003): ‘Belonging in the cosmopolitan imaginary’, Ethnicities (3:531), p.541. 
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heritage is also inherently malleable and conceptions of it are thus prone to change 
because heritage fundamentally reflects changing ideas about identity. The nature of 
cultural heritage and historical identity lead me to assert that individual autonomy 
and control over cultural heritage is key.  
 
In the second chapter I problematise cultural heritage as a political issue and set out 
the scope of enquiry of this thesis. Existing threats to heritage are well documented. 
Within the heritage literature and in treaty legislation, the promotion of cultural 
diversity is treated as the solution to this problem and, indeed, a variety of other 
social and political issues. By referring to existing works on cultural diversity within 
political theory, I demonstrate why a more nuanced approach to heritage and 
diversity is necessary. The issue of cultural heritage is not only about whether to opt 
for preservation, non-intervention or destruction, but also about whose heritage.  
 
In the third and fourth chapters I set out the main principles of a liberal response to 
cultural heritage. Chapter 3 focuses on ideal liberal principles that govern a response 
to cultural heritage. Given that cultural heritage arguably reflects and represents 
particular conceptions of the good life, a liberal response to cultural heritage must 
fundamentally be characterised by non-intervention. The chapter thus examines the 
role of non-intervention and its limitations, arguing that any intervention on cultural 
heritage can only be justified to uphold liberal values of autonomy and toleration.  
 
Chapter 4 situates the liberal principles outlined in the previous chapter within the 
context of contemporary nation-states. For the foreseeable future the international 
system of states remains characterised by sovereign nation-states; states that are 
fundamentally conceived around the existence of a (dominant) national community. 
Accepting that national identity continues to play a major role in structuring our 
perception of the social and political world entails that it is necessary to accept a 
certain amount of public heritage. Public holidays, national flags, symbols, anthems, 
museums all reflect the state’s position on cultural heritage and are all necessary 
features of contemporary nation-states, frequently reflecting the experiences of the 
dominant nationality. Although this cultural particularity undermines the liberal 
state’s claims to neutrality, it is important for a liberal theory to engage with 
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particularity rather than simply denying or ignoring it. Indeed, at the end of the 
chapter, I attempt to demonstrate how this public heritage can be used to promote 
liberal values. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 evaluate the principles established in the previous chapters by 
considering alternate approaches. Chapter 5 considers the ramifications of two 
broadly liberal positions, liberal nationalism and constitutional patriotism. I 
demonstrate how cultural heritage within a liberal nationalist state would result in the 
preservation of a dominant national heritage at the expense of minority heritages, 
while heritage under constitutional patriotism results in the neutralisation of diversity 
in favour of projecting a unified, universalised heritage. I shall show how both of 
these positions, in seeking to inculcate loyalty to political or national ideals, face 
fundamental problems of legitimacy and are simply too demanding of individual 
liberty . A liberal public heritage is distinguished from these approaches through a 
refusal to engage in processes that are designed to foster loyalty to institutions, and 
by emphasising the value of scepticism and a more complex understanding of public 
values and histories. 
 
Chapter 6 considers how to respond to the cultural bias in public heritage by 
examining the ramifications of promoting a diversity of cultural heritages in public 
spaces. I consider arguments that support promoting diversity for the purposes of 
cultural survival, the politics of recognition and cultural defences, also known as 
cultural exemptions from law. Ultimately, I defend the position outlined at the 
beginning of the thesis on the basis that it allows individuals the greatest freedom to 
engage meaningfully with their own heritages. An awareness of power relations 
between diverse groups within the liberal state, however, entails that a liberal 
government is obliged to intervene in instances where cultural biases are found to 
constitute an injustice (e.g. if information about public services is only provided in 
the official language, this arguably constitutes discrimination against those who 
cannot speak the language). 
 
Chapter 7 explores the ramifications of cultural heritage on historical justice. Indeed, 
monuments, memorial days, symbols, practices and rituals are often constructed in 
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the wake of historical atrocities. I explore what all of these objects mean for 
historical justice and in particular, for obligations of recognition and remembrance 
within the liberal state. Acts of ‘recognition’, however, often result in the creation of 
monuments, public holidays and new forms of public rituals – indicating a shift from 
recognition to remembrance. Yet, there is something radically disrespectful of 
individual freedom in demanding that citizens express joy, or feel sorrow by 
performing certain rituals on specific days of the year. Given that a liberal response 
requires that interventions in cultural heritage must be kept to a minimum, this 
necessarily limits its ability to engage with issues of historical justice. It is important, 
therefore, to distinguish between recognition, which is consistent with the liberal 
position outlined here, and remembrance – which exceeds what the liberal state may 
reasonably require. Governments may acknowledge specific historical events and 
occasionally pay tribute to these, but individuals must have the space to decide 
whether or not to engage with these activities. 
 
The final chapter of the thesis applies the principles outlined in the thesis to specific 
thematic cases, namely: the cultural landscape; official knowledge; languages and 
rituals, in order to illustrate, clarify and reinforce the arguments and principles 
established in the previous chapters. 
1. The Contemporary Significance of the Past 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
The Contemporary Significance of 
the Past 
 
 
 
In this chapter I shall begin by setting out a number of important issues, concepts and 
definitions. In the first part of the chapter, I outline the value of a connection to the 
past, what I term an ‘historical identity,’ on the basis that all individuals require some 
connection to a past, to provide their own lives with meaning and context. Crucially, 
however, this connection often ties us to a particular group, which can be defined in 
part by an understanding of ‘shared meaningfulness.’ This shared meaningfulness is 
often referred to as collective memory. There is inherent value in collective memory 
and an historical identity. Yet, because of this, the parallel value of forgetting is 
overlooked. Indeed, the complex relationship between the two values highlights the 
importance of allowing individuals to freely construct their own historical identities, 
possessing complete control over what they choose to remember and what they 
forget as a matter of freedom of conscience. 
 
An historical identity, however, does not merely manifest itself in individual 
memory. Artefacts and practices can help sustain a link to the past and it is these 
objects which we may regard as cultural heritage. In the second half of the chapter, 
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therefore, I turn to define cultural heritage in depth. Rather than merely consisting of 
buildings, monuments and artefacts, heritage also encompasses intangible objects 
such as practices, traditions, rituals and knowledge. In defining cultural heritage, I 
draw upon UNESCO’s 2003 Convention Concerning the Safeguarding of Intangible 
Heritage and highlight four significant aspects of cultural heritage: 1) the extent to 
which heritage is defined and identified by its recognition by particular cultural 
groups; 2) how the content of a group’s cultural heritage is impermanent and 
malleable; 3) how cultural heritage is inherently tied to the identity of a group; 4) 
how authority over cultural heritage is to be established. It is these four features of 
cultural heritage that render it distinct from other objects and pursuits such as 
antiques and antiquarianism, as well as the academic study of history. It is also these 
four features, however, that render cultural heritage a potentially problematic 
political issue.  
 
 
The Personal Significance of the Past: On Historical Identity 
To possess some basic understanding of what has come before us is to conceive of 
the significance of the past as a type of knowledge. There are many reasons why we 
might actively seek to gain knowledge of the past - for example, there are didactic 
reasons, to gain historical awareness, to understand our own culture, to situate the 
present, to find out ‘what really happened’, and to help inform present decisions; but 
there are also more metaphysical reasons for looking backwards – to enhance our 
own self-understanding, to clarify our own existence, to explain our identity or 
humanity, and to pay a debt to our ancestors.6 These motives are manifold and not 
necessarily transparent. I wish to maintain that the significance of the past, conceived 
as a type of knowledge, is an important facet of a personal identity.  
 
Indeed, we are defined and shaped not only by knowledge of our own experiences, 
but also by the experiences of those who have preceded us: from discovering a 
family genealogy, to understanding the story of ‘our people’ – be it national, ethnic, 
religious, or otherwise – all individuals require some connection to the past. This 
                                                       
6 De Baets, A. (2009): Responsible History, (New York: Berghahn Books), p. 26-27, Table 1.3 
‘motives for historical writing.’ 
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conception of the past or of ‘history’, however, is not necessarily a factually accurate 
account of what has occurred before us. A personal history should be regarded as 
distinct from the endeavours of professional historians, and while this ‘knowledge’ 
of the past may contain elements of historical truths, the point that I wish to 
emphasise here is the significance of a connection to a past. I believe that this 
connection is important to all individuals - even a complete rejection of the history 
must entail some basic conception of it. Indeed, as James Booth has asserted, to have 
an identity is also to have a history.7 Knowledge of the past therefore matters, most 
basically, because it allows us to conceive of the context of our own lives. 
 
However, while it is clear that our identities are historically contingent, it should also 
be obvious that different individuals attach different values to their historical 
connections, and the extent to which we engage with our connections to the past 
should be conceived as a matter of choice as well as chance: some individuals may 
find their histories to be an inherited unalterable legacy, whilst others may ‘choose’ 
to emphasize certain aspects of their pasts whilst downplaying others. Furthermore, 
some people may make a conscious decision to reject their roots whereas others may 
simply be indifferent to them. It is also important to note that, over the course of our 
lives, we may identify with many different historical legacies and indeed engage with 
several historical connections at the same time. Inherently subjective and incredibly 
dynamic, an individual’s connection to the past has a highly elusive character. Yet, 
the fickle nature of personal historical connections should not in any way undermine 
the fact that, accepted or rejected, an individual’s conception of the past can play an 
intrinsic role in the ‘construction’ and maintenance of personal identity. It follows, 
therefore, that if we wish to respect and uphold freedom of conscience, individuals 
should be free to ‘determine’ their historical identity in a manner of their choosing, 
as part of defining their own identities. Of course, this by no means indicates that the 
state is bound to recognise or respond to this identity. One can think here of the 
substantial number of people who characterise themselves as ‘Jedi knights’ on census 
                                                       
7 Booth, J. (2006): Communities of memory: witness, identity and justice, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press), p.180. 
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forms8; while the state does not have any inherent obligation to recognise this 
identity, it nevertheless must respect and cannot deny this conception as part of a 
respect for personal identity and freedom of conscience. 
 
 
Collective Meaning, Collective Memory 
All individuals require some sense of the past to provide their present lives with 
meaning, context and identity. As Cicero remarked, to remain ignorant of history is 
to remain forever a child.9 The tangible and public implications of personal accounts 
of the past, however, are only emphasized by the fact that a personal historical 
identity is deeply conditioned by group membership. By situating or defining 
ourselves with reference to a particular aspect or interpretation of the past which 
exists beyond our own very personal experiences, we axiomatically tie ourselves to a 
particular group.10 Some individuals, for example, identify themselves as the 
descendants of significant historical injustices such as slavery, or indeed, the 
Holocaust. They maintain a connection with a previous generation but, in doing so, 
are also establishing a connection with other individuals of the present generation 
who share this particular connection with the past. Therefore, it is when our 
connections to the past gain substantive content, when we identify with a particular 
past, that we become part of a group which can be defined, in part, by a recognition 
of this specific past. Much of what we consider to be significant aspects of the past is 
indicative of our membership within a particular group. Indeed, a collective, in this 
sense, both sustains and is sustained by individual memory.11  
                                                       
8 After a long campaign, the 2001 UK Census included an option to select ‘Jedi Knight’ under 
religion. Officials were keen to point out, however, that even though the status of Jedi Knight had 
been given its own code, this did not confer on it the status of official recognition. Source: BBC 
News, Oct 9th, 2001 - http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1589133.stm The 2011 Census, however, did not 
include this option. Interestingly, in 2010 after a removing a man for refusing to take off his hoodie 
(he claimed that he was a Jedi Knight), a Job Centre later apologised for failing to respect his religious 
belief, perhaps indicating a shift towards the recognition of Jedi rights? Tesco, however, continues to 
maintain its ban - on hoodies, stating that “Obi-Wan Kenobi, Yoda and Luke Skywalker all went 
hoodless without going to the Dark Side.” Source: ‘Jedis Stand Up for Religious Rights’ in The 
Guardian, , March 18th, 2010 - http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/mar/18/jedis-
religious-rights-star-wars.  
9 Cicero, cited by Kelley, D in (1991): Versions of history from antiquity to Enlightenment, (Yale: 
Yale University Press), p.76. 
10 Halbwachs, M. (1980): The Collective Memory, (New York: Harper and Row), p.53. 
11 Halbwachs, M. op cit., p.182. 
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This notion of the shared meaningfulness of historical events is frequently discussed 
using the term ‘collective memory.’ First used by Emile Durkheim, collective 
memory must be understood and analysed along different parameters to individual 
memory.12 The term, though widely used, is unfortunately somewhat misleading. By 
no means will all members of a group interpret the past in exactly the same manner, 
for it is not really possible to speak of group memory outside of the very general 
statement that each member of the group remembers a specific event as having 
occurred, accepts this event as relevant, and shares some conception of its general 
interpretation. Collective memory is a concept for shared meaningfulness13, that each 
member of the group recognises the significance of a particular historical experience 
or event and not necessarily the specific content or meaning of that event.  
 
Indeed, much of what we consider to be significant aspects of the past is indicative of 
our membership within a particular group, and this is why certain artefacts and 
traditions will frequently be recognised by many individuals as constitutive of the 
cultural heritage of a particular group. As Maurice Halbwachs has argued, a 
collective, in this sense, both sustains and is sustained by individual recollections of 
the past.14 Although individual memory predominantly exists within the framework 
of collective meaningfulness, it is important to recognise that these groups are neither 
static nor mutually exclusive. Throughout the course of their lives individuals may 
have changing conceptions of what constitutes a meaningful past; as such, we have 
multiple roots which have the potential to grow as well as change direction. Group 
memory therefore coheres in a very approximate sense.  
 
 
The Virtue of Remembrance and the Freedom to Forget 
The virtue of remembrance lies primarily in the fact that by situating ourselves as 
pinpoints within a historical framework, by becoming aware of generations that exist 
                                                       
12Forty, A. and Kuechler, S. eds. (1999): The Art of Forgetting, (London: Berg Pulishers), p.1-2. Forty 
also describes the attempt to analyse collective memory using the same terms as individual memory as 
an ‘unfortunate’ consequence of Durkheim’s legacy.  
13 Young, JE. (1993): The Texture of Memory, (Yale: Yale University Press), p. xii. 
14 Halbwachs, M. op cit., p.182. 
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before, during and after ourselves; respect for the past teaches us humility, and 
undeniably, respect for the present. Indeed, this ethical virtue is well documented. 
Cicero wrote that, ‘there never has lived a man possessed of so great a genius that 
nothing could escape him, nor could the combined powers of all the men living at 
one time possibly make all necessary provisions for the future without the aid of 
actual experience and the test of time.’15 F.A. Hayek, drew on a similar thought when 
extolling the value of a spontaneous evolutionary order.16 Michael Oakeshott, too, 
chastised the rationalist who considered no other experiences other than his own17, 
and Simone Weil argued that in order to give to the future we need to be able to take 
from the past.18 While the veneration of tradition and of experience has often been 
associated with Conservative thought, even John Stuart Mill, who repudiated the 
authority of custom, noted that, ‘it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to 
live as if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they came into it; as 
if experience had as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode of existence, 
or of conduct, is preferable to another.’19  
 
Indeed, groups – national, religious, ethnic and otherwise - with their own particular 
collective memories partly base their existence on the virtue of remembrance with 
stories of shared experience. I have asserted the importance of allowing individuals 
to define their historical identities, and hence join and remain part of particular 
collectives, above. Yet there is also potentially something radically unfree about 
collective memory (and attempts to instil and maintain collective memory). Being 
told that one ought to remember, mourn and perform specific rituals on certain days 
can undermine freedom of conscience. I shall engage with these points in greater 
depth in later chapters, but it is worth highlighting that while there may be a personal 
or ethical virtue in remembrance, potential conflicts arise when situating this within a 
                                                       
15 Cicero De re Publica II 1.2. 
16 Hayek, FA. (2011): The Constitution of Liberty, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), p.113. 
17 Oakeshott, M. (1991): ‘Rationalism in Politics’, in Rationalism in Politics and other essays, 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Press), p.6. 
18 Weil (1987): op. cit, p.48-49. 
19 Mill, J.S (1993): ‘On Liberty’, in Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative 
Government, (London: Everyman’s Library), p.125. 
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broader moral and social context. Any discussion on the value of remembrance must, 
therefore, be accompanied by a parallel discussion on the value of forgetting.20  
 
For Friedrich Nietzsche, an awareness of the past and of previous existence is to our 
detriment and what ultimately what distinguishes us humans from animals. Nietzsche 
wrote:  
 
‘A human might well ask an animal: ‘Why do you not speak to me of your 
happiness but only stand and gaze at me?’ The animal would like to answer, 
and say: ‘The reason is I always forget what I was going to say’ – but then he 
forgot this answer too, and stayed silent: so the human being was left 
wondering.’21  
 
Doomed as we are to always be aware of the past, Nietzsche argued that it is 
impossible to lead a meaningful life without forgetting.22 This is because the 
converse, to immerse oneself entirely in the past and in remembrance, is in effect to 
allow the dead to bury the living.23 The condition of memory in combination with the 
necessity of forgetting, led Nietzsche to argue that the past had to be used for the 
purposes of life24, and in doing so he attempted to outline a theory on the appropriate 
use of the past. Nietzsche recognised the need for the past as belonging only to a 
‘specific soil and climate’; when the past was used irresponsibly it could grow into a 
‘devastating weed.’25 He was, for example, critical of those who associated 
themselves with the Romans, burying themselves also in the works of Greek poets26, 
and mockingly Nietzsche asks them: ‘Is the past not big enough for you to be able to 
find nothing except things in comparison with which you cut so ludicrous a figure?’27 
 
                                                       
20 This is a key argument of Forty et al in Forty and Kuechler eds. (1999), op cit. 
21 Nietzsche, F. (1997): ‘The Uses and Abuses of History’ in Untimely Meditations, (Cambridge 
University Press), p.60-61. 
22 Ibid., p.62 and 63. 
23 Ibid., p.72. 
24 Ibid., p.77.  
25 Ibid., p.72. 
26 Ibid., p.86, extremely critical actually – he described such individuals as eunuchs. 
27 Nietzsche, op cit., p.86; see also comments on historical justice, p95: ‘historical justice, even when 
it is genuine and practical with the purest of intentions, is therefore a dreadful virtue because it always 
undermines the living thing and brings it down: its judgement is always annihilating.’ 
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The historical and the unhistorical are thus, for Nietzsche, necessary in equal 
measure for individual and civic health.28 While the virtue of remembrance does 
encompass a respect for times that have passed, forgetting, as parallel to 
remembrance, is also a necessary virtue. In this context forgetting should be 
conceived as an organic phenomenon; the natural consequence of change and 
growth, when a memory ceases to matter. It is indicative both of a shift in the content 
of meaningful memory and of ‘moving on.’ In fact, remembrance and preservation 
mean little without forgetting and innovation; as James Bau Graves writes, ‘neither 
can stand alone since they both provide justification for their counterpart’s 
existence.’29 While it can be important to remember the past, to cherish the great 
victories and mourn tragic injustices, to carry on traditions and to preserve artefacts, 
part of living in the present naturally entails a continual movement away from the 
past.  
 
Indeed, the identification of specific, meaningful historical experiences entails the 
neglect or ‘rejection’ of other aspects of history. As I have mentioned previously, 
what we choose to preserve, or the practices that we continue to embody are 
axiomatically the objects that we deem of value. Unlike Borges’ Funes the 
Memorious30, due to finite psychological as well as practical resources, we cannot 
remember everything. But nor would we wish to do so, for equal knowledge of all 
aspects of the long march of history with all its intricate twists and turns is to 
anaesthetise the past and render all experience the same. The past gains its 
significance by virtue of its subjectivity; and collective memory gains significance 
because it can provide individuals and groups with a sense of a specific and 
meaningful past. There is virtue in forgetting if for no other reason than the fact that 
it makes us more acutely aware of the things that we wish to remember.31  
 
                                                       
28 Ibid, p.63. 
29 Graves, J. (2005): Cultural Democracy, (Illinois: University of Illinois Press), p.41. 
30 Borges (1942): ‘Funes the Memorious’ – The story of a boy who, after falling from a horse, 
developed an eidetic memory – the ability to remember everything with exceptional detail. Borges 
presents this as a curse more than a blessing. 
31 Note the intentional similarity here to Oakeshott’s conception of conservatism: ‘a disposition 
appropriate to a man who is acutely aware of having something to lose which he has learnt to care 
for.’, op. cit. p.408 ‘On being Conservative’ in Oakeshott (1991): op cit. 
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In outlining a theory of the value of historical identity and collective remembrance, 
therefore, it is crucial that accommodations are made for the parallel value and 
necessity of forgetting. A discussion on the value of amnesia, however, also requires 
that we recognise the extent to which individual psychological states of forgetting 
and remembering may be beyond the scope of political theory. By this I mean that it 
is important not to presume that certain actions, such as preservation and tradition, 
correlate exclusively with specific psychological states. For instance, while the 
physical construction of the past in terms of statues and monuments centrally grows 
out of a respect for that past and previous members of our community, in attempting 
to transfer memories to material objects, we may actually be trying to forget 
them.32The inclination to externalise the past, in much the same way that a painter 
externalises his creative energy by producing artwork, can thus also imply a 
simultaneous need to rationalise or designate the past. The past has been engaged 
with but it has also been externalised in a suitable and appropriate form which may 
be interpreted as a desire to acknowledge the past, but also to move on.33 To embody 
a memory in an artefact may well set it along an inevitable, albeit slow, road to 
amnesia. Therefore, while social psychologists may undoubtedly have much to say 
about how attitudes determine behaviour, to assert the correlation between memory 
and preservation is a contestable empirical claim that I do not wish to rely upon here. 
The significance of all of this moral and psychological ambiguity – of the value and 
manner in which remembrance and forgetting manifest themselves - is to indicate the 
value (indeed, necessity) of a personal freedom to engage with our historical 
identities, memories and forgetting in a manner of our own choosing. 
 
 
From Identity to Tangible Objects and Practices 
Our identities are constituted by many different attributes and preferences, and 
certainly not all of these facets necessarily warrant further discussion. An historical 
identity however does, and this is a consequence of the manner in which it is 
constructed: while an historical identity is in part constituted by meaningful historical 
                                                       
32 Young, op cit., p.5.  
33 Rowlands, ‘Remembering to Forget: Sublimation as Sacrifice in War Memorials’ in Forty eds 
(2001): op. cit, p.131. 
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narratives, by no means are accounts of the past merely sustained in individual 
memory. ‘The past’ is not merely a figment of our imagination, nor something that 
we may only read about in history books; rather, as manifested in tangible and 
intangible objects – such as paintings, monuments, practices, languages and rituals - 
the past can be reflected in infinite locales. It is worth noting that this is a 
fundamental premise of this research: that it is absolutely crucial to acknowledge that 
certain objects and practices are capable of representing historical experiences and 
thereby assist in the configuration of our conceptions of the past. For example, Paul 
Connerton has argued that accounts of the past are conveyed and sustained by (more 
or less ritual) performances.34 From dressing in a certain manner and holding the 
specific piece of cutlery in the ‘correct’ hand35, to participating in certain rituals on 
certain days, through bodily practices and rituals we can physically embody tradition, 
memory and the past. Thus our understandings of the past and of history are also 
manifested in the traditions and routines that we follow. Such actions are not 
practiced (solely) on the basis of their continued utility, but rather on a customary 
basis with the (quite possibly irrational) belief that this is how things should and 
indeed, ‘always’ have been done. By acting as such, we can conceive of our 
traditions as a connection to, and continuation of, a meaningful past.     
 
Tangible artefacts and objects like paintings such as Picasso’s rendition of the 
bombing of Guernica, or Delacroix’s iconic image La Liberté guidant le peuple 
(‘Liberty leading the people’) of the French Revolution, also provide sources for 
comprehending the past by expressing the mood and experience of a particular 
moment in history. Indeed, history museums are built upon the premise that objects 
and images are able to convey an understanding of the past. In addition to this, the 
rise and fall of different regimes and eras of history have inevitably left their marks 
on the urban landscape. Remnants of colonialism, for example, are still apparent in 
the facades of cities such as Singapore, Hong Kong and Macau. So too the legacy of 
architectural movements such as Le Corbusier’s, whose manifesto to reject the past 
                                                       
34 Connerton, P. (1990):  How Societies Remember, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.40.  
35Ibid., see Connerton’s remarks on table manners, p.82-83. 
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and use architecture and urban planning for social engineering36 continues to linger 
in buildings throughout the ‘modern’ world. Over two decades since the fall of the 
Berlin wall, the built environment of East Berlin remains distinct from West Berlin, 
highlighting the very different historical experiences of these two sides of the same 
city. Indeed, the very act of building monuments and memorials represents a 
conscious attempt to construct and represent the significance of a historical event. All 
of these tangible objects are physical landmarks of historical memory. They are 
capable of expressing history in manner that is not necessarily amenable to 
articulation, and yet, when we open our eyes to the realm of historical significance, 
we find that traces of a meaningful past can be found everywhere. 
 
 
Cultural Heritage Defined 
To conceive of the past in terms of its presence in individual and collective memory, 
I have noted above, is to analyse the significance of the past as a type of knowledge. 
The past is something which may be remembered, interpreted and learnt about. This 
knowledge of the past, far from being limited to memories and narratives, as we have 
seen, can be represented in an infinite number of objects as defined by the term 
cultural heritage.  
 
'Heritage,' Graeme Davison once mused, 'is the cuckoo in the historian's nest.'37 It is 
a concept which does not lend itself easily to definition; or more precisely, to an 
essential definition that goes beyond describing the physical attributes of artefacts. 
While some authors, including the drafters of the 1972 UNESCO Treaty on Cultural 
Heritage, have listed adjectives such as historic, artistic and scientific to describe 
heritage, others have avoided the ‘problem’ of definition by circumventing the issue 
altogether. However, is cultural heritage sufficiently described by its physical 
attributes, or is its definition so clear or obvious that it may be omitted altogether?  
 
                                                       
36 Beckett, J (2008): City of Heavenly Tranquility: Beijing in the history of China. (London: Allen 
Lane), p.276. 
37 Graeme Davison as cited in Lowenthal (1998): The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History, 
(Cambridge University Press, p.xv. 
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The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, ‘considering that parts of the cultural or natural heritage are of outstanding 
interest and therefore need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind 
as a whole,’38 defines heritage as, 
 
monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and 
painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave 
dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal 
value from the point of view of history, art or science;  
 
groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, 
because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the 
landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of 
history, art or science;  
 
sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas 
including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from 
the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.39 
 
The problem with this type of definition – and UNESCO is not solely culpable in this 
regard40 - is that, rather than attempting to engage with the particular features of 
cultural heritage, attention is focused instead on why heritage is interesting or 
important. Heritage here is thus defined by its general significance. Yet by listing 
attributes such as historical, artistic, scientific, ethnological and anthropological, the 
1972 Treaty provides little more than an indication or physical description of 
heritage. It fails to identify the essential, distinctive features of cultural heritage, and, 
at worst, effectively promotes heritage as an interesting, albeit antiquarian, form of 
embellishment.  
 
This difficulty in identifying the particular characteristics of cultural heritage can be 
attributed to the fact that cultural heritage cannot be defined with reference to a 
                                                       
38 UNESCO (1972): Convention concerning the protection of world cultural and natural heritage, 
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf, Preamble, (accessed November 4th 2008). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Some examples, Govt. of Malta http://www.culturalheritage.gov.mt/page.asp?p=3068&l=1; China 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/TR-c/74810.htm; English Heritage (Conservation Principles) 
http://www.english-
heritage.org.uk/upload/pdf/Conservation_Principles_Policies_and_Guidance_April08_Web.pdf . 
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physical form. The 1972 Convention lists monuments, groups of buildings and sites 
as different types of cultural heritage but this is certainly not an exhaustive list of 
how cultural heritage is manifested. In defining cultural heritage it is in fact 
absolutely crucial not to place too much emphasis on material, or tangible, forms. It 
is only quite recently that UNESCO formally recognised the importance of intangible 
forms as part of cultural heritage.  In fact, the October 2003 UNESCO Convention 
for the Safeguarding of Intangible Heritage moves closer towards formally 
identifying what is specific about heritage by defining intangible heritage as, 
 
‘The practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as 
the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – 
that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of 
their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from 
generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups 
in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their 
history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus 
promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity. ‘41  
 
The convention also states that such intangible heritage can be manifested in a 
number of domains which includes (a) oral traditions and expressions, including 
language as a vehicle of the intangible cultural heritage; (b) performing arts; (c) 
social practices, rituals and festive events; (d) knowledge and practices concerning 
nature and the universe; (e) traditional craftsmanship.42  
 
Heritage, therefore, does not merely consist of statues and monuments, but intangible 
objects as well. It is very important to acknowledge this point, firstly, because it 
radically alters the scope of my inquiry. Secondly, given the customary rhetorically 
conservative nature of international treaties, the rationale provided for the inclusion 
of intangible objects, as valid manifestations of cultural heritage, is of particular 
interest. What is crucial about the 2003 Convention is that while it follows the same 
framework of defining heritage in terms of its significance, in contrast to the 1972 
Treaty, which defined heritage in terms of its ‘outstanding interest’ resulting from 
artistic, scientific, historical etc significance, the Convention on Intangible Heritage 
                                                       
41 Emphasis added. UNESCO (2003): Convention for the safeguarding of intangible heritage, 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?pg=00006, Article 2, (accessed November 4th 2008). 
42 Ibid. 
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asserts a very particular political significance of cultural heritage as its defining 
feature; namely, the ability to convey a sense of identity to groups. In fact, Article 2 
of the 2003 Treaty contains some surprising assertions that, when taken to heart, 
raise quite serious issues pertaining to policy on cultural heritage. This, obviously, is 
not a reason to ignore the 2003 Convention. On the contrary, I find it to be more 
illuminating than its ‘predecessor.’ Indeed, I shall be using this definition, i.e. Article 
2 of the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Heritage, as the framework 
for my definition of cultural heritage. This does not mean that I will only focus on 
intangible forms of heritage in my research. Rather, by examining and elucidating 
some of the assertions within Article 2, I shall attempt to demonstrate that there is no 
reason why the premises offered by the article should be limited only to intangible 
forms. Furthermore, by exploring the assertions offered by Article 2, I hope also to 
reveal the essential and particular features of cultural heritage. 
 
 
Cultural Heritage, Aesthetics and Acceptability:  
‘…[T]hat communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize…’ 
The 2003 Convention explicitly recognises here, irrespective of the existence of 
‘world’ or ‘universal’ heritage, that cultural heritage pertains primarily to the 
particular – to particular individuals, groups and communities that can, in part, be 
distinguished by the differing conceptions and content of their cultural heritage. It is 
a shift, therefore, from the implicit universalism of the 1972 Treaty, to an explicit 
recognition of the diversity of cultural heritages that constitute what we may regard 
as ‘world heritage.’  
 
More important, however, is the notion of ‘recognition.’ It is possible deduce from 
the above statement that various objects and practices can become cultural heritage 
by virtue of their recognition as such. Unlike within the 1972 Treaty, cultural 
heritage is not defined in terms of its ‘outstanding interest’ or outward appearance, 
but rather by the fact of its acceptance and acknowledgement by a particular group or 
community. Thus, in accordance with the 2003 Convention, cultural heritage cannot 
be defined with reference to an objective aesthetic value but rather, can encompass a 
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whole multiplicity of objects such as paintings, artefacts, monuments, architecture 
and costumes – but also language, narratives, practices and rituals – all of which are 
united by the fact of their recognition by a particular cultural group. A consequence 
of relying upon the 2003 Convention’s notion of recognition is that we move away 
from any criteria for form – in theory, therefore, any tangible or intangible object, so 
long as it is recognised as such, can be regarded as cultural heritage.  
 
Appealing to the ‘recognition’ of cultural heritage allows us to distinguish it from art 
and antiques. Whereas the recognition of fine or excellent art generally implies a 
degree of formal knowledge about aesthetic theory and art history, and of antiques an 
appreciation and understanding of the aesthetic qualities of particular ages; the 
recognition of cultural heritage, in contrast, does not rely upon a corresponding form 
of (supposedly) objective knowledge. Rather, presumably and somewhat 
controversially, and in accordance with the 2003 Convention it is only the members 
of a particular cultural group who are ‘qualified’ to identify objects as their cultural 
heritage. This is not to suggest that cultural heritage, art and antiques represent three 
mutually exclusive fields of objects, nor to say that the appearance or aesthetics of 
cultural heritage are irrelevant; the appearance and form of objects will definitely 
play a substantive role in the process of recognition, and it is certainly possible to 
appreciate objects of cultural heritage as works of art in their own right. However, to 
speak of an object as cultural heritage is, from the outset, to commit oneself to 
analysing it along the specific parameters of its recognition by a particular cultural 
group. Whether this analytical distinction in turn requires a commitment to a 
differentiated practical treatment of cultural heritage is in part, what this chapter, and 
indeed the rest of the thesis, seeks to establish.  
 
The actual process of recognition and the acceptance of an object as constitutive of 
cultural heritage is a matter which requires further attention. On one hand, as the 
Convention implies and as I wish to maintain, certain objects may be regarded as 
cultural heritage when they are recognised as such. This notion of recognition 
immediately imbues such objects with a particular significance, fundamentally 
implying that the objects which are regarded as cultural heritage should (minimally) 
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be treated as analytically distinct from other objects (such as those regarded as art 
and antiques). On the other hand, the actual recognition of cultural heritage seldom 
occurs explicitly or, for that matter, with much consistency.  
 
David Lowenthal attempts to illustrate this point with his example of a statue by 
Frederic MacMonnie entitled ‘Civic Virtue.’ The statue, depicting an unclothed man, 
yielding a sword in his right hand, whilst standing on two women (one defeated, the 
other cowering), is meant to allegorise virtue overcoming vice. Lowenthal writes that 
the statue was, ‘taken away when viewers ignorant of its mythology took umbrage at 
a man trampling a woman.’43 The statue in this regard caused offence not because of 
its allegorical symbolism, but rather because of its physical expression. According to 
Lowenthal, present day values have superseded whatever values the statue originally 
meant to portray. Therefore ‘Civic Virtue’ is no longer an example of public 
heritage, the issue of its preservation as become one of public art.  
 
It is worth noting, however, that Lowenthal has simplified the story of ‘Civic Virtue’ 
to a certain extent, because when the statue was initially unveiled in 1922, its 
depiction of misogynistic violence was received with a mixture of shock and 
dismay.44 The history of Civic Virtue’s public presence has been one of continual 
efforts for its removal. Even though the statue was intended to symbolise the history 
and continuity of certain American values, it was, right from the start, never 
conclusively accepted as such.  While citizens did acknowledge the intent of the 
statue, and most certainly believed in the fundamental values of ‘virtue’ that the 
statue attempted to portray, they were unable to accept or derive that meaning from 
the statue. That is to say, the physical or aesthetic qualities of the statue undermined 
the value of the allegory.  
                                                       
43 Lowenthal, Preface to Forty eds. (1999): The Art of Forgetting, op cit.), p. xii. 
44 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/25/councilwoman-julissa-ferr_n_828362.html .  
Purnick (1996): ‘Women Seen, or Just Used Through Art’ in The New York Times, October 14th, 
1996 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9804E1D71F3EF937A25753C1A960958260, 
see also 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/nyregion/thecity/11virtue.html?_r=1&scp=4&sq=%27civic+virt
ue%27&st=nyt and 
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This presents a rather interesting predicament at this point because I have argued that 
the aesthetic value of an object does not determine whether or not it can be 
considered cultural heritage. However, it has become clear through the example of 
Civic Virtue that aesthetics and physical form do matter. My response to this is that 
these values are only important insofar as they are able to communicate meaning and 
value to their audience. Thus I maintain that while the physical form or inherent 
attractiveness of an artefact do not immediately determine whether or not an object is 
heritage, they can play a substantive functional role in allowing groups to derive 
meaning from an object. An appreciation of an artefact of cultural heritage is thus 
based upon a recognition that the form of the artefact is able to convey an accepted 
and relevant past. 
 
Yet, while the creation of monuments and memorials and the preservation of certain 
artefacts certainly indicate cultural heritage, these instances of relatively clear 
recognition are comparatively rare. This is because what may reasonably be 
described as cultural heritage may be so integrated into the landscape of everyday 
life that acquiescence of it is never unequivocally acknowledged. While ingrained 
tradition and institutions may not be appreciated on a daily basis, as Kevin Lynch 
points out, the existence of cultural goods conveys a sense of security and continuity 
such that the threat of their demise will often be met with hostility and dissent.45 
Indeed, it is perhaps only when objects and practices are under threat that groups 
come to recognise these things as forming part of their cultural heritage. How then to 
address this apparent paradox of a cultural heritage defined by recognition, though 
rarely explicitly recognised, save in exceptional instances and times of perceived 
danger?  
 
While this contradiction is potentially problematic, cultural heritage’s largely elusive 
nature reveals a far more significant issue: namely, that objects and practices which 
might reasonably be considered cultural heritage are also rarely recognised as such, 
and thus it is necessarily and de facto largely a private matter – that is, not requiring 
                                                       
45 Lynch, K. (1972): What time is this place, (Cambridge: MIT Press), p.40. 
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the attention of the state as a matter of political concern. I think that this point is 
important because it is certainly possible to conceive of a ‘cultural heritage’ that is 
self-sustaining, uncontroversial and that is not harmed by, or in fact may benefit 
from, the ignorance of the state. While such practices and artefacts may not be 
explicitly recognised as cultural heritage, it is reasonable to assume that they could 
be justified as such (should the need for justification arise). 
 
 
Cultural Heritage, History and Authenticity: 
[Cultural heritage], ‘transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly 
recreated…’ 
The question of what is recognised by using the term cultural heritage can be 
answered most banally with reference to the term itself. Heritage denotes that which 
can be passed down from generation to generation. The recognition of an object as 
cultural heritage can thus be regarded as a type of claim – a claim for the capacity of 
an object to represent the lineage, or experiences, of a particular group. But, as noted 
by the Convention, cultural heritage is also ‘constantly recreated’, meaning that the 
content of a group’s heritage is subject to interpretation and revision. Certain 
practices and artefacts may be ignored or spurned by some generations, only to be 
gratefully resuscitated by those who proceed from them. From this, it also follows 
that cultural heritage does not necessarily have to be of a certain age in order to be 
recognised as such: new monuments can be built to memorialise some aspect of a 
group’s history and it would be foolish, on account of their recent conception, to 
discount their ability to communicate the past. In this regard, it is also entirely 
appropriate to describe some practices and artefacts as ‘invented traditions.’46  
 
The auction houses of Sotheby’s and Christie’s, for instance, have recently found 
themselves targeted by Chinese protesters furious over the sale of Chinese 
artefacts.47 Such sales have provoked indignation on the basis that Chinese cultural 
heritage belongs to the Chinese, and as such are not appropriate items for sale. 
Nevertheless the sales have provided certain individuals with the opportunity to 
                                                       
46 See Hosbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (1992): The Invention of Tradition, (Cambridge). 
47 Beckett, J. (2008): op cit., p.253.  
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demonstrate their loyalty to China’s Central Government. In 2009, the Macanese 
casino and property tycoon, Stanley Ho, successfully bid US$8.84 million for an 
artefact and promptly ‘donated’ it to the Chinese government48, and Cai Mingchao, 
the head of an auction house in Xiamen, won the bid for two Chinese bronzes 
auctioned by Christie's in Paris and later refused to pay – “Every Chinese would have 
stood up in that moment. It was just that I was given the opportunity," he said 
modestly, "but I want to emphasise that this money cannot be paid."49 Both sets of 
artefacts were in fact originally part of the same fountain situated in the imperial 
gardens of the Summer Palace in Beijing; a palace which was pillaged by British and 
French forces during the Opium Wars, and it was around this time that the artefacts 
disappeared.50 These attempts to reacquire Chinese artefacts coincide with an official 
Chinese government policy to recover items that had been ‘stolen by invading 
nations, stolen by foreigners or purchased by foreigners at extremely low prices from 
Chinese warlords and smuggled abroad’ between 1840 and 1949.51 Yet, while 
attempting to rescue artefacts stolen by foreigners, contemporary Chinese patriots 
need not bother themselves with the artefacts affected by the most recent cultural 
holocaust in Chinese history, the Cultural Revolution, and its ‘systematic’ 
desecration and destruction of anything that represented or appeared ‘old.’52 Indeed, 
the Chinese experience with cultural heritage is an example of how the clearest 
expressions of claims to cultural heritage can be found when heritage is perceived as 
being under threat. But, more significantly, it also illustrates of how the content of 
cultural heritage and its recognition is prone to change; how some objects are worth 
fighting for, whereas others are gratefully forgotten. As George Orwell once wrote: 
‘when [the past] has been recreated in whatever shape is needed at the moment, then 
this new version is the past, and no different past can ever have existed.’53 
 
                                                       
48McDonald, M. (2009): ‘Twist in Sale of Relics Has China Winking’, in The New York Times 
(March 2nd 2009): 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/world/asia/03auction.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=stanley%20ho%20
and%20chinese%20art%20auction&st=cse  
49 Hille (2009): ‘Chinese Art Trader Declines to Pay Up’, in The Financial Times, (March 3rd 2009) 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8e0f2e92-0792-11de-9294-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1 . 
50 Macdonald (2009): op. cit. 
51 Beckett (2008): op. cit, p.253 – who cites footnote 11 at p.342. 
52 Although given that the upper echelons of the central government remains composed, in large 
proportion, by former Red Guards, this should perhaps not come as a surprise. 
53 Orwell, G. (1969): 1984, (Penguin Books), p162; p.266.  
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It is in fact absolutely crucial, in defining the scope of cultural heritage, to recognise 
that it is, by nature, dynamic and thus continually prone to change. A shift in values 
and understandings of cultural heritage can occur for any number of reasons such as 
social change or revolution; the discovery of ‘new’ sources of heritage; or simply 
because the significance of certain artefacts and traditions have organically decayed 
into meaninglessness. The past and its significant attributes are malleable and the 
manner in which they are conveyed and recognised is conditioned by the needs, 
beliefs and context of the present day. That is to say, the conception of what 
constitutes cultural heritage is determined by the existence of specific historical 
experiences, artefacts and practices that are interpreted and deemed meaningful by 
the present. As Simone Weil wrote, ‘we possess no other life, no other living sap 
than the treasures stored up from the past, digested, assimilated and created afresh by 
us.’54 To this effect, it is also quite reasonable to assert that cultural heritage is 
actually made meaningful by the fact of its dynamism. Or, as Eric Hobsbawm put it, 
a ‘good’ history (within the context of cultural heritage, in this instance) is defined 
by a history which is good for present.55  
 
Indeed, professional historians have been sceptical of the use of the past for purposes 
other than their own, and it is perhaps useful at this juncture, therefore, to clarify the 
relationship between cultural heritage and the study of History.56 Strictly within the 
confines of this particular work I would like to define History as a particular type of 
academic or intellectual enquiry into the past. Despite fairly recent criticism57, 
contemporary historians (i.e. excluding the moralising ancient historians such as 
Herodotus and Thucydides) are for the most part devoted, in accordance with the 
Rankean proviso, to reveal the past ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’ (as it really 
happened) by happily cloistering themselves in archives and libraries. There is a 
                                                       
54 (emphasis added) Weil, S. (1987): Need for Roots, (Routledge), p.48-49. 
55 Hobsbawm, E. (2008): ‘Identity history is not enough’ in On History, (Abacus), p.356. 
56 For the purposes of clarity and consistency I indicate the professional study of the past with a 
capital H for History. Contingently, history (no capitalisation) should henceforth be taken as 
synonymous with the past. 
57 Namely, that History is little more than literary criticism. For a general overview and response see 
Windschuttle, K. (1997): The Killing of History (Paddington: Free Press). Note also Evans, RJ. 
(1997): In Defence of History (London: Granta), citing R.F.Atkinson (1971, p8), ‘philosophers 
interest themselves in history for their own purposes: the instrumental value, or disvalue, of their 
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general consensus as to what constitutes a standard for ‘good’ or authentic History, 
which requires coherent arguments and observations that can be supported with 
reference to reliable source materials.58 This commitment to historical ‘truths’ also 
entails a parallel duty (conceived by many historians) to dispel historical myths59 in 
order to prevent the sort of nightmare scenario envisaged by Orwell’s 1984 - where 
historical ‘truths’ were continually subjected to the will of the state. Hobsbawm has, 
in fact, gone so far as to liken history used for nationalist, ethnic and fundamentalist 
ideologies, to poppies – as ‘the raw material for heroin addiction.’60 It should not 
come as a surprise then that historians have responded to the increasing popularity of 
cultural heritage with discomfort. Yet, any attempt to pit these two parallel 
appreciations of the past against one another can only be described as inherently 
futile, although this has not in any way deterred efforts to do so. For instance, John 
Tosh has argued that, ‘because heritage deals primarily in the objects surviving from 
the past, it often fails to convey the extent of the gulf which divides us from our 
forebears…history then ceases to be an intellectual resource; its capacity to inform 
and unsettle the present is obscured by a screen of sentiment.’61 J.H.Plumb has noted 
that, ‘where the service of the past has been urgently needed, truth has ever been at a 
discount,’ and advocates that historians should ‘cleanse the story of mankind’ from 
such deceitful visions.62 And Robert Hewison has boldly asserted that, ‘the heritage 
‘industry’ is essentially engaged with producing ‘bogus history’.63 
 
While it is true that the factual accuracy of cultural heritage often leaves something 
to be desired, criticisms which decry the historical fallacies of cultural heritage are 
not terribly constructive. That memory, and especially collective memory does not 
always serve up a factual representation of the past is a self evident fact. Yet, if 
                                                       
58 See Antoon de Baets’ distinction between good/bad and right/wrong history in (2009): Responsible 
History (New York: Berghahn), p.14 – ‘The abuse of history is its use with the intent to deceive. The 
irresponsible use of history is with its deceptive or negligent use…Bad history is the product of error, 
imperfect insight, bias and lack of training – can be heavily distorting and prejudiced, but it is not 
irresponsible or abusive as long as it does not transgress the moral boundary of dishonesty or gross 
negligence.’ 
59 See for example, Hobsbawm (1998): On History, op cit., p.7; Evans, op cit., p.207; Tosh, J. (2008): 
Why history matters (Houndmills), p.44; Plumb, JH. (1969): The Death of the Past, (Macmillan), p.32 
60 Hobsbawm, op. cit, p.6. 
61 Tosh, op. cit, p.12. 
62 Plumb (1969): op cit., p.32. 
63 Cited in Corsane, G. eds. (2005): Heritage, Museums and Galleries, (London: Routledge), p.23. 
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heritage is distinguished by its shared meaningfulness, as I propose, then there is 
nothing inherently wrong with historical fallacies such as myths. As Isaiah Berlin 
was careful to recognise, ‘it is plainly a good thing that we should be reminded 
…that the scope of human choice is a good deal more limited than we used to 
suppose.’64 A symptom of bad history can thus be a laudable attribute of cultural 
heritage. To recognise historic outcomes as beyond the realm of human control is 
also to grasp at the limited capacities of individual will. Long before the advent of 
history, it was myth that made the past meaningful and, by revealing universal and 
timeless truths, it was regarded by the ancient Greeks as a great teacher in all matters 
of spirit.65Aristotle famously praised poetry by virtue of its ability to express moral 
teachings, and as such, being ‘more philosophical than history.’66 Collective memory 
and narrative thus encapsulate a powerful and imaginative means through which our 
moral and ethical beliefs can be expressed and practiced. Indeed, as John Gray has 
noted, ‘the myth-free civilization of secular rationalism is itself the stuff of myth.’67 
 
This is not to say that historians should not pay any attention to Hobsbawm’s calling, 
however. While all cultures to some extent include myths as part of their cultural 
heritage, historians can play a crucial role in dethroning the myths that are actively 
defined as historical ‘truths’, and when conflicts over ‘authentic’ heritage arise. 
However, it is important to recognise that History and the products of historical 
research are also narratives about the past – and a narrative, it must be remembered, 
be it truthful or mythical is also a form of cultural heritage. Indeed, a work of History 
– be it in the form of a written text or an oral recording - that is accepted as 
meaningfully representing the experiences of particular cultural group, must also be 
regarded as a type of cultural heritage. The question of how states should engage 
with the past thus necessarily includes questions about public histories, and in 
particular, the creation of a history curriculum in public education. 
 
                                                       
64 Berlin, I. (1998), ‘Historical Inevitability’ in The Proper Study of Mankind, (Pimlico), p.130 - and 
as such not suited to the task of the historian. 
65 Finely, M.I (1991): The Use and Abuse of History, (Lonodn: Penguin) p.14. 
66 Cited in Herwitz, D (2008): Aesthetics, (London: Continuum), p.14. 
67 Gray, J (2009): Gray’s Anatomy, (London: Allen Lane), p.16. 
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The criteria for authentic cultural heritage employed by this work is therefore based 
solely on the acceptance of an object as capable of representing the historical 
experiences of a particular group. This does not mean that the object must reveal 
accurate historical ‘truths’, nor that it will be accepted as cultural heritage for 
perpetuity. Rather, authenticity is based entirely upon the meaningfulness of an 
object at a particular time. As Pierre Nora has noted, ‘history belongs to everyone 
and no one, whence its claim to universal authority,’ whereas memory, on the other 
hand, ‘is blind to all but the group it binds.’68 Inherently subjective and entirely 
prone to revision, this aspect of cultural heritage’s definition leaves the identification 
of cultural heritage as completely subject to the will of those to whom it is claimed to 
represent. 
 
 
Conclusion: Cultural Heritage, Identity and Authority 
‘…provides them with a sense of identity and continuity promoting respect for 
cultural diversity and human creativity.’ 
I have thus far outlined a conception of cultural heritage which is defined by 
recognition. Indeed, this definition echoes the sentiment outlined at the beginning of 
the chapter which was that individuals should possess the freedom to determine the 
content and significance of their historical identity. Cultural heritage can therefore 
encompass a seemingly infinite variety of objects and practices, all of which are 
united by the fact of their recognition by groups of individuals. In doing so I have 
largely relied upon the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of 
Intangible Heritage as a starting point for my discussion on the nature of cultural 
heritage. Article 2, in particular, has provided an invaluable starting point, not only 
because of the degree of consensus and legitimacy that it possesses as part of an 
international treaty, but also because it helped to introduce several important themes 
pertaining to the nature of cultural heritage: namely, the notion of the acceptability of 
cultural heritage as recognised by a particular cultural group, and the question of 
authenticity and how authentic cultural heritage is continually subject to revision 
(and thus necessarily differs from what may be regarded as ‘good’ History). The 
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capacity of objects and practices of cultural heritage to express an historical identity 
that both sustains and is sustained by group membership, was discussed right at the 
beginning of the chapter. Certain objects and practices are capable of representing 
and reflecting historical experiences and moments; and, in doing so, they assist in the 
construction of an historical identity. Individuals, I have asserted, must be free to 
define an historical identity in a manner of their choosing, because an historical 
identity can play a crucial (or minimal) role in determining the context of our own 
lives. 
 
Article 2, however, ends with the statement that the preservation of cultural heritage 
is capable of ‘promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity’ and, 
although I have concurred with the rest of the Article, this is a view that I take issue 
with. The claim that cultural heritage can promote respect for diversity (because, 
presumably, this is what diversity requires), with no empirical or normative 
justification, is a rather cavalier statement – especially to scholars who have spent 
years analysing and weighing out the pros and cons of multicultural policies. 
Furthermore, it is interesting that the preservation of cultural heritage remains the 
default position within the heritage literature – a position also adopted by UNESCO 
– that is also rarely defended with any substantial degree of rigour; rather, as above, 
it is simply assumed that preservation is necessary and we need only to establish 
what exactly should be preserved. 
 
Yet it this a view which has also become increasingly prevalent, in recent years, 
amongst heritage practitioners and academics, as well as UNESCO.69 Although an 
engagement with the fact of diversity is inherently laudable, I find the underlying 
consensus that diversity is something to be publicly promoted and preserved – with 
little or no engagement with scholarly works on diversity – extremely problematic. I 
shall return to this issue, on the lack of reasoned engagement with the fact of 
diversity within the heritage literature, in the next chapter. It is precisely these two 
points of contention, on the 1) need for preservation, and 2) the existence of a 
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multitude of cultural heritages, to which this research is devoted to. The question of 
what to do about cultural heritage - whether it should be preserved, destroyed, or 
simply left alone – is thus accompanied by a parallel and equally important question: 
whose heritage? In a contemporary liberal society that is composed of a diversity of 
groups, whose heritage should the state take an interest in? I begin to address this 
question in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Cultural Heritage and the Problem 
of Diversity 
 
 
 
At the end of the previous chapter I highlighted my discontent with an underlying 
premise of UNESCO’s 2003 Convention Concerning the Safeguarding of Intangible 
Heritage; specifically, with the notion that the preservation of cultural heritage 
promotes diversity. In this chapter I shall problematise the issue of cultural heritage 
by demonstrating: 1) why, contrary to the 2003 Convention and recent scholarship on 
heritage and human rights, the fact of diversity actually poses substantive normative 
problems for the preservation of cultural heritage; 2) how this is, first and foremost, 
an issue for governments (as opposed to NGOs and international organisations); 3) 
the significance that contemporary political theory – and in particular, works on 
multiculturalism - have for heritage studies and management. Before I can do this, 
however, I wish to briefly examine the rationale behind preservation and how this 
has been linked to diversity. 
 
 
Threats to Cultural Heritage 
Barely a day passes in Hong Kong without some mention in the media of yet another 
part of Hong Kong’s heritage being threatened or destroyed. Indeed it is the 
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experience of my homeland that inspired my research here. People often ask whether 
and how Hong Kong has changed since its return to China. It is not the gradual or 
perceived erosion of civil liberties that has the greatest bearing on the everyday life 
of the population, but rather the changes in the cultural landscape and built 
environment. On the 30th of June 1997, the old Hong Kong flag - with its Union 
Jack, and lion and unicorn in a field of deep blue – fell and the new red (for obvious 
reasons) flag, with a bauhinia decorated by a star in each of its five petals, was 
hoisted up the flagpole. In the decade and a half since the establishment of the 
Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, the Government has redesigned its 
currency, stamps and even post-boxes. We traded the Queen’s Birthday and 
Commonwealth Day for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
Establishment Day and National Day of the People’s Republic of China. Although 
Hong Kong’s Basic Law stipulates that the region will retain autonomy until 2047, 
the Chinese national anthem, March of the Volunteers, now plays before the Chinese 
language evening news – a daily reminder of where the real power lies. The Hong 
Kong Government has increasingly turned its attention toward public buildings, 
streets and monuments, seemingly bent on eradicating any evidence of Hong Kong’s 
colonial past. Though this is understandable, given that the colonisation of Hong 
Kong and Macau continues to be a source of national pain and humiliation for China, 
parts of the Hong Kong population still take issue with the fact that history is literally 
being taken away from under their feet.  
 
Indeed, far more dramatic instances of threats to cultural heritage have been reported 
around the world; perhaps none more poignant than the destruction of the Bamiyan 
Buddhas by the Taliban in 2001.  In times of armed conflict and revolution, cultural 
heritage is always under threat; destroyed or pillaged and never to be seen again. 
Indeed, it has been said that all successful revolutions end with statues coming 
down.70 One can think here of the iconic images that captured the dismantling of  
Stalin’s statue following the fall of the Soviet Union; of the destruction of Saddam 
Hussein’s statue during the 2003 Iraq war, and, most recently, of Colonel Gaddafi’s 
statue in Tripoli. And who could query a right to do so? After years of oppression, 
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pulling down the statue of a hated dictator, provides closure and indicates the start of 
a new era. Of course, sometimes states are able to maintain statues and monuments 
from previous regimes in an educational and creative manner. Budapest’s Momento 
Park, which is a collection of monuments from Hungary’s communist past, springs to 
mind here.71 Yet, these instances are in the minority. Increased mobility and a 
thriving tourism industry have also threatened cultural heritage. The town of Luang 
Prabang, for example, in northen Laos is a World Heritage site renowned for its 
landscape, architecture and traditional practices. Notably, early every morning 
hundreds of Buddhist monks venture out onto the streets to collect alms as part of a 
religious practice that emphasises humility, simplicity and respect. The presence of 
crowds of tourists, who willingly give food and money in exchange for entertainment 
and photographs, threatens to undermine this practice and indeed, the fragile 
existence of Luang Prabang.72   
 
The problems that arise as a consequence of tourism can be attributed to a more 
general problem for cultural heritage and identity – namely, the commodification of 
cultural goods. In today’s world ‘difference’ has become fashionable and cultural 
products such as world music, ethnic jewellery and fashion, writing, arts, and films 
from the developing world can all be transformed into commodities for a new 
‘cosmopolitan’ marketplace.73 But also because, for many people, part of going on 
holiday to a section of the world that they have never been to, also entails visiting 
historical sites such as monuments and churches, as well as learning about the local 
culture. A great deal of money can be made from charging admission to heritage sites 
and selling cultural ‘goods’, and in this regard, it is not entirely inappropriate to 
speak of a ‘cultural heritage industry.’ This industry must be lauded for the most 
part, because, in addition to allowing individuals to gain insight into different 
cultural experiences, it can also help to sustain and preserve valuable traditions and 
artefacts. However, this fact does not alter the extent to which cultural artefacts can 
be produced, circulated and exploited according to a logic that is undoubtedly 
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market-related.74 The consequence of this is that while we do value difference, we 
have also learnt to attach a price tag to it. 
 
The commodification and mass consumption of cultural heritage becomes inherently 
problematic when supposedly sacred goods are deprived of their original meaning. 
Theodor Adorno decried the distribution of mass culture, noting that only its crudest 
materials were passed on; distinctions between sacrosanct and downright silly were 
completely eroded. He argued that, ‘through constant contact with the sold-off spirit, 
“amusement” in turn is elevated until it denigrates into dutiful exercises in the 
appreciation of cultural values.’75 Thus, consumed as mass culture, cultural heritage 
is potentially reduced to a frill, an embellishment; subsequently, formulaic and 
meaningless.76 This, incidentally, was the argument adopted by a Maori tribe in 
response to the ‘culturally insensitive’ use of the traditional ‘haka’ war dance in 
advertisements and movies, as well as by the New Zealand All Blacks’ during rugby 
matches.77 Such objects and practices resemble what once looked like heritage but 
serve an altogether different purpose. 
 
 
Preserving Cultural Heritage, Preserving Diversity 
Given all of these threats to cultural heritage, it is hardly surprising that preservation 
has become a rallying cry for archaeologists, heritage practitioners and scholars, as 
well as politicians and populations alike. Indeed the development of heritage 
preservation within the UK provides an interesting introduction to this issue because 
it shows just how far the heritage movement has come over the past three decades. 
 
The preservation of cultural heritage became an incredibly popular movement in the 
UK during the 1980s. It is no coincidence that this occurred under the New Right. 
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The notion of preserving a grand and glorious heritage had enormous appeal to a 
regime who claimed its ideology was based on traditional family values. Yet, the past 
that was portrayed was representative only of the experiences of the white, well-to-
do land owner – a fact which was reflected in what the National Trust preserved. 
During the 1980s the National Trust accumulated a vast collection of country homes, 
castles and mansion houses. Over 60% of its budget funded the preservation of 
properties that were typical of the richest 0.05% of the population.78 Indeed the 
heritage lobby within the UK frequently described the country house as the ‘soul’ of 
Britain, effectively naturalising the heritage and experiences of the dominant classes 
as the history of the entire nation.79 It was a reverence for the nation which projected 
a false homogeneity by glossing over existing particularities and disparities.  
 
The way in which the New Right manipulated heritage and conceptions of tradition 
to its advantage reaffirms several important points. Regardless of ideological intent, 
because of finite time and resources we cannot preserve everything for posterity and 
thus what is preserved is deeply selective. Furthermore, it is impossible to arrive at 
an objective criterion for preservation. What we preserve is what we deem of value, 
or what we perceive other generations will deem of value. Yet the New Right also 
revived and manipulated heritage for strategic reasons. It strongly rejected the 
welfare state and the ‘permissive’ society that had come with it. The regime sought 
to legitimise its radical policies by articulating a position that was supposedly a 
continuation of historical tradition, at the expense of ignoring the recent history of 
the welfare state and instead, situating the ‘true’ history and tradition of the United 
Kingdom in the Victorian period.80 Conservative nationalists were quick to capitalise 
on the popularity of cultural heritage by adopting it into their rhetoric. Under the 
‘rise’ of heritage extreme figures would use the nation in an openly racist manner to 
distinguish ‘authentic’ from ‘inauthentic’ citizens in terms of ancestral continuity.81 
A highly selective account of ‘Britishness’ became portrayed as the true identity of a 
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betrayed nation.82 Many evoked highly romanticised conceptions of cultural heritage 
with a yearning to return to the days of long ago. To question the ‘National 
Heritage’, or the policies that were conducted in its name, would often bring into 
doubt your own loyalty to the community.83 Heritage had been transformed into a 
powerful ideology. The experience of cultural heritage under the new right is 
interesting because although the current international heritage movement (as 
manifested in the work of UNESCO et al) does not emphasise a national ideology, 
the movement itself remains driven by a set of normative goals, and this, I wish to 
demonstrate, is the ideology of diversity.  
 
The 2009 UNESCO World Report on Cultural Diversity notes,  
 
Cultural diversity, beyond the mere fact of its existence, has aesthetic, moral 
and instrumental value as the expression of human creativity, the embodiment 
of human strivings and the sum of humanity’s collective 
experience…Cultural diversity has become a key concern, amid accelerating 
globalization processes, as a resource to be preserved and as a lever for 
sustainable development.84  
 
It echoes the spirit of both the 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity, the 2005 UNESCO Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions and various other international agreements. Indeed, 
this acknowledgement of the value of cultural diversity is largely symptomatic of 
broader developments around the world in response to globalisation and perceived 
homogenisation - namely, an increased awareness and engagement with cultural 
identity. The significance of cultural identity, however – be it ethnic, religious, 
indigenous or otherwise – is increasingly being articulated within the framework of 
human rights, such that a respect for human rights and individual autonomy requires 
a respect for cultural identity and diversity. The tensions between individual human 
rights and cultural rights have already been well documented such that I shall not go 
into them here. Yet it would appear from the steady proliferation of international 
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conventions promoting the value of diversity that the notion of cultural rights is 
gaining credence. The message is clear: respect for a humanity which is characterised 
by cultural difference is best sustained through the promotion of diversity. 
 
It must be stressed that the underlying sentiment here is inherently laudable. Indeed, 
the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Heritage has also been 
interpreted as a means of valuing a diversity of cultural expressions, in contrast to the 
1972 World Heritage Convention which has been criticised as encapsulating a 
particularly Western conception of heritage.85 This recent emphasis on cultural 
diversity has also precipitated a watershed of very interesting work from the field of 
heritage studies. Laurajane Smith, for example, has written about how marginalised 
groups can challenge dominant discourses on the past and use heritage to facilitate 
aspirations for political recognition.86 Whereas Jeremie Gilbert has written about the 
extent to which indigenous rights have been articulated by way of asserting the 
importance of cultural traditions that are linked with a particular territory.87 The shift 
in emphasis from a national heritage, which largely excludes, to a diverse heritage 
which largely seeks to include, is clearly a positive development. Before turning to 
discuss some of the more problematic consequences of this development, however, it 
is necessary to deviate from my discussion of diversity for a few moments in order 
set out a definition of culture. 
 
 
Towards a Definition of Culture 
In defining cultural heritage, I discussed the relationship between cultures and 
cultural heritage in the previous chapter. ‘Culture’ is an incredibly broad and, in 
many ways, problematic term, which has come to encompass all manner of 
affiliations, objects and practices. I will not be able to discuss the multitude of 
meanings that this word has come to cover. What I shall attempt to do, however, is to 
provide a brief account of culture that, engages both with political theory and 
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sociology, in order to arrive at a conception of culture which will enable me to 
discuss its political and normative significance for responding to cultural heritage. It 
is important that this conception affords individuals the greatest liberty possible in 
embracing a particular culture, whilst at the same time recognising the significance 
of group membership. 
 
I therefore wish to begin defining culture by asserting a fundamental premise: that an 
individual’s culture is neither simply a matter of choice or chance; that is, I do not 
wish to prescribe or claim to understand the exact nature of the relationship between 
individuals and culture – because I do not believe that this is a question which can be 
answered at all. Our cultural affinities can guide all of our life choices, or it can 
guide very few of them. We can be part of a single culture that determines an entire 
way of living, or we can equally be part of many different cultures. This is likely to 
be a very frustrating conception of culture – and so it is perhaps best illustrated by 
comparison with what it is not. The conception of culture that I rely upon here is 
based upon the work of Rogers Brubaker. In his response to Craig Calhoun, 
Brubaker describes an appropriate categorization of culture as ‘neither individualism 
nor groupism,’ Brubaker asserts: 
 
‘Ethnicity cannot be reduced to individual choice, as some political scientists 
would have it; but it cannot be reduced to bounded groups either. Groupist 
idioms are as flat as individualist ones. This is not surprising, for groupism is 
itself a species of individualism, in a double sense, treating groups as 
collective individuals, and as collections of individuals. As Calhoun and 
others have observed elsewhere, this sort of ‘groupist individualism,’ as one 
might call it, is central to nationalist discourse...the alternative, then, to 
conceptualizing ethnicity, race, and nation as substances or things or entities 
or organisms or collective individuals – as the imagery of discrete, concrete, 
tangible, bounded, and enduring ‘groups’ encourages us to do – is not to 
adopt an analytical idiom of individual choice, but rather to think in 
relational, processual, and dynamic terms. This means thinking of ethnicity, 
race, and nation not in terms of substantial groups or entities, but in terms of 
practical categories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, 
organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects, and contingent 
events. It means thinking of ethnicization, racialization, and nationalization as 
political, social, cultural, and psychological processes. And it means taking as 
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a basic analytical category not the ‘group’ as an entity, but groupness as a 
contextually fluctuating conceptual variable.’88 
 
Conceiving of group identity in terms of a process enables us both, I believe, to 
embrace the significance of groups and individuals, without a necessary reduction to 
either at the expense of the other. Indeed, all too many political scientists, as well as 
theorists – as we shall soon see – have the tendency towards ‘groupism’; ‘to take 
discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogenous and externally bounded 
groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and 
fundamental units of social analysis.’89 The problem with this, as Anne Phillips 
notes, is that conceiving of groups in such a ‘totalising’ way ‘encourages precisely 
the kind of cultural stereotyping that it was intended to dissolve.’90  
 
However, while it is important not to exaggerate the coherence and cohesion of 
cultural groups, the converse is also true: it is important to remain skeptical of overly 
individualist accounts of culture. Brubaker and Cooper note, 
 
‘…the prevailing constructivist stance on identity – the attempt to ‘soften’ the 
term, to acquit it of the charge of ‘essentialism’ by stipulating that identities 
are constructed, fluid and multiple – leaves us without a rationale for talking 
about ‘identities’ at all and ill-equipped to examine the ‘hard’ dynamics and 
essentialist claims of contemporary identity politics. ‘Soft’ constructivism 
allows putative ‘identities’ to proliferate. But as they proliferate, the term 
loses its analytical purchase. If identity is everywhere, it is nowhere. If it is 
fluid, how can we understand the ways in which self-understandings may 
harden, congeal and crystallize? If it is constructed, how can we understand 
the sometimes coercive force of external identifications? …How can we 
understand the power and pathos of identity politics?’91 
 
Following Brubaker and Cooper, I have thus far defended a need to conceive of 
culture as a process in order to avoid the pitfalls of ‘groupism’ and excessive fluidity. 
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I have also attempted to employ a conception of culture which accords individuals 
the greatest freedom possible in defining their culture – that is, I have not attempted 
to put any limits on the content of what may constitute a culture. Cultural groups, 
therefore, can reasonably include anything from religion, ethnicity, and nationalism, 
to football teams, cycling enthusiasts, food connoisseurs, theatre groups, artists and 
so on. This is culture in a banal sense, referring essentially to a multitude of groups 
with varying interests. Scholars of diversity, and indeed heritage studies, are not 
generally concerned with this broad range of ‘cultures’. The cultures that they 
conceive of, and the cultures that I am interested in here are those that can be 
regarded as politically significant. 
 
 
What Makes a Culture Politically Significant? (And what about Jedi knights?) 
Because of finite time and resources it is not possible to preserve everything; but nor 
would it be desirable to do so if this were in fact possible. It is thus necessary to 
narrow the scope of cultural heritage that requires the attention of governments. In 
outlining reasons for a normative political engagement with cultural heritage, I noted 
that cultural identities can be political and it is the cultural heritage of these 
politically significant cultural groups that governments need to engage with.  
 
I believe that such ‘politically significant’ cultures can be identified by four distinct 
features: 
 
• Endurance: The cultural group must not only have a history and a set of 
shared experiences as defined by ‘collective memory’, but there also needs to 
be a relatively strong chance or interest in its continued existence in the 
foreseeable future; 
• A set of beliefs or interests: The group needs to possess a set of relatively 
coherent or comprehensive beliefs that imply a specific way of living. This, 
in part, determines a culture’s significance on individuals. 
• Significance: The ideas that underlie a group’s existence need to have a 
degree of significance for individuals. This significance is manifested not 
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only in its impact on personal identity, but the manner in which it affects 
everyday life and extraordinary events. 
• Size: Though not always the case, the group should be of a certain size such 
that it can be said to represent a critical mass. 
 
Not all of these criteria must be present in order to achieve political significance. 
Fundamentally, cultural groups gain this status by virtue of the bearing that they have 
on the political life of a community and vice versa. They may often suffer from 
discrimination – by virtue of their beliefs or practices. Groups are therefore also 
distinguished by the fact that they may reasonably make three different political 
claims: 1) a claim to power or autonomy (as with national groups); 2) a claim for 
recognition or acknowledgement of the particular experiences of the group; 3) a 
claim about justice, regarding treatment, discrimination etc. What distinguishes 
politically significant cultures from groups generally is that it may be said that it is in 
the public interest that governments consider (but do not necessarily decide in favour 
of) the claims of these groups.  
 
This narrows the forms of culture that I am interested in here to groups that are 
defined by (but not limited to): ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender, race, class, 
caste and differences in physical or mental ability. This conception of culture is 
compatible with the notion of cultural heritage that I have attempted to employ in 
this thesis with an emphasis on cultural experiences as playing a crucial role in the 
construction of a cultural identity. In the first chapter I discussed how ‘Jedi Knight’ 
became an religious option within the UK’s 2001 Census – though as officials were 
keen to note, this did not constitute ‘official recognition.’ Drawing inspiration from 
Star Wars, ‘jedi-ism’ has been the source of much amusement and ridicule. To 
respond to the question of whether Jedi knights constitute a politically significant 
cultural group, however, it would seem that based upon the above criteria, they do 
indeed. I believe that this example raises a crucial point, because although we may 
intuitively view the beliefs and practices of certain cultural groups as bizarre or 
worthy of ridicule, while we may question and sometimes challenge these beliefs, it 
is important not to deny them and the value that they may hold for others.  
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The Problem with ‘Diversity’ 
I have noted that the recent international consensus on preserving a diversity of 
heritages must fundamentally be regarded as a positive development. On occasion, 
however, the desire to preserve diversity and – by virtue of this – cultural heritage 
has resulted in some rather peculiar notions. For instance, a UNESCO World Report 
titled Investing in Cultural Diversity and Cultural Dialogue notes some existing 
‘threats’ to cultural heritage, and suggests how to respond to them. Some examples 
of these ‘threats’ are listed below: 
 
‘In Nigeria, the Isa see the introduction of free primary education in the west 
of the country, dating from 1955, as the reason for a growing lack of interest 
among younger generations in their culture, particularly since Christian and 
Islamic doctrines are taught in school to the exclusion of traditional African 
religions. In Vanuatu, the time young children spend at school and in school 
activities are said to have kept them from learning the traditional practice of 
sand drawing, which is in decline.’ 
 
‘Failure to respect the sacred or devotional character of certain ceremonies: 
this is emphasized by the defenders of the Mask Dance of the Drums from 
Drametse, who deplore the growing lack of interest among the young 
generation in the deep spirituality of these practices.’ 
 
‘Portable telephones and emails in Jamaica have rendered virtually obsolete 
the traditional means of communication in the form of the drum and abeng 
(conch shell), undermining the ancient musical traditions.’92 
 
It is fair to note the unfortunate disappearance of some traditions, but it is also a huge 
leap to go from here to suggesting that these outcomes are – all things considered – 
regrettable. Universal primary school education and improved telecommunications 
are generally regarded as positive developments. As some practices decline, as the 
youth lose interest in ‘traditional’ ways of life, new practices and traditions are 
bound to emerge – and we cannot necessarily place greater value on older practices 
just because they have (thus far) withstood the test of time.  
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This is symptomatic of the manner in which diversity is conceptualized. Diversity is 
far more complex and divisive than generally recognised by scholars within the field 
of heritage studies. As the editors of Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Human Rights 
note in their introduction, those engaged in heritage conservation projects (and 
studies) require a deeper (and more nuanced) understanding of social, political issues 
at hand.93 Diversity has become a buzzword, a panacea for cultural and social 
problems. Yet as I pointed out at the beginning of the chapter, greater appreciation of 
diversity has also led to the denigration of cultural goods and practices. As David 
Lowenthal points out, indiscriminate adoration of a diversity of cultural heritages is 
not only deeply patronising, but can also be as derogatory as an explicit aversion to 
it.94 He cites the experiences of a Pueblo craftswoman, who noted that,  
 
‘We have to learn how to be Indian…first the whites came and stripped us. Then, 
they come again and ‘find’ us. Now, we are paid to behave the way we did when 
they tried to get rid of us.’95 
 
It is clear that the implications that cultural heritage has on the promotion of 
diversity, and vice versa, need to be explored much more fully.  
 
 
A Precedent of Interventions on Cultural Heritage 
Part of understanding the complexity of diversity involves a recognition that cultural 
heritage remains fundamentally a matter for states and national governments. 
Although NGOs and International Organisations play a crucial role in setting 
normative standards and monitoring progress, ultimately any impact that they can 
have on cultural heritage remains at the discretion of states. For the time being and 
the forseeable future, we continue to live within an international system that is 
characterised by state sovereignty, and any policy or action regarding cultural 
heritage is ultimately subject to the will of sovereign governments. Observing a 
precedent of control also demonstrates how national governments are in the strongest 
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position to intervene in cultural heritage. In this section I therefore explore the 
myriad ways in which governments have intervened in cultural heritage. Time and 
time again, actions by governments have either explicitly or implicitly resulted in the 
control of historical narratives, and while a survey of the existing precedent of 
control does not demonstrate why governments should engage with cultural heritage, 
it certainly proves useful in highlighting the range of ways in which governments are 
capable of shaping discourses on the past through their treatment (or manipulation) 
of cultural heritage.  
 
 
Iconoclasm 
Of all the ways in which individuals have responded to the existence of a past, none 
are more striking, or more extreme, than acts of iconoclasm. Such actions represent 
systematic efforts to annihilate objects based upon their symbolic or ‘iconic’ 
significance. In sharp contrast to the organic decay or demolition of artefacts due to 
development, instances of iconoclasm can be identified by the existence of 
motivations directed specifically at the destruction of certain artefacts. From the 
destruction of the remnants of the ancien regime by the French iconoclasts, to Mao’s 
Cultural Revolution, to the Buddhas of Bamiyan; the obliteration of cultural heritage 
has been an effective means of creating distance from an undesirable past by 
destroying the objects associated with it. Designed to legitimise the present regime 
by disgracing the past, such treatment of cultural heritage clearly has political 
implications. While iconoclasm does not always occur at the behest of governments, 
when sanctioned or exercised by states the consequences of iconoclasm tend to be 
much more thorough and permanent.  Minimally then, a question about a state’s 
responsibility to cultural heritage asks whether the systemic destruction of cultural 
heritage ever be justified. This is a question that will be addressed during the course 
of this study.  
 
 
Institutionalising cultural heritage 
Explicit efforts on the part of governments to control the past have not been limited 
to the destruction of cultural heritage. Indeed, governments have at their disposal a 
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broad variety of measures that effectively result in the creation of a cultural heritage. 
Some of these measures are more explicit than others. War memorials, for example, 
venerate not only the glorious dead but the nation and its cause as well, and when 
maintained in public spaces also represent a substantive treatment of cultural 
heritage. In the UK, although wearing a poppy in the lead up to Remembrance Day is 
not necessarily a requirement, public individuals (such as newscasters) have been 
broadly criticised for their failure to do so. In recognising Remembrance Day, the 
state also creates a space for other remembrance rituals (such as wearing a poppy) to 
flourish. 
 
National public holidays also clearly indicate which traditions the state wishes to 
uphold. I have already mentioned above how, following its return to China, Hong 
Kong now has a rather different set of public holidays: while school children in Hong 
Kong had for decades had a holiday on the Queen’s Birthday, ‘Commonwealth Day’ 
and the birthday of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the region’s return to China not only ended the 
observation of these days but also signalled the arrival of a whole host of new public 
holidays such as ‘Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Establishment Day, 
‘National Day of the People’s Republic of China’, ‘Labour Day’, and (somewhat 
incongruously) ‘Buddha’s Birthday.’  
 
National coinage and notes often carry the images of respected historical figures, and 
in this regard it is easy to understand why the designers of the Euro banknotes choose 
to use generic and evocative images as opposed to existing landmarks and historical 
figures. Cultural heritage is also represented in certain symbols, crests and colours 
that can frequently be found on public buildings, and especially, on national flags.  
 
The creation, or endorsement, by the state of a particular heritage can be attributed to 
a desire to foster loyalty to the state as part of nation building. As Antony D. Smith 
writes, most states aspire to become nation-states, and this necessarily entails 
approximating a fit between national culture and identity, and the political 
institutions of the state.96 Therefore governments have a vested interest in promoting 
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a specific culture to its citizens. To be sure, it does make a lot of sense to engage 
with historical experience and cultural heritage in creating this fit between culture 
and institutions, as history brings with it the weight of precedent, custom, and thus, 
legitimacy. This legitimacy, in turn, aims at fostering the trust and loyalty of its 
citizens, but also the respect of other sovereign states. The existence of a national 
currency, anthem, narrative, and flag are all necessary customary components of the 
modern nation-state.  
 
 
National museums 
Although I have traced some examples of how states have interfered with cultural 
heritage, perhaps the most obvious manner in which historical artefacts have been 
institutionalised is with the creation of a national museum. It is interesting, in 
considering why states should respond to the existence of cultural heritage, that the 
genesis of public museums corresponds exactly with the emergence of nationalism 
after 1820.97 Of these, none is more representative of the new relationship between 
the state and public culture than the Louvre in France. Formerly the palace of kings, 
the Louvre, as a museum, would come to symbolise the new republic which granted 
equality (of access) to all. Although the Louvre was not the first royal collection to 
be made public, it was certainly the most significant - not merely because of the 
Louvre’s unique revolutionary circumstances, but also because of the scale and scope 
of its transformation; it was to become the shining example of subsequent state 
museums.  The explicit treatment of cultural heritage as a public matter is, it seems, 
inherently tied to the modern, secular state as national museums have grown in 
stature to become a necessary component of statehood in every corner of the world.98  
 
Yet, while it is clear that states have taken an interest in cultural heritage for the 
purposes of building national museums, it would be a mistake to assume that these 
buildings are used solely to display indigenous objects. On the contrary, the content 
                                                       
97 McClellan ‘Nationalism and the origins of the museum in France,’ in Wright, G. (1996): The 
Formation of National Collections of Art and Archaeology, (Yale University Press), p.29. 
98 Preziosi ‘In the Temple of Entelechy: The Museums as Evidentiary Artifact’, in Wright (1996): op. 
cit. p.165. 
2. Cultural Heritage and the Problem of Diversity 
 
61 
 
of national museums (be they of history, or of art) tends also to be of a universal 
nature. In national art history museums, one can always find the prerequisite 
landscapes, still-life’s and works of Renaissance, Baroque and Impressionist artists; 
the point however of a national museum is to demonstrate a particular superiority of 
display.99 The juxtaposition of national genius alongside universally accepted 
greatness allows museums to boast particular national qualities as well as a prowess 
in acquiring works of universal acclaim.  
 
National museums thus represent a unique phenomenon with regards to state 
intervention in cultural life. Appearing as the most tangible expression of what the 
state values and wishes to preserve, they encompass a broad array of objects 
originating both indigenously as well as otherwise. Constructed to mimic ancient 
Greek or Roman temples, many museums possess a lofty quality, presenting ‘high 
culture’ to the people; indeed the experience of a museum is, as Carol Duncan points 
out, much like a ritual in and of itself, as visitors ‘come away with a sense of 
enlightenment, or a feeling of having been spiritually nourished or restored,’100 – 
which is ironic, considering the museum’s secular origins. Duncan continues, noting 
that, in visiting a museum, the visitor ‘also encounters there the state itself, embodied 
in the very form of the museum. Acting on behalf of the public, it stands revealed as 
the keeper of the nation’s spiritual life…’101 The physical presence of a national 
museum thus stands as testament to the legitimacy of the state as the protector of a 
national heritage, but also for the heritage of others.  
 
 
Public Education 
It is important, in outlining the parameters along which government interventions in 
cultural heritage can take place, to consider the ramifications for public education. In 
the Netherlands, for example, schoolchildren are taught the fifty ‘canons’ of national 
history and culture in an explicit effort to bolster awareness of Dutch heritage 
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particularly amongst young people and ‘newcomers’.102 Education, and especially 
citizenship education, frequently entails learning about the story of the nation and 
what makes this particular nation unique. Although these narratives are framed as 
history, the education - especially of school children – lacks the nuances and 
acknowledgement of competing interpretations that form a necessary component of 
good academic History. As such, the historical narratives employed by states in a 
national curriculum must also be regarded as the creation of a cultural heritage, and 
thus require the attention of this research. Should states, for example, have the right 
to impose a particular account of the national past on school children; or should they 
(merely) stick to covering older, more ‘uncontroversial’ topics such as the ancient 
Greeks and Romans? Another question which is continually raised regarding 
education, though not pertaining to a national narrative, is the place of human 
evolution in the curriculum, and, for that matter, teaching about Adam and Eve; are 
they to be taught as Science, History, or Religious Studies – these too are questions 
which necessarily pertain to the treatment of cultural heritage. Education represents 
one very powerful means of conveying a specific account of the past. It is also an 
issue, therefore, which requires careful consideration.   
 
 
The Prohibition of Other Heritages 
I have thus far examined the promotion and destruction of heritage, as well as the 
accumulation of other people’s heritages. I turn now to one final instance on the 
control of cultural heritage, and this takes its form in the prohibition of certain 
cultural practices.  
 
Legal provisions affecting the appropriate slaughter of animals, suitable head gear 
for riding a motorcycle, manners of personal dress and decoration have all received a 
great deal of attention in recent years as governments increasingly engage with the 
existence of a heterogeneous population. While legislation on these themes has, in 
most instances, not been aimed specifically at the control of cultural heritage per se, 
the consequences of such provisions do necessarily effect the cultural practices of 
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certain groups. For example, increased support for animal welfare has led to criticism 
of certain forms of ritual slaughter as practiced by Muslims and Jews, and in some 
countries has resulted in prohibition. The prohibition of such practices however does 
amount to the rejection of certain cultural heritages. Indeed, appeals to revoke laws 
that effect cultural practices often cite their customary nature and critical role as part 
of the group’s cultural heritage. Thus, in considering the manners in which a state 
may control cultural heritage, it is necessary also to take account of legislation that 
implicitly results in the restriction of certain cultural heritages. 
 
 
Beyond Pragmatism: The Significance of Cultural Groups 
State sovereignty and a precedent of control over cultural heritage provide pragmatic 
reasons for asserting that states and governments are the primary agents in 
responding to cultural heritage (as opposed to NGOs or international organizations). 
Yet, beyond this pragmatism lies a more normative consideration and this is the fact 
that national governments are in the best position to respond sensitively and 
effectively to the concerns of a diversity of cultural groups and heritages. But not 
only are states in the best position to respond to such matters; as we have seen just 
now – governments continually make decisions that yield crucial outcomes for 
cultural groups and practices, and the significance of this is that national 
governments need to engage with issues of cultural groups and heritages. 
 
As we have seen in the first chapter, all individuals require some sense of the past to 
give their lives meaning and context. Though individuals vary in their appreciation of 
this connection, the acceptance and recognition of a particular past ties us to a 
particular group which can be defined, in part, by a recognition of the shared 
meaningfulness of this historical experience. Historical experience manifests itself in 
both tangible (e.g. monuments and artefacts) and intangible (e.g. languages and 
rituals) cultural objects, and because of the extent to which historical experience (and 
cultural heritage) play a role in the construction and maintenance of a personal 
identity, the freedom to choose a particular cultural heritage is a matter of individual 
liberty. Drawing upon the experiences of Jedi knights, in the first chapter I asserted 
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that while states are not necessarily (or a priori) under an obligation to recognize 
cultural identity, they must respect and cannot deny an individual’s ability to define 
their identity with reference to certain experiences and heritages. 
 
States must maintain an interest in cultural heritage because of its significance for 
individuals and citizens. It is important to acknowledge, however, that interest does 
not necessarily imply action; maintaining an ‘interest’ can result in states deciding 
not to preserve anything at all, and simply allowing individuals to pursue and engage 
with heritage in a manner of their choosing, implying a sort of ‘benign neglect.’ 
Nevertheless, even deciding not to preserve a cultural heritage is the outcome of a 
process of interested engagement with the issue. Engagement does not necessarily 
require specific action. The issue of cultural heritage is not rendered outside of the 
public and political realm simply because states decide not to engage with the issue. 
If governments choose not to engage with (and preserve) cultural heritage and 
practices they need to explain why.  
 
Of course, governments might respond that it is precisely this distinction between 
individuals and citizens which renders cultural heritage outside the realm of public 
interest; individuals may engage with cultural heritage but this is their own private 
business and not a political issue. Even if drawing a line between public and private 
interests were so easy, the fact remains that some, if not most, cultural identities are 
public and political – requiring the attention of the state. 
 
Given the precedent of state interventions discussed above, aside from the public 
interest in cultural heritage, a significant reason for government engagement with 
cultural heritage is the fact that to do otherwise would leave governments liable to 
charges of hypocrisy. Through public holidays, museums, languages and 
monuments, states demonstrate a willing engagement with cultural heritage. For the 
sake of consistency and demonstrating a commitment to responding to public interest 
(as opposed to merely serving its own agenda), therefore, governments have strong 
normative reasons for engaging with cultural heritage. 
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The Value of Political Theory 
In this chapter I have sought to problematise the issue of cultural heritage by 
asserting the value of examining the ramifications of cultural diversity. Cultural 
heritage is under threat but the question of how to respond to cultural heritage is not 
merely a matter of deciding whether or not to preserve, but also, as we have seen 
here, of whose heritage we ought to be preserving. There is not simply a single 
cultural heritage, but a diversity of national, ethnic, religious, racial and many other 
forms of heritage. The fact that UNESCO’s 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of 
Intangible Heritage and other treaty legislation place such a great emphasis on 
cultural diversity can only be regarded as a positive development. The extent to 
which previous legislation and treaties ignored diversity and minority groups 
effectively sanctioned and reinforced bias toward dominant groups and norms. The 
world is characterized by diversity and it is important to acknowledge this fact in 
domestic and international legislation in order for analysis and action to relate more 
closely to reality.  
 
Yet, as I have sought to demonstrate, an engagement with diversity throws up a set of 
entirely different issues and problems. An awareness of difference is not always a 
good thing and can lead, for instance, to essentialisation as well as discrimination. 
Diversity, therefore, is not necessarily the panacea that is often supposed and there is 
a need for a more complex and nuanced understanding both of cultural groups and 
diversity. This is not to say that there is no value in the promotion of diversity. 
Rather, the intrinsic value of promoting diversity has become a premise upon which 
much research and legislation has subsequently been based and it is important not 
only to evaluate this premise, but also to examine its alternatives.  
 
So what are the alternatives? As opposed to promoting difference, states could 
choose to promote unity in spite of, or beyond, diversity. They could actively 
renounce the notion of needing to promote or preserve anything at all, and actively 
privatize cultural heritage. Governments could simply leave heritage and diversity as 
they are – a fact of social life, but of no particular normative or political significance. 
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I shall build up a more concrete picture of these alternatives over the subsequent 
chapters. I will not, however, have to start from scratch because there is an existing 
body of literature and scholarship that already engages with the issue of cultural 
diversity and how to respond to it. Indeed, it is absolutely crucial for heritage 
scholars to gain a better understanding of background normative and socio-political 
issues by drawing upon contemporary scholarship on multiculturalism and diversity.  
 
A great deal has been written over recent years about how to respond to cultural 
diversity within contemporary nation-states. Although many political theorists 
engage solely with the issue of culture (as opposed to cultural heritage), I believe 
that it is possible to draw out the implications of their work here for cultural heritage. 
Charles Taylor and Iris Marion Young, for instance, have both endorsed the politics 
of recognition for cultural groups; arguing that a lack of political recognition is 
detrimental to identity and a group’s sense of self-worth.103 Whereas, Will Kymlicka, 
argues for the right to engage with culture on the basis of its significance to 
exercising individual autonomy.104 We can see echoes of these arguments in the 
works of heritage scholars such as Laurajane Smith (whose work was mentioned 
above); heritage can thus be transformed into a vehicle for the politics of recognition. 
This clearly fits into the notion of promoting diversity that has been discussed above. 
Nationalists, however, and constitutional patriots would argue for the alternative – 
for promoting unity as opposed to diversity - whereas libertarians might say that 
cultural heritage and diversity should simply be left to be.  
 
This is not to imply that theorists of cultural heritage ought look no further for how 
to respond to diversity; on the contrary, it is my intent, not only to illustrate that 
diversity is an issue which has long concerned other disciplines, but also to 
demonstrate that the question of how to respond to diversity is inherently more 
complex than otherwise indicated by recent scholarship and international 
agreements. The positions that I have outlined above by no means encompass the 
broad spectrum of works on multiculturalism. Nor has my brief description captured 
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press), and Young, IM. (1990): Justice and the Politics of Difference, 
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the nuances of these positions. However, while such works of political theory do not 
provide the answers to the question of how to treat cultural heritage within a 
multicultural and diverse society, I do believe that they constitute a starting point for 
further interdisciplinary research. Indeed, it is surprising that heritage scholars have 
not thus far considered the implications of contemporary political theory on their 
work at great length. So, if Langfield et al, citing the Smithsonian Institute (2005), 
have identified the problem of the field’s under-theorised state, it is my contention 
that part of the solution to theorising heritage lies in political theories of diversity and 
multiculturalism.105  
 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to problematise cultural heritage as being not merely 
a debate about whether or not to preserve cultural heritage, but also raising questions 
about whose heritage. The general response from within the heritage literature and in 
existing treaty legislation has been that we ought to preserve a diversity of heritages. 
Yet I have sought to demonstrate the importance of adopting a more cautious 
approach to diversity as well as preservation and have highlighted the necessity of 
exploring alternate positions. I have also been keen to emphasise that cultural 
heritage is a political matter that needs to be addressed by state governments. 
Debates about culture and diversity in contemporary political theory can therefore 
help to shed light on political responses to a diversity of cultural heritages.   
 
Yet it is important to stress that examining cultural heritage through the lens of 
political theory will not simply result in a rehashing of existing debates. Indeed, if 
political theory can benefit cultural heritage, then cultural heritage is of similar value 
to theoretical debates about multiculturalism. With an emphasis on historical 
conditioning, examining cultural heritage allows us to give weight to the experiences 
of cultural groups – something that many scholars of multiculturalism and diversity 
have simply neglected. It also provides a means of theorizing culture as a process 
because, by definition, an analysis of cultural heritage necessarily rejects a view of 
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culture as static, ‘groupist’ and given. In the next chapter, therefore, I begin to 
discuss how an exploration of cultural heritage can benefit normative debates about 
culture and diversity by outlining a response to cultural heritage from the perspective 
of liberal political theory. 
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Chapter 3 
 
A Liberal Response to Cultural 
Heritage 
 
 
 
Liberalism provides a good starting point for outlining a response to a diversity of 
cultural heritages because it grows out of a need to accommodate difference. In this 
chapter, therefore, I shall begin to outline a liberal response to cultural heritage. 
Though many believe that liberalism provides the best guide for organising politics, I 
shall make no such claims for liberalism here. Rather, I believe that its reluctance to 
demonstrate any explicit preference for a particular form of the good life, combined 
with its commitment to universalism, renders liberalism a very strong contender for 
offering a sound solution for responding to a diversity of cultural heritages. It is also 
a response which is capable of yielding a large consensus. However, I also readily 
accept that the liberal response to cultural heritage offered here is but one possible 
response among many. 
 
The first part of this chapter therefore says a little bit about liberalism and the sort of 
liberal state that is imagined here, before moving swiftly on to outlining the general 
principles that govern a liberal approach toward cultural heritage. A liberal response 
to cultural heritage, it turns out, is guided fundamentally by non-intervention, i.e. 
largely leaving heritage alone. As we noted in the first chapter, the normative 
3. A Liberal Response to Cultural Heritage 
 
70 
 
significance of cultural heritage lies in its value to personal and group identity. The 
liberal proviso therefore requires that individuals possess the greatest liberty possible 
to engage with their cultural heritages without state intervention. This is perhaps 
easier said than done - for leaving individuals largely alone to pursue their own 
meaningful cultural heritages means that the state will, at times, have to restrain itself 
from intervening in cultural practices which it, as representative of the majority or 
dominant view, might deem unsavoury. Non-intervention, therefore, requires a great 
deal of toleration on the part of governments. 
 
It would be a mistake however to assume that liberal states ought do nothing at all 
about cultural heritage. It is important to remember that underlying non-intervention 
is a commitment to individual liberty. A liberal state is therefore charged first and 
foremost with maintaining this freedom. For the most part, this involves refraining 
from interfering in matters pertaining to individual conceptions of the good life but 
this may also, at times, require interventions in cultural heritage. Thus, in the second 
part of this chapter, I discuss exceptions to non-intervention. There are two reasons 
why liberal governments may intervene in cultural heritage and this is 1) to uphold 
toleration and 2) to maintain autonomy. Toleration and autonomy are two central 
features of liberalism and, although they have often been presented as contradictory, 
I shall attempt to largely reconcile them by setting strict parameters on the content of 
each concept. It is liberalism’s commitment to individuals, however, that ultimately 
sets limits upon toleration. What emerges, therefore, is that, while guided 
fundamentally by non-intervention, a liberal state may only intervene in cultural 
heritage to uphold and preserve the liberal principle of individual freedom. 
 
 
A Brief Definition of Liberalism 
‘Liberalism’ is a word that has come to stand for many different things and, 
depending on the context, also carries with it a mixture of connotations. Within the 
context of my work, however, I am interested in looking at political liberalism, 
which is defined by a lack of commitment on the part of governments to any 
particular conception of the good. This is for the purposes of liberty, and allowing 
3. A Liberal Response to Cultural Heritage 
 
71 
 
individuals to pursue their own (private) ends, and it is for this reason that liberalism 
has so often been labelled ‘individualist’ – devoted as it is to the preservation of 
individual freedom. Indeed, it is a commitment to individual freedom which lies at 
the heart of liberalism – everything else, from toleration, to autonomy, equality and 
opportunity comes secondary to this. 
 
A liberal state is thus identified by its unwillingness to promote or favour any 
particular religious, ethical, ethnic, or other way of living. Apart from individual 
freedom, it is therefore also committed to neutrality and indifference. It aims to 
protect individual liberty by balancing, negating and ignoring a number of competing 
interests. The liberal state remains neutral fundamentally out of a respect for the 
moral equality of persons. A ramification of neutrality is a commitment to 
objectivity, when confronted with competing conceptions of the good, and to 
universalism, such that the liberal state does not favour a conception of the good 
from a particular moment in history. Thus, the values that the liberal (and the liberal 
state) espouse are relevant not only in the current context, but – it is also assumed – 
for perpetuity. A liberal political theory therefore encompasses all generations, but at 
the same time it is also inherently ahistorical. Historically, however, liberal thought 
grew out of a scepticism about the authority of tradition combined with a parallel 
need to accommodate different ways of living. This means that a liberal point of 
view will attempt to avoid bias toward any particular tradition or cultural heritage 
and thus, in determining how to respond to a variety of cultural heritages, liberalism 
provides a strong starting point for inquiry. 
 
Beyond this very basic conception, it is important to note that liberalism is by no 
means an uncontroversial or unified position. Indeed different liberal theorists will 
point to different notions of how a commitment to neutrality is to be maintained and, 
in some circumstances, when it may permissibly be superseded. Of course, the 
manner in which freedom is defined has great bearing on the liberalism that 
subsequently emerges. Much like ‘liberalism’, ‘freedom’ is also a concept that can 
scarcely be sufficiently defined and justified here. Like many liberals, however, the 
view put forth here is sympathetic to Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between positive and 
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negative liberty – with scepticism of the former and preference for the latter.106 It 
finds that individuals need space to exercise choice and pursue their own conceptions 
of the good – thus requiring non-intervention on the part of liberal governments. 
However, the view of freedom asserted here also finds that governments have a role 
to play in the creation of this space - such that it is meaningful and worthwhile to 
individuals. Freedom is both being left alone and also having something of some 
value to do whilst being left alone. While this definition is likely to prove 
unsatisfactory, it will have to suffice for the time being; for a discussion about 
freedom – much like liberalism – could easily fill more room than is available here. 
Yet as liberalism and freedom are so closely intertwined, this position on freedom 
will hopefully be explained as well (if not completely justified) by the end of this 
work. 
 
The fundamental aim of the liberal state envisaged here is to protect a diversity of 
interests and conceptions of the good by upholding respect for liberal values. This 
does not mean that everybody within the state needs to be committed to and exercise 
what are commonly regarded as ‘substantive’ ‘Liberal’ values such as freedom of 
speech, equality, assembly and so on. Rather, the liberalism that is outlined in this 
chapter and defended throughout the rest of this thesis is defined by a commitment 
on the part of government to uphold and encourage toleration for a diversity of ways 
of life and a respect for individual autonomy. Accordingly, one does not necessarily 
need to be a ‘Liberal’ within the liberal state envisaged.  
 
Thus, there are a diversity of views – all of which might reasonably claim to be 
liberal. The argument offered here is not the liberal response to cultural heritage, but 
a liberal response (though undoubtedly in the author’s opinion it is also a good 
liberal response). It is a particular liberal solution to cultural heritage, but also a 
particular liberalism. With an emphasis on historical conditioning, examining 
liberalism vis-à-vis cultural heritage allows us to give weight to experiences. This 
can provide a remedy to the universal nature of liberalism, which has all too often 
been interpreted as ahistorical. History is often treated as a matter of contingency – 
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i.e. something that we can do little about. Thus, cultural heritage provides us with a 
means of tracing cultures and engaging with their processes of development, as well 
as factoring in experience. By engaging with cultural heritage, it becomes possible to 
acknowledge the significance of historical experience in the construction of personal, 
and hence group, identity. Furthermore, accepting the historical contingency of 
identity should also force us to reconsider our own liberal and supposedly universal 
beliefs. As much as liberals may try to ignore this, the liberalism that we conceive of 
today is equally the outcome of a particular set of historical circumstances. An 
engagement with cultural heritage should make us more aware of the particular 
nuances that liberalism may pick up when applied in specific contexts, and also more 
wary of our own liberal traditions and prejudices.  
 
 
A Liberal Response to Cultural Heritage 
In the first chapter I outlined the significance of an historical identity and the manner 
in which objects, which we regard as cultural heritage, are capable of conveying and 
representing that identity. Cultural heritage is capable of sustaining identity because 
it expresses historical experiences which can play a substantive role in the 
construction of an historical identity. Accounts of the past are not only maintained in 
abstract memories and narratives, but largely envisaged and manifested in particular 
objects, practices and rituals – and these objects, recognised and defined as cultural 
heritage, possess a symbolic and emotive content that individuals can derive meaning 
from and may perceive as intrinsic to how they define their own identity. It is also 
important to remember, as I have noted above, that this conception of the past is 
inherently tied to group membership; following the arguments of Maurice 
Halbwachs, a collective both sustains and is sustained by a shared understanding of 
the past. The personal significance of cultural heritage thus lies in its capacity to 
represent a meaningful past to the present generation; a capacity which is made all 
the more potent, in many cases, by the fact of its expressive nature – appealing not to 
reason, but emotion.  
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Yet, while our identities are to some extent historically contingent, it should be 
obvious that different individuals will attach different values to their historical 
connections; and the extent to which they engage with their connections to the past is 
as a matter of choice as well as chance. Some individuals may find their histories to 
be an inherited unalterable legacy, whilst others may ‘choose’ to emphasize certain 
aspects of their pasts whilst downplaying others. Some may make a conscious 
decision to reject their roots whereas others may simply be indifferent to them. Over 
the course of a lifetime, individuals may identify with many different historical 
legacies and indeed engage with several historical connections at the same time. So, 
cultural heritage can matter but it doesn’t necessarily matter equally to everyone.  
 
The liberal state envisaged here is one that guarantees basic liberties out of a respect 
for individual dignity and freedom. It is a liberal state that is composed of a 
multitude of groups – some larger and more powerful than others. Given that a 
liberal state is one which aims not to promote any particular conception of the good 
life, and given that cultural heritage is, by definition, both representative and 
constitutive of particular conceptions of the good, a liberal response must therefore 
largely be characterised by non-intervention. The role of the liberal state is to allow 
individuals to make decisions about heritage for themselves as a matter of individual 
liberty.  
 
In the same way that individuals must be free to form and define their own identities, 
and given that an account of the past can form an intrinsic facet of personal identity; 
individuals should also be free to identify with a past that is meaningful to them. This 
negative right to define relevant historical experiences thus forms a crucial 
component of a respect for individual identity and freedom of thought. A logical 
extension of this freedom to define an historical identity entails a similar negative 
freedom to define a cultural heritage. Individuals must be free to engage with certain 
cultural objects and practices (i.e. a cultural heritage) as these can play a crucial role 
for personal identity and well-being. Furthermore, a right to defining the content and 
significance of cultural heritage entails that individuals cannot be told or assumed to 
engage certain aspects of their past simply by virtue of their race, ethnicity, 
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nationality or religion. I frame this largely in terms of a negative right (i.e. non-
intervention) for normative as well as pragmatic reasons. As a liberal project, I 
therefore begin with the premise that states should largely remain indifferent to 
identity and conceptions of the good – thus a liberal government’s response to 
cultural heritage should largely be one of non-intervention.  
 
The elusive nature of the acceptance and recognition of cultural heritage, which was 
discussed in the first chapter, leads me to assert a more pragmatic reason for why the 
definition of cultural heritage should be left to individual choice. The fact that 
cultural heritage is rarely explicitly recognised and continually subject to change 
does not undermine the significance and meaningfulness that cultural heritage can 
have for individuals. On the contrary, it is absolutely vital to acknowledge that this 
dynamism is a necessary condition of cultural heritage. It is only natural that, as time 
passes and values change, the content of what is defined by cultural heritage is also 
subject to variation. A shift in values and understandings of cultural heritage can 
occur for any number of reasons such as social change and revolution, the discovery 
of ‘new’ sources of heritage, or simply because the significance of certain artefacts 
and tradition have organically decayed into meaninglessness. The past and its 
significant attributes are malleable, and the manner in which we choose to convey 
and recognise them is subject to our own current needs and beliefs. To this extent, it 
is also reasonable to assert that cultural heritage is made meaningful by the fact of its 
dynamism. While it is true that this understanding of the significance of recognition 
does make cultural heritage harder to identify as an ‘outsider’, I believe that it is far 
more important to situate the control of cultural heritage amongst those who feel a 
genuine connection to it. The changing content of cultural heritage reflects the 
dynamism of values and social structures. Non-interference in identifying cultural 
heritage thus appropriately allows individuals to have room to discover and define a 
past and cultural heritage that is meaningful to them. Furthermore, although the 
significance of historic traditions may not be acknowledged on a daily basis, the 
threat of their demise or destruction will often be met with great hostility. It is also 
therefore important to respect the extent to which individuals do not necessarily wish 
3. A Liberal Response to Cultural Heritage 
 
76 
 
to explicitly identify their cultural heritage, and accept that a meaningful appreciation 
of the past may, in part, be an inherently private matter.  
 
The third and final reason why individuals should have the freedom to define the 
terms of their cultural heritage also arises from a practical concern for the reality in 
which cultural heritage is manifested. While much of individual cultural heritage 
may be implicitly accepted and privately appreciated, it is crucial to recognise the 
extent to which cultural artefacts have also become commodities within the 
cosmopolitan marketplace, and thus widely disseminated in accordance with a logic 
that can be fundamentally driven by the pursuit of profits. Part of claiming an 
individual’s right to define the terms of meaningful historical experiences, therefore, 
also stems from a conscious effort to avoid the prescription and essentialisation of 
cultural heritage, as resulting from its commodification. Thus, while I have attempted 
to defend the definition of cultural heritage as being contingent upon its acceptance 
by individuals, it is necessary to acknowledge that these very same cultural artefacts, 
affixed with the logo of “cultural heritage” as we have seen in the previous chapter, 
have also demonstrated themselves to be highly lucrative objects.  
 
A (negative) right to defining the terms and significance of cultural heritage, 
therefore, also arises out of a concern for the reality in which cultural goods can be 
distributed. Such use of cultural heritage becomes inherently problematic when the 
commodification of supposedly sacred goods deprives them of their original 
meaning. Indeed, in the previous chapter I cited Theodor Adorno who decried the 
distribution of mass culture as well as the commodification of cultural heritage 
within the global marketplace for ‘ethnic’ goods. Thus, consumed as mass culture, 
cultural heritage is potentially reduced to a frill, an embellishment; subsequently, 
formulaic and meaningless.107  
 
In many regards, a meaningful personal cultural heritage is distinct from, and parallel 
to, the use of ‘cultural heritage’ in mass culture. It would also be incredibly idealistic 
to assume that cultural heritage will always be represented truthfully and respectfully 
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by consumer culture. Nevertheless, despite the extent to which individuals can 
engage with their heritage in a personal and meaningful manner, the public presence 
of inherently superficial displays of cultural heritage can be still be very upsetting. 
By stereotyping the qualities of a particular group, such uses of ‘cultural heritage’ 
perpetuate the essentialization of cultural groups. It is difficult to swim against the 
tides of fashion and consumer culture, yet giving individuals the moral right to 
define the terms of their cultural heritage is a starting point.  
 
Though largely leaving cultural heritage alone may not sound as though it requires a 
profound effort on the part of governments, in reality, this is a rather difficult stance 
to maintain. This is because governments are obligated not to intervene in many 
circumstances where it might very much like to. There are many cultural practices 
followed by a minority of the population which the government might deem 
abhorrent or distasteful. Yet the mere existence of a clash between the norms of the 
majority and minority does not in itself provide sufficient justification for 
intervention in cultural practices. Non-intervention thus requires, in the first instance, 
a great deal of toleration.  
 
 
Toleration and Liberal Political Theory 
Toleration is a key feature of any liberal theory and hence plays a crucial role in 
determining a liberal response to cultural heritage. Indeed, if the primary aim of 
liberalism is to protect the interests of a diversity of individuals and groups, then 
toleration of a diversity of cultural heritages becomes an absolute necessity. Liberal 
proponents of toleration often draw upon the works of John Locke and John Stuart 
Mill in order to demonstrate toleration’s provenance. Yet, the toleration of Locke is 
quite different to the toleration of Mill and so, despite a general consensus on the 
significance of toleration, its myriad interpretations necessitate a brief exploration of 
the concept. In this instance, I shall conceptualise toleration and discuss the 
implications of a number of interpretations of toleration before outlining how 
toleration of cultural heritage might manifest itself within the liberal state envisaged 
here. 
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According to Peter Jones, Toleration has two features: 
 
1. We tolerate only that to which we object 
2. We can only tolerate what we are able to prevent108 
 
Susan Mendus elaborates on these points, writing that 
  
‘There are two features common to all [cases of toleration]: the first is that 
the problem of toleration arises in circumstances of diversity. The second is 
that toleration is required where the nature of diversity is such as to give rise 
to disapproval, dislike, or disgust…simply to allow the different practices of 
others, whilst not objecting to them, disapproving of them, or finding them 
repugnant, is not to display tolerance, but only to favour liberty.’109 
 
Mendus draws upon the work of Deborah Fitzmaurice and Mary Warnock to 
distinguish between weak toleration, which is characterised by mere dislike, and 
strong toleration, which is characterised by moral disapproval. The distinction 
between these two forms of toleration can be clarified with an example of reasons 
behind the ‘toleration’ of Muslim headscarves: to tolerate headscarves despite 
reservations about its aesthetic appeal is merely weak toleration – expressing a 
dislike of how headscarves look. Refraining from intervention despite holding the 
belief that the headscarf is a symbol for the subjugation of women within Islaam, 
perpetuating inequality between genders entails strong toleration – encapsulating a 
deeper, moral rationale. Like Fitzmaurice, Mendus believes that weak toleration is 
itself already part of a respect for liberty and liberalism – and does not require a 
separate principle. This distinction between weak and strong toleration divides 
scholars such as Mendus and Fitzmaurice, from other prominent liberal theorists 
such as John Rawls and Joseph Raz. It is the presence or lack of strong toleration that 
represents a crucial juncture for liberalism. The key issues, as Mendus writes, ‘is 
what the liberal attitude will be to those forms of life which do not place a high value 
on autonomy, and this question is most pressing in contexts in which the non-
autonomous lifestyles take the form of a sub-culture.’110 Indeed, an acceptance only 
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of weak toleration can, as we shall shortly see, be quite damaging to a theory that 
presents itself as liberal.  
 
Although John Rawls was not explicitly (or even implicitly) concerned with how to 
respond to a diversity of cultural heritages, his theory of justice remains the most 
prominent account of liberalism to have been conceived during the twentieth Century 
and is premised upon the existence of reasonable pluralism (and competing 
conceptions of the good – i.e. cultural groups) within society. Thus, his account of 
justice nevertheless provides a relevant starting point to a survey of toleration and 
cultural heritage. Like the view put forth here, Rawls recognises the necessity of 
limiting liberalism’s ambit in order to allow multiple conceptions of cultural goods 
(or ‘comprehensive doctrines’ as Rawls calls them) to flourish.111 The scope of 
justice is thus limited to the institutions which make up the ‘basic structure.’112 How 
then to arrive at a shared societal conception of justice which takes into account the 
fact of reasonable pluralism? The answer, in part, lies in Rawls’ understanding of the 
‘overlapping consensus.’ Rawls writes: 
 
‘The idea of an overlapping consensus is introduced to make the idea of a 
well-ordered society more realistic and to adjust it to the historical and social 
conditions of democratic society, which include the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. While in a well-ordered society all citizens affirm the same 
political conception of justice, we do not assume they do so for all the same 
reasons, all the way down….But this does not prevent the political conception 
from being a shared point of view from which they can resolve questions 
concerning the constitutional essentials’113 
 
Thus, Rawls is able to ensure that for a variety of reasons, within a ‘well-ordered’ 
(i.e. liberal) society, citizens endorse two ‘distinct although closely related views’: a 
shared conception on justice and a conception of the good.114 By limiting the 
purview of justice, Rawls is able to accept a broad range of competing conceptions of 
cultural goods – at first blush, that is.  
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Yet, when Rawls considers how to respond to comprehensive doctrines (cultures, and 
cultural heritages) that challenge accepted principles of justice, his view begins to 
appear somewhat less convivial. Rawls continues: 
 
‘There are at least two ways in which comprehensive doctrines may be 
discouraged: those doctrines and their associated ways of life may be in direct 
conflict with the principles of justice; or else they may be admissible but fail 
to gain adherents under the political and social conditions of a just 
constitutional regime…the question is this: if, in a just constitutional regime, 
some conceptions will die out and others only barely survive, does this by 
itself imply that its political conception of justice fails to be neutral between 
them?’115 
 
Rawls does not seem to think so. For Rawls neutrality is completely consistent with 
rejecting or undermining certain conceptions of the good. Yet, upon closer 
inspection, Rawls’ theory of justice doesn’t appear to be terribly tolerant at all. The 
comprehensive doctrines, or cultures, that Rawls is willing to accept ‘include 
religious doctrines that affirm liberty of conscience and support the basic 
constitutional freedoms, as well as various liberal philosophical doctrines, such as 
those of Kant and Mill, that likewise do so’116 – that is, essentially, substantively 
liberal conceptions of the good and cultures. The crucial point here is what exactly 
basic constitutional freedoms might consist of. To take one example, a basic and 
relatively uncontroversial freedom within most liberal societies is the fundamental 
value of moral equality between individuals – yet the majority of the world’s 
religious groups would be unable to endorse this, often distinguishing between male 
and female, young and old, devout and agnostic, and so on. Rawls seems perfectly 
willing to ‘tolerate’ liberal groups – but is not so accommodating to illiberal ones. 
This seems somewhat beside the point – this is weak, not strong, toleration. We may 
reasonably contend, therefore, that while Rawls might allow a significant number of 
cultural groups to engage unobstructed with their own heritages, groups that do not 
fit into the liberal framework that he envisages would be prevented by the state from 
following their traditions.  
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Joseph Raz, on the other hand, puts forth an altogether different argument for 
rejecting certain ways of living. He asserts that,  
 
‘It is the duty of the state to promote the well-being of its citizens, and 
without state action there will not be the social pre-conditions of such well-
being…It follows that a government whose responsibility is to promote the 
autonomy of its citizens is entitled to redistribute resources, to provide public 
goods and to engage in the provision of other services on a compulsory basis, 
provided its laws merely reflect and make concrete autonomy-based duties of 
its citizens.’117 
 
Thus Raz envisages that it is the duty of the state to ensure that individuals have a 
variety of valuable ways of living to choose from. In doing so, the state necessarily 
endorses some cultures while rejecting others; yet ultimately, in promoting a 
spectrum of goods, it presupposes value pluralism.118 This is a view that, while 
promoting a diversity of cultural goods, remains distinctly intolerant of ‘deviant’ 
ways of living on the assumption that some ways of living are simply ‘better’ than 
others. This is an assumption which is implicit too in Rawls.119 As Chandran 
Kukathas writes, 
 
‘[Rawls] presuppose[s] the existence of a liberal political order [or certain 
moral truths, in Raz’s case]; that is, an order in which the value of autonomy, 
embodied in principles of justice is authoritatively upheld in the public 
sphere. To put it slightly differently, all presuppose the existence of a 
common standpoint of morality which is established…However, toleration is 
not possible when minority practice goes against the values implicit in the 
public sphere: values which have already been established. Minority practice 
is tolerated only for so long as it abides by the fundamental moral principles 
of the wider society; otherwise minority communities will be restructured (so 
far as is practicable) to be brought into accord with majority practice.’120 
 
Thus, in presupposing a common viewpoint or understanding of moral truths (e.g. 
Rawls’ overlapping consensus), the sorts of liberal states envisaged by Raz and 
Rawls necessarily end up rejecting all conceptions of the good (i.e. cultural practices) 
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that fail to comply with this common standpoint. Or, to paraphrase, only liberal 
cultural heritages and practices are permitted within these state. As Kukathas argues, 
toleration arises as an issue because of this deviation from the common standpoint.121 
Kukathas has a point here. If liberalism’s defining purpose is not to promote a 
particular conception of the good, it seems odd to only allow liberal conceptions of 
the good (and the cultural heritages of liberal groups) to flourish within the state. Raz 
explicitly, and Rawls implicitly rely upon a degree of consensus about the good life 
that is upheld by the state. A liberal state cannot, however, only allow liberal 
practices and forms of cultural heritage to exist within the state as this (as Peter Jones 
has noted) is not, in itself, toleration and does not take the fact of diversity seriously 
enough. As Simon Caney points out, [political] liberalism sets out the principles that 
should be upheld by political authorities such as governments, not all human 
associations.122 Thus secondary associations – such as churches, mosques and other 
cultural groups – do not necessarily have to conform to liberal or egalitarian 
principles in their internal organisation.123  
 
Kukathas endorses this latter view of toleration. Additionally, however, he does not 
want to rely upon the existence of a common standpoint and instead bases the value 
of toleration partly on its relationship with reason. He writes, ‘…toleration is 
important because if toleration is forsaken then so is reason. A stance of toleration 
upholds or honours reason since it forswears the use of force in favour of 
persuasion.’124 As a consequence, Kukathas’ own vision for the liberal state is much 
more permissive of cultural heritage because the state itself does not have the right to 
determine whether certain cultural practices are right or wrong. According to 
Kukathas, the freedom protected by toleration is freedom of conscience.125 This 
devotion to protecting freedom of conscience combined with scepticism of state 
authority, however, leads Kukathas to some rather striking conclusions. Kukathas, 
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for example, is reluctant to allow state intervention on emotive issues such as female 
circumcision. In other words, all cultural heritages are permissible within the liberal 
state, including those that that liberal government might deem abhorrent. Kukathas 
writes that, ‘even in cases where there is clear evidence of terrible practices, there is 
good reason not to give the established authority a right to intervene’126 – by placing 
emphasis instead on conversion by persuasion.127 ‘In morality, as in politics,’ 
Kukathas asserts, ‘there should be a separation of powers.’128 
 
Rather than regulating cultural practices through law and institutions, therefore, 
Kukathas imagines a sort of civil society that emerges through modus vivendi, in the 
absence of state intervention: 
 
‘[This modus vivendi is] not merely a balance of power. It describes 
something much more like the rules of the commons which have arisen and 
developed over time to deal with interaction between communities in areas 
where property rights do not exist and there may be conflicts over the use of 
common resources…the reason this amounts to more than a balance of power 
is that the agreements reached are not merely compromises made by groups 
(or their representatives) with one another. Agreements or understandings 
reached between individuals and groups come to be accepted (or internalized) 
as more basic norms governing social relations. The product over time is a 
commons which acquires the character of a public space without a sovereign 
power – unowned but governed by norms which circumscribe behaviour 
within it…what we have here is a form of social order whose underlying 
characteristic is toleration, even though it is not the result of any attempt to 
produce such an order.’129  
 
Kukathas’ scepticism of the political authority of governments leads him to entrust 
toleration and, indeed, the regulation of cultural practices to civil society. A 
conception of toleration operates fundamentally at the pre-political (as opposed to 
political) level. Yet it is curious that Kukathas never really explains why civil society 
is able to do a better job than the state. Kukathas concedes 
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‘it is possible that under a regime of toleration some associations will 
condone or uphold practices which are harmful to children – and to others in 
those groups who are weak and vulnerable. What it relies upon to temper this 
is the pressures of civil association more generally, which induce a measure 
of conformity to the standards of wider society.’130 
 
Kukathas recognises that the pressures of civil society may not always be able to 
undermine such harmful practices – but reconciles this with the fact that this is still 
preferable to conferring moral authority upon the state.131 Yet despite Kukathas’ 
well-articulated faith in civil society (and the right of exit), he remains susceptible to 
Barry’s charge that there is ultimately little that stands between ‘ritual’ cultural 
scarring that is frowned upon by civil society, but nevertheless not illegal, and 
sadistic scarring for fun.132 Indeed, in addition to ignoring the resolve of extremist 
groups, Kukathas marginalises the power relations that exist within civil society to a 
remarkable (considering his concerns with the abuse of power by the state) degree. 
Kukathas does not really consider the extent to which the ‘rules of the commons’ 
may merely reflect the interests of dominant groups and existing power relations 
within the state. While, admittedly, he does consider the possibility of ‘cultural 
imperialism’, Kukathas does not believe that liberalism can do much about this.133  
 
A fundamental problem with this degree of non-intervention is that it does not 
sufficiently engage with the fact that the social dominance of certain cultural groups 
may result in an equal, if not greater, level of intolerance toward minority groups, 
heritage and practices. Who is to say that the dominant groups within society will 
tolerate minority practices? As Cecile Laborde writes, the problem with the ‘benign 
neglect’ approach is that it largely presumes the existence of justice and well-ordered 
societies: its proposals are ‘designed to apply to ideal well-ordered societies but they 
are also offered as practical proposals designed to guide to reform the real world,’ - 
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unfortunately, she notes, actual societies fall short of these ideals.134 Furthermore, 
how should liberal governments respond to actions that so clearly violate principles 
of toleration and individual autonomy, such that they challenge the authority of the 
liberal government itself? Kukathas also seems to assume that a similar substantive 
degree of rationality can cut across groups – such that they a modus vivendi is even 
possible. This is somewhat presumptuous considering Kukathas’ rejection of a 
common conception of the good in politics. Though he is sceptical of state authority, 
it is unclear how meaningful toleration is any more likely to occur at the level of civil 
society – nor how toleration can be maintained. Unless these issues can be resolved, 
it is the state (consisting of the institutions that possess the legitimate power to 
coerce) that remains in the strongest position to facilitate co-existence between 
cultural groups and toleration of minority cultural practices. 
 
A comparison of the work of Chandran Kukathas, with other liberals such as Rawls 
and Raz, presents us with rather different conceptions of toleration and highlights a 
distinction between weak and strong variants. On one hand, by excluding a variety of 
cultural practices and ways of living from permissibility, Rawls and Raz provided 
insight into liberalisms that endorse only weak toleration, whereas on the other, the 
indifference of Kukathas’ liberal government rendered it far more tolerant of diverse 
ways of living. In this sense, Kukathas’ strong toleration is, in principle, more 
meaningful to a diversity of minority groups than its weaker alternative. Yet, as we 
have seen, the liberal state’s response to diversity cannot merely be one of ‘benign 
neglect’ because this insensitivity to power relations between social groups may in 
fact perpetuate even greater intolerance and substantial disparities in the treatment of 
different cultures. To me this suggests that the liberal government ought to regulate 
toleration but it must do so with a clear vision of its own bias towards its own 
conceptions of the good and thus severely limit the scope of its intervention. It is 
necessary therefore to strike an appropriate balance between toleration and freedom 
by setting limits to non-intervention. 
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Toleration and the Limits of Non-intervention 
Kukathas, as we have seen, largely seems to equate toleration with non-intervention. 
Indeed, for the most part, this is what respect for individual liberty, and hence 
toleration, requires. Yet, it is also important to acknowledge the limits of this 
approach. Regarding toleration and non-intervention as mutually exclusive obscures 
the extent to which non-intervention can in fact undermine toleration for a diversity 
of cultural goods. Pure non-intervention turns a blind eye on existing power relations 
between cultural groups within the state. At best, it assumes a certain degree of 
benevolence on the part of stronger groups, to not impose their will and practices on 
the minority. At worst, a response to cultural heritage that consists purely of non-
intervention, simply does not care about such sub-state social relations. Therefore, 
although a government may express tolerance, it cannot necessarily assume the 
prevalence of toleration among its citizenry. 
 
Toleration can, and frequently does in fact, require action and intervention on the 
part of liberal governments. As Peter Jones points out, a government is not tolerant 
because it provides an arena within which people can engage in acts of toleration, but 
rather because it holds intolerance at bay.135 He therefore envisages the role of 
institutions as upholding tolerance by preventing acts of intolerance.136 Thus, while 
the liberal state cannot only accept liberal ways of living, part of accepting a broad 
spectrum of cultures requires occasional interventions to uphold toleration, as 
advocated by Peter Jones. It is in this manner that toleration is made truly meaningful 
for minority groups and cultural heritage. 
 
It is important to consider the implications of this argument for cultural heritage. 
Although it is crucial that governments refrain from intervention in order to allow  
individuals to remain free to follow their own conception of the good, governments 
are also under an obligation to respond to actions which are intended to prevent or 
obstruct individuals from engaging with their cultural heritage as a crucial means of 
protecting toleration. This means, for example, upholding the right of teachers and 
students to wear headscarves to publicly funded schools. Intervention to uphold 
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toleration should largely manifest itself in legislation outlawing discrimination on the 
basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, religion etc. Though I shall turn to discuss this 
particular topic in greater depth in Chapter 6, it is important to stress that this 
approach does not require special exemptions or additions to law for entire cultural 
groups as advocated by scholars such as Will Kymlicka or Tariq Modood.137 
Furthermore, upholding toleration must be distinguished from promoting the cultural 
heritages of marginalised groups. The promotion of cultural heritages treats heritage 
(and cultures) as ends in themselves (and as I argue in Chapter 6, alientates 
individuals from their cultural heritage), whereas upholding toleration focuses solely 
on individual welfare. It is important to acknowledge that the actions that flow from 
these different principles are not mutually exclusive (i.e. both may yield similar 
outcomes) – for example, promoting culture and upholding toleration may both 
require the translation of voting  and legal information into minority languages, 
effectively subsidising a cultural practice. However, the different principles behind 
such actions determine their scope, endurance as well as applicability for members of 
cultural groups.138 The consequences of these two approaches will be contrasted in 
greater depth in Chapter 6. Thus, although governments may have strong moral 
reservations about certain practices they are nevertheless obligated, as liberal 
governments, to allow cultural groups to pursue their cultural heritage and to 
undermine obstructions to practicing this heritage should they arise.  
 
 
Culture and Autonomy 
Although I have taken issue with liberalisms that endorse only a weak conception of 
toleration, citing their limited value to a diversity of cultural groups, it is important to 
remember where the value of toleration comes from and it is this which sets limits on 
toleration. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the fundamental feature of 
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liberalism is its respect and protection of individual liberty. The maintenance of 
individual liberty and an ability to pursue various conceptions of the good thus 
requires toleration on the part of governments as well as the rest of society, but it also 
requires an appreciation of individual autonomy.  
 
Within the literature on liberal multiculturalism (or multicultural liberalism) a 
dichotomy seems to have been set up which pits toleration against autonomy. As 
George Crowder writes:  
 
‘…On one side there are those who see liberalism as standing primarily for 
the autonomy of the liberal person. Non-liberal groups that place serious 
restrictions on the autonomy of their members will on this view be liable to 
criticism and perhaps intervention by the liberal state. On the other side, there 
are those who identify liberalism with maximal toleration of the beliefs and 
practices of different social groups. This kind of liberal tends to regard the 
ideal of individual autonomy as too demanding a principle for liberal politics, 
since many non-liberal groups do not value that kind of personal freedom.’139   
 
In outlining the limits of toleration, I shall attempt to undermine this dichotomy and 
argue that, far from conflicting, the two concepts are complementary and both 
equally sustain a liberal state. On the issue of tolerance and autonomy, Will 
Kymlicka asserts: 
 
 ‘…it is not enough to say that liberals believe in toleration. The question is, 
what sort of toleration?...liberals have historically seen autonomy and 
tolerance as two sides of the same coin. What distinguishes liberal tolerance 
is precisely its commitment to autonomy.’140 
 
Yet, despite this, Kymlicka nevertheless sacrifices complete toleration for autonomy 
because he is unwilling to accept illiberal groups that constrain the autonomy of 
individuals. Kymlicka believes that liberalism requires ‘external protections’ for 
minority groups, against the dominant culture, but it should reject ‘internal 
restrictions’ which place limitations on the ‘right of group members to question and 
revise traditional authorities and practices.’141 On this issue I believe that, in 
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principle, Kymlicka is correct. In a trade-off between toleration and respect for 
individual autonomy, the liberal response must prioritise the individual by 
undermining instances of cultural intolerance and promoting individual autonomy. 
Of course, this is contingent on a particular definition of autonomy and external 
protections (and as we shall see in a Chapter 6, I disagree strongly with Kymlicka’s 
conception of both) but Kymlicka’s arguments for ultimately protecting individual 
choice over the toleration of cultural practices is convincing. However, as Kymlicka 
himself recognises, his own particular view is likely to be perceived as illiberal 
because ‘its unrelenting commitment to individual autonomy is intolerant of non-
liberal groups.’142 This is also precisely the criticism levelled at Kymlicka by 
Chandran Kukathas.  
 
Equally, however, it seems odd to profess an allegiance to liberalism (and hence, 
individuals), as Chandran Kukathas does, and reject autonomy. Of his own work, 
Kukathas writes: 
 
‘The conception of liberalism advanced…agrees that liberty of conscience is 
fundamental to toleration and, so, to liberalism, but rejects the connection 
with autonomy. Indeed, the protection of autonomy can run counter to liberty 
of conscience; and it those circumstances, liberty of conscience should 
prevail.’143 
 
He continues: 
 
‘[a liberal regime] upholds toleration not because it values autonomy but 
because it recognizes the importance of the fact that people think differently, 
see the world differently, and are inclined to live – or even think they must 
live – differently from the way others believe they should.’144 
 
The suggestion that autonomy must be rejected because of its clashes with freedom 
of conscience is indeed a curious one, for it would seem that freedom of conscience 
(and a right of exit, as endorsed by Kukathas) form a substantive part of autonomy. 
Yet this curiosity, and the dichotomy between autonomy and toleration, can be 
explained by the fact that many scholars of multiculturalism have tended to rely upon 
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a very particular, and rather ethnocentric, conception of autonomy. The 
understanding of autonomy espoused by these theorists focuses on substantive 
outcomes or positive freedoms – such as equality between genders or an ability to 
query the practices of a particular culture. Conceived in this manner, autonomy has 
often been regarded as a western – i.e. liberal - concept. Examining this argument, 
Anne Phillips cites Louis Dumont who contrasted an ‘egocentric’ Western self, with 
a ‘socio-centric’ non-western self.145 Indeed, the implications of Kukathas’ (and 
indeed Kymlicka’s) arguments about toleration and autonomy further compound a 
notion of autonomy which remains coherent only within a liberal, western context. In 
relying upon a very particular, or ‘western’ conception of autonomy, multiculturalists 
who have set themselves up as proponents of either ‘toleration’ or ‘autonomy’ reveal 
an inherently ethnocentric bias in their work when they presume a lack of autonomy 
within non-liberal minority cultures. Yet, as Phillips writes (citing Meyers), ‘while 
cultures may vary in the way they nurture or stifle the skills and capacities for 
autonomy, no one is without autonomy; autonomy is not an all-or-nothing concept 
but more a matter of degree.’146 The manner in which autonomy is defined, therefore, 
is crucial. 
 
A substantive account of autonomy is not, however, neutral147 and can, in fact, be 
contrasted with a ‘proceduralist’ account of autonomy which places emphasis, 
instead, on the processes through which individuals come to make decisions about 
their lives. A ‘procedural’ account of autonomy can be defined as: 
 
‘…the capacity to reflect on and, within the limits of our circumstances, 
either endorse or change the way we act or live – thus, in some significant 
sense, to make our actions and our choices our own.’148 
 
Of course, as Phillips notes, a completely ‘autonomous’ decision – defined by a lack 
of outside interference – is impossible; we are inevitably influenced by our 
relationships and the world around us.149 Phillips also highlights the worry of how an 
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emphasis on ‘deciding for oneself’ appears to ‘associate freedom with the ability to 
separate onself from others.’150 The conception of autonomy defended here does not 
require individuals to lead an ‘examined’ life of stepping back to independently 
question beliefs and practices, but nor does it simply accept all choices – even those 
which have clearly been imposed – as genuine.  
 
It is rather peculiar, however, that so many liberal multiculturalists have tended to 
focus on substantive autonomy, when it would seem that a procedural account of 
autonomy - which places no emphasis on a particular conception of the good – fits 
far more coherently within a liberal framework. By relying upon a substantive 
conception of autonomy, liberals effectively sneak in particular conceptions of the 
good into their analysis. Defined as a matter of procedure, liberals (such as 
Kukathas) have no reason to reject the value of autonomy because it cannot be seen 
as undermining toleration; the two values are complementary. Toleration is what 
protects individuals (and cultures) from dominant groups, and autonomy is what 
protects individuals from their own cultures, as well as dominant groups. Indeed the 
value of ensuring the individuals have the freedom to engage meaningfully with their 
own cultural heritages, without interference from the state, largely grows out of a 
respect for individual autonomy. Accordingly therefore, for the most part, individuals 
are free to engage with their cultural heritage and practices, unobstructed by the state. 
This freedom to follow a conception of the good is attenuated solely by a liberal 
commitment to the autonomy of the individual, which has been defined as the 
capacity or space to reflect upon and revise one’s own life choices. The liberal state 
therefore only intervenes in instances where it is apparent that an individual has been 
deprived of the ability to make a meaningful choice about a particular cultural 
practice. Autonomy thus acts as a form of protection both against the norms of an 
individual’s culture, as well as against the norms of the dominant culture. As Mendus 
argues, 
 
‘We should tolerate all and only those actions which do not constitute an 
infringement of autonomy. If toleration is justified by the consideration that 
                                                       
150 Phillips, A. (2010): Gender & Culture, (Cambridge: Polity), p107  
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people have the right to lead their own lives in their own way, then it is 
equally limited by that same consideration.’151 
 
These instances should be relatively rare as, for the most part, the liberal state is 
charged with the duty of providing the space and opportunities for individuals to be 
able to make meaningful life choices. This is not so much forcing individuals to lead 
‘examined lives’ as it is providing a background in which individuals can choose 
whether to lead an examined life. Because this response to cultural heritage 
ultimately relies so heavily on individual choice, it is important to make sure that 
choice is meaningful in order to undermine the problem that Anthony Appiah 
describes as ‘ascribing autonomy to automatons’, that is, affirming the autonomy of  
‘people who couldn’t really want what they seem to want, but are subordinate to the 
will of others, or blinded by inadequate knowledge of the world.’152 Making sure that 
choice and, hence, autonomy is meaningful crucially applies to public information 
and education in drawing awareness to a range of options and cultural experiences, in 
addition to cultivating an understanding of choice choice153, and providing support 
networks (such as legal advice and representation, counselling, education and 
shelter) for vulnerable individuals (especially women and children) who may choose 
to exit from their cultural groups. Thus, it is in this manner that the liberal state is 
able to really rely upon the value of choice as a means of gauging and sustaining 
autonomy, as opposed to merely keeping up appearances of doing so. It is important 
to stress that these resources should not only be aimed at supporting and informing 
those who need or wish to exit their cultural group. This would place too much 
emphasis on exit – rendering cultures ‘all or nothing’ entities. In designing such 
mechanisms, resources and support networks, it is important for governments to 
work with cultural groups to foster greater understanding of the opportunities within 
them, and not only the alternatives outside. This strategy also ensures that 
marginalised cultural groups feel less threatened by the state. 
 
It may be argued that interventions, which prohibit individuals from following 
certain cultural practices because they have not been able to make a choice and had 
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152 Appiah: op cit., p. 53. 
153 This particular issue is discussed in much greater depth in Chapter 8. 
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an option to act otherwise, harm or fundamentally disrespect cultural groups. The 
viability of interventions, however, is obviously a matter of scale. The state will not 
simply intervene on banal, everyday decisions. Rather interventions, when necessary 
or requested, focus on life changing circumstances – which may take the form of one 
substantial act, or repeated small acts – examples of such changes in circumstances 
include, marriage or divorce, physical change or long-term changes to appearance, 
deprivation of medical attention or education, etc. If an individual is found not to 
have exercised autonomy on such matters (i.e. through the absence or inability to 
exercise autonomy154) or has requested intervention, then the state possesses the right 
to intervene on their behalf, enshrined in the law, as a matter of individual liberty. It 
should be stressed that this applies to individuals from both the dominant and 
minority cultures. Therefore, by upholding complementary principles of toleration 
and autonomy, the liberal state is able to ensure that individuals are provided with the 
greatest liberty possible to engage with their cultural heritages whilst being protected 
from the pressures of the majority and indeed of their own cultural group. While this 
may seem disrespectful of groups, it must be remembered that the principles outlined 
here still allow for a great scope of cultural heritages to be practiced. However, when 
faced with the choice of upholding toleration or protecting individual will and 
freedom, the right choice – for a liberal state – is clear.  
 
 
A Liberal Conception of the Good  
I began this chapter by outlining a brief definition of liberalism. A liberal state, I 
asserted, is one which does not support any particular conception of the good life, 
allowing individuals instead to remain autonomous in choosing their own ways of 
living. A liberal response to cultural heritage, therefore, is one that is guided 
fundamentally by a norm of non-intervention. This, however, immediately 
necessitates a strong degree of toleration on the part of the governments as well as 
citizens because, with a diversity of goods, there is bound to be conflict about the 
                                                       
154 I include children in this category. Thus, the state may intervene in instances where it objects to 
cultural heritage practices or conventions ‘which may take the form of one substantial act, or repeated 
small acts – examples of such changes in circumstances include, marriage or divorce, physical change 
or long-term changes to appearance, deprivation of medical attention or education, etc’ (taken from 
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proper way to lead one’s life. Though liberal governments may disagree with how 
some groups choose to honour their pasts and lead their own lives, they are under an 
obligation - as liberal governments - not to intervene when they dislike or morally 
object to certain practices and patterns of behaviour.  
 
Yet, despite originating from a position that remained most sympathetic to a response 
of benign neglect, this chapter has also identified circumstances where it is necessary 
for governments to intervene. Strong toleration, I have argued, is distinguished from 
its weaker variant by a refusal, on principle, to intervene in practices that clash with 
understood norms and morals - and vital in allowing a diversity of cultural groups to 
pursue their own conceptions of the good. Nevertheless, the exceptions to non-
intervention outlined here - albeit grounded in liberal values – are equally based on 
moral objections to certain cultural practices. Does this mean that the liberal view 
endorsed here only supports weak toleration? Not at all. What this does highlight, I 
believe, are two things: firstly, toleration (much like autonomy) is a matter of degree; 
and secondly, unless based upon the smallest (and weakest) of governments, a liberal 
state cannot escape from possessing some sort of shared moral standpoint that is 
upheld and enforced by the state. When comparing the work of John Rawls and 
Joseph Raz with that of Chandran Kukathas, I indicated the need to establish a 
balance between the toleration of diversity and individual autonomy. My solution has 
been to endorse and sets limits on both by reinforcing the fundamental issue that is at 
stake – i.e. individual liberty. It is an interest in individual liberty, which both fuels 
and tempers respect for toleration and autonomy. Thus, although a liberal 
government may wish to intervene in certain cultural practices that it deems 
abhorrent, it is a respect for individual freedom that must undermine this desire; and 
while the government too may have certain ideas about how ‘autonomous’ 
individuals are likely to act, it has a duty to respect the decisions that individuals 
make for themselves. Conversely, toleration of cultural practices is limited when it 
becomes clear that an individual has not been granted decision-making power or a 
reasonable alternative. This is a position that clearly places a great deal of emphasis 
on individual choice – both in cultivating a capacity to choose, identifying instances 
where choice and autonomy are absent and providing meaningful alternatives. In 
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ensuring the choice is meaningful, I have stressed the obligation of the liberal state in 
setting up mechanisms for exit – including support networks such as counselling, 
housing, aid and legal advice. Education also plays a crucial role in this process and 
this will be discussed in greater depth in the final chapter. In short, the only ‘moral’ 
that constrains the strong toleration outlined here is the fundamental liberal value of 
individual liberty. As Susan Mendus writes, ‘we ought to tolerate what is morally 
wrong because it is part of being an autonomous agent that one should be allowed to 
do what is morally wrong.’155 While it is true that this does set quite clear limits on 
toleration (indeed, some might argue that this isn’t toleration at all) it is what renders 
the vision of toleration outlined here distinctly liberal. A liberal state’s commitment 
to individual liberty places it under a duty to intervene, as a defensive strategy, and 
ensure that there are meaningful alternatives for individuals to choose from. 
 
This first point leads quite neatly into my second point on the existence of a shared 
liberal viewpoint. Liberalism, I have stressed repeatedly, is a philosophy that aims 
not to promote any particular conception of the good life. It is committed to 
individual liberty – for better or worse. In the spirit of Voltaire’s famous dictum on 
defending a right to free speech, irrespective of the content of that speech – 
liberalism is committed to allowing individuals to pursue their own conception of the 
good. While this is not a conception of the good in itself, it does nevertheless indicate 
some sort of shared viewpoint. Indeed, although Kukathas makes a fair point in terms 
of the extent to which Kymlicka and Rawls presume a shared moral standpoint in 
terms of individual autonomy, we cannot completely reject the notion of shared 
values that are to be upheld by the state as they can play a crucial role in sustaining 
toleration and liberal values. However, these shared values needn’t be the thick, 
substantive, (supposedly) liberal values asserted by Rawls et al and I shall explore 
the extent of these values in the next chapter.  
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Difficult Cases 
It is possible to anticipate a number of difficult scenarios where it is not immediately 
clear how to apply the principles that I have outlined above, for example, instances 
where a clash of ‘incompossible’ cultural goods renders it impossible to practice one 
cultural heritage without violating another, where there is conflict over ownership or 
possession of heritage (such as sacred land) or where it is not immediately clear what 
respect for toleration and autonomy require. Take the ‘cultural’ practices of 
foxhunting within the UK, whaling within Japan, Kosher and Halal butchery within 
Judaism and Islam, or shark-finning within Chinese cultures, for example. For 
proponents of animal rights, these practices entail gross violations of their conception 
of the good. Followers of such practices believe that they form a crucial part of their 
cultural heritage. Yet, without making assumptions about the moral status of animals, 
is difficult to determine what respect for autonomy or toleration entails – indeed, 
both sides in these situations are unlikely to come to a common understanding in this 
regard. In seeking to maintain meaningful engagement with cultural heritage by 
upholding a minority practice, a liberal state in fact undermines its own (i.e. 
dominant) cultural heritage and there is no reason why the one, minority heritage, 
should necessarily take precedence over other heritages. Indeed, there is no reason of 
principle why the dominant practice (or interest) should take precedence or vice 
versa. Bhiku Parekh has suggested four points to consider when a group’s practices 
clash with the cultural norms of the dominant group: 
 
1) [The practice’s] importance to the minority way of life; 
2) the minority’s ability to offer a reasonable defence of it; 
3) the wider society’s operative public values – or, what comes to the same 
thing; 
4) the importance of the relevant value to its way of life; 
5) the society’s ability to offer a reasonable defence of its values.156  
 
In these difficult cases, engaging with cultural heritage (as opposed to merely 
cultures) helps to shed light on possible resolutions to such problems. Although a 
group may claim the historical significance of certain practices, cultural heritage – as 
we have seen in the first chapter – is inherently malleable. Thus, an 
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acknowledgement of this flexible nature of cultural heritage allows us to scrutinise 
whether contested practices are constitutive of group identity, or (merely) subsidiary. 
The fact that some groups will engage with certain practices and objects for a while, 
only to discard them later, reveals the possibility of distinguishing between a group 
and its practices (and other  attributes) – though of course we cannot completely 
separate the two. Unless a group is united only by a particular practice, in most cases 
specific practices and actions (as opposed to the beliefs and understandings that 
underlie them) are likely to be subsidiary; in that they stem from and are not 
necessarily encapsulated by a particular belief in and of itself. This can be 
determined by tracing the history of a practice, the length of time that it has been part 
of a culture, as well as the statistics for what percentage of a cultural group engages 
with the practice – and for what reasons. Conceiving of constitutive and subsidiary 
aspects of a culture undermines ‘groupism’ (something which I will discuss in 
greater detail in Chapter 6) by refusing to treat groups as static, and reinforces the 
notion of culture as an ongoing process. This distinction between constitutive and 
subsidiary aspects of a culture by no means implies that governments should pay 
attention to the former, whilst neglecting the latter. But it does provide a guide for 
action when there is a clash between cultures and a decision over which should take 
precedence needs to be made. It also provides insight to assessing the cost of 
permitting and rejecting certain cultural practices. An example that Bhiku Parekh 
mentions is that of whether Sikhs ought to be able to carry a covered kirpan (or small 
dagger); Parekh argues that where Sikhs are able to carry the kirpan, and others not, 
this is not a matter of discrimination but rather the exercise of religious freedom.157 I 
would argue instead that it is important to examine the significance of carrying the 
kirpan and weighing the significance of this religious freedom against the value and 
purpose of laws against carrying concealed weapons. While the general principle that 
individuals must be free to engage with their cultural heritage maintains, in difficult 
situations where it is not immediately clear what respect for toleration and autonomy 
require, this distinction between constitutive and subsidiary aspects of cultural 
heritage and an analysis of the harm that prohibiting a cultural practice may cause 
can provide a guide for the application of principles in such difficult cases.  
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A further example and perhaps the most frequently cited clash of cultural heritages is 
that of the standard Monday to Friday work week within Western society, which 
ultimately discriminates against Muslims. While many devout Muslims may be able 
to circumvene this issue by seeking employment or schooling that is able to 
accommodate this schedule, children who wish to attend public schools and civil 
servants do not have this option at their disposal. Arguably Friday has quite a 
different significance for Muslims, than Saturday and Sunday have for Jews and 
Christians. It is not regarded as a day of rest, but rather a time for public worship. 
The harm that working or attending school on a Friday does to the cultural identity of 
Muslims is thus open to scruntiny, affecting some more adversely than it does others. 
In such instances it is not really feasible to redesign the work week to accommodate 
this minority of devout Muslims and thus they will either have to conform to 
convention, or seek education and employment in the private sector. This is an 
unfortunate and inevitable outcome. It is important not to ignore the imposed 
financial and ethical costs in such contexts. Recognising the extent to which 
collective identities are historically contingent also entails that if governments do 
have to reject or undermine practices that are associated with particular groups, they 
also need to acknowledge the damage that this may do to the identity of the group as 
an historical community, alienating individuals from their cultural heritage. 
Decisions which will have clear implications on the ability of groups to engage with 
their cultural heritage must take this into account - both when determining public 
policy as well as in framing a rationale for why a particular form of cultural heritage 
is prohibited by the state. Brian Barry is broadly correct in stating that, ‘‘if somebody 
says ‘we’ve been doing this for a long time, ‘the right response may be ‘well, in that 
case it’s high time you stopped doing it.’158 However, it is crucial that the public 
justification of such a response must be framed with a great deal more tact and 
understanding. Even more importantly, however, than acknowledging the costs of 
certain laws and regulations on the practice of cultural heritage, is to remain 
cognisant of the fact that laws and regulations affect people from the same culture in 
different ways. It is for this reason that I reject exemptions from laws for cultural 
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groups in Chapter 6. A liberal response to cultural heritage and, indeed, liberalism 
should respond primarily to the needs of individuals. Thus while I reject the view, 
proposed by Kymlicka et al., that some cultures ought to be excused from certain 
rules and laws, I do believe that in difficult cases it is important to examine the 
context, history and consequences of cultural practices, as well as their bearing on 
individuals and make efforts to undermine the consequences of cultural dominance. 
As mentioned, I shall discuss these issues in Chapter 6. 
 
 
Conclusion 
A liberal response to cultural heritage is guided fundamentally by a norm of non-
intervention, such that although the state does not actively create or preserve cultural 
heritage, it does not impinge upon the freedom of individuals to create or preserve 
cultural heritage should they choose to do so. Indeed, this liberal approach to cultural 
heritage attempted to afford individuals the greatest liberty possible in engaging (or 
not engaging) with their cultural heritage. There are two exceptions to this approach: 
1) interventions to uphold toleration, 2) interventions to uphold individual freedom 
and autonomy.  
 
It may perhaps be asserted that the argument outlined here, by devoting more 
attention to the exceptions to non-intervention than non-intervention itself, (apart 
from saying remarkably little about cultural heritage) has deviated too much from the 
liberal ideal. I do not believe this to be the case. Rather, the position established here 
is one which remains guided by a liberal philosophy but it is also acutely aware of 
the socio-political context within which this philosophy is to be applied. It takes into 
consideration the reality of dominant groups and elites, extremist groups and 
minority cultures, as well as governments that maintain a vested interest in 
promoting a particular cultural identity and conception of the good life. This is not a 
deviation from liberalism, rather it is what makes this response a political liberalism 
– both in the sense of limiting the scope of liberal principles, but also by taking the 
political context in which these principles manifest themselves into account. In the 
next chapter I ‘deviate’ even further from the liberal ideal, but return to engage more 
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firmly with cultural heritage, by situating it firmly within the context of the 
contemporary nation state.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The Necessity of a National 
Heritage 
 
 
 
The fundamental aim of this chapter is to situate the liberal approach to cultural 
heritage, outlined in the previous chapter, within the context of contemporary nation-
states. In the previous chapter I argued that, in order for individuals to engage 
meaningfully with cultural practices and their own conceptions of the good, a liberal 
response to cultural heritage is largely characterised by non-intervention. In this 
chapter, however, I shall demonstrate why placing this liberal response within the 
context of a contemporary nation-state requires recognition that, despite a general 
desire to allow individuals to engage freely with their own heritages, states – 
however liberal – will ultimately end up endorsing certain, frequently national, forms 
of cultural heritage in public places.  
 
The chapter begins with a brief analysis of an array of existing state interventions in 
cultural heritage: objects such as flags, anthems, languages, and symbols are all 
examples of cultural heritage that contemporary states necessarily possess. However, 
in order to understand the substantive content of these public attributes of cultural 
heritage, it is necessary to examine the relationship between cultural heritage and 
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national identity. National identity, as I shall demonstrate, in fact commonly relies 
upon the existence of a particular heritage. Arguably, over the past 200 years, forging 
a link between the state and the nation has been mutually beneficial to both the 
political institutions of the state and national groups. Most nations have sought 
independence through political sovereignty (though some have been content with 
varying degrees of autonomy). States, on the other hand, benefit from the solidarity 
generated by nationalism insofar as a national identity reproduces the ‘natural’ 
relationship between the nation and state. While contemporary nationalism does not 
necessarily manifest itself in grand gestures, and despite recent arguments to the 
contrary, it remains a significant force to be reckoned with within contemporary 
politics. Thus, my work (and indeed any work concerning political identity) must 
engage with nationalism and national identity. In contemporary politics, therefore, 
the identity-grounding practices that states engage in are typically (though not 
necessarily) cast in terms of a national identity for the purposes of approximating a 
fit between the dominant-nation and the state.  
 
My analysis of state interventions in cultural and national heritage therefore leads me 
to assert a key aspect of a liberal response to cultural heritage: all contemporary 
states – liberal or otherwise - require certain, frequently national, attributes of 
cultural heritage that contribute to the construction of a state’s identity. This is a 
pragmatic, non-moral argument. Indeed, a commitment to contextualising liberalism 
within a contemporary (nation-)state necessitates occasional slippage on the liberal 
state’s normative commitment to neutrality.159 Accepting the necessary existence of 
certain (national) public symbols and practices constitutes such a concession. Though 
perhaps philosophically undesirable (at least from a purely liberal perspective), states 
also require a degree of cohesion and shared morality (albeit an extremely thin one). 
This chapter aims to demonstrate how a limited public cultural heritage contributes to 
social cohesion, partly, by facilitating the recognition of liberal values and the role of 
the liberal state and institutions in maintaining these values. This is not so much a 
liberal argument as an argument for how to defend and sustain liberalism and the 
liberal state. The purpose of the liberal project, therefore, lies in negotiating a 
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boundary between accepting politically necessary attributes of cultural heritage and 
largely negating or privatising the forms of cultural heritage that extend beyond this. 
The arguments advanced in the previous chapter still apply – liberal states are under 
a moral obligation to undermine significant instances of cultural dominance and to 
sustain a space for individuals to engage with and revise their conceptions of the 
good life. However, placing this argument within the context of the liberal state 
allows us to recognise the necessity of certain strategies that are geared toward 
upholding liberalism. 
 
 
States and the Necessity of a Cultural Heritage  
All states necessarily possess what might reasonably be described as cultural 
attributes that are manifested in the public realm. I say reasonably, in this context, 
because while these attributes are conceived of as cultural, they are of a 
fundamentally political nature. These attributes contribute to, and reinforce, the 
identity of the state both domestically and internationally, to the extent that we might 
say that governments have an inherent interest in taking an active role in framing this 
identity. Examining the parameters along which a state’s identity can be framed 
brings cultural aspects of identity into the picture. Although cultural heritage by no 
means provides the only source for political identity, it can and, indeed, has played a 
crucial role in the formation of a state’s identity. The notion of inherited knowledge, 
practices, symbols and shared experiences lends credence to the perceived legitimacy 
of the state and its government. The extent to which a government’s interest in 
controlling the state’s political identity is a legitimate concern, however, is another 
matter. In this section, I am not interested in justifying the potentially identity-
building practices that governments engage in – nor am I specifically discussing 
liberal states. Rather, my purpose here is to set up a fundamental premise that all 
states rely upon cultural heritage for the construction of a political identity. 
 
In a previous chapter I demonstrated the political significance of cultural heritage. 
The precedent of state interventions in cultural heritage (from cultural policy, to 
iconoclasm, and school curriculums, to the prohibition of certain forms of cultural 
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heritage) necessarily renders cultural heritage – or at least some forms of it – a 
political matter. It is necessary to explore the relationship between cultural heritage 
and contemporary states in greater depth. Ranging from banal to monumental, 
everyday to extraordinary, flags, anthems, languages and symbols, museums, the 
iconography on currency and public holidays, are just some of the examples of state-
sponsored cultural heritage. Cultural heritage, it must be remembered, is defined in 
this research as tangible and intangible objects and practices that are perceived as 
representing significant experiences and inherited knowledge and belonging to a 
particular people – and in this context, obviously, the people in question are the 
citizens of the state. Thus the flag, anthems, public holidays etc are presented in 
terms of their historical significance to all citizens of a particular state. They are 
perceived as meaningful because of their link to historical experience. 
 
All of these political attributes mentioned just now are necessary components of 
contemporary sovereign states; to the extent that we could not conceive of a state 
without, for example, a flag or certain set of symbols.160 These objects of cultural 
heritage help constitute and reaffirm part of what we regard as the political identity 
of a state, and as such, are primarily of a political nature and subject to governmental 
control. These attributes are necessary both on an international and state level. On the 
international level, within a system of sovereign states, such attributes represent each 
state as equal but distinct from others. As I noted in a previous chapter, the 
collections of state art museums illustrates this: fundamentally similar in character, 
state art museums compete to accumulate works of universal acclaim.161 Equally, one 
further example is the singing of anthems at international sporting events. At an 
international level, such attributes are indicative of equal sovereign status (i.e. the 
performance is a matter of respect) as well as the distinctive character and identity of 
the particular state and its citizens. But this notion of legitimacy operates at a state 
level as well; the everyday presence of certain state symbols162, as well as the 
extraordinary events of mourning and celebration, as objects of cultural heritage, 
                                                       
160 Note that I am not making a comment on the sources of this culture – i.e. from above or below, 
elites vs. masses etc. 
161 McClellan in Wright, G. (1996): op cit.,p.34. 
162 I shall discuss this point of banal (national) identity is a later section focusing on the work of 
Michael Billig. 
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facilitate the construction of a relationship between the state and its citizens – in the 
sense that people come to associate these objects and practices with the state.  The 
presence of these objects therefore both reflects and reinforces a link to the state. 
 
Given the role that these attributes can play in forging a relationship between citizens 
and the state – as well as distinguishing states from each other, we can see why 
governments have an interest in taking an active role in constructing a public cultural 
heritage. The repetition of symbols and icons suggests both the stability and 
legitimacy of the state and its government. In this manner cultural heritage can be 
manipulated and framed for sustaining security, stability and cohesion. So, on one 
hand, we might have certain symbols on coins, flags and public buildings; an anthem 
to be sung at official events; specific public holidays and so on – things that we 
might regard as essential to contemporary states. On the other, however, there is 
scope for much greater intervention in the identity of a state – for example publicly 
funded monuments, heritage conservation, art museums, ceremonies, oaths. The first 
citizenship ceremony, for instance, was held in the UK in 2004. Whereas an oath or 
affirmation of allegiance was previously made privately, citizenship ceremonies now 
entail a public oath of allegiance (or affirmation) and a pledge of loyalty to the 
reigning British monarch and British laws and values: 
 
Oath of allegiance - I (name) swear by Almighty God that on becoming a 
British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty 
Queen Elizabeth the Second, her Heirs and Successors, according to law. 
 
Affirmation of allegiance - I (name) do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare 
and affirm that on becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true 
allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her Heirs and 
Successors, according to law. 
 
Pledge - I will give my loyalty to the United Kingdom and respect its rights 
and freedoms. I will uphold its democratic values. I will observe its laws 
faithfully and fulfill my duties and obligations as a British citizen.163 
                                                       
163 For further details see http://legacy.london.gov.uk/view_press_release.jsp?releaseid=19779; and 
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Intuitively, however, there seem to be some objects and practices that are more 
necessary than others, in the sense that their absence would disrupt the ordinary 
functioning of the state in transactions between citizens and the state and amongst 
states. Such necessary attributes might include: an official language/languages; a 
national flag; public holidays; symbols and icons for objects such as currency and 
coinage. Other objects and practices, e.g. a national curriculum that constructs a 
particular narrative of the nation’s history and values, seem to go beyond this ‘base-
line’. Context and frequency also obviously play a role here too – for it is one thing 
to have a national flag on public buildings and a national anthem that is sung at 
extraordinary occasions, but quite another to have this flag displayed on every street 
corner and the anthem sung at the beginning and end of every day. For the time 
being, distinguishing between flags, on one hand, and oaths, on the other, seems 
largely arbitrary. Though in practice this is likely to take a lot of time and effort, let 
us simply assume for now that it is possible to distinguish certain necessary 
attributes, from other ‘state-building’ objects and practices. I shall return to this issue 
in a subsequent section. 
 
Although we must accept that all states will possess certain attributes that contribute 
to the construction of an identity, and that these attributes are frequently the 
consequences of considered policies, the issue of the legitimacy of such actions is not 
one that I am interested in responding to at this point – nevermind about the 
legitimacy of these attributes in a liberal state. Rather, having demonstrated that 
these are prerequisites of contemporary states, my concern here is with how to 
negotiate both the content of these attributes, as well as the extent of their exposure 
in the political landscape. These concerns are made easier and more difficult at the 
same time, given that my project is intended to be a liberal one. Guidance on how to 
broach the issue of state identity comes from the liberal proviso that any outcome 
must not prefer to any particular conception of the good life. However, this 
complicates the task at hand because the state attributes which I have just described 
appear to do precisely this. Yet, one thing at this point is clear – in order for a 
political theory of cultural heritage to retain relevance for contemporary politics, it is 
necessary to accept the presence of certain forms of cultural heritage in public spaces 
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because for as long as the current state system exists, we can also safely assume that 
states will draw upon such objects and practices to distinguish themselves from other 
states and reinforce a particular identity. But before I may turn to examining the 
ramifications of these attributes for liberal states, it is necessary to add one further 
variable into the equation, and this is the continued significance of nationalism and 
nation-states. For we do not speak of state anthems, flags, languages and teams – but 
rather of national anthems, national flags, national languages and national teams.  
 
 
States and National Identities 
In the previous section I outlined the necessity of engaging with an understanding of 
the state that relies upon some degree of cultural heritage in the construction of its 
identity. Thus, we must begin with – rather than attempt to reject – the premise that 
all states require, domestically and internationally, certain attributes – such as a flag, 
symbols, icons and public holidays. In this section, I wish to clarify the content of 
these attributes and, in doing so, I shall be asserting the continued validity of nations 
and nationalism in contemporary politics. This is because, as noted above, we tend to 
think of these political attributes of the state in terms of their national significance; 
and this manner of thinking about the identity of the state is revealing as it indicates 
the persistence of an association of nation with state.164 Indeed, for the forseeable 
future, on cannot imagine states forgoing a particular identity, and preferring to refer 
to themselves as mere numbers, distinguishable only by land mass, resources and 
population size. A particular national identity continues to have a very powerful 
significance for states. Thinking about nations and nationalism, however, 
contextualises a state’s intervention in cultural heritage in terms of a dominant – 
often national – group, existing alongside other national, cultural and ethnic groups 
within the state. Drawing upon the work of Margaret Canovan, I shall begin with a 
brief examination of the elusiveness of the nation in contemporary theorising about 
the state. I shall then proceed to define nationalism as employed within this work, 
and its relationship with the state, before turning finally to assert the continued 
                                                       
164 I do not wish to determine or take a stance of the content of this identity – i.e. whether it is civic or 
ethnic. 
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significance of national identity within states and discuss the implications that this 
has for a theory of cultural heritage. 
 
I begin with the work of Margaret Canovan, fundamentally, because she helps to 
illustrate the extent to which conceptions of the nation remain hidden within political 
theory, but also because I wish to highlight the significance of the shift from an ideal 
state to an (arguably, not terribly ideal) nation-state. Canovan writes, ‘underneath the 
discourse of democratic theory, presupposed by talk of people, representation and 
citizenship, lie assumptions about the existence of bounded, unified political 
communities that seem suspiciously like nation-states.’165 She lists three features of 
theories that implicitly rely upon a conception of bounded community: 
 
1. The existence of a polity resting upon sufficient generalized trust to outweigh 
the bonds of kin, caste, religion or ethnicity and to make possible equal laws, 
public probity and government that is effective but impartial 
2. Social justice as requiring collective resources and communal solidarity 
3. Democracy as requiring trust, common sympathies and the capacity to act as 
a collective people to undertake commitments and acquire obligations166 
 
Canovan clearly targets liberal political theorists in her work, and I believe that she 
has a point here. A great deal of liberal political theory either implicitly or explicitly 
relies upon the existence of a coherent community. As Craig Calhoun writes,  
 
‘[Liberal political theory] is grounded implicitly but deeply in the 
presumption of states and nationalist ideas of how these relate to peoples. Yet 
it is also deeply committed to ideas of liberty and rights framed largely in 
individualistic terms. On the one hand there is a long tradition of work on 
‘getting governance right.’ On the other hand there is a long tradition of 
debunking nationalism as the source of either state legitimacy or citizen 
solidarity.’167  
 
Canovan finds that even the most restrained forms of liberalism – that do not possess 
any degree of communitarianism and are dedicated to limiting the state - presuppose 
                                                       
165 Canovan, M. (1996): Nationhood and Political Theory, (Surrey: Edward Elgar), p.27 – emphasis 
added. 
166 Canovan (1996): op cit., p.44. 
167 Calhoun, C. (2007): Nations Matter, (London: Routledge), p.7. 
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a kind of political community.168 Thus, Canovan argues, we must engage with 
nationhood. Yet, while I do agree with Canovan’s conclusion on the need to consider 
the role of nationalism, her shift from ‘bounded communities’ to ‘nations’, as largely 
based upon ‘suspicions’, is not a convincing one. It is never made authoritatively 
clear why such bounded communities are necessarily national communities.169 
Nevertheless, Canovan’s underlying sentiment on the need to engage more explicitly 
with nationalism is one that I wish to take seriously. Given, however, that she does 
not succeed in demonstrating why the bounded communities required by political 
theories equals to nation-states, it is necessary to look elsewhere for inspiration in 
justifying a necessary engagement with nationalism – and for this I turn briefly to 
‘empirical’ observation. My rationale behind this is not to assert the necessity of a 
national identity, but rather the probability of one. (I cannot and do not wish, at this 
point, to reject the possibility that a bounded community may well find its origins 
outside of a nation.) But before I may do this, it is worth setting out a brief definition 
of nationalism. 
 
A Brief Definition of Nationalism 
In defining nationalism I rely upon John Breuilly’s definition of it as an inherently 
political matter. Nationalism is about the attainment of power as manifested in 
control over the state (though some nations have been content with various forms of 
autonomy) – the central issue, according to Breuilly is thus the relationship between 
nationalism and the ‘objective of obtaining and using state power.’170 Breuilly writes, 
 
‘Nationalism cannot be linked to any particular type of cultural attribute or 
social arrangement; or to any particular structure of communications; or to 
any particular class interest; or to any particular economic relationship; or to 
any particular psychological state or need; or to any particular social function 
or objective…nationalism is a form of politics.’171 
                                                       
168 Canovan (1996): op cit., p.37. 
169 NB Kukathas, LA, p.27 also makes this point regarding Miller. 
170 Breuilly, J. (1993): Nationalism and the State, (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p.2. 
171 Breuilly (1993): op cit., p.35-6. I should probably clarify, at this point, that my reliance here on 
John Breuilly’s understanding of nationalism should not be regarded as a stance on the ongoing debate 
within the field of nationalism between ‘modernists’ and ‘ethno-symbolists.’ Given the pervasiveness 
of this debate within the field of nationalism studies, however, it is important to provide an extremely 
brief clarification for those not acquainted with it. ‘Ethno-symbolists’ such as Anthony Smith and 
John Hutchinson, by placing an emphasis on inherited myths, symbols, traditions and collective 
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Given, therefore, that nationalism is fundamentally about the desire for political 
power, Breuilly notes that, ‘once a nationalist, or even merely a national, opposition 
takes control of the state the specifically nationalist character of politics tends to 
diminish…in such a situation nationalism as a specific form of politics becomes 
meaningless.’172 This would appear to weaken the ties that I wish to establish 
between nationalism and the state. Breuilly, however, goes on to note that there are 
four exceptions to this: 1) Separatist movements; 2) ‘nation-building’ and an attack 
upon identities and loyalties which are believed to conflict with national 
commitment; 3) unification nationalist movements; 4) radical right challenges173 - 
and to greater and lesser extents it is precisely these four exceptions that my project 
is broadly concerned with here. Nationalism is thus inherently tied to the state. As 
Craig Calhoun writes,  
 
‘Nationalism grew hand in hand with modern states and was basic to a new 
way of claiming political legitimacy. States furthered social integration 
among their subjects by building roads, mobilizing militaries, sponsoring 
education, and standardizing languages. But they were also shaped by a 
cultural change which introduced a new, stronger idea of ‘the people’ who 
were both governed by and served by a state…political legitimacy was to 
‘ascend’ from the people rather than descend from God or proper dynastic 
ancestry. This placed a new stress on who the people might be…the idea of 
nation came to the forefront. It represented the ‘people’ of a country as an 
internally unified group with common interests and the capacity to act.’174  
 
Thus, nationalism has helped to provide a particular solution to an age-old problem 
of approximating a fit between the people and the state. As John Breuilly notes, a 
                                                                                                                                                           
memories, maintain that nations have ethnic roots as their source; while ‘modernists’, such as John 
Breuilly and Ernest Gellner, reject this view, and instead situate contemporary claims to nationhood 
firmly with a modern context, such that nations are invented by nationalists as a response to the major 
transformations that have arisen in modernity. In considering how governments can relate and should 
respond to cultural heritage, and adopting a fundamentally top-down approach – i.e. I am looking at 
how states should react to identity building practices, and not the possibility of whether this identity 
can come from ‘below’171 - my work easily fits within a modernist framework. Yet, by engaging with 
a cultural heritage which encompasses myths, memories and traditions, my work also resonates deeply 
with ethno-symbolism. I believe that my agreement here, with the idea of nationalism as a political 
phenomenon, should not raise objections from ethno-symbolists who cannot possibly reject the extent 
to which nationalism is a claim to power. 
172 Breuilly: op cit., p.221. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Calhoun (2007): op cit., p.48 – emphasis added. 
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nationalist ideology (used to justify nationalism) is especially successful for creating 
this fit for a number of reasons:  
 
1) The ideology itself finds its basis in the ‘intellectual responses to the modern 
problem between state and society’ – fundamentally historicist in nature – the 
ideology is successful because it appears intellectually plausible175;  
2) A rational connection between the cultural and political concept of the nation 
is never made. Instead, ‘by a sort of sleight of hand it appears to demonstrate 
the proposition that each nation should have its nation-state.’176; 
3) In doing so, there is no need to distinguish between culture and politics, 
society and state, public and private. ‘The nationalist has access to a whole 
range of sentiments, idioms and practices which would hitherto have been 
regarded as irrelevant to politics but are now turned into the values 
underlying political action.’177 
4) Finally, a nationalist ideology is successful because ‘it has a quality of self-
reference which is largely missing from socialist or religious ideology. 
Nationalists celebrate themselves.’178  
 
Therefore, having provided an outline in the first section of this essay as to how 
states rely upon conceptions of cultural heritage for a political identity, my 
discussion of nationalism helps to approximate what exactly may provide the content 
for this identity. Indeed, as Anthony Smith notes, it is the notion of a national 
‘historic community’ which assists in sustaining political stability.  
 
‘The pressing need to integrate culturally diverse peoples into a politically 
unified citizenry requires constant use of the mass media and the educational 
system on the part of bureaucrats and technocrats, in order to instil the 
appropriate civil sentiments of fraternity and solidarity. But solidarity must be 
based upon an historic culture, which cannot be created by revolutionary fiat. 
Hence the need to incorporate pre-existing cultural traditions into the new 
political culture, secularising and changing their meanings to accord with the 
new vision of the political community.179 
 
                                                       
175 Breuilly: op cit., p.350. 
176 Breuilly: op cit., p.342. 
177 Breuilly: op cit., p.350. 
178 Breuilly: op cit., p.344. 
179Smith, A. (1981): The Ethnic Revival, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.194 – emphasis 
added. Of course, he also goes on to reject the success of such tactics: ‘The political myths of the post-
revolutionary, modern, period, have proved to be insufficient to the task of welding poly-ethnic states 
together; even in more monoethnic states, there have been periodic rediscoveries of an historic culture 
as an indispensible basis for communal regeneration.’ 
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There is a strong case, therefore, for the capacity of a national identity (as a form of 
political identity) to successfully forge a link between a people and the institutions of 
the state. This is not, of course, to say that states have a legitimate interest in 
promoting a national identity. Recognising the significance of nations does not 
necessarily render this a liberal nationalist argument. Much as in the previous 
section, my argument here is not of a normative nature. Rather, given that states 
necessarily rely upon certain attributes for the construction of an identity, we need to 
engage with the power of national identities as serious contenders for providing the 
substantive content of these political attributes. I would, however, like to go one step 
further than simply recognising the relevance of a national identity for modern states. 
I would like to demonstrate that the identity that states possess (in their most basic 
and necessary attributes – flags, currency, anthems etc) are frequently of a national 
character. Note, once again, that this is a descriptive statement of how many states 
are, and not a normative claim of what they should be. The purpose of this is to 
legitimise my preoccupation with national solidarity (as opposed to a vaguer notion 
of ‘social’ or ‘community’ solidarity) in the latter half of this chapter. In what 
remains of this section, therefore, I wish to 1) mount a case for the continued 
significance of nationalism in contemporary politics, 2) consider the manner in 
which contemporary nationalism is manifested. In the next section of this chapter, I 
will examine the relationship between nationalism and cultural heritage, in order to 
reinforce an understanding of the ties between a national identity and the institutions 
of the state. 
 
 
The Continued Significance of Nations and National Identity 
The international system today remains fundamentally characterised by a system of 
states built upon the principle of sovereignty and national self-determination. Given 
the increase of global transactions and transformations that have been assisted by 
technological developments over the latter half of the twentieth century, however, it 
might perhaps be more prudent to speak instead of a cosmopolitan or global identity 
- which transcends national and state boundaries. While I do not query the 
emergence of such identities, I do maintain that this emergence is not at the complete 
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expense of nations and national identities. I agree with Craig Calhoun, who writes 
that, ‘globalization challenges nation-states and intensifies flows across borders, but 
it doesn’t automatically make them matter less.’180 Calhoun puts forward two 
significant arguments in defending the ongoing importance of nations. Firstly, he is 
sceptical about the existence of cosmopolitanism. Calhoun notes that, rather than 
finding its basis in abstract universalism, much of existing cosmopolitanism depends 
as much on an amalgamation of older traditions, as it does on the production of new 
ones.181 While Calhoun by no means rejects cosmopolitanism182, he takes issue both 
with its scope and effect, noting for instance on the European Union that, 
 
‘while European integration might be “post” the specific nation-state projects 
dominant for the last 300 years, it is not at all clear that it does not involve a 
new project of much the same kind, rather than fundamentally 
different….One could see the European Union as potentially a further 
centralization of political power and integration of both state administration 
and civil society of much the same sort as that which made modern France or 
Germany out of once less unified often warring smaller polities.’183  
 
Secondly, and perhaps more compellingly, Calhoun also argues for the ongoing 
significance of nationalism in the way that it continues to structure our conceptions 
of the world.184 Importantly, as we shall see later, Calhoun is not using nationalist 
arguments in support of nationalism; he is willing to acknowledge the normative 
problems with nationalism.185 However, for Calhoun, given the extent to which 
nationalism continues to support our understandings of the state, society and 
international relations – as well as our own roles within these structures, ‘it is 
important not to imagine [nationalism] as exceptional, about to vanish, a holdover 
                                                       
180 Calhoun (2007): op cit., p.16. 
181 Calhoun (2007): op cit., p.23. 
182 See Calhoun (2007): op cit., p.26 ‘not of entirely abandoning cosmopolitanism because we cannot 
act effectively without it. Nor should we want to abandon it, since it enshrines many important ideas 
like the equal worth of all human beings and – at least potentially – the value of cultural and social 
diversity.’  
183 Calhoun (2007): op cit., p.16. 
184 Ibid., p.27. 
185 Ibid, p.46 ‘the idea that nations give states clearly identifiable and meaningfully integrated 
populations, which in turn are the base of their legitimacy, is as problematic as it is influential. It is of 
course an empirically tendentious claim. But it is part of a discursive formation that structures the 
world, not simply an external description of it. See also Calhoun, p.149; ‘we may doubt both the 
capacities of nation-states and the morality of many versions of nationalism, but we lack realistic and 
attractive alternatives….’  
4. The Necessity of a National Heritage  
 
114 
 
from an earlier era lacking in contemporary basis,’ – Calhoun adds, ‘it is hardly good 
scholarship to wish nationalism away.’186 In response to Hobsbawm’s et al’s call to 
resist the formation of national myths, Calhoun notes that drawing upon fantasy does 
not make national myths, or indeed nations, any less real.187 He goes on to argue that 
it is a ‘sociological misunderstanding’ to believe that the reality of nations depends 
on their accurate self-representation.188 Thus, nations and national identity continue 
to matter fundamentally because we continue to conceive of them. 
 
Although it is impossible to fully verify this latter hypothesis of Calhoun’s, I believe 
that it is a powerful argument for the continued significance of nationalism and 
national identity. Even the most vehement supporters of globalisation would be 
reluctant to claim that national identities are completely irrelevant. But to strengthen 
my case for the prevalence of nationalism within contemporary states, I would now 
like to discuss the manner in which nationalism is present in contemporary, 
predominantly liberal western states by referring to Michael Billig’s understanding 
of ‘banal nationalism.’ 
 
In arguing for the continued significance of nationalism in framing our understanding 
of social relations, Craig Calhoun notes that those who argue against his thesis fail to 
see ‘everyday nationalism’189, and it is this notion of everyday, banal nationalism 
which is the focus of Michael Billig’s work. Billig asserts,  
 
‘Banal nationalism is introduced to cover the ideological habits which enable 
the established nations of the West to be reproduced. It is argued that these 
habits are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have supposed. 
Daily, the nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizenry. 
Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is 
the endemic condition.’190  
 
According to Billig, the perception that nationalism is no longer relevant can be 
attributed to an understanding of nationalism as ‘extraordinary, politically charged 
                                                       
186 Ibid., p27. 
187 Calhoun (2003): ‘The Variability of Belonging: Reply to Brubaker’ in Ethnicities (3:558), p.561. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Calhoun,(2007), op cit., p.27. 
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and emotionally driven.’191 By contrast, normalcy within the state is taken to be 
‘banal, unexciting politically and non-nationalist.’192 A lack of extra-ordinary 
nationalist sentiment thus implies a lack of nationalism. Billig, however, finds that 
nationalism within a number of western societies has become inherently ‘banal’; 
embedded in everyday routines, nationalism has become a familiar part of the 
environment, such that it operates ‘mindlessly, rather than mindfully.’193 To prove 
his point, Billig describes the role of flags in public places as well as the syntax 
adopted by newspapers (‘we, the people’; ‘our, fellow country-men’; ‘our team’; and 
‘our weather’).194 Although we do not necessarily acknowledge our nationality in 
grand gestures, (Billig in fact contests the ability of these occasional gestures to 
sustain national identity195) nationalism persists on a subconscious level and shows 
no sign of abating. Billig’s work on ‘banal’ nationalism is important because it helps 
us understand how nationalism manifests itself within much of the western world. It 
also provides support for the continued significance of nationalism. As noted at the 
beginning of this section, we do not speak of state holidays, teams and anthems – but 
rather national holidays, national teams and national anthems.  
 
It is important, however, not to exaggerate the pervasiveness of national identity. 
Will Kymlicka, for example, defines societal culture as follows:  
 
‘a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across 
the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, 
recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private 
spheres. There cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a 
shared language. I have called these ‘societal cultures’ to emphasize that they 
involve not just shared memories or values, but also common institutions and 
practices’196 
 
According to Kymlicka, societal cultures play a crucial role because, ‘freedom 
involves making choices amongst various options, and our societal culture not only 
                                                       
191 Billig, op cit., p.44. 
192 Billig, op cit., p.44. 
193 Billig, op cit., p.38. 
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provides these options, but also makes them meaningful to us.’197 As such, ‘the 
choice to leave one’s culture can be seen as analogous to the choice to take a vow of 
perpetual poverty and enter a religious order.’198 Kymlicka, in fact, explicitly draws 
upon the work of Ronald Dworkin in elaborating upon the significance of a societal 
culture, he notes furthermore that: 
 
‘To understand the meaning of a shared practice, therefore, requires 
understanding this ‘shared vocabulary’ – that is, understanding the language and 
history which constitute that vocabulary. Whether or not a course of action has 
any significance for us depends on whether, and how, our language renders vivid 
to us the point of that activity. And the way in which language renders vivid these 
activities is shaped by our history, our ‘traditions and conventions’. 
Understanding these cultural narratives is a precondition of making intelligent 
judgements about how to lead our lives. In this sense, our culture not only 
provides options, it also ‘provides the spectacles through which we identify 
experiences as valuable’199 
 
From this, and indeed as Kymlicka himself explicitly notes, it is clear that a societal 
culture is almost necessarily a national one. Equally clear is the fact that Kymlicka 
regards such societal cultures as coherent, more or less mutually exclusive and 
central to an individual’s conception of the good. Our membership within a societal – 
i.e. national - culture largely provides us with the source for understanding particular 
ways of living. Kymlicka exaggerates both the coherence and pervasiveness of 
national identity. As Jon Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss note:  
 
‘National catastrophes, wars and, not least of all, international sporting 
events, provide important contexts for everyday articulations of the nation. 
Ordinary people recognize, interpret and align themselves with pressing 
issues in explicitly national terms. But most of the time, the nation is not 
something ordinary people talk about; rather it’s something they talk with… 
The nation does not resonate evenly across time or space; it comes to matter 
in certain ways at particular times for different people. The question this 
shifts from ‘what is the nation’ to ‘when is the nation’? When – in what 
situations – does the category of nation become a salient frame for routine 
talk and interaction? The answer, it turns out, is not very often. Most of the 
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time nationhood does not frame people’s understandings of themselves, their 
interactions, or their predicaments.’200 
 
Thus, nations continue to matter – especially when most people think about political 
or state identities. However, they don’t matter all the time and certainly not to the 
extent that Will Kymlicka envisages. This sociological misunderstanding has distinct 
ramifications for Kymlicka’s own thesis – and I shall return to discuss these in a later 
chapter. 
 
The extent to which nationalism operates at a sub-conscious level – and indeed more 
generally within society - must, however, be distinguished from a particular form of 
national identity which is imposed or, minimally, controlled by the state. These are 
two related, but rather different things: to speak of nationalism, is to speak of a 
certain political force that frames our conceptions of the world; nation-building – and 
the sort of nation-building that I am interested in here – is not so much about the 
prevalence of certain ways of thinking, as it is about a particular form of control. 
Billig’s study of subconscious nationalism is a convincing one, but it is not primarily 
concerned with the state’s calculated efforts to inculcate this identity.201 This chapter, 
by contrast, is concerned with liberal forms of control over a state’s identity. So, it is 
important to distinguish between the presence of nationalism and a sense of 
affiliation to a nation, and a more normative account of how states should respond to 
this affiliation. Before moving onto the latter point in the second half of this chapter, 
it has been necessary to discuss the former.  
 
This section has demonstrated that despite the prevalence of globalism, nationalism 
remains a significant force in politics. As we have seen, nationalism is political 
matter; a national identity is thus also a political identity. I have, however, been at 
pains to say that this point is not intended to justify a state’s promotion of a national 
identity. Rather, my desire here has been to clarify the relationship between the state 
and a national identity. In contemporary politics the identity-grounding practices that 
states engage in are typically cast in terms of a national identity for the purposes of 
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approximating a fit between the dominant-nation and the state. Although I cannot 
prove that this is a necessary connection – that a state’s identity is necessarily and 
always a national one202, I have attempted to build up a case for a close engagement 
with a state’s national identity by considering the ongoing significance of nation-
states as well as the manner in which nationalism has become manifested in everyday 
life. It is important to recognise the ramifications of this step, because 
acknowledging the continuing validity of nationalism, entails an acceptance of the 
likelihood that a state’s political identity will contain elements of the nation. This is 
especially the case for political attributes that are constituted by aspects of cultural 
heritage (as demonstrated in the first section of this chapter). In the following 
section, therefore, I shall attempt to develop a clearer picture of the relationship 
between the state and a national identity by examining the relationship between 
cultural heritage and national identity. 
 
 
National Identity, Cultural Heritage and Nation-states 
In the previous section I attempted to support the claim that nationalism remains a 
significant force in contemporary politics. My rationale was to justify an engagement 
with national identity when considering the state’s relationship with cultural heritage. 
Although I have attempted to demonstrate the persistence of close ties between 
nations and states, I have also been at pains to state that these links are not necessary 
ones. In other words, I do not wish to exclude the possibility of a state’s bonds of 
solidarity being constituted by something other than a national identity. My 
argument thus far has been 1) that certain necessary attributes of contemporary states 
which assist in the construction of a political identity must be regarded as cultural 
heritage (i.e. the cultural heritage of the state); 2) that the construction of a political 
identity frequently relies upon a national identity. It is my intention to strengthen 
these two arguments in this current section by examining the relationship between 
national identity and cultural heritage, and from here will move to discuss the 
implications of cultural nationalism for the nation-state. 
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It is commonly acknowledged that nations have a vested interest in demonstrating 
the existence of an established history and heritage. Anthony Smith describes an 
ethnic community as distinguished (both by members and outsiders) as possessing: 
 
1. an identifying name or emblem; 
2. a myth of common ancestry 
3. shared historical memories and traditions; 
4. one of more elements of common culture; 
5. a link with an historic territory or ‘homeland’; 
6. a measure of solidarity, at least among elites.203 
 
Cultural heritage clearly forms a fundamental basis for nations and a national 
identity. Indeed an ethnic account of the origins of nations relies upon an 
understanding of cultural heritage as necessary for sustaining an ethno-national 
identity. None more so perhaps, than myths of the nation. Anthony Smith writes, 
 
‘These meanings and visions are encapsulated in distinctive ethnic myths 
which, like all myth, bring together in a single potent vision elements of 
historical fact and legendary elaboration to create an overriding commitment 
and bond for the community…no national movement and no persisting ethnic 
identity can emerge without a bedrock of shared meanings and ideals, which 
guide action and determine the direction of social change.’204 
 
Smith argues convincingly that no national movement can emerge (and presumably 
be sustained) without the existence of some body of knowledge which accounts for 
the origins of the people. Yet, the value of cultural heritage for national identity is by 
no means limited to accounts of ethno-nationalists. Indeed modernists, such as John 
Breuilly, recognise the significance of a cultural identity for nationalism – though, of 
course, Breuilly is also keen to point out that it is nationalists (as opposed to a pre-
existing ethnie) who attempt to exploit this identity.205 Breuilly also notes, 
 
‘To work effectively as a popular political ideology it needs simplification, 
repetition and concreteness. It is because nationalist ideology is particularly 
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adaptive in these ways that it can have great popular appeal. Simplification 
involves above all the construction of stereotypes. There are stereotypes of 
the nation in terms of history or racial characteristics or cultural practices as 
well as stereotypes of enemies. Repetition through speeches, newspaper 
articles, rallies, songs, etc. is an essential part of the work of a nationalist 
party. The turning of these simplified and repeated themes into concrete form 
is achieved primarily through symbolism and ceremonial.’206 
 
We can see therefore that, despite their disagreements over the origins of 
nationalism, both ethno-symbolists and modernists can accept that cultural heritage 
can play a powerful role in the construction of a national identity. Yet, as noted 
above, I am primarily interested in the relationship between a national identity and 
actions of the state; and not nationalism in general – so it is necessarily to bring my 
discussion back to the context of the (nation-)state.  
 
In the first section of this chapter, I demonstrated the necessity, both domestically 
and internationally, of a state’s political identity – a significant part of which must be 
regarded as interventions207 in cultural heritage; in the second section I attempted to 
establish a correlation (though not a necessary one) between the state and a national 
identity; finally, in this section, I underlined the significance of cultural heritage in 
the construction of this identity by demonstrating how a national identity relies upon 
the existence of cultural heritage. My overall concern in this chapter, however, it 
must be remembered, is with a liberal state that endorses a particular (national) 
identity. I have not, as of yet, brought liberalism into the picture. I shall do so very 
soon, but before I do, I would briefly like to consider the implications of the 
prevalence of nationalism and its reliance on cultural heritage for states and loyalties 
to the state. 
 
While we can perhaps understand why governments might perceive a vested interest 
in fostering loyalty by promoting a particular account of the people, it is worth 
speculating (for this is all that we can possibly do) about the success of state – i.e. 
imposed, top down - efforts to inculcate a national identity. It is on this specific topic 
that John Breuilly writes: 
                                                       
206 Breuilly: op cit., p344 – emphasis added. 
207 Both implicit and explicit. 
4. The Necessity of a National Heritage  
 
121 
 
 
‘Common sense would suggest that too much of it can be counter-productive and 
may result in a rather bored, sceptical, apolitical but discreet view of affairs…I 
am led to the tentative conclusion that, unless there are existing features in the 
political and economic arrangements of the country conducive to the 
establishment of a strong sense of national identity, the politics of cultural 
engineering will have very little effect on the population... Its effects in this area 
are probably confined to reinforcing an existing sense of national solidarity. But 
such a sense is more likely to be promoted by processes beyond the control or 
even understanding of nationalists.’208  
 
Debating the politics of identity-building, to some extent, requires a degree of 
assumption about the success of such practices. Recall that Michal Billig’s account 
of the prevalence of nationalism relied fundamentally upon a subconscious 
association with the nation – one which was not inherently imposed by the state. 
Billig’s account thus tacitly endorses Breuilly’s scepticism about the success of 
active ‘top-down’ nation-building. Even Anthony Smith, who as we have seen 
inherently ties (an ethno) national identity with cultural heritage and the state, 
recognises the limited ‘success’ of imposing a national identity: 
 
‘Unfortunately, the standardization and replication of the scientific ‘nation’-
states that normalisation entails, preserves the outward show of national 
differences while eroding the community’s historical way of life and 
attenuating the intimacy of collective action and the glow of shared myths 
and symbols. Culture is sundered from everyday life, as more and more areas 
of life become impregnated with scientific assumptions and rationalist 
norms.’209  
 
For Smith, as we have seen, the power of nationalism and a national identity largely 
lies in its mythical and irrational character. Attempting to institute aspects of a 
national identity within the structure of the state will only, therefore, have a limited 
effect, because formalising and rationalising a national identity, largely deprives it of 
its emotive power. 
 
Indeed while people may come to accept the presence of certain symbols and 
traditions as representative of the state, to what extent are people aware of their 
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deeper meaning? This distinction between a sense of belonging and an understanding 
of what belonging means is highlighted by discussions on citizenship tests. The 
British media, for example, is often quick to point out that foreigners seeking British 
citizenship are expected to have an understanding of ‘Britishness’ that most ‘natives’ 
do not possess themselves.210 Do the proponents of nation-building ask for too much 
when they construct an identity that is to be fully comprehended (and not merely 
grasped)? This has strong implications for my acceptance of certain public attributes 
as falling below the baseline of what we might consider as nation-building. Prudence 
suggests that governments will never be able to construct a coherent identity that will 
be understood and accepted by its citizens – never mind about the ethical 
implications of such actions. As Jon Fox and Cynthia Miller-Idriss note, 
 
‘Most of the scholarship on national symbols and the rituals that deliver them 
has focused on their elite production. Yet the actual ways in which the 
meanings of these symbols are consumed – perceived, interpreted, negotiated 
and constituted – by those in attendance does not unambiguously follow from 
their elite designs. The national messages conveyed by symbols are mixed – if 
not missed altogether…while the state or polity may have the upper hand in 
affixing national meanings to symbols, both their meanings and valences 
remain subject to negotiation and reinterpretation by their receiving 
audiences...The nationalist passions of the multitudes are not always ignited 
by national holiday celebrations. Rather, such events often become occasions 
for family outings or consumer spending rather than the public affirmation of 
national pride. The national symbols adorning these commemorations are 
viewed by many as commercialized accessories, denuded of their officially 
sanctioned national venerability.’211  
  
 
To sum up what has been established thus far, in the first section of this work I 
maintained that all states necessarily possess certain attributes that contribute to the 
construction of a political identity – and that these attributes could be regarded as 
cultural heritage. In the second section, I turned to examine nationalism and its 
relationship with the state, and found that there is a strong correlation between the 
political attributes of a state and a national identity. National identity, therefore, both 
endorsed and not endorsed by the state remains a significant force in contemporary 
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social relations. Although I did not prove a necessary correlation between a state’s 
political identity and a national one, in this third section, I attempted to reinforce this 
correlation by demonstrating the extent to which national identity necessarily draws 
upon cultural heritage – a cultural heritage which may subsequently be used by the 
state. In many regards these possible – and by no means necessary – correlations 
between the state, national identity and cultural heritage might seem insufficiently 
coherent. However, I believe that there is a danger in necessarily assuming that a 
state’s identity must (in a non-normative sense) be a national one – which, to some 
extent, is a problem with Margaret Canovan’s thesis, explored above. From the 
outset, I do not wish to limit myself by excluding the possibility of, for example, a 
constitutional identity. Indeed, this is something that I will consider in the second 
half of this chapter. Thus, for the time being, these rather messy ‘correlations’ must 
suffice because I believe that they provide a more nuanced and accurate picture of 
the reality of national identity. 
 
 
Cultural Heritage and Political Community 
It is crucial to examine the ramifications of the above arguments for a liberal 
response to cultural heritage, outlined in the previous chapter, which is largely 
characterised by non-intervention. Non-intervention is intended to allow individuals 
the greatest amount of liberty possible to engage with their cultural heritages and 
conceptions of the good. The political liberalism defended here is underpinned by 
two complementary values, toleration and autonomy. Indeed, sustaining a norm of 
non-intervention requires a great deal of tolerance – both on an individual and 
political level. It is when toleration fails at an individual level that the state 
occasionally has to intervene and this is constitutive of political toleration. Toleration 
is limited, however, by a parallel commitment to individual autonomy, which has 
been defined as the freedom to make and revise decisions. When an individual is 
found to lack autonomy in significant life choices, the liberal state is permitted to 
intervene in order to uphold individual liberty and toleration.  
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Though political liberalism idealises a small state, with limited interventions, I have 
outlined a number of circumstances where intervention may be necessary. My 
motive in these instances was been driven fundamentally by a concern for power 
relations both amongst groups and within them. Interventions to support toleration 
and autonomy are occasionally required to protect the individual. It is a similar 
awareness of the reality of power relations within the state which has prompted me, 
from the outset, to recognise the necessary existence of public symbols of cultural 
heritage – such as national days, anthems, symbols etc – that will tend to reflect the 
experiences of the dominant group. While I have asserted their necessary presence, I 
have made no effort to justify their existence philosophically. Indeed, I do not 
believe that a purely liberal defence of this kind of ‘nation-building’ is possible – as I 
shall demonstrate in the next chapter. In this section, however, I attempt to justify the 
presence of certain minimal attributes of national heritage. Crucially, this hinges on a 
distinction between a ideal  theory and a more pragmatic approach to political 
liberalism.  
 
 
Political vs. Philosophical Liberalism 
Within the literature, it is possible to distinguish (comprehensive) liberalism from 
political liberalism. Whereas the former applies to all aspects of life and often 
prescribes a specific way of living, the latter attempts to limit liberalism’s affect by 
referring only to political institutions. It should be clear by now that the argument 
established here has attempted to provide a version of the latter form of liberalism. 
Yet, of political liberalism, I believe that it is important to distinguish ideal political 
liberalism from a more pragmatic account of political liberalism. While the former 
adheres to the ideals of political liberalism and is philosophically coherent and 
consistent, it nevertheless remains divorced from many of the realities and 
necessities of political life. Some liberals, for instance, often overlook the distinction 
between the state, as a territorial entity, and governments, as possessing - in addition 
to the legitimate right to rule, maintain law and order and coerce (at least in theory) – 
a vested interest in the maintenance of power, stability and a common identity. They 
also, as Margaret Canovan and Craig Calhoun point out, are reluctant to 
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acknowledge the significance of national identity and community. Arguably, without 
engaging with these aspects of contemporary politics that embed themselves within 
the structure of government, it is relatively easy to maintain that liberal governments 
can and ought to remain culturally and politically neutral, by sustaining indifference 
toward competing conceptions of the good. 
 
It is thus with an awareness of the context within which liberalism is to manifest 
itself that I have sought to construct a liberal response to cultural heritage – thereby 
shifting emphasis from ideal political liberalism to a more pragmatic account of how 
to sustain liberal values. In doing so, I respond to the existence of governments and 
political elites who possess an interest in the maintenance of stability and security – 
in addition to liberalism, of course – as well as a dominant culture. This shift in 
perspective has necessitated a deviation from ideal theory and thus the theory 
outlined here perhaps allows for more interventions in cultural heritage than many 
political liberals might be comfortable with. While I believe that the interventions 
outlined thus far in this chapter remain consistent with political liberalism, nowhere 
has the slippage from ideal theory been more apparent than in the admission that, 
despite professing neutrality, liberal states will necessarily maintain certain national 
symbols and practices. I do not, however, believe that these concessions impinge 
upon the philosophical coherence of political liberalism. Indeed, I attempt to 
demonstrate how it is possible to maintain a commitment to neutrality, toleration and 
individual liberty despite dominant nationalities.  
 
 
The Value of Community 
In maintaining an allegiance to political neutrality and not promoting any particular 
conception of the good life, liberals prefer a small state – allowing individuals the 
greatest freedom possible to engage with their own conceptions of the good – and are 
necessarily sceptical of attempts to construct a public identity. For instance, 
Chandran Kukathas writes of the importance of: 
 
‘…resisting demands that the central authority take an active interest in 
shaping or constructing society to ensure that the communities which 
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compromise it conform to particular substantive values. It also means taking 
a more sceptical attitude towards established political authority, regarding it 
as (at best) not much more than the outcome of compromise among different 
peoples, with different ways, who have to find terms under which to 
coexist.’212 
 
It is for this reason that ‘orthodox’ liberals reject the liberal nationalist understanding 
of identity, the republican ideal of a substantial public culture and the constitutional 
patriot’s desire to ‘rationalise’ cultural identities. As John Rawls asserted, ‘the hope 
of political community must undeed be abandoned, if by such a community we mean 
a political society united in affirming a general and comprehensive doctrine.’213 
 
However, as Christian Joppke notes, this is a poor suggestion for contemporary states 
looking to foster integration and unity in diverse societies: ‘The shortcomings of 
procedural liberalism have been neatly identified by a variety of civic nationalists 
who point to its incapacity to motivate a preference for this over that collectivity.’214 
In remaining true to principle, liberals face a number of substantial problems: how is 
the liberal state able to sustain itself? In the face of extremist and dominant groups, 
social pressures and cultural biases, to what extent may the liberal state defend itself? 
When certain – liberal or illiberal – groups threaten the existence of toleration, how 
are other groups to be defended; especially when the threat comes from a dominant 
cultural group, against a cultural minority? Consider, for example, the banning of the 
hijab in schools or arranged marriages in supposedly dominantly liberal societies. In 
such instances if the state is to sustain neutrality between conceptions of the good, it 
will inevitably have to take a stance on such matters. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, the benign neglect view, as typified by Kukathas’ liberal state, would abstain 
from such matters – and would ultimately allow the outcome to be swayed by the 
dominant or majority opinion that emerges from the moral commons. Part of the 
solution, I have outlined in the previous chapter, lies in undermining cultural bias and 
upholding toleration. However, viewing this as a larger issue (and not just a question 
of how to respond to ethnic and cultural differences) if the state itself is effectively a 
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disparate ‘community of communities’ how will it be able to ensure the fulfilment of 
basic criteria for the maintenance of peace and stability - abiding the law and 
respecting the institutions and boundaries of the state (though not necessarily always 
agreeing with them) – all of which are necessary for the survival of the modern 
(liberal) state. All of these features of modern statehood, which we often take for 
granted, require a certain degree of social cohesion. A ‘community of communities’ 
with nothing to hold the various communities together is likely to split into smaller 
and smaller groups. There is nothing inherently wrong with this ‘splitting’ per se – 
indeed, in its respect for individual autonomy, the liberal state also commits itself to 
respecting a right to self-determination. However, continual splitting of the political 
community is likely to cause a great deal of instability and disturbance to the 
members of these various communities such that we might reasonably argue that it is 
in the public interest for the liberal state to aim to maintain some limited stability 
through a degree of cohesion. As Craig Calhoun writes, ‘though tolerance, interest in 
others, and openness to change may all be political virtues, they are not in 
themselves bases for constituting polities; they do not explain patterns of 
allegiance.’215 In order for any state or concentration of power to function it needs to 
be able to cultivate at the very least a minimal degree of allegiance – not to particular 
statesmen or political parties, but at a more basic level, to the system of government 
and the state/community itself. As a liberal state, however, presumably taxation, 
laws and institutions will be no larger than absolutely necessary, and thus the level of 
cohesion that is required is minimal. 
 
‘The truth is that multiculturalism,’ according to Joseph Raz, ‘while endorsing the 
perpetuation of several cultural groups in a single political society, also requires the 
existence of a common culture in which the different coexisting cultures are 
embedded.’216 Though Joseph Raz, as we have seen, endorses a very different 
conception of a common culture than is compatible with the theory outlined here, 
there is a great deal of merit to the argument that a diverse political community 
requires some, at the very least minimal, shared sentiment to hold it together. As 
Bhiku Parekh argues, for the state to focus on principles of justice alone is not 
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enough; this needs to be ‘balanced against the requirements of social harmony, 
integration of the excluded groups into the mainstream society, a rich and vibrant 
cultural life and a sense of social solidarity.’217 This, as Parekh explains,  
 
‘does not mean that members of such a society will not deeply disagree about 
important issues or find each other occasionally exasperating and 
incomprehensible, but rather that they are likely to feel sufficiently commited 
to it to live with their differences and not want to harm its well being.’218 
 
Indeed, some shared values are needed in order for toleration and autonomy to be 
respected. Political liberalism, with its agnosticism towards diverse conceptions of 
the good, faces the problem of how to respond to the perception of individuals and 
dominant as well as minority groups who feel that their rights and interests are not 
being taken seriously. It is true that, in general, the liberal state should not be overly 
concerned about the beliefs and perceptions held by individual citizens. Yet, the 
recent attacks in Norway on July 22, 2011 geared explicitly against multiculturalism, 
as well as in actions by groups such as the English Defence League and Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA) – demonstrate how perceptions of cultural groups can result in 
extreme responses with disastrous consequences. The post 9/11 and 7/7 world 
consists of ever increasing legislation and security checks that, in practice, seem to 
disproportionately target certain ethnicities. Indeed, it is difficult to ignore the fact 
that within some areas of the UK you are much more likely to be stopped by 
police219 and are likely to perform worse in school if you are from a black or 
minority ethnic group.220 Cultural identity all too frequently has significant bearing 
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on individual welfare and opportunity, and cultural groups are becoming increasingly 
aware of this. The 2001 riots in Oldham, Bradford, Leeds and Burnley are testament 
to this fact. As Anne Phillips also points out, when cultural groups perceive 
themselves to be under threat, there is a tendency to move towards greater cultural 
conservatism, whereby traditions are ‘rediscovered or even created, and practices 
that have long been contested are given a central role.’221 Combined with a parallel 
desire on the part of public authorities to tolerate and recognise a diversity of cultural 
goods, this cultural shift can result in an increase in ‘coercive practices that 
institutionalise women’s subordination.’222 Most worryingly, however, a recent study 
has shown that up to 40% of the British National Paty’s (BNP) supporters believe 
that armed conflict against ethnic, religious and racial groups in the UK could be 
necessary and justified.223  
 
While the disparity in general welfare amongst different groups is not an issue that I 
tackle here, the liberal state must engage with these perceptions of disunity because 
they can have a strong impact on the political community. One possible solution to 
this issue is the establishment of a shared culture that can contribute to an 
understanding and belief that the multiplicity of communities that exist within the 
state, ultimately form a larger, though not necessarily coherent, whole. Indeed, as 
David McGhee writes, there is a growing literature on shared community in response 
to a perceived disharmony amongst cultural groups, in particular where ‘segregation 
between antagonised community groups…reaches deep into every aspect of social 
life including housing, employment and cultural activities.’224 Solidarity is a term 
that seems slightly misleading here because it conjures up notions of loyalty and 
allegiance that cannot be defended from a liberal perspective (as I shall discuss in 
Chapter 5), and so the best word to describe the shared culture required by the liberal 
state is perhaps ‘recognition’; that is, recognition of the political community as 
encompassing a diversity of cultural, ethnic and national groups.225 The notion of a 
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shared (national) culture that fosters a sense of affiliation and community needn’t be 
strong patriotism envisaged by constitutional patriots (whom I shall turn to in a 
subsequent chapter), nor the thick public culture embraced by republicans. The 
liberal state does not require this – indeed, it cannot allow this. Rather, in the 
attributes that the liberal state maintains in public culture, the state is able to foster a 
weak sense of social solidarity. This responds to some of the problems identified 
above by facilitating recognition and respect for one’s fellow citizens. Indeed, this 
public culture can largely be manifested in cultural heritage. 
 
The presence of a public heritage affects perceptions of community and solidarity. 
Though public heritage often reflects the experiences of the dominant, national 
group, a liberal state is distinguished by the fact that it is obliged to make efforts, not 
only to keep the cultural particularity of these attributes to a minimum, but also to 
ensure that they reflect and promote toleration and respect for individual autonomy. 
Maintaining a public heritage is therefore a political strategy for promoting 
understanding of identity and diversity within the state. Though I shall discuss this at 
greater length in Chapters 6 and 8, what makes a strategy of this kind ‘liberal’ is the 
extent to which symbols and practices are deprived of an exclusionary sentiment and 
supplanted with an appreciation of liberal values. Indeed, a public heritage can be 
designed to raise awareness of the plight of marginalised groups, in addition to 
undermining perceptions whereby such groups come to feel threatened by the 
majority.  
 
The existence of certain attributes of cultural heritage, manifested in national 
symbols, days, anthems, education and official languages, can therefore be justified 
on the basis that they help forge an identity which can help sustain awareness of the 
greater political community. I shall discuss some parameters of this public heritage in 
the final chapter. It should be reiterated that nothing here justifies the particular 
national content of public heritage. Indeed, I have noted the need to ensure that a 
message of toleration is promoted as part of a national heritage. Though this is not an 
inherently liberal argument, I do not believe that there is anything here which stands 
in sharp contradiction with liberal principles – in fact, I have indicated how this 
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strategy can be applied to liberalism. Thus, though not inherently liberal, this is an 
argument about how to uphold and defend certain – in this case - liberal values. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to outline the necessity of certain, minimal attributes of a 
national heritage. A national flag, currency, certain symbols, and languages are all 
requirements for contemporary statehood, necessary for the recognition of the state at 
both a national and international level. Yet aside from reinforcing a particular 
political identity, I have argued that these attributes also help to sustain recognition 
of the broader political community.  
 
This is not a particularly liberal argument, nevertheless it is one that applies to liberal 
states as well. Indeed, a state that values difference and allows individuals to pursue 
a broad diversity of social goods – such as a liberal state – also relies upon some 
shared conception community in order to sustain respect for liberal values such as 
autonomy and toleration. Indeed, the arguments which I have relied upon to support 
the existence of public heritage were primarily made on pragmatic grounds. 
Although I am sceptical about the success of top-down nation-building, I have 
argued that a liberal state should be able to both accept and value the presence of 
certain basic public attributes that can, undeniably, be national in character. I believe 
this to be a necessary concession for ensuring that a (liberal) theory of political 
identity retains relevance for the world outside of ideal theory. 
 
Thus, there is necessarily a public heritage, but this heritage is kept to a minimum so 
that individuals have the freedom to engage with their own heritages. Rather than 
trying to draw attention to difference, however, public heritage seeks to bring people 
together – in spite of their differences. It is in this manner that cultural heritage can 
be used to foster cohesion and stability. I shall examine the specific parameters of 
this public heritage in greater depth in the final chapter of this thesis. This is a view 
that, despite an inevitable bias toward dominant group, must nevertheless be 
distinguished from constitutional patriotism or civic republicanism by the limited 
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purview of public heritage, and extent to which individuals are free to engage with 
their own cultural heritages. Let us now turn, therefore, to these two broadly liberal 
accounts of political loyalty to examine further implications of a liberal state’s 
engagement with a public cultural heritage.  
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Chapter 5 
 
The Limits of a National Heritage 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter I outlined and defended the existence of a necessary public 
heritage for the purposes of maintaining stability and cohesion amongst a diversity of 
cultural groups. Though I was keen to stress that this heritage would only be very 
marginal, I did acknowledge that it would likely, nevertheless, express a bias toward 
the experiences of dominant groups and nationalities. In this chapter I shall contrast 
the largely pragmatic argument for public heritage made in the previous chapter, with 
an examination of the practical ramifications of attempts to justify the promotion of a 
national identity on normative grounds, by considering the public cultural heritage 
envisaged by liberal nationalism and constitutional patriotism. I therefore evaluate 
the underlying principles of more explicit attempts to foster political loyalty through 
cultural heritage. The justification behind a national or civic heritage is crucial – as I 
shall demonstrate – because it largely determines the scope and pervasiveness of a 
public heritage. Though liberal nationalists and constitutional patriots do not discuss 
cultural heritage at any great length, I shall try to explore the implications of their 
arguments here. Ultimately, I argue that both constitutional patriotism and liberal 
nationalism remain incapable of reconciling a liberal commitment to the primacy of 
the individual with nationalist arguments.  
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Liberal nationalists (distinguishing themselves from ‘dangerous nationalists’) attempt 
to promote national identity as necessary for sustaining democracy and social justice. 
Despite their aims, liberal nationalist policies, I argue, ultimately result in the 
promotion of a particular, largely homogenous, heritage (e.g. in public monuments, 
symbols, history curriculum) representing the experiences of the dominant 
nationality - at the expense of other minority (cultural, ethnic, national) historical 
experiences, demonstrating insufficient concern for individual liberty and cultural 
diversity. While its intention is to differentiate itself from conservative variants of 
nationalism, it is difficult to see in practice (with the aid of cultural heritage) how 
liberal nationalism can sustain a public culture that remains true to liberal ideals.  
 
Though articulated in the language of universal values constitutional patriotism 
similarly relies upon the promotion of a particular narrative – once again, 
marginalising the narratives of certain (ethnic) groups. While most of its proponents 
would be inclined to disagree with this argument, examining constitutional 
patriotism’s ramifications for cultural heritage reveals a particularism and a 
particular cultural heritage that lies not far beneath a language of universal rights and 
values. Constitutional patriotism requires substantive content which necessarily 
draws upon cultural particularities. Thus, constitutional patriotism is rendered far 
more ‘dangerous’ than the nationalism it attempts to supplant when framed in terms 
of universal – i.e. neutral – values.   
 
While the criticism of cultural particularity might equally be levelled at the approach 
that I defend in this chapter, it is important to acknowledge that the promotion of a 
public heritage is obviously a matter of degree. This chapter rejects both liberal 
nationalism and constitutional patriotism fundamentally because both attempt to 
provide a normative defence for the inculcation of political loyalty that comes at too 
great a cost to individual liberty. Exploring the consequences of each for cultural 
heritage reveals the extent of this cost. Furthermore, their unlikely success in 
constructing a strong and coherent identity that will be accurately understood by all 
citizens only serves to undermine this goal. A commitment to individual liberty and, 
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in particular, an individual’s freedom to engage with their own cultural heritage in a 
manner that is meaningful to them, entails that we cannot accept such arguments in 
favour of nation-building.  
 
In contrast, although it will inevitably draw upon the historical experiences of the 
dominant nationality or group, the approach that I defend does not aim to build up a 
strong national commitment, but places significance instead on making room for 
individuals to meaningfully engage with their own cultural heritages. Given that 
states will, for the foreseeable future, rely upon the existence of certain political 
attributes that ‘flag’ a public identity, whether liberal states may allow such 
attributes seems largely beside the point. A liberal state will inevitably engage in 
cultural practices that undermine claims to neutrality. A liberal political theory of 
how to respond to cultural heritage cannot ignore this fundamental feature of 
contemporary statehood; the point rather is to determine how to limit and attenuate 
the potentially illiberal consequences of a necessary public heritage. The justification 
of a national heritage is necessarily limited to largely pragmatic arguments. To go 
further than this and attempt to provide a normative justification for the dominance 
of a particular national narrative in public space necessarily limits a liberal 
government’s ability to recognise and respond to instances where this dominance is 
disproportionate and unreasonable. 
 
 
Liberal Nationalism and the Preservation of a Particular narrative 
In this section I provide a general overview of liberal nationalism, focusing 
primarily, though not exclusively, on the work of David Miller. This is because I find 
Miller’s account of nationalism both comprehensive and persuasive. Miller is also 
the only liberal nationalist to provide an extensive account of public culture. I shall 
examine the ramifications of this position on cultural heritage. Ultimately, it is these 
ramifications that lead me to reject liberal nationalism on the grounds that its 
interventions in political identity go beyond what a liberal state may reasonably 
allow. While I reject liberal nationalism’s promotion of national identity, I agree with 
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the need to conceive of culture as a matter of contingency and inheritance, as 
opposed to being timeless and given. 
 
Broadly stated, liberal nationalism is an attempt to provide a normative defence of 
nation-oriented policies and the preservation or promotion of a national identity, that 
stems from fundamentally liberal values such as freedom, democracy and 
reciprocity. Liberal nationalism negotiates rather precarious territory and, although I 
shall ultimately reject this position, this attempt to recognise the significance of 
national identity is inherently laudable. The sheer number of works of contemporary 
political theory that deal specifically with the issue of culture and diversity and yet 
pay scant attention (if any) to national identity is alarming; firstly because, as I have 
just argued, nationalism remains a significant force to be reckoned with, and 
secondly, because of the extent to which the existence of nationalism seemingly 
poses a threat to liberal pluralism. As Craig Calhoun notes, 
 
‘[Contemporary liberals] tend to underestimate the work done by nationalism 
and national identities in organizing human life as well as politics in the 
contemporary world. They often treat nationalism as a sort of error smart 
people will readily move beyond – or an evil good people must reject – and 
so as theories they grasp less well than they should the reality of the 
contemporary world.’226  
 
Liberal nationalists are thus the rare theorists (recall Canovan’s argument on hidden 
nationalism, mentioned in the previous chapter) that engage with the presence of 
nations. But what distinguishes liberal nationalists is not merely an acceptance of 
national identity, but additionally, a normative defence of it. 
 
Many liberal nationalists are at pains to contrast their own liberal views with more 
‘dangerous’ variants of nationalism. Margaret Canovan, for instance, outlines the 
concept of Romantic Nationalism which finds that, ‘the reason why a nation has the 
right to form a state and to call upon the allegiance of its members is that its 
existence and its historic destiny proceed from a natural order that is assumed to be 
the source of authoritative values.’227 Canovan notes, ‘nationalists of this sort see the 
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nation rather than its members as the possessor of sacred rights, and stress that 
individuals are parts of something greater than themselves, with a duty to serve the 
whole.’228 By contrast, a liberal-individualist account of nationalism approaches the 
issue from the opposite direction and finds that, ‘since legitimate government is 
government by the consent of the individuals concerned, and since individuals 
identify themselves as members of nations, then there must be a right to national self-
determination.’229 Given, however, that the liberal proviso of not preferring any 
conception of the good life appears fundamentally at odds with the promotion of a 
national good, it is worth considering the ‘liberalism’ of liberal nationalism in greater 
depth.  
 
So, what is liberal about liberal nationalists? Yael Tamir defines the characteristics 
of her liberal national entity as one which endorses ‘liberal principles of distribution 
inwards and outwards; its political system will reflect a particular national culture, 
but its citizens will be free to practice different cultures and follow a variety of life-
plans and conceptions of the good.’230 Tamir’s liberalism thus essentially lies in her 
attempts to create a non-political space for minority nations to engage with their 
identity, whilst accepting the presence of an overarching national identity. William 
Galston equally professes himself to be a liberal whilst defending the virtues of a 
national identity. However, on his account, liberalism is defined by excellence and 
virtue, as well as equality and freedom231 - and thus he notes, ‘the virtues needed to 
sustain the liberal state are requisites of every political community: the willingness to 
fight on behalf of one’s country; the settled disposition to obey the law; and loyalty – 
the developed capacity to understand, to accept, and to act on the core principles of 
one’s society.’232 Finally, on the issue of the ‘liberalism’ of liberal nationalism, 
David Miller provides an interesting case in point, because while he is not explicitly 
a liberal, he is clear about the limits of nationalism’s compatibility with liberal 
values; the closing lines of On Nationality state: 
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‘It does not follow, however, that nationality is an essentially illiberal idea. 
What it does mean is that the principle of nationality makes a difference to 
the way we think about a wide range of issues – citizenship, minority rights, 
education, the promotion of cultures, constitutions, political boundaries, 
duties beyond borders and many more. Embracing the principle, we may still 
want to be liberals…but our assumptions have shifted. My aim [in this book] 
has been to spell these assumptions out as clearly as I can to see where they 
lead us morally and politically.’233 
 
Although some may be inclined to reject the view that Miller’s theory is a liberal 
one, and indeed, as Miller himself explicitly notes that, ‘the principles of nationality 
points us towards a republican conception of citizenship and towards deliberative 
democracy as the best means of making political decisions,’234 I would argue that the 
underlying sentiment of his work by beginning with individuals and accepting the 
fact of pluralism (and trying to accommodate it, as we shall soon see) is nevertheless 
profoundly liberal and thus worth investigating. Miller’s aim, it seems, is to see 
where an acceptance of national identity takes us with regard to broadly liberal 
political concepts.  
 
 
Why nationality? 
For Miller and other liberal nationalists, a national identity has both intrinsic and 
instrumental value. The intrinsic value of a national identity is based upon its ability 
to tie personal identity to an historical community. Miller refers to our ‘forebears 
[who] have toiled and spilt their blood to build and defend the nation.’235 This image 
of inheritance and descent is repeated throughout Miller’s work on nationality, 
implying the intrinsic value of belonging to a transgenerational community. Miller 
finds that holidays, roads, languages, festivals etc. are all ‘equally the sediment of an 
historical process which is national in character.’236  This is a nationalist argument 
that hinges on the perception of a particular transgenerational national culture.237  
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By contrast, the instrumental value of national identity, for Miller and other liberal 
nationalists such as Margaret Canovan, is based upon its ability to promote certain 
liberal political values. This is essentially what distinguishes liberal nationalism from 
nationalism. A substantial portion of Miller’s work On Nationality is in fact devoted 
to a defence of national identity for the purposes sustaining democracy and social 
justice. Miller argues that while a personal national identity is neither objective nor 
rational, it is nonetheless politically valid.238 Miller writes, ‘to have a national 
identity is to take part in a continuing process of collective self-definition which is 
expressed in essentially public ways.’239 Miller goes on to argue, 
 
‘There are strong ethical reasons for making the bonds of nationality and the 
bonds of the state coincide…obligations of nationality are strengthened by 
being given expression in a formal scheme of political cooperation, and the 
scheme of cooperation can be based on loose rather than strict reciprocity, 
meaning that redistributive elements can be built in which go beyond what 
the rational self-interest of each participant would dictate.’240   
 
States based upon principles of social justice, democracy, and reciprocity thus 
require a single national identity.241 The underlying logic of this argument is as 
follows: liberal states rely upon the existence of a national identity in order to 
facilitate democracy and social justice.  
 
What are the implications therefore of the cultural and political value of national 
identity for public culture – and by virtue of this, cultural heritage? Miller writes that 
while nationalists may prefer a neutral stance on some cultural issues, they are 
‘committed’ to non-neutrality when it comes to national culture: ‘where some 
cultural feature – a landscape, a musical tradition, a language – has become a 
component part of national identity, it is justifiable to discriminate in its favour if the 
need arises.’242 This is an argument for the preservation of a particular, dominant 
national heritage over the heritages of other minority groups. Yet, by no means does 
Miller wish to completely exclude non-nationals. Though ideally other nationalities 
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would possess their own states243, Miller makes concerted efforts to integrate other 
identities within a (national) political identity. He argues for a ‘collective 
conversation in which many voices can join’ in order to decide ‘what kind of people 
we are.’244 Underlying this argument, Miller, largely assumes:  
 
‘The minority groups want to feel at home in the society to which they or 
their forebears have moved. They want to feel attached to the place and part 
of its history, even if they also feel some attachment to their place of origin. 
So they need a story to share with the majority, though a story that can be told 
in different ways and with different emphases by different groups. To see 
themselves only as bearers of a specific ethnic identity, let’s say, would be to 
lose the chance to join a larger community whose traditions and practices 
have inevitably left their mark on the environment they inhabit.’245  
 
The implication of Miller’s arguments reveal that he is effectively proposing the 
creation of a homogenous national identity – one which incorporates different 
conceptions of the good – but, nevertheless, into a largely singular cultural narrative. 
Miller however rejects the claim that national identities will necessarily entail the 
‘sanctification of traditional ethical relations’ on the basis that this conversation 
amongst various nations, cultures and ethnicities will be shaped by processes of 
‘rational reflection.’246 Thus it is an argument for national identities ‘that have clear 
focus and are as far as possible independent of group-specific values.’247 This 
‘rationalizing’ of national identity seems to push Miller in the direction of 
constitutional patriotism – a political loyalty that is devoid of substantive cultural 
content. Yet it is clear that Miller does not want to do this, largely because of the 
value that he places on national culture, but also because of his scepticism of 
cosmopolitanism. On the consequences of cosmopolitan culture, Miller writes: 
 
‘The benefits of the global culture will be confined very largely to the elite, 
who can buy high culture at home (seats at the opera and so forth) and travel 
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around to sample the surviving indigenous cultures abroad. The non-elite will 
have to put up with a lowest common denominator mass culture exemplified 
by Disney, McDonalds, and Australian soap operas. In other words, if 
national identities are indeed being eroded, what is likely to take their place is 
not rich cultural pluralism for everyone, but the world market as the 
distributor of cultural resources.’248  
 
 
Culture has too much value for a political identity to simply be reduced to 
constitutional principles – instead, the existence of conflict between different 
conceptions of the good (Miller uses the example of religion) should prompt us to 
‘strike a balance’ between the ‘faithful’ and ‘dissenters.’249  
 
The desire not to promote a particular ‘ethical’ identity and rejection of pure 
constitutional principles reveals an inherent tension within Miller’s work. Miller 
seeks to justify his defence of a national public culture, in general, by saying that 
‘everyone has an interest in not having their inherited culture damaged or altered 
against their will.’250 Yet, there is a contradiction here between rational political 
values that remain unbiased toward any particular conception of the 
good/nationality/ethnicity/religion etc. and Miller’s devotion toward sustaining a 
national public culture. Indeed, as I have hoped to demonstrate thus far, any 
statement on public culture is necessarily a statement about certain political values. 
Promoting a particular national culture to the extent that Miller seems to envisage 
inevitably has an effect on the ability of minority groups to engage with their own 
cultural heritage – language policy alone provides evidence for this. 
 
There is also an evident tension between the inherent value of a personal national 
identity that is constituted by myths and traditions – that necessarily cannot be 
rationalised – and Miller’s ‘rational conversation’ about the public past as a response 
to the fact of reasonable pluralism. Miller justifies the significance of nationality in 
terms of its value for personal identity but the characterisation of the content of this 
identity is quite different when envisaged on a public scale. Miller begins On 
Nationality by spending a great deal of time fleshing out an understanding of a 
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personal national identity and its ‘irrational’ meaningfulness as based upon 
inheritance and the copious amounts of blood that our ancestors have spilt for us; and 
he ends by suggesting that a national public identity will largely be detached from 
traditional (i.e. irrational) meanings. Surely this outcome undermines the ‘intrinsic’ 
value of a national identity. Miller is unable to reconcile the inherent individual value 
of a national identity with its civic purpose; he both clings onto and rejects cultural 
particularity. Yet, Miller’s own statements on the value of a national culture make 
the implications of minority groups and minority heritages clear: there is no room for 
‘rational’ negotiation.  
 
So, to illustrate these principles in terms of cultural heritage: We can imagine a 
national narrative, under Miller’s conception of public culture that tells the story of 
people X who have existed within a given territory for 200 or so years. Though all 
the people of X across history have never met each other, bonds of culture, landscape 
and ancestry tie them together. This story will articulate the triumphs as well as 
tragedies of the nation and include its transition from nation to nation-state. This 
national narrative will require the assistance of symbols, icons, artefacts and 
monuments to give it credence. All of these objects of cultural heritage will work 
together to promote a single homogeneous narrative. But we can also imagine the 
entry of peoples Y and Z in the last 50 or so years. While they may not be ‘brothers 
of the soil’ and while they have different ancestors, they nevertheless want to and can 
be just like us. This more recent addition to the narrative can engage with the ethnic 
backgrounds of Y and Z – but ultimately the transition is one from potential outsider 
challenges to national identity, to acceptable sources of national identity; ethnic 
difference is permissible so long as it can be accommodated and smoothed into the 
overarching narrative. As Miller writes on the last page of On Nationality, the need 
to discriminate in favour of a national public culture is based on the fact that ‘a 
national culture gives the society its distinct identity, but may be unintentionally 
eroded in a cultural free-for-all.’251 Yet, Miller has further reasons for doing this: he 
notes that radical multiculturalists rely upon an appeal to the majority (in claiming 
minority rights) and that this only makes sense if there is an existing common 
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identity.252 Thus, as I have noted above, despite his rejection of particular ethical 
values, David Miller’s response to cultural heritage is fundamentally one of 
preserving a particular national identity (at the expense of other identities).  
 
 
The Problem with Liberal Nationalism 
The problem with liberal nationalism lies fundamentally in the fact that, despite 
efforts to demonstrate how national identity can be used to promote liberal values, 
the normative commitment of liberal nationalists to a particular national identity 
ultimately undermines their parallel commitment to individual liberty and cultural 
diversity. Liberal nationalists will necessarily promote the heritage of the dominant 
national group, and expect other cultural groups within the state to conform to this 
cultural heritage because of the value that is assigned to the dominant national 
culture.  
 
Chandran Kukathas sheds light on the root of this particular problem when he notes 
that, ‘it is not clear why this ethical community [i.e. national identity] should take 
precedence over the others it would displace or diminish. If ethical community is 
what is important, this can be had without the nation-state.’253 Similarly, Andrew 
Vincent queries the liberal nationalist conception of the individual and the 
disproportionate significance that it places on national identity; why does nationality 
matter more than other affiliations?254 The position that Miller ultimately adopts, 
though he does not admit this, can partly be explained by the fact that his work 
possesses a strong ethno-nationalist strain. He places an intrinsic value on the ethnic 
(by virtue of repeated references to ‘inheritance’, ‘blood of our ancestors’ etc.) roots 
of national culture – as prior to the state.255 (Recall how Miller writes that on issues 
of national culture, the nationalist cannot be neutral). Similarly, Yael Tamir also 
possesses an essentially ‘ethnic’ understanding of national identity when she defends 
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a public sphere ‘in which individuals can share a language, memorise their past, 
cherish their heroes, live a fulfilling national life.’256  As Cecile Laborde notes,  
 
‘while officially inclusive, in practice [such accounts rely] on highly 
moralised and ethnicized constructions of the national community, which 
paradoxically confirm the position of the foreigner, Muslim, or immigre as 
perpetual outsiders. Thus, [for example] it is by singling out the Muslim girl 
as ‘refusing to be French’ that ethno-national constructions of Frenchness are 
affirmed and entrenched.’257 
 
Fundamentally, however, though Miller partly accepts the tautology of his 
arguments, like other liberal nationalists he does not fully recognise the extent to 
which nationalist arguments pervade his work. In other words, arguments for 
sustaining social justice, democracy and other liberal values only really help to 
explain why some degree of solidarity is needed; not why this solidarity should be 
grounded in a national identity. Miller uses nationalist arguments to support his 
argument for the value of liberal nationalism – as opposed to some other kind of 
solidarity generating identity (e.g. religion, race or ethnicity). Miller (and other 
liberal nationalists, such as Tamir) commit the ‘sleight of hand’ mentioned by John 
Breuilly, above, of ‘never [making] a rational connection between the cultural and 
the political concept of the nation because no such connection is possible.’258 It is for 
this reason that national identity necessarily trumps other social affiliations. Indeed, 
this same criticism can also be levelled at Will Kymlicka whose work will be 
discussed in the subsequent chapter. This logical flaw renders liberal nationalism 
philosophically incoherent because it is unable to provide a reasoned defence of 
nationalism. This is all the more problematic given the extent to which liberal 
nationalists propose discriminating in favour of national identity.  
 
As Miller writes, it is necessary to discriminate in favour of the national culture when 
the need arises.259 Although a national identity is to be ‘rationalised’, the value of a 
personal national identity, which is defined in terms of ancestry and shared 
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memories, undermines the possibility of extending this inherited legacy to 
‘outsiders.’ Liberal nationalists are largely blind to the equal public potential of other 
heritages (be they of national minorities, or religious and ethnic groups) because the 
nationalist elements embedded within their principles. Miller writes of ‘favouring 
neutrality on some cultural questions’ but remaining ‘committed to non-neutrality’ 
where the national culture is at stake.’260 He does not seem to recognise the 
pervasiveness of a national culture and how an unfaltering commitment to it 
necessarily undermines neutrality on other cultural questions. As a consequence, a 
public cultural heritage – such as a national flag, anthem, holidays, language, rituals 
and practices – are likely to reflect the experiences of the dominant national group.  
 
By promoting a particular national narrative and marginalising other cultural goods, 
liberal nationalist arguments ultimately undermine a commitment to individual 
liberty and the diversity of cultural goods that this necessarily entails. The scope of 
intervention of liberal nationalism Miller goes above and beyond what a liberal state 
may reasonably allow; this is clearly active nation-building conducted by the state. 
To be fair, Miller explicitly labels his project a republican one; yet, his republican 
credentials appear on unstable ground when we find that his theory leaves little room 
for minorities who do not wish to engage with a national identity – they must either 
integrate by accepting nationality, or keep to themselves.261 Similarly Yael Tamir’s 
utopian vision for national minorities (never mind religious or ethnic groups) 
highlights the inability of liberal nationalism to successfully engage with minority 
groups. Tamir writes of a future European community in which ‘many of Europe’s 
small nations which failed to establish independent nation-states… could become 
[part of] a community of nations that openly recognises the diversity of constitutive 
unity’ and nation-states effectively cease to matter.262 Liberal nationalists appear 
fundamentally unable to respect and account for the existence of a diversity of 
minority groups. Instead, these identities need to be integrated into a national public 
culture.  
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Liberal Nationalism vs. Dominant Nationalities 
Unsurprisingly, this is a view that liberals cannot accept. As Miller acknowledges, a 
republican conception of citizenship is far more demanding than its liberal 
counterpart.263 While I have gone to great lengths to prove the continued significance 
of nations and nationalism, unlike Miller, I have not engaged in nationalist 
arguments to justify them. We must accept the extent to which a state’s political 
identity may engage with a national heritage as a matter of prudence in ensuring that 
theory retains relevance to actual politics. This, however, does not mean that we 
should go so far as to justify its presence, promotion and extension to minority 
groups. I believe that the difference between accepting a dominant nationality out of 
pragmatism and assigning this dominant nationality with ethical significance is 
crucial. For one, the view that I have defended does not justify an imposition of 
identity upon citizens. Although the liberalism outlined here and Miller’s liberal 
nationalism can agree on the significance of a personal national identity, liberalism 
finds that it is precisely because a national identity matters – amongst other identities 
– that we cannot intervene to inculcate a national identity. It is one thing to accept 
the value of a personal national identity, and a very different thing to defend the 
promotion of this identity in the public sphere. As Andrew Vincent notes, 
 
‘Nationalism is undoubtedly not going to disappear from world politics. If 
this is the case, then liberal nationalism is, without a shadow of doubt, the 
most acceptable form of nationalism. But there is a distinction to be made 
between pragmatic acceptance and a principled ethical acceptance of 
nationalism…humans are constituted by many and diverse forms of group 
and association. Brutal families, religious fanatics, criminal associations and 
large business corporations also have a constituting role. However, although 
realizing it is very difficult, most of the time, to do anything but control the 
peripheries of such entities, we certainly would not accord them any ethical 
significance per se, simply because they are social entities which have a 
constitutive role.’264 
 
                                                       
263 Miller, ON, p.194. 
264 Vincent : op cit., p.294. 
5. The Limits of a National Heritage  
 
147 
 
Vincent highlights the distinction between liberal nationalism and the view that I 
wish to defend here. Although I accept the continued practical significance of nation 
states and national identity, I do not wish to assign any normative significance to 
national identity. Indeed, Erica Benner has queried the distinction between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ nationalism on the basis that, 
 
‘We may choose to treat nationality as an intrinsic, unconditional value which 
can then be invoked to justify intolerance, repression and conflict. Or we can 
treat it as an undeniable social fact that sometimes supports ‘ethical’ life and 
sometimes undermines it, depending on the way it ties in with other facts and 
values.’265 
 
The view endorsed here wishes to treat nationalism as a social fact. Although there 
may be an inherent ethical value in national identity, elevating this value onto a 
public or political level undermines individual freedom and respect for cultural 
diversity. While it is true that the public attributes of cultural heritage that I defended 
in the previous chapter may necessarily reflect a national identity, I do not believe 
that these attributes can necessarily be regarded as an imposition upon individual 
liberty. Accepting nationality as a social fact whilst maintaining a commitment to 
liberal values means that while the content of a public heritage, such as a flag, 
anthem, holidays, symbols etc., is likely to reflect the dominant nationality, there is 
no normative justification for this particular content. Indeed, liberal values – as I 
shall demonstrate in the next chapter – require interventions if and when the 
particular content of this heritage is found to place minority groups at a significant 
disadvantage. A commitment to liberal values therefore also protects individuals 
from the dominant of a particular public heritage and helps to sustain neutrality 
between groups. 
 
Indeed, Tamir, Galston and Miller are, to different extents, all willing to compromise 
neutrality between conceptions of the good and individual liberty for nationalist 
purposes. This point is only exacerbated by the fact that liberal nationalists demand a 
loyalty to a national public culture because this is an important means, according to 
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liberal nationalists, of promoting and upholding social justice and democracy. I shall 
discuss the implications of patriotism and loyalty building at the end of this chapter. 
However, as Brian Barry writes:  
 
‘A theory that has the implication that nationalities (whether they control a 
state or a sub-state polity) have a fundamental right to violate liberal 
principles is not a liberal theory of group rights. It is an illiberal theory with a 
bit of liberal hand-wringing thrown in as an optional extra.’266 
 
Liberal nationalism’s cultural particularism ultimately justifies a whole range of 
interventions in cultural heritage at the expense of individual freedom and cultural 
diversity. In the next section of this work therefore I turn to an attempt to remain 
loyal to political neutrality, as manifested in constitutional patriotism. 
 
 
Constitutional Patriotism and the Neutralisation of Cultural Heritage 
Part of my critique of liberal nationalism rested upon a rejection of its deep 
normative engagement with cultural particularity. While I believe that it is important 
to accept the necessary existence of some political attributes, such as a national flag, 
currency, language and anthem, liberal nationalism ultimately imposes and demands 
a particular cultural identity of its citizens and thus must ultimately be rejected on 
liberal grounds. Liberal nationalism’s nationalist arguments entail that it accords 
disproportionate ethical significance to a dominant national identity. Although it is 
necessary to accept the fact of national identity and the continued significance of 
nation-states, this does not mean that we ought to imbue them with normative 
significance. In this section, therefore, I turn to an alternative proposal for cultural 
heritage - one which attempts to remedy this problem by largely withdrawing 
cultural particularity from the public sphere: constitutional patriotism. I shall provide 
an outline of this approach, its understanding of political loyalty and consequences 
for cultural heritage. Once again, it is important to note that constitutional patriotism 
is fundamentally a republican doctrine. Thus, from the outset, it is of limited 
applicability to liberalism. Nevertheless, I believe that it is necessary to engage with 
constitutional patriotism, not only because it is receiving increasing attention, but 
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also because it is often posited as an alternative to liberal nationalism. While it 
similarly results in the promotion of a particular narrative, this narrative is to be 
articulated, instead, in the language of constitutional – and, occasionally, even 
universal values. However, as I shall demonstrate, examining constitutional 
patriotism’s ramifications for cultural heritage reveals a particularism and a 
particular cultural heritage that lies not far beneath a language of universal rights and 
values. Constitutional patriotism requires substantive content, which necessarily 
draws upon cultural particularities. Thus, it is rendered far more ‘dangerous’ than the 
nationalism it attempts to supplant, particularly when framed in terms of universal – 
i.e. neutral – values. 
 
In defining constitutional patriotism, I rely fundamentally upon the work of Jurgen 
Habermas and his proponents. Unfortunately, as Cecile Laborde notes, Habermas’ 
general principle of constitutional patriotism has resulted in two broad approaches to 
the treatment of public culture: critical and neutralist.267 Critical attempts at 
constitutional patriotism have attempted to destabilise existing narratives268 and the 
‘neutral’ approach to constitutional patriotism, Laborde notes that this interpretation 
essentially consists of ‘valorising ‘universalism’ over particularism.’269 Habermas 
and constitutional patriotism have also been read as entirely universalistic or 
cosmopolitan projects.270 I shall try my best to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of constitutional patriotism; though, this is admittedly difficult as 
Habermas’ view has changed over the years and there are different variants of 
constitutional patriotism. Ultimately, however, I hope to demonstrate that despite 
some differences, variations of constitutional patriotism remain plagued by the same 
fundamental problems.  
 
It is important to begin by acknowledging how constitutional patriotism grew out of 
a particular moment in Germany’s history. The ‘Historikerstreit’ refers to a debate 
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that largely took place in Germany’s national papers, and primarily amongst 
historians, during the 1980s. The subject of this debate hinged on how Germany 
ought to respond to the Holocaust. It was here that Habermas first articulated what 
was later to become known as constitutional patriotism: 
 
‘If the traditional national symbols have lost their power for younger people, 
if a naive sense of identification with one’s own history has given way to a 
more tentative way of dealing with history, if the discontinuities are felt more 
strongly and continuities are not celebrated at every turn, if national pride 
and a collective sense of self-worth are forced through the filter of a 
universalist orientation of values – to the degree that these things are true we 
can speak of evidence for the formation of a post-conventional identity.’271 
 
Furthermore, Habermas noted: 
 
‘The only patriotism that will not estrange us from the west is a constitutional 
patriotism. Unfortunately, it took Auschwitz to make possible to the old 
culture nation of the Germans binding universalist constitutional principles 
anchored in conviction. Those who want to drive the shame about this fact 
out of us…those who desire to call Germans back to conventional forms of 
their national identity, are destroying our only reliable foundation for our ties 
to the West.’ 272 
 
Thus, we can see that constitutional patriotism grew out of a particular context of 
concerns about national identity, historical justice, and remembrance273, as well as 
diplomatic relations with other states. Though some have queried the applicability of 
constitutional patriotism beyond its particular context, as we shall see, it is an 
understanding of political loyalty that seems to be gaining increasing credence 
especially within the context of a European identity.  
 
Broadly speaking, constitutional patriotism attempts to substitute ‘traditional’ 
loyalties to the state with ‘constitutional’ ones. It is a strategy for binding the 
population together with political, social and economic, as opposed to ethnic, 
values.274 As Patchen Markell notes, ‘by grounding political integration in this way 
on the very principles that also serve as the normative basis of political legitimacy in 
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modernity, constitutional patriotism promises to bring the sustaining energy of 
affective identification into politics while avoiding the possibility of conflict between 
citizens’ passionate attachments and their rationally grounded moral and political 
obligations.’275 In doing so, it relies fundamentally on a distinction between 
‘traditional’ and ‘post-conventional identities.’ Essentially, a ‘post-conventional’ 
identity entails an ability to step back from personal desires and from ‘conventional 
social expectations’, and critically reflect upon them. Identity thus, according to 
Mueller, becomes ‘decentred’ as individuals relativise what they want and what 
others expect from them in the light of wider moral considerations.’276Mueller quite 
neatly sums up the underlying thrust of constitutional patriotism when he writes that: 
 
‘This concept does not imply that particularity has to be relentlessly purged, 
or that religion, tradition, ‘family values’, and other forms of ‘conventional 
morality’ are simply superseded; instead they are, at least partially, 
reinterpreted in the light of the universalist claims and perspectives that also 
find expression – however imperfectly – as basic civil rights and as 
constitutional norms more generally. In other words, citizens are asked to 
reflect critically upon particular traditions and group identities in the name 
of shared universal principles. This also means that they have reflectively to 
endorse – or, for that matter, reject – the particular national traditions with 
which they find themselves confronted. Put differently, the cold light of 
reason is not supposed to be a permanent glare, in which the dimly lit and 
warmly perceived objects of tradition appear naked and insufficient, but 
rather a searchlight that is employed from time to time to examine and, if 
necessary, clean up the complex store of ideas, styles, and normative 
frameworks that shape our lives not very consciously, for the most part. But 
we never replace everything at the same time, which is why the ‘horror 
vision’ of an entirely unattached, or, as the jargon of political philosophy has 
it, the ‘unencumbered self’ does not apply here. If we want to stick with the 
homey metaphors that communitarians often favour, it’s a matter of good 
housekeeping, not philosophically prescribed homelessness.’277 
 
This quote, I believe, provides a good approximation of constitutional patriotism 
fundamentally as a method of critical reflection that is guided by universal principles. 
Tradition and culture are not explicitly demolished, rather, they are habitually held 
up for scrutiny. Mueller writes that,  
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‘Rather than enshrining a particular view of the past with sacralised rituals, 
interpretations of the past had to be renegotiated in an open public sphere. 
The controversies surrounding, for instance, trials, the extension of statutes of 
limitations, films, and monuments could all contribute to a process of moral 
self-clarification, as long as claims about memories were subjected to shared 
public reason’278  
 
It is important to distinguish this from cosmopolitanism: constitutional patriots are, 
for the most part, committed to the existence of the nation-state.279 Indeed, Mueller 
openly recognises that constitutional patriotism is a form of nationalism.280 However, 
like liberal nationalism, it is an attempt to dispel the dangers of ‘bad’, i.e. cultural, 
nationalism by focusing instead on constitutional or universal values. Maurizio Viroli 
explicitly contrasts his vision of patriotism with nationalism as follows: 
 
‘The crucial distinction lies in the priority or the emphasis for the patriots, the 
primary value is the republic and the free way of life that the republic 
permits, for the nationalists the primary values are the spiritual and cultural 
unity of the people.’281 
 
The distinguishing feature of Viroli’s patriotism thus lies in the fact that it can act as 
an ‘antidote’ to nationalism by promoting particularly liberal values (as opposed to 
national ones) whilst being based upon shared life, language education and 
memories.282 Furthermore, although J.S. Mill has often been read as a nationalist, 
Georgios Varouxakis convincingly demonstrates how Mill’s theories on nationalism 
situate him more firmly within constitutional patriotism.283 Like Viroli, Mueller and 
Habermas, Mill recognised the significance of nationality and nation-states as a fact. 
However, as Verouxakis adds,  
 
‘Mill accepted nationality only as a means to other ends. But he did not attach 
any intrinsic value to nationality per se or to the preservation of national 
cultures. Rather, Mill’s attitude with regard to nationalism was informed by 
his paramount commitment to rationality.’284 
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Though nationalism or patriotism might appear to be at loggerheads with 
cosmopolitan values, Mill’s position on such matters was that nationalism was a 
means of promoting general obligations toward humanity.285 Like other 
constitutional patriots, Mill sought to supplant unconsidered traditional beliefs about 
the nation with a rational patriotic identity. This ‘rationalisation’ of identity, 
advocated by so many constitutional patriots bears a striking resemblance to David 
Miller’s understanding of public discussions over the national identity. Recall that 
Miller’s discussions were to occur within the context of a state that endorsed 
democracy, social justice and relatively liberal values; and these, presumably, are the 
very same ‘universal’ values that constitutional patriots have in mind. I noted above, 
Miller’s reluctance to consider at any great length the possibility that his public 
rationalisation of identity might result in a variation of constitutional patriotism. 
Similarly, constitutional patriots appear convinced that their version of scrutinising 
traditions is different to liberal nationalism. 
 
So, what are the implications of a public rationalisation of traditional identities for 
cultural heritage in the case of constitutional patriotism? Habermas notes,  
 
‘Which of our traditions we want to carry on and which we do not, is decided 
in the public process of transmitting a culture. The disputes concerning this 
will flare up all the more intensely, the less we are able to rely on a triumphal 
national history, on the seamless normality of what has come to prevail, and 
the more clearly we are conscious of the ambivalence in every tradition.’286  
 
It is possible to draw a parallel here to what Nietzsche described as critical history – 
which essentially consisted of attempts to counter the domineering, mythical or 
monumental effects of the past by continually subjecting it to scrutiny.287 Indeed, this 
approach to the past is likely to be incredibly popular with historians such as Eric 
Hobsbawm who has continually repudiated the appropriation of the past for purposes 
other than critical history.288 If this critical approach were adopted, it would seem 
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that there would be very little, if any, cultural heritage left in public spaces. This is 
because, as we have seen, cultural heritage is highly subjective and consists of myths 
and narratives that do not always correspond with historical truths. It is difficult to 
think of any ‘tradition’ that can stand up to critical scrutiny for traditions tend not to 
be followed on rational grounds. Thus a constitutionally patriotic response to 
traditional identities essentially justifies the removal, marginalisation and 
privatisation of cultural heritage. It is interesting to note, however, as a brief response 
to this approach to heritage, that while Nietzsche acknowledged the need for a 
critical element he also was careful to recognise that, ‘if we condemn these 
aberrations and regard ourselves as free of them, this does not alter the fact that we 
originate in them.’289  
 
Despite these aims, in effect, constitutional patriotism actually culminates in the 
removal of very specific forms of cultural heritage. As Craig Calhoun notes, 
constitutional patriots have the tendency to equate (bad) nationalism with ethno-
nationalism – i.e. an essentially ethnic understanding of nationhood.290 As a 
consequence, expressions of ethnic identity must necessarily be purged from the 
public sphere. According to Calhoun, Habermas (and by virtue of this, many 
constitutional patriots) rely upon an ‘overly sharp dichotomy between inherited (i.e. 
ethnic) identity and rational discourse’; voluntary public life is identified as entirely 
constitutive of the latter, thus obscuring the extent to which a public, constitutional 
identity may also rely upon ‘irrational’ processes of cultural creativity and 
communication.291 Cecile Laborde, for instance, explicitly targets ethnic identity and 
seeks to substitute these with a ‘post-national’ loyalty.292 Laborde argues, 
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‘The narratives of the nation must be told in a way which does not alienate or 
exclude minorities. Undoubtedly, national identity has an irreducibly ‘ethnic’ 
core and, to the extent, its ‘de-ethnicization’ should be imagined less as a 
fixed endpoint than as a process…instead of denying the relevance of 
national identity, critical republicans seek to expand the modes of national 
identification. They do so by fostering the progressive transformation of 
existing constructions of ‘we-ness’. Thus, the mainstreaming of Muslim 
identity in the French public sphere will detach dominant constructions of 
Frenchness from association with particular cultural traditions, be they 
secular lifestyles, particular culinary habits, or clothing styles.’293 
 
Thus, in accordance with this argument, rather that citing certain objects as 
representative of a particular past, cultural heritage would simply be reconceptualised 
as testament to a sort of ‘universal’ genius and artistic ability of mankind; 
neutralising the particularism and symbolic content of heritage.294 Particular, ethnic 
heritages might remain within public spaces, but only on the condition that they can 
be ‘rationalised’ into a constitutional or universal framework. Indeed, this is the 
implication of many scholarly works on constitutional patriotism.  
 
It is to Laborde’s credit, however, that she presents a more nuanced approach. 
Laborde, like many constitutional patriots295, explicitly targets the ethnic bias within 
public culture and suggests that this ought to be critically reflected upon.296 
However, for Laborde,  
 
‘De-ethnicisation does not mean turning a blind eye to on the pervasiveness 
of ethnicized norms and practices in contemporary society, or blaming 
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minorities for unreasonably stressing their ethno-cultural particularism at the 
expense of national citizenship. Rather, de-ethnicisation refers to the 
elimination of institutional, cultural and social obstacles to the fair 
incorporation of minorities: the onus is on mainstream institutions radically 
to reform themselves in ways that promote the political and social 
participation of all.’297 
 
This strategy for de-ethnicisation therefore entails neither the neutralisation of 
minority ethnic identities nor the recognition of difference, but rather the 
‘mainstreaming’ of minority identities by reconceptualising the dominant perceptions 
of shared identity.298 As Laborde herself notes, this strategy renders her arguments 
more akin to the negative ideals of non-domination than the positive affirmation of 
cultural identity. In addition to endorsing an approach to culture that fundamentally 
aims at undermining cultural dominance within existing institutional structures, 
Laborde is also wary of essentialism or ‘ethnicisation’ (‘where citizens are reduced 
to their presumed identity, culture or religion’299) and critical of existing approaches, 
within Anglo-American liberal philosophy, that reason about multiculturalism in a 
way which presumes the existence of just institutions and does not question social 
change.300 The view that governments ought to pay more attention to undermining 
the ethnic bias in public culture, rather than promoting a diversity of minority 
cultures is one which was suggested in Chapter 3 and will be defended more 
thoroughly in Chapter 6. And, like Laborde, the view endorsed here finds that 
‘benign neglect’ ultimately does not take cultural dominance both within institutions 
and amongst social groups seriously enough.301 Indeed, the liberal response to 
cultural heritage, presented here, is sympathetic to many other aspects of Laborde’s 
arguments. For instance, the conception of education and critical reflection presented 
in this thesis agrees with the general sentiment of Larborde’s argument which 
‘strongly advocates autonomy-promoting education yet denies that the actual 
exercise of autonomy is an ingredient of the good life.’302 Laborde also adds that 
‘people do not need to live autonomously to be good citizens, but they need to have 
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appropriate skills to combat servility and domination in public and private life.’303 
While, unlike Laborde, I have defended the significance of autonomy, I have also 
been careful to place greater emphasis on the value of choice and the capacity to 
make decisions (as opposed to achieving specific, substantive ends. Thus, I am in 
agreement with Laborde on the value of education and of learning about strategies to 
respond to intolerance and domination. 
 
However, despite these similarities (and, indeed, other similarities between the 
liberal view endorsed here and constitutional patriotism, more generally304), it is 
important to note that Laborde’s work, like other constitutional patriots’, ultimately 
fits within the framework of republicanism, not political liberalism. While there is a 
lot of common ground,  liberalism and republicanism have fundamentally different 
ideas about the scope and goals of citizenship and the public sphere; though they 
may be in agreement on many issues, they ultimately differ on many topics which 
pertain to these fundamental differences. Thus, for instance, although sympathetic to 
many of Laborde’s (and, indeed, constitutional patriotism’s) underlying strategies for 
undermining cultural dominance, the scope and pervasiveness of a liberal public 
heritage is quite different to a republican public heritage. Whereas republicans 
generally emphasise the significance of a large public culture and its value for 
fostering inclusion, civic virtue and political participation, the varient of liberalism 
that I have endorsed here is only really interested in public culture insofar as it 
affects individual freedom and political stability. It is true that a sense of civic virtue 
develops out of a desire to sustain respect for toleration and autonomy. However, in 
comparison to the civic virtue of republicanism, this sense is much more minimal 
and limited. Furthermore, liberals generally place much more stringent limits on 
government, interventions and public culture. In other words, although a 
constitutional patriot’s response to cultural heritage may consist of similar strategies, 
liberal public culture and heritage will be guided by different principles.  
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The Problem with Constitutional Patriotism 
The fundamental differences between republicanism and political liberalism account 
for a number of problems, from a liberal point of view, with constitutional 
patriotism. However, because as we have seen, constitutional patriotism is by no 
means a unified position, it is only possible to highlight a number of general 
problematic tendencies. First among these is the notion of rationalising identity, 
which is central to constitutional patriotism and inherently problematic for political 
liberals. Even Viroli who writes of the strength of our irrational attachment to 
patriotism305 believes that republican patriotism’s love of reason will temper ‘love of 
self…family and other relations.’306 In this regard, constitutional patriotism is far 
more demanding than even liberal nationalism, which asks for a public discussion of 
identity but not necessarily personal reflection. Indeed, one of the strengths of liberal 
nationalism is the fact that it is able to recognise that national (and other social) 
affiliations cannot necessarily be rationalised – even when it comes to public 
culture.307 Thus some constitutional patriots, as we have seen above, wish to harness 
the strength of social affiliations without really understanding their often irrational 
nature. The bonds of constitutional solidarity are likely to be significantly weakened 
when rationalised and held up to critical scrutiny. Of course, some constitutional 
patriots, like Mill, might be willing to accept this on the basis that rationality must 
triumph over national loyalty. But then one wonders whether these bonds will be 
able to generate the level of loyalty that constitutional patriots seem to desire – and 
indeed, why they would choose this ‘new’ identity over their own ‘traditional’ 
identities. Individuals, it seems, will not have the room to engage with their own 
traditional identities or cultural heritages under constitutional patriotism because they 
are required to critically reflect upon these beliefs in an attempt to move toward a 
‘post-conventional’ identity. This is a view that fails to take individual liberty, 
privacy and cultural diversity seriously enough. 
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Though she does not require that individuals reflect upon their own traditional or 
post-conventional identities, Cecile Laborde’s vision of critical republicanism is 
susceptible to a similar problem. As I have noted above, Laborde’s arguments are 
distinguished by the fact that she places greater emphasis on the rationalisation (or 
de-ethnicisation) of public identity, whereby institutions ought to actively undermine 
any ethnic (or other cultural) bias. I have expressed my sympathy toward this view as 
it does address a significant problem (articulated by other scholars such as Iris 
Marion Young and Will Kymlicka, as I shall discuss in the next chapter) about the 
existing bias toward certain dominant cultural norms within public culture. Yet, as 
outlined in Chapter 4, I am also deeply sceptical about the possibility of completely 
neutralising the public sphere (even Habermas, as we have seen above, accepts that 
constitutional patriotism is rooted in a particular history). Ultimately governments, 
no matter how liberal, tend to be rooted in certain cultural norms and, despite the 
noblest of intentions, ultimately possess a vested interest in maintaining at least some 
of these norms. (Indeed, scepticism of government and an awareness of self-interest 
lead liberals to endorse minimal government.) Furthermore, a problem in itself (that I 
shall mention shortly) is the fact that governments are often unaware of their own 
cultural particularity and the extent to which they reinforce certain cultural norms.308 
The solution advocated here (and discussed in greater depth in Chapters 6 and 8) has 
been to engage with certain cultural biases by distinguishing between some 
instances, where the cultural bias is unjust and places individuals from marginalised 
cultures at a significant disadvantage (and ought to be undermined), and others, 
where the bias cannot be changed or is not sufficiently problematic. Though 
Laborde, admittedly, does not make any claims about the chances of achieving 
complete de-ethnicisation, the fact that she does not consider whether governments 
are capable of reflecting upon ethnic biases (despite her own critique of ideal theory 
as presuming the justness of institutions), is problematic. Laborde’s own critique of 
ideal liberal theory can thus be levelled against her own arguments: she 
fundamentally presumes ideal just conditions and a lack of vested self-interest within 
governments. The goal of neutralising, de-ethnicising or post-conventionalising 
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identity is problematic on a personal and political level because it fundamentally 
misunderstands the rooted, often irrational nature of identity. 
 
By advocating a shift towards a post-conventional identity, a second problem with 
some conceptions of constitutional patriotism is that they effectively create a 
distinction between ‘us’ as having achieved a post-conventional identity, guided by 
universalism, and ‘them’ as stuck in their traditional – read ‘ethnic’ – ways of living. 
This is a variation of Calhoun’s description of certain critiques of nationalism, 
discussed earlier, which view national identity as something that ‘smart people’ 
should readily be able to move away from, while individuals that choose to follow 
certain traditional practices are viewed as backward or somehow ‘less evolved.’ The 
post-conventional identity suggests a similar distinction. 
 
Thirdly, as Anne Phillips has noted, there is a tendency on the part of dominant 
cultures not to conceive of themselves as possessing a culture. ‘Culture,’ Phillips 
writes, ‘remains relatively invisible to those in the hegemonic position, who may 
readily acknowledge the influence of class or gender on their attitudes and behaviour, 
yet rarely cite culture as explaining why they think or act the way they do.’309 Thus, 
citing Hollinger’s post-ethnic America, Phillips writes: ‘the historical practices 
through which both cosmopolitanism and universalism have been articulated often 
enact the very parochialism they decry.’310 This is likely to compound the above 
problem on the distinction between traditional and post-conventional identities. 
Indeed, it is minority groups who are likely to be stigmatised for not being able to 
move toward a post-conventional identity, fostering balkanisation and increased 
tensions amongst groups. A constitution, it must be remembered, can never be 
completely disassociated from the historical context in which its principles arose. 
Blind to this particularism, constitutional patriots run the risk of seeking to 
‘rationalise’ all other cultural and ethnic identities that deviate from this supposedly 
neutral identity – masking cultural particularity with a supposedly universal rhetoric.  
Constitutional patriotism is thus rendered inherently more dangerous than the ‘bad’ 
ethno/cultural-nationalism it attempts to supplant as it tries to neutralise ethnic (i.e. 
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minority) heritages, whilst placing emphasis, instead, on a constitutional heritage that 
is quite possibly just as (ethnically) particularistic as the identities that it wishes to 
supplant.  
 
Indeed, constitutional patriotism is far more particularist than many of its proponents 
are willing to admit. Viroli, for example, accepts the particularity of the patriotism 
that he endorses but argues that this particularity is not exclusionary because it is 
based upon specific values about liberty.311 The cultural particularities of this view 
are revealed when Viroli outlines that these constitutional values are rooted in life, 
language, education and particular memories.312 Indeed, as Patchen Markell notes, 
the universalism of constitutional patriotism both depends upon and is threatened by 
the particularities that enable it to become the object of passionate identification.313 
Citing the work of John Schaar, Margaret Canovan notes,  
 
‘The patriot, in other words, is not dedicated to defend the liberty of just 
anyone’, but specifically of his compatriots. The limitations of loyalty to a 
particular political community cannot be transcended by interpreting that 
community as the carrier of universal principles, which are the true focus of 
the patriot’s loyalty. Patriotism demands loyalty to a patria.’314  
 
By this logic constitutional patriotism is really an extreme form of civic nationalism. 
While it attempts to construct an identity and foster political loyalty on a 
fundamentally political basis, it ultimately relies upon a particular base and concept 
of community – such communities, as Margaret Canovan has argued, look 
suspiciously like national communities.315 While constitutional patriotism is gaining 
leverage within political theory, it is doubtful whether many of its proponents would 
be comfortable with the notion that they are effectively endorsing a radical account 
of nationalism. Many constitutional patriots are very keen to distinguish their views 
from ‘bad’ nationalism – and yet it appears that this is largely an issue of semantics. 
This should not, however, come as a surprise to scholars of nationalism – for 
constitutional patriotism displays all the necessary features of a nationalist ideology 
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(outlined above).316 Furthermore, as early as 1981, when describing the ‘ethnic 
revival’, Anthony Smith noted,  
 
‘Modern ethnic nationalisms have had to ground their aspirations in an 
overall critical discourse, appealing to general principles like popular 
sovereignty, inalienable rights and cultural diversity. They have had to 
become reflexive and make use of universal notions of ‘liberty’, ‘spirit’, 
‘nature’ and ‘history’, which are applicable to many ethnic communities and 
to different strata of the population.’317 
 
Thus in masking a variation of civic nationalism behind a façade of universal rights 
and obligations, constitutional patriotism is not merely deceptive, it also fails in its 
‘aims’ of superseding particularism. Constitutional patriotism thus simply asks too 
much of us. Unlike Miller’s liberal nationalism, however, many constitutional 
patriots fail to take seriously the extent to which individuals derive meaning from 
‘irrational’ and uncritical affiliations to culture and conceptions of the good. Most 
worryingly of all, as Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou note, the recent success and 
growing acceptability of far right parties and particularly the British National Party 
in the UK, can in part be attributed to the fact that these parties are increasingly 
turning away from racial discourses and, instead, adopting ‘civic’ nationalist 
narratives – such as the language of rights and freedoms318 – and, in doing so, make 
it increasingly difficult to distinguish between genuine and exclusionary freedoms.  
 
 
Patriotism and Liberal Theory 
In this chapter I have sought to highlight the weaknesses of liberal nationalism and 
constitutional patriotism by examining their ramifications for cultural heritage. Both 
seek to inculcate a particular public identity in order to foster loyalty toward broadly 
liberal values. Yet, as I have argued in Chapter 4, they have good reason to; many 
contemporary theorists remain blind to the necessity of shared values. I have argued, 
in the previous chapter, that although this idea may be unappealing to some liberals 
                                                       
316 Recall, John Breuilly’s 4 points on a nationalist ideology, mentioned in the previous chapter. See 
Breuilly: op cit., p.344. 
317 Smith (1981): op cit., p.xiii. 
318 Halikiopoulou, D. and Vasiliopoulou, S. (2010): ‘Toward a ‘civic’ narrative: British National 
Identity and the Transformation of the British National Party.’ in The Political Quarterly (Vol. 81, No. 
4). 
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on the basis that it, minimally, requires an extremely thin shared conception of 
solidarity, a liberal public culture can help to sustain respect for individual liberty, 
tolerance, diversity and other liberal values. For liberal nationalists, this public 
identity is largely based upon the cultural experiences of the dominant nationality. 
For constitutional patriots, this is based upon civic values that are believed to have 
universal significance. With this in mind, it might be argued that the view that I have 
put forth – of a necessary public heritage, which remains biased toward the cultural 
experiences of the dominant group, whilst maintaining a commitment to upholding 
liberal values of respect for individual liberty and toleration – bears a striking 
similarity to a combination of these two positions. Indeed, I have also gone so far as 
to argue in the previous chapter that a pragmatic defence of a public heritage can be 
made on the basis that it can be used to sustain liberal values and promote a degree of 
social solidarity. Does this necessarily situate my work within broadly liberal 
attempts to justify the inculcation of political loyalty? I do not believe that it does, 
and so it is worth briefly clarifying the relationship between public heritage, 
liberalism and the inculcation of political loyalty. 
 
Liberalism’s historical genesis and emphasis on neutrality in the face of competing 
conceptions of the good must render it necessarily sceptical toward attempts to 
inculcate loyalty to particular forms of the good – even liberal ones. A public culture 
– no matter how ‘liberal’ – is ultimately a means of inculcating loyalty by ‘flagging’ 
the legitimacy of the government’s dominance in certain attributes such as national 
symbols, flags, ceremonies etc. Liberal nationalists and constitutional patriots both 
outline the significance of a strong public culture in order to promote loyalty toward 
certain values but, in doing so, this public culture also promotes the legitimacy of the 
state. Writing on civic education, however, Harry Brighouse points out that such 
efforts – which extend to histories, national holidays and practices – seriously 
undermine the legitimacy of the state by conditioning support for policy and 
institutions.319 Such implicit and explicit attempts to garner political loyalty 
necessarily undermine the liberal state’s commitment to political neutrality. Of 
course, some might be willing to argue that the liberal state remains agnostic toward 
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all conceptions of the good with the exception of liberal conceptions of the good, 
which it actively promotes, but this is not a view that I wish to endorse here. Indeed, 
if we wish to take political neutrality seriously, then the liberal state cannot provide a 
normative justification for its engagement in these sorts of loyalty building practices. 
Indeed, it is important to acknowledge (as I have above) that supposedly ‘neutral’ 
values can in fact mask very particular policies; liberalism that is implemented in 
specific contexts can be influenced by historical circumstances and take on the 
indigenous cultural characteristics of that particular context.  
 
This does not mean that all attempts by the liberal state to maintain cultural neutrality 
are in vain. Nor does this mean that we should give up on neutrality altogether (and 
simply focus on promoting a liberal conception of the good). Rather, it does suggest 
why liberal states should not be in the business of intentionally inculcating loyalty to 
political institutions. Attempts to foster political loyalty – even to the liberal state – 
represent incursions on neutrality and seriously undermine the legitimacy of the 
liberal state. Yet, I have argued in the previous chapter that a public culture can 
foster a sense of solidarity that is an important means of maintaining peace and 
stability. This is not explicitly patriotism, but it does arguably raise questions about 
political neutrality and the extent to which the state fosters loyalty. Nevertheless a 
number of strategies underlie a liberal public culture that can help to distinguish it 
from the loyalty-fostering public cultures of liberal nationalism and constitutional 
patriotism.  I have argued in previous chapters that any intervention in cultural 
heritage must ultimately be for the purposes of upholding liberal values.  
 
Yet, how is this different from the public culture of constitutional patriotism and 
liberal nationalism that is equally geared toward the promotion of broadly liberal 
values? One crucial means of undermining the potential problems for legitimacy and 
neutrality and the coercive nature of a public culture, as Brighouse has suggested, is 
to ensure that it is infused with a healthy degree of scepticism.320 In practice, this 
entails teaching critical reflection in civics classes, and emphasising a diversity of 
approaches to the good life, among other measures (this point will be discussed in 
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greater depth in the final chapter). But it also entails concerted efforts to ensure that 
public heritage does not unduly reinforce the dominance of certain groups, whilst 
ensuring that any particular public heritage does not come at too great a cost to 
national minorities. So, while the state’s response to cultural heritage is largely one 
of maintaining individual liberty and toleration (both through intervention and non-
intervention), it is important that the liberal state’s interventions on public heritage 
also include measures that serve to highlight the complexities of a diversity of 
cultural narratives.  
 
Yet, it still might be argued that constitutional patriotism and liberal nationalism (to 
lesser extent) also advocate critical reflection. Reflection within the liberal state is at 
once both more and less demanding that both of these views. Unlike constitutional 
patriotism and liberal nationalism, scepticism within the liberal state extends to the 
government (and constitution) itself. This is more demanding than both views 
because liberal nationalism’s enchantment with national identity renders it ultimately 
unwilling to query the cultural dominance of national identity, and constitutional 
patriotism similarly seeks to inculcate loyalty to the constitution. Yet, this view is 
also less demanding than both constitutional patriotism and liberal nationalism 
because, as mentioned above, it does not attach great significance to political 
participation and civic virtue. Public heritage is thus kept relatively small, such that it 
does not unduly impose upon individual freedom to engage with cultural heritage 
and reflect a desire to inculcate political loyalty. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In the previous chapter I outlined the necessary existence of certain attributes of 
cultural heritage that are likely to reflect the experiences of a dominant nationality. In 
this chapter I sought to explore the ramifications of this argument through an 
examination of two different responses to a public national or civic culture, liberal 
nationalism and constitutional patriotism. This examination helped to highlight the 
dangers and limits of a national heritage. 
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In recognising the personal significance of national identity, liberal nationalists fail 
to understand how this personal affiliation can be undermined when articulated on a 
political level. Though liberal nationalists work within a framework of reasonable 
pluralism, they fail to take affiliations that dissent from the dominant national 
identity seriously. Yet, I was even more sceptical about the consequences of 
constitutional patriotism. Fundamentally a method for filtering out undesirable 
‘traditional’ affections, constitutional patriotism demands that we critically 
reconsider our most basic affiliations as a necessary condition of ‘post-conventional’ 
society. This is a far more demanding position than liberal nationalism which 
attempts to justify its radical position on universal values. Under a thin layer of 
universalism, however, lies a deep particularism. Constitutional patriotism is thus far 
more dangerous than liberal nationalism because, although it is framed in the 
language of universalism, it ultimately rests upon a radical form of civic nationalism.  
 
Despite this, I remained somewhat sympathetic to the underlying premise of liberal 
nationalism. Indeed, it is absolutely crucial to recognise the continued significance of 
national identity and contemporary nation-states in order for a political theory to 
have bearing on the reality of political identity. However, although the attributes of 
public heritage defended in this work are frequently and predominantly 
representative of a national identity, in contrast to liberal nationalists such as David 
Miller and Will Kymlicka (as we shall see in the next chapter), I am keen not to 
assign any particular normative value to nationality. Public heritage is likely to 
reflect the experiences of a dominant nationality simply because contemporary states 
continue to remain largely structured around (dominant) nations – and not because 
there is anything of particular value about nationality. The arguments that I have 
used to support the existence of a national heritage have not drawn upon any intrinsic 
value of nationality and thus leave room to change a public heritage should this 
heritage be found to disproportionately discriminate in favour of the dominant 
nationality. Indeed it is this point that renders the position established here as distinct 
from the work of liberal nationalists.  
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Furthermore, it is also to liberal nationalism and constitutional patriotism’s credit 
that both of these theories acknowledge the importance of social solidarity for 
maintaining certain political values such as liberalism. However, I have also 
highlighted how such measures can undermine freedom and toleration throughout 
this chapter. My argument is thus a much less ambitious and an inherently more 
liberal response to cultural identity and social solidarity. It is less ambitious because 
although I did argue for the continued significance of national identity, I drew a 
distinction between this social phenomenon of how people continue to conceive of 
themselves and others, and a national identity that is imposed by the state. While 
nationalism, in the former sense remains significant, I am sceptical about the 
coherence and success of a constructed ‘top-down’ national identity. I do not defend 
a strong cultural heritage partly because I do not believe that any use (never mind 
positive use) can come from it. Although public (national) heritage remains a feature 
of contemporary nation states and can be further justified, pragmatically, on the basis 
that it can help to sustain respect for liberal values, governments must take care that 
these attributes are kept to a minimum and explained with sufficient nuance and 
respect for a diversity of cultures and historical experiences. Whether there is a need 
to include alternative forms of cultural heritage in public places – by way of 
reconceptualising existing symbols, or by actively creating opportunities for the 
heritages of marginalised groups – is an issue that will be addressed in the 
subsequent chapter.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Are a Diversity of Cultural 
Heritages a Public Good? 
 
 
 
In Chapter 3, I outlined a liberal response to cultural heritage that aims to provide 
individuals with the greatest freedom possible to engage (or not engage) with their 
cultural heritage. For the most part this requires abstaining from interventions on 
cultural heritage – even when governments deem the cultural practices of certain 
groups abhorrent or unethical. The exception to this, I asserted, is when interventions 
are intended either to 1) uphold toleration by undermining restrictions to cultural 
heritage, or 2) sustain individual autonomy and decision making powers over cultural 
heritage. In the previous two chapters I outlined the necessity and limits of a public 
cultural heritage. I also demonstrated how the attributes of a public cultural heritage 
are likely to reflect the experiences of a dominant national group. My argument in 
defence of the presence of such attributes is not a specifically liberal argument; all 
contemporary nation-states will possess a certain ‘standard’ of cultural heritage. I 
have also acknowledged that some cultural heritage can also be regarded as a public 
good for promoting unity and liberal values - and so, while a bias in public culture 
represents a deviation from ideal liberal theory, I have attempted to demonstrate how 
this public heritage could nevertheless be regarded as means to defending liberalism. 
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The liberal response put forth in this thesis therefore only allows interventions in 
cultural heritage when they can be said to uphold liberal values. 
 
In this chapter, I explore and evaluate the argument outlined thus far by considering 
alternative approaches to cultural heritage, which entail the promotion and public 
recognition of a diversity of cultural heritages, exemptions from certain laws for 
cultural groups, and group rights, to see whether these too might reasonably be 
regarded as heritage strategies that ‘defend’ liberal values. In doing so, I shall 
address two fundamental questions: firstly, what are the ramifications of a public 
(national) heritage on liberal neutrality; and secondly, whether cultural heritage – 
both of minority and dominant groups – should be regarded as public goods as well, 
and hence promoted within public spaces. As in the previous chapters, my intent here 
is to examine the implications of general principles – I shall discuss the treatment of 
specific forms of cultural heritage in the final chapter. 
 
This chapter therefore begins by examining how the presence of institutionalised 
attributes of cultural heritage can undermine the neutrality of the state. I shall draw 
primarily upon the work of Iris Marion Young and Will Kymlicka here; both provide 
very convincing arguments that undermine the liberal state’s claims to neutrality. 
Examining the ramifications for the public presence of cultural heritage, I believe, 
lends further credence to their arguments. The de facto non-neutrality of public 
heritage poses a problem for a liberal theory which seeks to avoid promoting any 
particular conception of the good life, and framing this in terms of ‘historical 
contingency’ (i.e. not something that we can do anything about) seems largely 
disingenuous. In seeking to resolve this problem, I turn to discuss the viability of 
promoting a broad spectrum of cultural heritages in the public sphere. 
 
As discussed in my second chapter, heritage is increasingly being perceived as 
threatened by destruction, development and global tourism. Furthermore, as we have 
seen, the free market and vending of global cultural goods also distorts and 
essentializes the cultural heritage of marginalised groups. Consequently, the notion 
of promoting (and preserving) a variety of cultural heritages for the purposes of 
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promoting diversity has garnered a great deal of support in the heritage literature 
over the past few years. It is therefore important to consider the role of the liberal 
state in responding to a diversity of cultural heritages. The question of whether a 
diversity of cultural heritages constitutes a public good (and therefore should be 
promoted) has been explicitly asserted as a matter of cultural survival, but it is also a 
largely a question about the politics of recognition (i.e. of a symbolic nature), which 
can further manifest itself in the allotment of special group rights. In this chapter I 
consider, and reject, all three of these suggestions. 
 
Cultural heritage possesses instrumental value for cultural groups – to describe 
objects as possessing their own intrinsic value has the consequence of alienating a 
heritage from individuals and cultures, thus undermining its normative significance. 
Asserting that we can preserve a ‘culture’ (and hence diversity) by promoting its 
cultural heritage is therefore as problematic as claiming that the normative 
significance of a culture is merely the sum of its cultural heritage and practices: 
unless a culture is defined and held together solely by a specific practice or object, 
the preservation of this practice or object is unlikely to secure the survival of a 
cultural group, never mind about cultural diversity. Furthermore, in this chapter, I 
also query the extent to which cultural survival and the promotion of diversity should 
be the business of liberal (as opposed to conservative) states – i.e. cultural survival 
and diversity cannot be considered public goods as this impedes the creation and 
development of novel and equally valuable identities and practices. 
 
The above indicates how the promotion of cultural heritage is a highly symbolic 
matter, whereby governments can indicate their recognition of group difference by 
promoting and preserving certain forms of cultural heritage. This would essentially 
entail reconceptualising cultural heritage as a political resource for the politics of 
recognition. Yet although we cannot alienate heritage from its particular culture, it is 
important not to assume that a cultural group can be adequately represented (and 
recognised) through the elevation of one particular aspect of its cultural heritage. 
There is, however, a distinct possibility that the recognition of a broad variety of 
cultural heritages may prove to be a double edged sword, leading to essentialization 
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of group identities. Treating cultural heritage as a public good in this regard may be 
largely self-defeating.  
 
Finally, I address the question of cultural exemptions from laws. While it is 
intuitively appealing to take all contextual information (including cultural affiliation) 
into consideration when drawing up laws or making judgements in law courts, I 
demonstrate how cultural defences and exemptions commit the fallacy of groupism 
by assuming the stability and equal acceptance of group norms.  
 
Promoting a diversity of heritages seems a rather difficult and dubious response to 
the manner in which public symbols and attributes necessarily undermine cultural 
neutrality. The chapter therefore rejects the view that liberal states ought to promote 
a diversity of cultural heritages for the public good, and draws to a close by 
elaborating upon the liberal response to cultural heritage first outlined in Chapter 3. 
A much simpler and infinitely more liberal alternative to the positions considered in 
this chapter is to reduce the extent to which certain heritages come to achieve 
dominance in the public landscape; by undermining significant instances of cultural 
bias and maintaining only a minimal level of cultural attributes, negating the need to 
promote a diversity of heritages (in order to combat oppression) and allowing 
individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good. This is perhaps best 
described as a remedial account of non-intervention in the sense that while the state 
does not actively promote a diversity of cultural heritages as a public good, it still 
makes occasional and exceptional efforts to level out public culture. Although 
cultural heritage threatens cultural neutrality, political neutrality for the most part 
remains intact. 
 
 
Dominant National Heritages and the Myth of Neutrality 
In the previous chapter I outlined the necessity of certain public attributes of cultural 
heritage. Such attributes included an official language(s), symbols and icons on 
currency, public buildings and so forth, a national flag, a national anthem, as well as 
public holidays. These attributes, I also pointed out, frequently reflect the existence 
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and experiences of a dominant national identity. My argument was largely 
pragmatic: I did not attempt to defend the presence of a dominant nationality in 
public attributes of cultural heritage because I do not believe that a normative, liberal 
justification of national identity is possible. The content of a public heritage could 
just as easily reflect a religious or class dominance. My point, however, was to 
highlight the context within which a liberal response to cultural heritage must 
necessarily operate. Nation-states remain the dominant political structures and 
concentrations of power within the current international system and this is why it is 
necessary to engage with national identity. Indeed, in Chapter 4 and 5, I remained 
sceptical about the success of institutionalising cultural heritage as a means to 
fostering national or political loyalty and also rejected (broadly) liberal attempts to 
justify such practices. In this chapter I shall attempt to sharpen the parameters of a 
liberal response to cultural heritage by considering the role of minority heritages in 
public spaces. Crucially, I shall consider whether it is the duty of the liberal state to 
redress the ‘balance’ of public symbols by actively promoting the experiences of 
marginalised groups though cultural heritage. This, it must be remembered, is the 
prevalent position both within the heritage literature and of UNESCO. 
 
This section, therefore, examines the ramifications of a public heritage – that 
necessarily reflects the experiences of dominant groups - on the liberal state (one 
which within this work, it must be remembered, is defined by neutrality between 
different conceptions of the good). If it can be established that this presence 
constitutes an injustice, there would appear to be a very strong case for considering 
the rectification of this imbalance through the promotion of ‘minority’ heritages. 
Indeed, I shall demonstrate that the dominance of certain forms of cultural heritage 
lends credence to arguments put forth both by Iris Marion Young and Will Kymlicka 
about the ‘myth’ of the neutral state. Yet, while the study of cultural heritage adds 
additional force to arguments about neutrality, it simultaneously undermines the 
validity of further claims that this particular form of ‘cultural dominance’ constitutes 
injustice. Thus, while I reject the view that the presence of liberal attributes of a 
public national heritage constitutes an injustice, this nevertheless poses a problem for 
ideal liberal political theory.  
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Will Kymlicka and Societal Cultures 
It would appear that the presence of certain national attributes of cultural heritage, no 
matter now minimal, attests to increasingly prevalent claims that liberalism, despite 
what it may profess, is not and cannot be neutral. As Will Kymlicka notes: 
 
‘A multination state which accords universal individual rights to all its 
citizens, regardless of group membership, may appear to be ‘neutral’ between 
the various national groups. But in fact it can (and often does) systematically 
privilege the majority nation in certain fundamental ways – for example, the 
drawing of internal boundaries; the language of schools, courts, and 
government services; the choice of public holidays; and the division of 
legislative power between central and local governments. All of these 
decisions can dramatically reduce the political power and cultural viability 
of a national minority, while enhancing that of the majority culture.’321  
 
Kymlicka uses this critique of neutrality to explicitly target a variation of liberalism 
which he describes as ‘benign neglect’ – a position which can be traced back to the 
liberalism of John Stuart Mill322 - and which Kymlicka believes is simply 
‘incoherent’, reflecting ‘a shallow understanding of the relationship between states 
and nations.’323 According to Kymlicka, proponents of this view,  
 
‘may argue that cultures do not need state assistance to survive. If a societal 
culture is worth saving, [they] argue, the members of the culture will sustain 
it through their own choices. If the culture is decaying, it must be because 
some people no longer find it worthy of their allegiance. The state on this 
view should not interfere with the cultural marketplace – it should neither 
promote nor inhibit the maintenance of any particular culture…’324  
 
Yet for Kymlicka, and indeed as we have seen in the preceding chapters, 
governments will inevitably make certain decisions regarding official languages, 
                                                       
321 Kymlicka, MC, p.51-2, emphasis added. 
322 “It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to suppose that it is one of selfish 
indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with each other’s conduct in 
life…Instead of any diminuation, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote 
the good of others. But disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to 
their good than whips and scourges, either of the literal or metaphysical sort…Human beings owe to 
each other help to distinguish the better from the worse.” Mill, JS. (1996): ‘On Liberty’, in 
Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government, (Orion Publishing Group, 
London), p.144). 
323 Kymlicka, MC, p.113, emphasis added. 
324 Kymlicka, MC, p.107-108. 
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state symbols, public holidays etc that lend support to particular nationalities.325 
While Kymlicka does not find the existence of certain prevailing forms of public 
cultural heritage326 regrettable, it is clear to him that the ideal of ‘benign neglect’ is 
infeasible. Kymlicka therefore proposes to ‘save’ liberalism, amongst other means, 
by ensuring that the state similarly attempts to support the language, culture and 
identity of minority groups.327 A liberal response to cultural heritage for Will 
Kymlicka entails the promotion of minority heritages to rectify the imbalance in 
national public culture. 
 
Taking a closer look at Kymlicka’s theory, however, reveals that he only has rather 
particular groups in mind when addressing this imbalance; namely, what he terms 
‘societal cultures.’ Kymlicka defines societal culture as:  
 
‘a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across 
the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, 
recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private 
spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a 
shared language. I have called these ‘societal cultures’ to emphasize that they 
involve not just shared memories or values, but also common institutions and 
practices’328 
 
According to Kymlicka, societal cultures play a crucial role because, ‘freedom 
involves making choices amongst various options, and our societal culture not only 
provides these options, but also makes them meaningful to us.’329 As such, ‘the 
choice to leave one’s culture can be seen as analogous to the choice to take a vow of 
perpetual poverty and enter a religious order.’330 Kymlicka, in fact, explicitly draws 
upon the work of Ronald Dworkin in elaborating upon the significance of a societal 
culture, he notes furthermore that: 
 
‘To understand the meaning of a shared practice, therefore, requires 
understanding this ‘shared vocabulary’ – that is, understanding the language and 
history which constitute that vocabulary. Whether or not a course of action has 
                                                       
325 Ibid, and p.108, 111: Note that Kymlicka uses the term ‘societal cultures’ here – which, as we shall 
see, are essentially the same as nations. 
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any significance for us depends on whether, and how, our language renders vivid 
to us the point of that activity. And the way in which language renders vivid these 
activities is shaped by our history, our ‘traditions and conventions’. 
Understanding these cultural narratives is a precondition of making intelligent 
judgements about how to lead our lives. In this sense, our culture not only 
provides options, it also ‘provides the spectacles through which we identify 
experiences as valuable’331 
 
From this, and indeed as Kymlicka himself explicitly notes, it is clear that a societal 
culture is almost necessarily a national one. It is national affiliations which, 
according to Kymlicka, bear the greatest significance on our identity – and thus, it is 
national identities that require protection.  
 
It is important to note that Kymlicka regards societal cultures as coherent, more or 
less mutually exclusive and central to an individual’s conception of the good. Indeed, 
Kymlicka’s ‘groupism’ renders him a liberal nationalist in much the same vein as 
David Miller, whose work was discussed in the previous chapter, who also found that 
our membership within a national largely provides us with the source for 
understanding particular ways of living. Like Miller, Kymlicka essentially relies 
upon an ethnic understanding of nations with an emphasis on language, history and 
inheritance (as opposed to civic nationalism which places greater emphasis on things 
like citizenship, law and values) And, like Miller, Kymlicka also relies upon 
essentially nationalist arguments to provide a defence for according national groups 
with political autonomy. But while Miller is at least able to point to virtues of 
democracy and social justice in order to support the value of a national identity, 
Kymlicka’s defence of national identity largely relies upon the assumption that it is 
more significant than any other group identity and thus the liberal value of autonomy 
is best protected through a promotion of national identity. An assumption which, 
upon closer scrutiny, seems largely suspect. As Tariq Modood notes,  
 
‘This bias in Kymlicka [towards national minorities] is not good liberalism, 
but even if it is not inconsistent with historical liberalism which we saw has 
been a movement of escape from religious oppression and conflict in favour 
of a (unified/hegemonic) national or public culture, it puts religious groups 
and especially Muslims outside multiculturalism as a civic or policy idea.’332 
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Modood further views Kymlicka’s dichotomy between national minorities and ethnic 
groups as failing to capture the reality of immigration and immigrants.333 It is as 
though we inherit a societal culture (nationalism/ethnocentralism) and then need to 
choose it (liberalism). As Brian Barry notes, this is nationalism with a little bit of 
liberalism on the side; Kymlicka is ‘spellbound by sub-state nationalities.’334  
 
I hope that this brief discussion of Will Kymlicka’s ‘societal cultures’ has helped to 
undermine the significance of national identity as an identity that is to trump all 
other affiliations, and highlight the importance of remaining sceptical of 
characterisations of cultural groups that treat them as more-or-less mutually 
exclusive and responsible for all of our decisions. Although Kymlicka makes some 
valid points regarding the problems that public culture poses for liberal neutrality, his 
undue emphasis on national identity is a key weakness.335 Indeed setting such 
nationalist arguments to one side, there is no reason why a national identity has 
greater significance than other cultural identities. This particular bias has distinct 
consequences for Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism as I shall demonstrate in a 
later section. Let us turn therefore to Iris Marion Young to see how she engages with 
culture within the neutral state. 
 
 
Iris Marion Young and the Politics of Difference 
Iris Marion Young makes a similar criticism of liberal neutrality that is equally 
vindicated by the public presence of a national heritage. In Justice and the Politics of 
Difference Young attempts to undermine liberalism, and particularly its false 
neutrality, and puts in its place a politics of difference. Young outlines five faces of 
oppression and one of these, ‘cultural imperialism’, is defined as follows: 
 
‘to experience cultural imperialism means to experience how the dominant 
meanings of society render the particular perspective of one’s own group 
invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as 
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the Other…cultural imperialism involves the universalization of a dominant 
group’s experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm… the 
culturally dominated undergo a paradoxical oppression, in that they are both 
marked out by stereotypes and at the same time rendered invisible….these 
stereotypes so permeate the society that they are not noticed as contestable. 
Just as everyone knows that the earth goes around the sun, so everyone 
knows that gay people are promiscuous, that Indians are alcoholics, and that 
women are good with children. White males, on the other hand, insofar as 
they escape group marking, can be individuals.’336 
 
While it is clear that Kymlicka is necessarily referring to the existence of a dominant 
nationality, the identity of Young’s ‘dominant group’ is more ambiguous and this is 
to her credit because, for Young, dominance can encompass nationality and ethnicity 
as well as religion, class, gender and all manner of other affiliations. It is important 
to note that, although I have stressed the dominance of national identity, I have 
attempted to support this with evidence and have been careful not to draw any 
necessary connection between a particular national identity (vs. religious, ethnic etc) 
and the state. I have argued that a public heritage is likely to reflect a national 
identity because of existing political structures. On the other hand, Kymlica’s deep 
engagement with national minorities (which he refers to a societal cultures) renders 
him unable to grasp the equal significance of other cultural affiliations. Indeed, 
Young’s conception of culture is far more flexible and is defined as follows: ‘culture 
simply refers to specific meanings that people use and understand when they 
interact…on this meaning of culture, however, there is no reason to refer to a culture 
as a single substantial entity, with coherent bounded limits that unify it and 
distinguish it entirely from other similarly substantial cultures outside it.’337  
 
The injustice of cultural imperialism, for Young, takes root in the fact that under the 
guise of neutrality, the dominant group is able to naturalise its cultural experiences; 
marginalising and suppressing the experiences of marginalised groups.338 Neutrality 
and impartiality, according to Young, are therefore not only impossible but also 
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possess ‘adverse ideological consequences’339 because they require the assimilation 
of marginalised groups into the dominant culture. Young’s critique and subsequent 
remedy, however, are far more radical than Kymlicka’s. Whereas Kymlicka does not 
explicitly frame cultural bias in terms of injustices340, Young does. Furthermore, 
Kymlicka’s affection for national identity ensures that he is only willing to promote 
the experiences of national minorities, whereas ‘ethnic’ immigrants are largely 
required to assimilate. Young therefore advocates a politics of difference which is 
aimed at, ‘creating affirmative expression for denigrated groups, becoming self-
conscious about and reforming some bodily habits of interaction, and so on…civil 
society is the primary site of efforts to change habits, meanings and forms of 
expression…’341 Subsequently, Young’s solution – as a matter of justice - therefore 
is to create a public and political space for all manner of differences.342 
 
 
The Problem with Neutrality 
Both Will Kymlicka and Iris Marion Young problematise the existing bias in public 
culture for different reasons and to different ends. It is possible to apply their 
critiques of liberal neutrality to the existence of a public national heritage. Indeed, 
the necessary presence of objects and practices which largely reflect the experiences 
of dominant groups within society adds credence to these critiques. Does this, 
however, constitute an injustice? Should liberal states simply give up on political 
neutrality? Or should they be aiming to promote the experiences of all groups as 
well? Before I may move to consider this, it is worth briefly examining how others 
have responded to these charges.  
 
Some liberals have taken issue with Young’s underlying premise that liberalism is 
oppressive because it forces assimilation. For instance both Brian Barry and 
Chandran Kukathas have argued that liberalism neither promotes nor rejects 
assimilation. Barry notes: ‘for liberals, the right amount of diversity – and the right 
amount of assimilation – is that which comes about as a result of free choices within 
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a framework of just institutions.’343 Whereas Kukathas similarly adds: liberalism 
‘does not explicitly recognise the different groups of which individuals might be 
members because it takes no interest in them, and does not presume to make 
judgements about them – and their worth or standing. Its outlook is culture-blind.’344 
By rejecting the view that liberalism requires assimilation, both attempt to undermine 
Young’s charge of the oppressive nature of liberal neutrality.  
 
Yet the extent to which public heritage undermines liberal neutrality between 
conceptions of the good – a value which this thesis takes as central to liberalism – is 
a problem that remains unresolved. Barry and Kukathas have responses to this issue 
too. Barry, in fact, accepts that liberalism cannot be culturally neutral.345 He notes, 
 
‘It would seem that for liberalism – or any other doctrine for that matter – to 
be culturally neutral, there would have to be no existing (or possible?) world-
view with which it conflicts. Since this is manifestly absurd, the assertion 
that liberalism is not culturally neutral asserts something that could not 
conceivably be denied.’346 
 
Similarly Kukathas adds, 
 
‘…at most it shows that claims about impartiality are contestable. The 
response here should be, not to jettison impartiality, but to take seriously any 
challenge that an apparently impartial, or neutral and universal, requirement 
is simply a partial one in disguise…while liberalism refuses further to 
entrench such standards by giving them explicit recognition, it does not 
purport to be able to eliminate them. There is no solution to this problem.’347 
 
On the issue of cultural neutrality, both liberal theorists are willing to bite the bullet 
of ‘cultural neutrality’ albeit for different reasons. Barry reconciles such problems 
with neutrality by accepting that liberalism cannot be culturally neutral and instead 
asserts that ‘…the way in which liberalism is neutral is that it is fair.’348 The state is 
therefore neutral in terms of procedures and the equal treatment of individuals by the 
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state. Thus, for example, all religions ought to be privatised.349 The law, according to 
Barry, treats individuals identically and thus equally.350 Because Brian Barry is a 
liberal egalitarian, he is able to reconcile the problem with cultural neutrality by 
placing greater emphasis on equality instead.  
 
Kukathas, on the other hand, is willing to accept this bias within public culture on the 
basis that for him, there is simply no principled response to this issue. Regarding the 
ramifications of Young’s critique of neutrality, Kukathas notes: 
 
‘The fact that, in the absence of any deliberate decision to support one culture 
or another, one culture dominates, or some language is used is in no way an 
‘embarassment’ for the ‘benign neglect’ view…the benign neglect view is 
characterised not by a failure to realise that neglect will have consequences, 
but rather by a willingness to accept the consequences of neglect. This 
position may be controversial; but it is not incoherent.’351 
 
It may be possible to make certain changes to public symbols and heritage according 
to Kukathas; however, liberalism itself does not offer a particular answer to this 
issue. Much like Barry, Kukathas notes that in accordance with the ‘spirit’ of 
neutrality, we do ‘follow particular traditions of procedure’ and that the law does 
‘recognise certain days as holidays’ – but this does not alter the character of the state 
as neutral as this does not constitute the pursuit of particular ends.352 This is what 
Will Kymlicka means by ‘benign neglect’ – except the benevolence of this position 
is thrown into doubt when Kukathas argues that: 
 
‘…when decisions have to be made about such matters, it may be better to 
present these things as the result of accident and history, not policy and 
justice. This may be best because it does not suggest that the status quo is 
fair; and also leaves open the possibility of change.’353 
 
Kukathas is somewhat misleading here. The existence of symbols and attributes, 
public holidays and official languages are not always the outcome of ‘accidents’ as 
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we have seen and it is unclear what Kukathas means by ‘history.’ Governments – 
liberal and otherwise – necessarily explicitly recognise certain cultural experiences in 
a public heritage and very often this is the outcome of a deliberate policy. For a 
liberal state to present certain aspects of public culture as a result of ‘history’ seems 
largely to run contrary to the use of critical reason and justification (not to mention a 
skepticism of inheritance and tradition) which lies at the heart of liberal theory.  
 
Along a similar vein, though Brian Barry stresses the importance of treating 
individuals equally through law, he also acknowledges that the law will inevitably 
reflect the interests of some over others. There is nothing inherently wrong with this, 
as Barry notes:  
 
‘The essence of law is the protection of some interests at the expense of 
others when they come into conflict…the interests of women who do not 
want to be raped are given priority over the interests of potential 
rapists…[and] the interests of children in not being interfered with sexually 
are given priority over the interests of potential paedophiles…’354 
 
Barry also accepts that legislation may also disproportionately impact upon the 
cultural practices of certain groups. He cites how certain provisions on the 
appropriate slaughter of meat impact upon Jewish and Muslim practices.355 However, 
within a genuinely liberal state it is not clear why one culture should necessarily 
triumph over others. Despite his egalitarian concerns, Barry does not seem to take the 
cultural bias within laws – and indeed, within liberal theory itself – seriously enough. 
Whereas Kukathas, however, does not seem to take this bias seriously at all. Indeed, 
in many instances the public justification that this is simply the result of ‘accident’ 
and ‘history’ is simply not good enough.  
 
Some legislation and public heritage, such as a national flag or anthem, may have 
little bearing on cultural identity. Yet, other aspects of public culture such as official 
languages have great significance for everyday life within the liberal state. Thus, 
while it is unclear whether existing biases within public culture necessarily constitute 
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injustices, even the most orthodox of non-interfering liberals can agree that this 
raises issues for neutrality. What response these ‘issues’ require within liberal theory 
is a matter of debate.  As Kukathas notes, it is necessary to take claims against the 
impartiality of neutrality seriously and the presence of a public cultural heritage 
clearly seems to threaten liberalism’s claim to neutrality. Barry and Kukathas believe 
that ‘orthodox’ liberalism – with its reliance on non-intervention and equal treatment 
– can withstand this challenge, and yet both of the views presented do not seem to 
take the harm that this can entail seriously enough. Consequently, this requires a 
serious consideration of alternative solutions to the problems with neutrality 
espoused by theorists such as Young, Kymlicka and Charles Taylor who propose 
promoting the culture of marginalised groups as a counterbalance to a dominant 
culture. As a means to responding to such alternatives, I shall have to consider 
whether a diversity of cultures, and cultural heritages, constitute public goods.  
 
 
Are a Diversity of Cultural Heritages a Public Good? 
In this section I shall consider whether a liberal state is under a moral obligation to 
provide resources for individuals to engage with their culture and whether a diversity 
of cultural heritages should be promoted in the publc sphere, i.e. I shall, in part, be 
evaluating whether a plurality of cultural heritages are a public good. A public good 
in this sense is broadly defined as that which is deemed to be socially or politically 
valuable by the state, but cannot be adequately provided by the market. In what 
remains of this chapter, therefore, I shall lay out reasons for why it is necessary to 
reject the view that the liberal state ought to promote a diversity of cultural heritages. 
In the next chapter, when I consider the limits of non-intervention and the value of 
social and political solidarity, I shall assess whether cultural heritage is a public good 
owing to its ability to generate cohesion wthin the state. (Note that I already rejected 
arguments for the ‘goodness’ of fostering national loyalty in the previous chapter.)  
 
As discussed in my second chapter, the notion of promoting (i.e. preserving) a 
variety of cultural heritages for the purposes of promoting diversity has garnered a 
great deal of support in the heritage literature over the past few years. The question 
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of whether cultural heritages constitute a public good (and therefore should be 
promoted) has been explicitly asserted by UNESCO and heritage scholars as a matter 
of cultural survival, but it has also recently been conceived of as a question about the 
politics of recognition (i.e. of a symbolic nature), which can further manifest itself in 
the allotment of special group rights. I shall discuss (and reject) each of these matters 
in turn.  
 
 
Cultural Survival 
Sometime before November 2007, the last two fluent speakers of the ‘Zoque’ 
language in the village of Ayapan, Tabasco, stopped talking to each other. The 
source of their antipathy was not clear, but it became apparent that the two elderly 
men had ‘really personal reasons’ for not speaking; reconciliation seemed unlikely. 
A spokesperson noted that, “we know they are not to say enemies, but we know they 
are apart. We know they are two people with little in common."356 While the two 
men may not have had much in common, they had shared one particular attribute, 
and now that they were no longer talking, their local variant of Zoque was in serious 
danger of becoming extinct.  
 
The notion that the two elderly men of Ayapan set should aside their differences and 
start talking for the sake of preserving cultural heritage is as unviable as it is absurd. 
Nevertheless this is precisely what many heritage scholars, UNESCO and some 
political theorists would seem to advocate. Before I move to reject obligations on the 
part of states to ensure cultural survival, it is worth examining how we might arrive 
at such a position in the first place. 
 
According to UNESCO, half of the 6,700 languages spoken today are at risk of 
disappearing and this is worrying, it says, because languages are the ‘very essence’ 
of intangible cultural heritage.357 This loss of cultural heritage is distressing because - 
recall Article 2 of the 2003 UNESCO Convention on intangible heritage which notes 
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that – heritage ‘provides [communities, groups and individuals] with a sense of 
identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human 
creativity...358 Indeed, this link between cultural diversity and cultural heritage is 
increasingly being articulated within the heritage literature, where the default 
position is largely one of preserving a multitude of heritages for the purposes of 
sustaining or promoting diversity. According to the editors of Cultural Diversity, 
Heritage and Human Rights, it is a ‘lack of action by governments that is probably 
the largest threat to cultural diversity, cultural heritage and cultural rights.’359  
 
‘Speaking abstractly,’ Anthony Appiah points out, ‘a concern for survival is perfectly 
consistent with respect for autonomy; otherwise every genuinely liberal society 
would die in a generation. If we create a society that our descendents will want to 
hold onto, our personal and political values wil survive in them.360 Indeed, as I have 
pointed out in an earlier chapter, interfering to uphold toleration does help cultures to 
survive. Yet it is one thing to say that the state ought to tolerate diversity by not 
destroying cultural heritage and undermining instances of cultural bias, but it is a big 
step from this to asserting that liberalism requires the promotion of a diversity of 
heritages as an end in itself. Indeed, although the notion of preserving tradition and 
culture stands at loggerheads with the Enlightenment values upon which liberalism 
was founded – appearing more at home within the scholarly writings of conservative 
philosophers – it is an idea which has garnered a surprising and somewhat puzzling 
level of support from liberal political theory. Will Kymlicka, whose treatment of 
‘social culture’ draws upon Ronald Dworkin and was discussed above, writes: 
 
‘The survival of culture is not guaranteed, and, where it is threatened with 
debasement or decay, we must act to protect it. Cultures are valuable, not in 
and of themselves, but because it is only through having access to a societal 
culture that people have access to a range of meaningful options.’361 
 
 And along a similar vein, Bhiku Parekh asserts: 
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‘Assuming that our culture is reasonably rich, our loyalty to it generates 
several duties. We have a duty to cherish the memories of those who 
creatively contributed to it and sustained it during trying times, and to 
exemplify its noblest ideals, both as an expression of our gratitude and as an 
earnest of our continuing commitment to our cultural inheritance. We also 
have a duty to preserve and pass on to succeeding generations what we think 
valuable in it, to defend it against its perverse misrepresentations…and to 
protect it against wanton attempts to destroy or discard it….’362 
 
These accounts of the need to preserve cultures are surprising for reasons noted just 
now, but they are also puzzling because of their peculiar conceptualisations of the 
relationship between the state and culture, and cultural heritage.  
 
To begin with, asserting that we can preserve a ‘culture’ or national identity, in 
Kymlicka’s case, (and hence diversity – as Parekh maintains) by promoting its 
traditions and cultural heritage entails a problematic conception of culture. This is 
because unless a culture is defined and held together solely by a specific practice or 
object, the preservation of this practice or that object is unlikely to secure the 
survival of a cultural group, never mind about cultural diversity. It is also a gross 
oversimplification of cultural identity. Furthermore, isolating specific practices and 
traditions has the effect of alienating them from their particular cultural context – 
fundamentally undermining the normative significance of cultural heritage.  
 
It is likely, however, that Kymlicka and Parekh do not have this response in mind. 
Instead, we may assume that they are endorsing a ‘wholesale’ preservation of 
particular cultures – i.e., every attribute and aspect of a culture is to be maintained. 
Yet asserting a duty to preserve cultures in this regard is to commit the fallacy of 
‘groupism’ (discussed above) whereby groups, their identities, members and 
practices are treated as permanent and mutually exclusive. It also runs the risk of 
essentializing groups: the nuances of group identity are unlikely to be visible once 
they are elevated onto a political level. Conceiving of culture as such, or when 
UNESCO mourns the loss of the conch shell as a means of communication or points 
out how compulsory primary schooling has undermined cultural practices of drawing 
in the sand, is what Appiah describes as ‘spectator sport diversity.’ He notes: 
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‘I may fervently want there to be Amish driving buggies, Mennonites milking 
cows, and Shakers shaking on their exquisitely crafted furniture; but it would 
be a moral error to take measures, therefore, to discourage members of these 
pictureque communities from leaving and joining ours. We’re not the ones 
getting up at four and cleaning the stables, and they’re not doing it for our 
delectation. The decision of whether to ‘uphold’ tradition is for them to make, 
not us.’363 
 
Appiah also picks up on the strategy of drawing a comparison between preserving 
cultures and biodiversity, arguing that this approach fundamentally denies agency. 
He points out that ‘although there are mennonite farm boys who have elected to 
become east village disk jockeys, yellow larkspurs, as a rule, do not decide to 
become daisies; nor is there any dissent in the social order of the giant sequoia.’364 
Wholesale attempts to preserve cultures run counter to a liberal conception of 
freedom by effectively prescribing a certain way of living. This prescription also 
impedes the creation and development of novel identities and practices. Ultimately, 
however, such attempts are also in vain because it is unlikely that the state has the 
resources to preserve all cultures. The goal of preserving cultures is therefore 
fundamentally misguided.  
 
 
Cultural Heritage and the Politics of Recognition 
Pertaining primarily to symbols, objects, rituals and artefacts, the politics of cultural 
heritage is largely a matter of recognition and thus should primarily be assessed in 
terms of the politics of recognition – although obviously this has implications for 
more general cultural rights and exemptions (which will be discussed at the end of 
this section).365 Although I have denied that the preservation of cultural heritage can 
ensure cultural survival, it is possible to assert that cultural heritage can promote the 
recognition of cultural identity. Laurajane Smith has convincingly demonstrated how 
marginalised groups have successfully challenged dominant cultural norms through 
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cultural heritage and thus rejects the view that acceding to cultural claims are merely 
‘empty gestures’. While I agree with Smith, I nevertheless reject the view that states 
should engage with promoting the cultural heritages of marginalised groups as a 
manifestation of the politics of recognition when recognition is treated as an end in 
and of itself. As I shall demonstrate, Smith’s work only emphasizes my underlying 
argument that individuals and groups should have the greatest freedom possible to 
engage with their cultural heritages, and thus, that liberal states should, to the 
greatest extent possible, refrain from interventions in cultural heritage. 
 
Much of Laurajane Smith’s argument rests upon the existence of what she describes 
as the ‘authorised heritage discourse.’ In the West, Smith asserts, the authorised 
heritage discourse stresses the material, or tangible nature of heritage, along with 
monumentality, grand scale, time depth and aesthetics.366 These assumptions are then 
naturalised by taking certain understandings about the construction of identity, 
cultural values and meanings as facts, and as such, conceptions of heritage which 
defer from the authorised discourse are treated as inherently suspect.367 The 
authorised heritage discourse not only defines what is to be considered heritage but it 
also stresses and authorises a particular ethic: this is a heritage to be revered and 
passed onto future generations.368 Importantly, Smith’s conception of the authorised 
heritage discourse maps rather neatly onto the political attributes of national identity 
which I outlined in the previous chapter. Smith draws upon two case studies where 
marginalised groups have challenged the authorised heritage discourse to support her 
thesis that control over cultural heritage empowers marginalised groups. Smith is a 
heritage scholar and archaeologist, not a political theorist, but her argument cuts 
across several significant normative issues so it is important to dissect it carefully.  
 
Smith’s first case study is of the Waanyi who sought a stake in managing the 
Riversleigh World Heritage Area and surrounding Boodjamulla National Park in the 
north of Queensland, Australia. The area is on UNESCO’s Natural Heritage list, due 
to the high density of fossils found in the region and their value to palaeontologists. 
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By contrast, the Waanyi – who were aware of the fossils prior to their discovery by 
palaeontologists – conceived of the fossil fields as part of a landscape defined by 
personal histories, individual and collective memories.369 Their claims for 
repatriating the fossils on cultural grounds were thus met with incomprehension. 
Smith writes: ‘The Waanyi requests for fossil repatriation to keeping places can be 
understood as symbolic demands for recognition of their cultural custodianship over 
the landscape in a way that challenges dominant conceptions of both the landscape 
and heritage.’370 
 
Smith’s second case study also concerns the Waanyi, but in this instance, Smith 
demonstrates how the existing precedent in consulting with the Waanyi had been 
only to consult with male members of the group. It was presumed that the Waanyi 
men were generally the spokesmen for cultural issues. This was inherently 
problematic because much of the information about the cultural sites entailed 
knowledge that could not be imparted to men, and thus the Waanyi women were 
concerned that key knowledge about their sites was either unknown by park 
managers (and therefore endangered) or that the sites were being inappropriately 
managed.371 Smith then notes how, by engaging with the Waanyi women, 
archaeologists were able to record and map sites, record oral histories and gather 
information, which they were then able to pass onto the park managers. Interestingly, 
Smith notes that specific knowledge of archaeology was not required for these 
tasks.372 Rather, the women were able to make use of the ‘authority’ of the 
archaeologists to gain a degree of control over the sites which had hitherto been 
denied to them.  
 
Both of these case studies demonstrate the complex reality within which questions 
about cultural heritage manifest themselves. What is clear with both, however, is the 
importance of allowing cultural groups to maintain control over their cultural 
heritage. This is the fundamental principle which must guide responses to cultural 
heritage and it is this principle which I attempt to defend here. Yet, both studies also 
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highlight problems with what exactly this control should entail. As the first case 
demonstrates, there may be conflicts over control of cultural sites – both in terms of 
whether cultural claims should trump natural (or scientific) ones, as well as how to 
resolve conflicts when two or more groups claim ownership over cultural artefacts. 
In such instances it is necessary for the state to mediate between various cultural 
claims. What I wish to consider here are the ramifications of cultural heritage on the 
politics of recognition. I have noted the extent to which heritage scholars and 
UNESCO have zealously embraced the value of promoting diversity and, while this 
has generally required the preservation of cultures, it also touches on the politics of 
recognition. Smith’s case studies provide the bases both for acknowledging the 
significance that heritage plays for recognition, as well as rejecting the politics of 
recognition as an end in itself. Having rejected the view that preserving cultural 
heritage preserves cultures, I am also sceptical about the further assumption that 
cultural heritage can symbolically promote the politics of recognition. In order to 
demonstrate why this is the case, it is necessary to briefly introduce the main ideas 
behind the politics of recognition. 
 
The politics of recognition is an idea which stems from an essay by Charles Taylor, 
but it has also been endorsed by various theorists, among these, Iris Marion Young 
and Tariq Modood. Taylor begins with a notion of authenticity and moves to assert a 
fundamental premise that ‘we as humans suffer from a lack of recognition.’373 That 
is, we suffer if this authentic self is not recognised. The problem, therefore, with the 
‘orthodox’ liberal process of assigning universal and identical rights and duties (what 
Taylor describes as the ‘politics of equal respect’) is that it fundamentally requires 
assimilation – and this, according to Taylor is ‘the cardinal sin against the ideal of 
authenticity.’374 The politics of equal respect is thus fundamentally inhospitable to 
difference. There are clear similarities between Taylor’s arguments here and those of 
Iris Marion Young, whose work was discussed at the beginning of the chapter. Recall 
that Iris Marion Young argued that it is blindness to difference which facilitates the 
perpetuation of a façade of neutrality.375 Both Young and Taylor therefore proceed to 
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assert the necessity of recognising group difference. Taylor argues that a lack of 
proper recognition can cause great damage and self-depreciation can become a tool 
for one’s own oppression; recognition is not merely a courtesy, it is a human need.376  
 
There is a great deal of merit in the underlying sentiment of the politics of 
recognition. While much discussion has hinged on whether the state should 
recognise difference or whether it should seek to transcend it, there is as Anne 
Phillips writes, something distasteful about having to look beyond difference in order 
to perceive others as equals377- especially when the attributes of supposedly universal 
human beings frequently reflect the very particular interests and experiences of 
dominant groups. This much is certainly clear from the discussion on the cultural 
attributes of the state: it is simply not true that minority cultures cannot be devalued 
if the state remains culturally neutral. 
 
In practice, the politics of recognition necessarily entails a positive affirmation of 
difference. As such, Tariq Modood’s suggestion that it does not entail ‘morally 
approving or disapproving of that difference’378 is largely incorrect. It is simply 
inconceivable that a state would promote differences without making a value 
judgement about those differences – indeed, this would appear to run contrary to the 
very purpose of the politics of recognition. Manifested in terms of cultural heritage, 
the politics of recognition would entail not merely preserving and presenting the 
experiences of dominant groups in its political attributes, but promoting a multitude 
of experiences and cultural heritages reflecting a markedly heterogeneous society. 
Given the resonance that cultural heritage possesses for group identity, it is 
surprising that political theorists have yet to draw upon this link. However, as noted 
above, this has become the dominant assumption within the heritage literature: that 
the promotion of cultural heritage promotes diversity.  
 
The reason why we read more works, or appreciate the artwork, cultural forms and 
performances created by individuals of certain ethnicities and cultures, for instance, 
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is partly because they had a greater opportunity to have their work published, 
performed, displayed and recognised. To deny the existence of meaningful artefacts 
produced by marginalised groups reveals an underlying bias in our own perceptions. 
Heritage could be used, therefore, to empower marginalized groups and foster greater 
cultural understanding by meeting claims for recognition in a creative and effective 
way. As Laurajane Smith argues, in such cases heritage becomes a ‘process in which 
identity, social and cultural meaning, memories and experiences are mediated and 
evaluated.’379 Governments could indicate their recognition of group difference by 
promoting and preserving certain forms of cultural heritage – e.g. by including 
minority artefacts in museums, erecting public monuments etc – thus demonstrating 
their appreciation of diversity in the public sphere by reconceptualising cultural 
heritage as a political resource for the politics of recognition.380 
 
Yet while heritage scholars have been quick to jump on the value of promoting 
diversity, and despite the fact that the preservation of a diversity of cultural heritages 
fits quite neatly into the politics of recognition, I have noted that Smith’s case studies 
provide the bases both for acknowledging the significance that heritage plays for 
recognition, as well as rejecting the politics of recognition as an end in itself. Having 
drawn out the potential ramifications of cultural heritage for the politics of 
recognition, I shall now discuss reasons for rejecting the politics of recognition as an 
end in itself, before outlining why recognition nevertheless plays a significant role in 
according groups the freedom to engage with their cultural heritage. 
 
My reasons for rejecting the politics of recognition with regard to cultural heritage 
largely stem from inherent problems with the politics of recognition – problems 
which manifest themselves far more clearly, however, when applied to cultural 
heritage. While I have acknowledged how heritage can be used to promote diversity, 
there is a distinct possibility that the recognition of a broad variety of cultural 
heritages may prove to be a double edged sword, leading to essentialization of group 
identities. Treating cultural heritage as a public good, in this regard, may be largely 
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self-defeating. Nirmal Puwar, for instance, has explored the subtle ways in which 
institutionalised racism operates such that for example a black woman is received by 
packed audiences when speaking about her cultural experiences but when she 
assumes to speak about other issues her words fall on deaf ears.381 It is not clear 
therefore whether greater concern for group difference does not bring with it 
essentialised conceptions of such groups; whereby we assume a static stereotyped 
identity of groups and expect them to conform to it. Heritage scholar, David 
Lowenthal, writes of Donald Trump who, when refering to a group of wealthy 
Pequots whose casino had surpassed his own, chided that they did not look like ‘real’ 
Indians; they had looked real enough, they retorted, when they were poor.382 
Lowenthal is a renowned heritage scholar who, while acknowledging the inherent 
malleability of cultural heritage, is also deeply sceptical about the uses of cultural 
heritage for political purposes.383  Indeed assessing the implications of the politics of 
recognition on cultural heritage only seems to prove what David Miller has described 
as the ‘paradox’ of this politics. Miller notes, 
 
‘…identity politics cannot be infinitely flexible. It must designate certain 
groups for political recognition, fix their membership and determine what 
rights they are going to enjoy. In practice it relies upon taking some 
characteristic such as gender or race that can be readily identified in the great 
majority of cases and using this as a basis for group classification…it is 
simply not compatible with the claim that each person must be able 
continually to shift their preferred group identity on the basis of feelings of 
affinity.’ 384  
 
The politics of recognition is thus unable to account for the nuances of cultural 
groups and this is to its great detriment. The appreciation of a multitude of 
ethnicities, identities and experiences within our culture has brought has also brought 
with it reserved spaces for the art and heritage of ethnic minorities. There is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with this, but when such spaces become prescribed such that 
minority cultural expressions are unable to deviate from the ‘role’ that has been 
prescribed them, such affirmative action is reduced to little more than new forms of 
domination. Writing about the preservation of ethnic heritages, Lowenthal argues, 
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‘indiscriminate adoration is no less demeaning than aversion and many who claim to 
admire ethnic legacies betray patronising contempt in doing so.’385 Critiquing the 
politics of difference as envisaged by Iris Marion Young, Chandran Kukathas adds, 
  
‘At best, the politics of difference will do nothing to reduce the levels of 
oppression in society, while serving further to divide one group from another, 
and further alienating many of them from the mainstream of society. Policies 
of affirmative action – indeed, preferential policies generally – will (as they 
already have done) provoke resentment against minorities. Perversely, they 
will discredit even benign or harmless forms of affirmative action practiced 
informally by individuals and organisations.’386 
 
Thus, we can see that the politics of recognition as envisaged by Taylor and Young 
et al may, in fact, yield the converse of what may have originally been intended. In 
addition to essentialising groups, cultural heritage can also become a vehicle for 
increased balkanisation. 
 
Indeed we can argue that the underlying normative arguments for the politics of 
recognition are themselves inherently suspect. Brian Barry has ridiculed the desire to 
simultaneously affirm all cultures.387 Barry argues, 
 
‘The proposal is logically incoherent. The inescapable problem is that 
cultures have propositional content. It is an inevitable part of any culture that 
it will include ideas to the effect that some beliefs are true and some 
false…the demand for cultural equality runs into conceptual problems of a 
kind that are not inherent in the demand that we should find equal value in 
every cultural artefact such as a painting. This is an absurdly inappropriate 
demand. But the reasoning is simply that, unless discriminations are made, 
ascribing value to something ceases to have any point. It is true that a state 
can decide to treat all paintings as if they were of equal value, and buy them 
indiscriminately by the square foot. The Dutch government did for a time 
have exactly such a policy, but it still could not overcome the problem that 
people would insist on making discriminations. Even when this abundance of 
‘art’ was offered free of charge to schools and hospitals, almost all of it was 
rejected….Young’s notion of treating all groups equally would amount to a 
generalization of the Dutch scheme, in accordance with the Dodo’s dictum: 
‘Everybody has won, and all must have prizes.’388 
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Equally, Will Kymlicka’s suggestion to draw up a schedule for public holidays 
which draws from different cultures (substituting a few Christian holidays for Jewish 
of Muslim ones, for instance) highlights the ease with which the recognition of a 
diversity of cultural heritages can slide into farce. Kymlicka writes:  
 
‘Perhaps a better solution would be to have one major holiday from each of 
the largest religious groups in the country. We could have one Christian 
holiday (say Christmas), but replace Easter and Thanksgiving with a Muslim 
and Jewish holiday. This would maintain the value of common holidays, and 
would also encourage people of each faith to learn something about the 
beliefs of other faiths.’389 
 
Finally, in addition to the potentially undesirable outcomes of the politics of 
recognition, Seyla Benhabib has challenged Taylor’s assumption that the 
significance of individual recognition should necessarily imply the public recognition 
of collectives. She notes, 
 
‘the term permits an all too easy slide between different levels of analysis and 
evaluation. Just as oppressed minorities may have the individual and 
collective responses to bear with pride and fortitude the wounds and 
indignities inflicted upon them, individual claims to authentic self-expression 
need not run in tandem with collective aspirations to cultural recognition. 
They may even contradict one another. Taylor’s theses rests on the 
ambiguities of recognition, as this term slides between individual and 
collective spheres.’390 
 
This argument is reinforced by the fact that, as we have seen above, groups and 
individuals are generally better off when their cultures are not subject to public 
scrutiny. Governments cannot assume that all individuals have a desire for their 
culture to be publicly affirmed.  
 
Therefore, although cultural heritage may successfully promote the politics of 
recognition, the likelihood with which it can also promote intolerance and 
essentialisation combined with its inability to capture the nuances of cultural identity 
renders the ‘end’ of political recognition ultimately undesirable. This does not 
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however mean that any form of recognising cultural claims is inherently bad, but 
rather that states should not engage with the politics of recognition as an end in itself.  
 
 
Exemptions from Law: the Cultural Defence 
Some theorists have argued that, because of existing biases toward dominant groups 
and how these biases place minorities at a significant disadvantage, some cultural 
groups ought to be exempt from certain laws and regulations. Will Kymlicka, who 
we have seen in Chapter 3 advocates ‘external protections’ for minority groups, 
against the dominant culture, is a proponent of this sort of view – believing that 
liberalism requires special representation rights and exemptions from certain laws.391 
Thus Sikhs, for example, ought to be exempt from legislation which requires them to 
wear a helmet when riding a motorcycle or working on a construction site. Yet, 
interestingly, Brian Barry, who explicitly dimisses Kymlicka’s approach is also open 
to occasional exemptions when absolutely necessary. Despite being of the view that 
good cases for exemptions tend to highlight general problems with the rule itself, 
Barry is willing to accept that there may be some rare instances where some should 
be exempted from a rule and not others.392  
 
The ‘cultural defence’ is a very specific form of exemption from law. Advocates of 
the cultural defence assert that an individual’s culture determines their reasoning and 
understanding of social contexts to such an extent that law courts must consider an 
individual’s cultural background when deciding upon a case. Cultural heritage, in 
this sense as in general exemptions, is used to provide a justification for certain 
actions. Alison Renteln asserts: 
 
‘…to ignore the truth of enculturation is to bias the result for the beginning. 
In many jurisdictions, for example, courts generally adhere to a legal fiction 
known as the ‘objective reasonable person’ standard when adjudicating these 
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types of claims. Judges and juries are asked to weigh a person’s actions in 
light of what such an ‘objective’ person would do under similar 
circumstances….the ‘objective reasonable person’ is merely a person from 
the dominant culture. Naturally, if a member of an ethnic group is judged 
against the standards of the dominant culture, his or her traditions are likely 
to be condemned as unreasonable. If the traditions are considered in the 
context of the ethnic minority’s standards of reasonableness, however, the 
result may be quite the opposite.’393 
 
Renteln writes about the ‘indignity’ that individuals from ethnic minorities suffer of 
having to justify ‘bizarre’ traditions.394 On the issue of homicide, Renteln argues that 
while this is certainly a ‘most reprehensible act’ it is nevertheless necessary to 
consider cultural factors ‘to determine the appropriate level of culpability and 
corresponding punishment.’395 Renteln asserts: 
 
 ‘A successful cultural defense would permit the reduction (and possible 
elimination) of a charge, with a concomitant reduction in punishment. The 
rationale behind such a claim is that an individual’s behaviour is influenced 
to such a large extent by his culture that either 1) the individual simply did 
not believe that his actions contravened any laws, or 2) the individual felt 
compelled to act the way he did. In both cases the individual’s culpability is 
lessened….the reason for admitting a cultural defence lies not so much in a 
desire to be culturally sensitive; although that is surely a large part of it, but 
rather in a desire to ensure equal application of the law to all citizens.’396  
 
It unclear, however, why premeditated murder is any less bad when instigated for 
cultural reasons. As Brian Barry writes, equal laws will inevitably result in different 
outcomes for different groups; it is the intention of the law to prejudice the interests 
of some (i.e. victims) over the interests of others (e.g. rapists, paedophiles, etc.)397 
Barry continues, 
 
‘…this is not to deny that the unequal impact of a law may in some cases be 
an indication of its unfairness. It is simply to say that the charge will have to 
be substantiated in each case by showing exactly how the law is unfair. It is 
never enough to show no more than that it has a different impact on different 
people.’398 
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Doriane Coleman concurs on this point, though unlike Barry she does not ultimately 
accept the permissibility of certain cultural exemptions. Worryingly, however, she is 
able to demonstrate how the cultural defence generally focuses only on the rights of 
the defendant and thus ‘fails entirely to consider the primary function of the criminal 
law, that is, the protection of victims and the public generally from criminal 
conduct.’399 To illustrate this point, Coleman discusses People v. Moua, a rape case 
in which the defendant argued that he had merely been following a traditional 
Hmong practice in which a man selects his wife first by kidnapping and subsequently 
raping her:   
 
‘[the victim] was an employee at Fresno State University who, like many 
other young people her age, had left her community to work in an office on 
campus. Had her parents not been Laotian, the California penal code would 
have demanded serious punishment for Moua. Instead, simply because the 
victim could be identified as Laotian by the defendant, the state denied her 
the protection afforded by its penal code. Her own decision to reject the 
aspects of her parent’s culture that are alleged to invite rape was irrelevant. 
Most frightening in this particular case is the fact that because the court 
adopted the defendant’s view of the victim as a member of an immigrant 
group (of Laotians) rather than as an individual (who may or may not have 
acted that culture), she was deprived of the choice to say ‘no’ to her 
rapist.400’  
 
Both Coleman and Anne Phillips also cite the case of Fumiko Kimura, a Japanese 
American woman who, upon realising her husband’s infidelity, drowned her two 
children and subsequently tried to drown herself. As Phillips writes, at her murder 
trial in 1985, ‘it was claimed that this constituted a traditional Japanese practice of 
parent-child suicide as the more honourable course of action’ as it would be ‘cruel to 
leave her children to live on without her in conditions of disgrace.’401 As Coleman 
and Phillips note, Kimura’s cultural defence was ultimately successful because it 
reinforced the stereotype of a weak-willed woman prevalent in the dominant culture. 
Both therefore reject the cultural defence ultimately on the grounds that it has the 
tendency merely to reinforce (cultural and gender) stereotypes that work towards the 
detriment of women and children.402 Seyla Benhabib adds, that by upholding a 
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cultural defence, judges have reinforced a notion of cultures as ‘monolithic wholes, 
imperious to internal change and transformation.’403 As Phillips notes, ‘culture 
operates on a terrain already defined by mainstream assumptions: the idea that 
women are not really responsible for actions undertaken under the direction of male 
family members, or that men explode when they discover their women are involved 
in illicit affairs.’404 It is this latter point which Anne Phillips places emphasis upon, 
when she queries understandings of individuals as ‘at the mercy of cultural 
dictates.’405 Phillips goes on to argue: 
 
‘It is important to recognise the choices people make, not read these as a 
reflection of their so-called culture or treat them as a false consciousness that 
can be set to one side in the promotion of gender equality. Yet the insight 
about learnt or adaptive preferences remains, as does the more standard point 
about many people not having much choice at all. We cannot assume that all 
is well just because people nod their heads and bear it, or that individuals 
have consented to the way they are being treated so long as they refuse to 
leave. In many cases, the issue will be how to differentiate choice from 
coercion. This has to be approached differently once we drop the misguided 
understandings of culture.’406 
 
Phillips thus highlights both sides of the issue: while it is important not to assume 
that individual decisions are simply the product of a pre-given cultural identity, 
views that reduce the significance of all individual actions to individual free will are 
equally suspect. 
 
Thus an action or practice should not be permissible (when it clashes with laws) 
merely because it forms part of a cultural heritage. Culture is not an excuse. While it 
may diminish moral culpability, this does not and should not alter legal culpability. 
There may be many reasons why people feel that they ought to be able to commit 
certain criminal offences and get away with it, but the law should not sway to these 
beliefs – irrespective of whether they are part of a cultural heritage. I believe that 
Barry’s initial sentiment, citied above, is correct: if we do have reservations about 
how laws affect certain people more than others, it may be necessary to revise the 
law in its entirety, as applicable to all people – and not merely members of particular 
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cultural groups, otherwise the law must remain intact.407 Indeed, liberals have long 
been sceptical of arguments from tradition – it is this scepticism that, in fact, forms 
part of a ‘liberal tradition’. The question of a cultural defence is thus not a 
particularly new one – though it has received increased attention over recent years. 
However, as we can see, it can yield particularly harmful consequences – not only in 
terms of its effects on women and children. As Appiah points out ‘upholding 
differences among groups may entail imposing uniformity within them.’408 Pointing 
at multiculturalists such as Will Kymlicka who stress the existence and interests of a 
multitude of groups, Appiah argues that they also eliminate difference by 
representing the group as a ‘clump of relative homogeneity.’409 Thus, to conceive of 
culture as such is to commit the fallacy of groupism and assume that cultural beliefs 
(and groups) are to a significant degree unchanging and unchangeable, held equally 
by all members of the group.  
 
A rejection of the cultural defence and exemptions from laws and rules should not, 
however, in any way undermine concern for individual welfare. While Coleman 
rejects the notion of a cultural defence’s ‘strong multiculturalism’ – which finds that 
‘a culture and its people may be judged fairly only according to its own standards,’410 
she strongly endorses the notion of individualised (subjective) justice - which takes 
an individual’s past and habits into consideration - as a matter of good 
multiculturalism.411 Thus, while entire cultures should not be rendered exempt from 
certain laws, in specific cases it may be necessary to revise procedures for certain 
individuals. I do not believe that this represents a deviation from principle.   Rather, 
the response outlined thus far - whereby liberal governments make concerted efforts 
to undermine bias in public culture, and uphold toleration and autonomy when 
individuals are placed at a significant disadvantage because of existing cultural 
biases – adequately protects individual freedom and cultural heritage. Having 
rejected cultural survival, recognition and exemptions, it is worth examining the 
ramifications of these arguments by returning to the issue of liberal neutrality. 
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Cultural Heritage and Liberal Neutrality Revisited 
In the previous chapter I outlined the necessity of certain public attributes of cultural 
heritage; heritage, which I have acknowledged is likely to express the experiences of 
certain dominant, national groups within the nation state. These, I argued, are 
necessary for states to function at both a domestic and international level. Indeed, it 
is difficult to imagine contemporary states without a national flag, anthem, public 
holidays, official language etc. In this chapter I acknowledged the problems that this 
particularism raises for liberalism’s commitment to neutrality. This led me to 
consider whether a diversity of cultural heritages should be considered a public good, 
such that liberal governments are under an obligation to promote the heritages of 
minority groups within the state. I considered and rejected the preservation of 
cultural heritage for the purposes of cultural survival, the promotion of cultural 
heritage for recognising the political significance of groups and exemptions from law 
for cultural practices and norms fundmentally on the basis that all three of these 
strategies overlook diversity within groups. They fail to account for the fact that 
different individuals relate to their cultural identity and membership in quite different 
ways and thus preserving, recognising and exempting cultures can ultimately 
stereotype groups and undermine individual freedom to engage with cultural in a 
manner that is meaningful. 
 
A liberal government, however, would appear inherently hypocritical if it were to 
deny the recognition of marginalised heritages, whilst promoting (i.e. recognising) its 
own dominant national heritage – irrespective of how minimal or necessary this 
might be – and professing neutrality when faced with competing conceptions of the 
good. Indeed, this would only seem to highlight the fact that liberalism remains blind 
to its own cultural particularity and is only really neutral towards other conceptions 
of the good. This chapter has sought to come to terms with liberal neutrality and the 
significance of cultural heritage on this neutrality. While it has become clear that the 
liberal state cannot plausibly maintain complete cultural neutrality, the solution to 
this problem does not lie in promoting a diversity of cultural heritages either.  
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Yet, ‘orthodox’ liberal positions as articulated by Brian Barry and Chandran 
Kukathas are not satisfactory either. Both Barry and Kukathas accept that within the 
liberal state there are likely to be biases in public culture (in terms of national 
symbols, public holidays etc.) that favour the experiences of particular groups. As 
opposed to seeking to tackle this problem directly, both place greater emphasis on 
other issues. Kukathas focuses on impartiality – by refraining from any explicit 
engagement in public heritage, the liberal state is able to maintain neutrality. Barry 
focuses on equality – by ensuring that individuals are ultimately treated fairly (i.e. 
equally), biases in public culture are rendered irrelevant as far as neutrality is 
concerned. Yet both of these responses, I have argued, are unsatisfactory because 
they do not take a commitment to cultural heritage and the fact of diversity seriously 
enough. Kukathas simply accepts the detrimental affects of a dominant culture and 
Barry largely focuses on achieving equality through existing legal structures (which 
are equally likely to reflect the cultural interests of dominant groups).412 
 
My position on this issue is that while cultural neutrality may never be possible, 
liberals should primarily strive for political neutrality. These two concepts of 
neutrality are not mutually exclusive – culture undeniably has ramifications for 
politics and vice versa - but it is political neutrality that is of greater concern to the 
liberal state. While the public culture of the liberal state may inevitably be biased 
(e.g. a set of national symbols and icons, public holidays and work-weeks) toward 
the experiences of certain dominant groups (undermining cultural neutrality), it is 
important that this cultural bias does not disproportionately impede individuals from 
exercising their rights within the liberal state. The extent to which symbols and 
public holidays may reflect the historical experiences of certain groups indicates that 
the state is not culturally neutral. However, the liberal state strives to maintain 
political neutrality in the sense that it seeks to eliminate, undermine or account for 
cultural biases which significantly undermine the equality and interests of 
individuals. Thus, although there may inevitably be some cultural biases in public 
culture, political neutrality, in the sense of upholding the moral equality of all 
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individuals, is sustained. In other words, a respect for individual autonomy and 
toleration ensure that political neutrality is upheld. 
 
To conceive of neutrality as such – recognising inevitable, but occasional cultural 
biases – is to place greater emphasis on the idea of neutrality as a process. Thus, 
while necessary components of contemporary statehood – such as official languages, 
public holidays and so forth – may reflect the dominance of a particular culture, 
liberal governments should attempt to level the playing field. I do not, however, 
believe that political neutrality necessarily requires egalitarianism in all instances – 
though this can be a prudent guide for action when conflicts arise. Cultural heritage 
encompasses an incredibly broad spectrum of issues, and egalitarianism (in the sense 
of providing equal opportunity or outcome) even on the most significant cultural 
issues is not always feasible. Language policy and public holidays, for example, as 
well as the content of a school curriculum and citizenship studies cannot cater 
equally to all individuals. Rather than defending egalitarianism in all contexts, 
liberalism and individual liberty is best upheld by sustaining individual autonomy 
and toleration, identifying instances where egaltarianism is desirable and possible, 
and employing alternatives where not.  
 
The liberal state is not particularly interested in culture in these instances of 
intervention. Culture is only relevant insofar as it may (partly) be responsible for the 
circumstances that individuals find themselves in and has an impact on toleration and 
autonomy.413 As Kukathas notes: 
 
‘From a liberal point of view it does not matter what happens to the identities 
of particular groups or the identities of individuals. Of course, it may matter 
enormously to the groups and individuals in question; but while liberalism 
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does not counsel obstructing those who wish to preserve or enhance their 
identities, it takes no interest in supporting such endeavours either.’414 
 
However, while I agree with Kukathas that the liberal state is not interested in 
cultural survival, an underlying argument of this thesis is that the impossibility of 
achieving complete cultural neutrality in no way implies that cultural matters, 
including heritage, are beyond the scope of liberal political theorising. Indeed, such 
cultural matters become relevant to politics because of the impact that they have on 
the political and social welfare of individuals. This can entail changing aspects of 
public culture, adding to it, and in some cases subtracting from it. While liberal 
governments obviously do not have free reign on promoting the culture of their 
choice, some public heritage (even if this does occasionally reflect a particular 
conception of the good) can be justified because this can be transformed (and 
deprived to the greatest extent possible of particular cultural content) to promote 
liberal values. The underlying rationale behind this is one of ensuring that public 
culture does not place certain individuals at a significant disadvantage. Therefore, 
although I deny that the cultural heritages of minority groups should be treated as 
public goods in the sense that governments ought to actively promote the heritages of 
marginalised groups or make a practice of exempting groups from general laws, 
efforts should nonetheless be made to undermine severely detrimental instances of 
cultural dominance. This strategy has a number of important features and I will 
discuss these in this final section. 
 
 
Reducing cultural dominance: a defensive strategy 
A liberal response to cultural heritage is guided fundamentally by a concern for 
individual autonomy and toleration. As a consequence, a liberal response to cultural 
heritage is largely characterised by non-intervention because this, I have argued in 
Chapter 3, is the best means of ensuring that individuals are able to engage 
meaningfully with their own cultural heritages. Yet, in this chapter I have 
demonstrated the problem with how ‘non-intervention’ can, nevertheless, entail the 
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promotion of a particular cultural heritage vis-à-vis the existence of certain national 
symbols and practices which are institutionalised by the state. On this issue, Brian 
Barry writes: 
 
‘Ways of life that are compatible with liberal institutions are not threatened 
by institutions. the only ways of life that need to appeal to the value of 
cultural diversity are those that necessarily involve unjust inequalities or 
require powers of indoctrination and control incompatible with liberalism in 
order to maintain themselves.’415  
 
The problem, I have noted above, with this ‘orthodox’ position is the fact that it does 
not take the impact of a dominant culture seriously enough. Laws and decisions 
about public culture are invariably biased toward dominant groups and can 
disproportionately harm certain individuals as a consequence. I am thus tentatively in 
agreement with the underlying strategy of Will Kymlicka’s suggestion that:  
 
 ‘It may be possible to avoid some of these issues by redesigning public 
holidays, uniforms, and state symbols. It is relatively easy to replace religious 
oaths with secular ones, and so we should. It would be more difficult, but 
perhaps not impossible, to replace existing public holidays with work-weeks 
with more ‘neutral’ schedules for schools and government offices.’416  
 
The strategy in this instance is to undermine significant cultural dominance and I 
find this to be largely sound when we consider the implications that a dominant 
national heritage has on the neutrality of the liberal state.417 I have already rejected 
Kymlicka’s special treatment of national minorities and thus this strategy should 
apply equally to all cultural groups. The underlying principle behind this strategy is 
essentially one of fairness – not between cultural groups – but rather for the 
individuals within them.  
 
Yet although the underlying sentiment of fairness which runs through this particular 
aspect of Kymlicka’s work is laudable, as Joseph Carens notes, Kymlicka’s own 
particular framework does not necessarily provide much guidance about what is 
                                                       
415 Barry, CE, p.135. 
416 Kymlicka, MC, p.115. 
417 As acknowledged in the previous chapter, this is a similar strategy to the one advocated by Cecile 
Laborde. However as mentioned in Chapter 4, unlike Laborde, I do not believe that it is possible to 
undermine all instances of cultural bias. 
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right.418 Carens highlights (on the particular issue of aboriginal language rights) the 
uncertainty that while changing official policy may be inherently desirable as a 
matter of symbolic recognition, it is not necessarily clear that this is what justice 
requires.419 Similarly, saying that we should undermine significant cases of cultural 
dominance does not really get us to when exactly it may be necessary to intervene, 
and what form this intervention should entail.  
 
I believe that the solution lies instead in distinguishing between ‘insignificant’ 
instances of cultural bias (for example with regard to the treatment of little known 
objects or practices by relatively small groups) and ‘significant’ instances (for 
example, with regard to language rights or specific practices where the group in 
question makes up a substantive proportion of the population).420 (That said, the size 
of a particular group should not always be the deciding factor of the legitimacy of a 
group’s claim.) My point here is to indicate that it is possible to identify a particular 
threshold of harm to individuals that warrants state attention, whereby the same 
principle of reducing significant cultural dominance may require different responses 
to different aspects of culture. This ‘harm’ threshold was initially outlined in Chapter 
3421 and I shall examine how this principle manifests itself with regard to various 
                                                       
418 Carens, CCC, p.60. 
419 Carens, ibid. 
420 ‘Insignificant’ in this regard to the state – this is not to say that a group may not be able to appeal 
to another body such as UNESCO, for example. Interestingly, on the issue of language rights Carens 
writes: ‘Furthermore, no aboriginal person can routinely expect to communicate with doctors, 
lawyers, dentists, bureaucrats, television technicians, and so on in her native language, much less to 
find employment in that language in the economy outside the reserve.’ (op cit. p.60) – I disagree that 
this is what making a language ‘official’ necessarily entails and will discuss this in greater depth in the 
final chapter. 
421 Note that significant cultural dominances can come from internal pressures within an individual’s 
culture, as well as external pressures from a different group. Significant instances are defined above 
as: ‘instances where it is apparent that an individual has been deprived of the ability to make a 
meaningful choice about a particular cultural practice.’ P.78. Note also, however that ‘The viability of 
interventions, however, is obviously a matter of scale. The state will not simply intervene on banal, 
everyday decisions. Rather interventions, when necessary or requested, focus on life changing 
circumstances – which may take the form of one substantial act, or repeated small acts – examples of 
such changes in circumstances include, marriage or divorce, physical change or long-term changes to 
appearance, deprivation of medical attention or education, etc. If an individual is found not to have 
exercised autonomy on such matters or has requested intervention, then the state possesses the right to 
intervene on their behalf, enshrined in the law, as a matter of individual liberty. It should be stressed 
that this applies to individuals from both the dominant and minority cultures. Therefore, by upholding 
complementary principles of toleration and autonomy, the liberal state is able to ensure that 
individuals are provided with the greatest liberty possible to engage with their cultural heritages whilst 
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aspects of culture in Chspter 8. A liberal response to cultural heritage is generally 
characterised by non-intervention in order to allow individuals to engage 
meaningfully with their cultural heritage. However, it is necessary at times to 
intervene in order to uphold liberal values of toleration and autonomy. Significant 
harm is therefore characterised by a lack of toleration and respect for individual 
autonomy. Thus, undermining cultural dominance (for example, by broadening the 
scope of official languages) helps to uphold both of these principles. It should be 
noted that these interventions are likely to be infrequent and are designed to be 
remedial efforts. As a rule of thumb, the legitimacy of cultural claims are deeply 
suspect if the group in question has to go to great lengths to persuade liberal 
governments that they are being unfairly and significantly disadvantaged by the 
dominance of the national culture. Furthermore, in the vast majority of instances, 
should significant422 groups require resources to sustain their cultural heritage, it is 
likely that they will be able to appeal to sources of funding (such as, individual 
members or, indeed, UNESCO) other than the state. 
 
 
Fairness and Group Rights 
Liberal states, I have argued, maintain a commitment to a minimal national culture – 
even if this commitment cannot always be upheld in practice. Its interventions in 
cultural heritage are not strictly out of a concern for culture, but rather the 
circumstances that individuals may find themselves in as a result of their culture. It is 
a concern for political as opposed to cultural neutrality. The liberal response of non-
intervention and reducing instances of significant cultural dominance outlined here 
has not been asserted in terms of claims for group rights, but rather in terms of 
cultural domination which can systematically place individuals at an unfair 
disadvantage both substantively and symbolically. Examples of unfair disadvantages 
may include: 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
being protected from the pressures of the majority and indeed of their own cultural group.’ See above, 
p.81-82.  
422 i.e. Both in terms of scope, size and political significance – such as racial, ethnic, national or 
religious groups 
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1. The recital of religious prayers and hymns in state schools or prior to public 
meetings423; 
2. the existence of an official language within a state that includes a substantial 
national minority/minorities; 
3. citizenship tests which are largely based upon a particular national culture; 
4. citizenship oaths of allegiance that also invoke a particular religion; 
5. a history curriculum which fundamentally only reflects the experiences of 
particular groups; 
6. state funding of heritage that is representative of a particular group. 
 
Although it may seem rather disingenuous to frame the moral duty of the liberal state 
in terms of its obligations to individual citizens when laws and customs remain 
clearly biased towards particular groups, this fundamentally grows out of a concern 
to respect the autonomy of individuals in their decisions to engage with a particular 
culture. Furthermore, it also acknowledges how various individuals may relate to the 
same culture in quite different ways. Of course, this individual right, not to be placed 
at a substantial cultural disadvantage by the state, may turn out only to be a matter of 
syntax (especially when efforts may target individuals from specific cultures); it is 
nevertheless crucial – from a liberal perspective – to reinforce the primacy of the 
individual. A liberal response to cultural heritage therefore officially rejects the 
notion of group rights, although in practice many responses to cultural heritage may 
have the same outcome or effect as assigning particular group rights. For example, an 
acknowledgement of the difficulties that individuals face in not being able to speak a 
dominant language will lead the liberal state to provide translations of certain vital 
information (e.g. on voting, taxation, laws etc.). Yet, while translations may be part 
of according special language rights and recognising minority cultures, the 
fundamental aim behind such actions is not the survival of a minority culture, but 
rather ensuring that individuals who are unable to speak the dominant language have 
access to important public information. Similarly, although I do not endorse the 
cultural defence, it is important that courts take all contextual information, including 
cultural identity, practices and norms, into consideration. The major difference in 
these instances, however, is that the state does not seek to actively promote the 
                                                       
423 For an interesting take on this latter point, see Drury (2012): ‘Christianity Under Attack’ in The 
Daily Mail (11/2/12) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2099300/Councils-BANNED-saying-
prayers-meetings-sparking-fury-Government-church-leaders.html  
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cultural identity of marginalised groups. This is an issue that will be explored in 
greater depth in the final chapter.  
 
 
Recognition Revisited 
While the end of politically recognising group difference was rejected in the previous 
section, it is important to grant that – as we have seen with Laurajane Smith’s study 
of indigenous claims on cultural heritage – acknowledging unfairness and 
disadvantages is a significant part of responding to these unfairnesses and 
disadvantages. Indeed recognition – in terms of official statements and apologies – 
may at times be all that is possible when responding to unjust political and cultural 
dominance. In this sense however, recognition is not directly about distinct cultural 
groups but rather about specific injustices and biases. As Seyla Benhabib has 
attempted to demonstrate, rather than leading to cultural separatism and 
balkanisation, recognition (outside of the framework envisaged by Taylor et al, 
discussed above) might be able to initiate ‘critical dialogue and reflection in public 
life about the very identity of the collectivity itself.’424 Bhiku Parekh has also 
asserted the importance of the state recognising itself as multicultural and 
characterised by diversity.425 He adds that once governments have made efforts to 
ensure that minorities have cultural space then ‘it should not matter if the definition 
[of national community] retains some bias towards the dominant majority 
community.’426 I maintain, however, that in order to yield positive outcomes, 
recognition should not be conceived of as a political end in itself, but rather treated 
as a means of responding to dominance and unfairness. I shall engage with 
recognition for the purposes of addressing injustices in greater depth in the next 
chapter.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
                                                       
424 Benhabib (2002): op cit., p.70. 
425 Parekh (2002): op cit., p.235. 
426 Ibid., p.236. 
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This chapter fundamentally sought to consider the implications of an institutionalised 
national heritage on policy towards the heritages of a diversity of groups. Though I 
rejected the view that the presence of minimal attributes of cultural heritage (as 
outlined in the previous chapter) constitutes an injustice, I did acknowledge the 
problems that this poses for the neutrality of the liberal state. While it is important 
not to give up on the political neutrality of the state, the necessary existence of 
certain symbols and attributes of a dominant national cultural heritage (which may 
well exceed the ‘minimal’ threshold established in the previous chapter) entails that 
we must accept that the liberal state is not and cannot be culturally neutral. The 
liberal state can nevertheless strive toward political neutrality. 
 
Part of maintaining political neutrality requires that individuals should, to the 
greatest extent possible, have the freedom to engage with their cultural heritage 
without intervention from the state. In the second section of this chapter, I therefore 
expanded upon the normative significance of cultural heritage that was laid out in my 
second chapter. This found that while non-intervention should remain the guiding 
principle behind a liberal state’s response to cultural heritage, it is equally important 
to acknowledge existing biases (i.e. that of the dominant national culture) within the 
liberal state. 
 
Given this public bias, it is necessary to seriously consider the alternatives proposed 
by Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor and Iris Marion Young of promoting a diversity of 
cultures – and by extension, cultural heritages. In assessing the viability of promoting 
a diversity of cultural heritages as a public good, the third section of this chapter 
considered 1) cultural survival, 2) the politics of recognition and, by way of this, 3) 
group rights. The view that the promotion of a diversity of cultural heritages 
constitutes a public good, and ought therefore to be preserved or promoted, was 
rejected on the basis that the three strategies that underpin this strategy fail to capture 
the nuances of cultural identity and, as a consequence, ultimately serve to undermine 
an individual’s ability to engage freely with their cultural heritage. 
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The chapter was brought to a close by demonstrating how a liberal response to 
cultural heritage that fundamentally remains charaterised by non-intervention, can 
nevertheless address significant instances of cultural bias. A liberal response to 
cultural heritage is driven by a concern for individual freedom and toleration. While 
this principle requires non-intervention for the most part, this same principle also 
authorises state interventions when individuals are placed at a significant 
disadvantage as a consequence of their cultural orientation and affiliations. The 
liberal state will therefore intervene to undermine instances where dominant cultural 
biases place certain individuals at a distinct disadvantage. This can entail making 
changes to public culture as well as providing certain individuals with additional 
help. This is not a group right, although attempts to undermine the dominance of the 
national culture may, at times, have the same effect as group rights. The strategy of 
undermining cultural dominance may require replacements or additions to the public 
culture, and sometimes subtractions from it. Thus, while a public heritage necessarily 
undermines a liberal state’s claim to cultural neutrality, the existing biases within 
public cultural can be attenuated by upholding political neutrality. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Cultural Heritage, Recognition and 
Remembrance 
 
 
 
In this thesis I have aimed to outline and defend a liberal response to cultural 
heritage. The preceding chapters have primarily discussed the ramifications of this 
response in relation to cultural identity. Cultural heritage, I have demonstrated, both 
reflects and is constitutive of the historical identity of cultural groups and, because a 
liberal state is comprised of a multitude of cultural groups, it is important that liberal 
governments make concerted efforts to abstain from interference in cultural practices 
that it deems abhorrent, whilst ensuring that tolerance and respect for individual 
liberty are upheld. In this chapter I turn to examine the ramifications of another 
important feature of a liberal response to cultural heritage and this is its significance 
for collective memory and historical justice.  
 
In defining cultural heritage I have argued that it can play a crucial role in 
communicating and sustaining collective memory. The central issue that I wish to 
address in this chapter is the role of memory and historical justice in the construction 
and maintenance of a public heritage. In earlier chapters I defended the existence of 
minimal attributes of public cultural heritage, that are likely to reflect the experiences 
of a dominant nationality, as both necessary for all contemporary states and valuable 
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for liberal states because this public heritage can be used to promote solidarity and 
respect for toleration and individual liberty. This chapter examines the content and 
rationale of a liberal public heritage by exploring the ramifications of symbolic 
gestures of historical justice, and determines whether a public heritage can include 
practices and objects that are designed to sustain collective memory.  In doing so, I 
also wish to demonstrate how certain prevalent claims for symbolic responses to 
historical justice might manifest themselves in cultural policy.  
 
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of possible liberal rationales for engaging 
with the past. Indeed, the recognition and remembrance of certain historical events 
and atrocities are often regarded as necessary symbolic gestures for achieving some 
sort of historical justice – liberal or otherwise. Both recognition and remembrance 
have specific outcomes for cultural heritage. There are few villages, towns and cities 
in Europe, for instance, that do not have some sort of monument or memorial for the 
first and second World Wars. I shall therefore examine the ramifications that these 
requirements of historical justice have on cultural heritage.  
 
A key argument that I put forth in this chapter is the importance of distinguishing 
between recognition and remembrance. Indeed, in the historical justice literature, 
these two are often treated as synonymous. By examining their ramifications for 
cultural heritage, I wish to demonstrate that this is clearly not the case. While a 
liberal state can and should endorse the recognition of certain historical events, its 
response to cultural heritage cannot include obligations of public remembrance. 
Although the liberal state may take a minimal stance on cultural heritage, it is 
obligated to create room for individuals to freely engage with their own histories and 
heritages. The chapter draws to a close by examining what the normative distinction 
between recognition and remembrance means pragmatically for the maintenance and 
management of monuments, memorials and other public practices, as well as the 
permissibility of iconoclasm. Recognition fulfils the symbolic requirements of 
historical justice but, importantly for a liberal state, must also allow individuals to 
largely derive their own meaning from historical events. It is important therefore that 
cultural heritage that is sustained in public space for a prolonged period of time  – 
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such as monuments, plaques, memorial days and rituals – is presented or framed in a 
manner that emphasises historical understanding and a diversity of experiences and 
opinions on the past, and not subjectively as a matter of collective memory.  
 
Before I begin, it is worth noting that my primary aim here is to examine the 
ramifications of broadly accepted arguments about historical justice on cultural 
heritage and not to make claims about the desirability and feasibility historical justice 
more generally. In doing so, however, I necessarily highlight strengths and 
weaknesses of certain arguments. I would like to stress that my concern, however, is 
primarily with the question of how a liberal states’ cultural policy is affected by 
historical justice.  
 
 
Liberal Reasons for Engaging with the Past 
Up until now, I have primarily discussed a liberal response to cultural heritage vis-à-
vis its significance for individual and collective identities and conceptions of the 
good. Cultural heritage, however, also has a significant bearing on memory and the 
extent to which individuals engage with the past. Indeed, an underlying argument 
throughout has been to emphasise the historical significance of certain cultural 
practices and traditions. In discussing cultures and cultural practices, it is important 
to treat them not as ahistorical snapshots, but rather as the outcome of accumulated 
time and experiences. Yet, this historical aspect of cultural heritage also sits 
somewhat uneasily with liberalism, which grew out of a scepticism of custom and a 
rejection of the authority of tradition. It is important therefore to examine the 
consequences of the liberal response that I have defended, which allows for a 
minimal amount of tradition and custom in the public sphere, on memory and 
engaging with the past. One crucial question that I seek to answer in this chapter is 
whether it is permissible for liberal states to sustain a public heritage that requires 
collective memory.  
 
Philosophical conservatives are known for their appreciation of a sense of the past – 
something that they claim cannot be fully articulated or rationalised.  Indeed, the 
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value of respecting and sustaining the past has also been used as an argument to 
defend the continuation of certain traditions, practices and norms. In this sense, the 
past is used to legitimise the present. Yet a liberal cannot allow or defend these 
justifications for engaging with the past as they necessarily place tradition and 
custom beyond the scope of critical reasoning. Although liberalism remains sceptical 
of tradition, there are liberal reasons for engaging with the past and these, in turn, 
have distinct outcomes for cultural heritage.  
 
The importance of engaging with historical justice, for instance, is consistent with 
liberal values.  Before outlining the arguments in favour of pursuing historical 
justice, it is worth taking a moment to consider why a liberal defence of historical 
justice might be a little bit puzzling from the outset. Liberalism, as we have seen, is 
generally characterised by the maintenance of neutrality in the face of differing 
conceptions of the good and an adherence to universal values. In other words, 
liberalism has largely strived to be ahistorical. History and the experiences derived 
from history are not irrelevant; rather they are simply contingent. It is for this reason 
that a liberal argument in favour of engaging with the past might appear, from the 
outset, to be rather strange. However, ‘the past’ in liberal arguments for historical 
justice does not matter insofar as an event may have occurred many, many years ago; 
rather, liberal proponents of historical justice to some extent rely upon the 
assumption that certain actions violate what may be regarded as a universal threshold 
of permissible behaviour.427 Widespread torture, theft and enslavement, as well as 
mass murder and genocide, for instance, are generally regarded as actions that 
transgress this threshold. Furthermore, the lingering consequences of such actions 
have, arguably, also had a detrimental effect on the livelihoods, opportunities and 
welfare of proceeding generations and contemporary society – and thus historical 
justice is as much about obligations to the present as it is to the past.428 Historical 
justice therefore provides liberals with very strong reasons for engaging and 
responding to the past. Consequently, it is important to examine the impact of these 
arguments on cultural heritage. The next section examines the general relationship 
                                                       
427 To correlate, perhaps, with what is regarded in law as ‘universal jusrisdiction’, such that 
geographical and, indeed, temporal boundaries may be trangressed.  
428 Waldron, J. (1992): ‘Superseding Historic Injustice’ in Ethics (103. 1), p.7. 
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between cultural heritage and historical justice, before turning to discuss the 
implications of this for liberalism. 
 
 
Cultural Heritage and Historical Justice 
Though many scholars are in agreement about the importance of historical justice, 
what exactly historical justice consists of has been a matter of contention among its 
proponents. For instance, while Jeremy Waldron strongly defends the notion of 
‘historical recollection’, he remains sceptical about the possibility of more 
‘substantive’ efforts of rectification – such as, for example, land restitution.429 Robert 
Nozick, on the other hand, defends a version of historical justice that relies upon the 
validity of counterfactuals – namely, that attempts are made to ‘return’ to the state of 
affairs that would have existed had the historical injustice not occurred.430 Finally, 
Janna Thompson re-frames historical justice as a  ‘past referring obligation’ and by 
rejecting the sufficiency of ‘abstract’ notions such as apology and forgiveness, as 
well as the possibility of returning to a former state of affairs, endorses the notion of 
reparation as a matter of reconciliation.431 These are just a few examples of the many 
different positions taken on the possibility of historical justice. It is not my intention 
here to endorse or deny any of these positions. Rather, the point that I wish to focus 
on, and which is most relevant to my purposes here, is the fact that many accounts of 
the possibility of historical justice necessarily entail some degree of recognition, that 
is, the acknowledgement in the first instance that a wrong has taken place. Implicitly 
we may assume that any effort at rectifying an historical wrong will require some 
degree of recognition, but more importantly it is very often the recognition and 
acknowledgement that a wrong has taken place which matters most to victims of 
injustice and their descendants. If it were possible to rectify an historical wrong by 
way of returning land or giving over a sum of money, the value of these efforts 
would largely be diminished if not accompanied by some substantial form of 
recognition that displays an awareness (indeed, repentance) of historical events as 
well as the actors involved. Thus, I believe that it is reasonable to accept the widely 
                                                       
429 Ibid. 
430 Nozick, R. (2003): Anarchy, State, Utopia, (Oxford: Basic Books), p.152-153. 
431 Thomson, J. (2002): Taking Responsibility for the Past, (Oxford: Blackwell). 
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held belief, in the literature, that the recognition of historical injustices is a necessary, 
if not sufficient, means of achieving historical justice; and indeed that this 
acknowledgement may well be as important as any possible material 
compensation.432   
 
The recognition of an historical injustice, however, has distinct ramifications for the 
treatment of cultural heritage. Specifically, I wish to demonstrate here that what has 
been described in terms of recognition and acknowledgement has lead to both the 
creation and destruction of cultural heritage. As noted above, recognition has been 
widely433 acknowledged as a necessary condition of historical justice – it has been 
framed in terms of what is ‘owed’ to the victims of past injustices as well as their 
ancestors. This recognition can be functional – as part of more substantial efforts, 
e.g. reparations, to rectify the past, but it is also highly symbolic. Efforts to respond 
to injustices are made not merely because a wrongful act occurred, but also because 
the past continues to have meaning for those who have suffered from it. We may 
therefore assume that efforts to recognise the past are unlikely to be limited to trials 
and abstract public statements by political authorities; acts of recognition are also 
likely to entail the construction of monuments and commemorative objects. The 
likelihood of these latter forms of recognition is high because it is precisely symbolic 
forms of commemoration that can, as we have noted, carry the most meaning for 
victims of injustices and their descendents. Yet all of these (i.e. monuments, plaque, 
memorial days, moments of silence etc), as we have established, are part of what 
may be regarded as cultural heritage. Therefore, we can see that the recognition of an 
injustice can lead to the creation of a cultural heritage; indeed the act creating a 
cultural heritage (in the case of constructing a monument) may actually be 
constitutive of recognition.  
 
Conversely, however, the recognition of historical injustices can also lead to the 
destruction of cultural heritage. For instance, the findings of a commission that had 
                                                       
432 See, for example, Waldron: op. cit., p.7; Kukathas (2003): ‘Responsibility for Past Injustice’ in 
Politics, Philosophy and Economics, (2.2), p.172. 
433 Caney, S. (2006): ‘Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of 
History’ in Journal of Social Philosophy (37:3), p.477.  
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been set up following German reunification in order to decide what should be done 
with a statue of Lenin that remained in Berlin-Friedrichshain noted,  
 
‘The monuments erected by a regime, insofar as they serve its legitimation 
and solidification, lose their right to exist when this regime – and particularly 
a violent, unjust and hated one – collapses or is overthrown; monuments 
serving only the self-representation and ideological elevation of the 
Communist dictatorship or the glorification of its leaders have no place in a 
democratic society; every society has the right to bring to prominence its own 
view of history.’434 
 
The destruction of the statue, as we can see, was justified as a matter of historical 
justice, and – more specifically – through the recognition that the past regime had 
been an unjust one. It was a means of recognising that the past regime had been 
unjust, as well as achieving some degree of historical justice. What this example also 
demonstrates is that the treatment of cultural heritage is a manifestation of historical 
justice. Taking a stance on historical justice thus to some degree necessarily entails 
taking a stance on cultural heritage, and vice versa – the treatment of cultural 
heritage necessarily has distinct outcomes for the achievement of historical justice. I 
shall explore the consequences of iconoclasm for liberalism in a later section, but 
will first discuss the distinction between recognition and remembrance in greater 
depth. 
 
 
Cultural Heritage, Recognition and Remembrance 
The relationship between historical justice and the maintenance of cultural heritage 
raises problems for how historical justice has generally been conceptualised. 
Although I have stated that efforts to recognise historical injustices can lead either to 
the creation or destruction of cultural heritage, implicit in the creation of a cultural 
heritage is the likelihood that this heritage will be maintained and preserved. The 
question of whether the longer term maintenance of cultural heritage can be justified 
out of a duty toward historical justice is interesting because it raises a potential 
problem for the broadly accepted understanding of historical justice that I have just 
                                                       
434 As cited in, Gamboni, D. (1997): The Destruction of Art, (London: Reaktion Books), p.85. 
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discussed above. We may reasonably assume, for instance, that a monument that has 
been constructed to recognise the contributions of men and women during a war will 
not immediately be torn down upon its completion. While the construction of a 
cultural heritage may itself constitute recognition, which as we have seen is fairly 
uncontroversial and accepted, I wish to demonstrate that the ongoing maintenance of 
that cultural heritage – for instance, an annual memorial day as well as a monument 
that is maintained in public space – marks a shift from recognition to remembrance, 
and this shift is potentially problematic. The shift from the creation of cultural 
heritage to its maintenance is potentially problematic because while the requirements 
of historical justice may well entail the creation of a cultural heritage for the 
purposes of recognition, it is unclear whether historical justice requires that we 
continue to remember historical atrocities through the sustained practice or presence 
of cultural heritage. This shift has a significant bearing on 1) the conceptualisation of 
historical justice and 2) the implementation of historical justice in practice.  
 
Conceiving of the shift from the creation to the maintenance of cultural heritage (as 
mirroring a shift from recognition to remembrance) as problematic requires, in the 
first instance, that we accept the distinction between recognition and remembrance as 
valid and important. Recognition entails public acknowledgements, expressions of 
regret and mourning, apologies, trials, history and the construction of monuments. 
Remembrance is distinguished by the maintenance of all of the above demonstrating 
a desire to sustain the public presence of the historical injustice. In this sense, 
recognition is atemporal; unlike remembrance it does not, by definition, rely upon a 
specific amount of time to elapse. Indeed, recognition does not necessarily imply a 
desire to remember for perpetuity. For instance, James E. Young notes that, in 
attempting to transfer memories to material objects, ‘we have to some degree 
divested ourselves of the obligation to remember…In effect, the initial impulse to 
memorialise events like the Holocaust may actually stem from an opposite and equal 
desire to forget them.’435 The inclination to recognise and externalise the past can 
thus also be indicative of a need to rationalise or designate the past. The past has 
been engaged with but it has also been externalised in a suitable and appropriate 
                                                       
435 Young, JPD, p.5. 
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form, which can be interpreted as a desire to acknowledge the past, but also to move 
on.436 It is sustained efforts at maintaining the artefacts and practices of recognition, 
however that indicates a shift to remembrance. Remembrance requires continued 
rituals or performances of collective memory and for these actions and objects to be 
maintained for a certain period of time in order to be regarded as denoting 
remembrance. It also implies a certain type of emotional response of joy and 
celebration, or regret and mourning. It is deeply subjective and particular; above all it 
is emotive and not necessarily prone to rationalisation, suggesting a desire to sustain 
specific emotions such as mourning and regret. Indeed, it is worth reiterating the 
words of Pierre Nora – whose work I cited when distinguishing cultural heritage 
from history – who notes that ‘history [and recognition as I shall demonstrate] 
belongs to everyone and no one, whence its claim to universal authority,’ whereas 
memory, on the other hand, ‘is blind to all but the group it binds.’437 Recognition, on 
the other hand, is a somewhat ‘colder’ response. It is an acknowledgement of an 
event – undoubtedly with some emotion – but does not require that these emotions be 
sustained for a prolonged period. 
 
It is impossible, however, to draw a clear line that distinguishes when recognition has 
ended and remembrance has begun partly because recognition (in the most banal 
sense) requires some recollection and remembrance of the past. Furthermore, as I 
have just noted, recognition is also largely atemporal; it is not defined with a 
particular timeframe. I have largely conceived of recognition and remembrance as 
ideal types. Nevertheless, I believe that the desire to sustain a specific emotion for a 
prolonged period of time can enable us to roughly distinguish a normative difference 
between the two. The recognition of a specific historical event, for example with an 
annual commemoration or the maintenance of specific objects such as monuments 
and plaques, cannot continue beyond a certain amount of time before turning into 
remembrance. Furthermore, recognition can potentially also place greater emphasis 
on historical understanding and, unlike remembrance, is more amenable to exploring 
the different perspectives of historical atrocities. While recognition and remembrance 
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are two quite different responses to historical injustices, the problem – as I have 
noted above – lies in the fact that, in practice, recognition can frequently turn into 
remembrance.  
 
Arguments in favour of recognition, however, have used the terms recognition and 
remembrance rather carelessly and the distinction between recognition and 
remembrance has not necessarily been acknowledged in the literature on historical 
justice. For example, in his essay Superseding Historic Injustice, Jeremy Waldron 
notes: ‘Perhaps the determination to remember is bound up with the desire to sustain 
a specific character as a person or community against a background of infinite 
possibility.’438 On the next page Waldron clarifies what this remembrance is to 
consist of: ‘only the deliberate enterprise of recollection (the enterprise we call 
“history”), coupled with the most determined sense that there is a difference between 
what happened and what we would like to think happened, can sustain the moral and 
cultural reality of self and community.’439 Waldron’s account of honouring victims 
of injustice thus consists of ensuring that the facts of the injustice are recollected and 
noted down – as defined by the ‘enterprise of history.’ This is recognition; it cannot 
however be described as remembrance as Waldron does not mention that recollection 
ought to be sustained for a specific amount of time. The problem with Waldron’s 
argument here, I think, is not merely one of semantics, but rather a genuine 
conflation of remembrance with recognition – what Waldron is advocating as 
remembrance is in fact recognition. Indeed, as he does not offer a reason for why 
remembrance (as defined in this chapter) ought to be sustained, the argument that 
Waldron makes can only support recognition. Waldron’s argument helps to highlight 
both the confusion in terminology as well as the difficulty in distinguishing 
recognition from remembrance. Thus the nature of recognition and the forms that it 
can take (for example, the construction of a monument) have strong implications for 
historical justice because, returning to the monument and other objects and practices 
that are generally designed and constructed to withstand a certain amount of time, we 
may presume in many cases that such expressions of recognition will continue to 
exist, indicating a shift from recognition to remembrance. As a specific manifestation 
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of recognition, cultural heritage thus highlights a potential problem with our 
understanding of historical justice; we need to ask whether historical justice requires 
remembrance, or indeed if public remembrance is ever permissible. In other words, 
should liberal states impose a duty of remembrance alongside recognition, or is there 
something inherently wrong with this? I have already mentioned above that there has 
been a tendency to conflate the terms remembrance and recognition and thus 
‘remembrance’ has received a fair amount of attention from within the literature. 
However, of the theorists that do mention remembrance, it is not clear to what extent 
sustained remembrance is actually endorsed. Indeed, there is a surprising lack of 
scholarship on the value of forgetting.440 This is a rather conspicuous gap in the 
literature on historical justice; no one seems willing to provide a reasoned rejection 
of remembrance. Historical justice is a topic that remains fraught with emotion and a 
desire to account and atone for psychological as well as tangible harms, so it is easy 
to understand why scholars might be unwilling to reject remembrance. Many have 
endorsed the abstract concept of recognition as a means of embracing the symbolic 
and emotional significance of historical injustices. Yet few have explored, in 
practice, what recognition should consist of. As we have seen, the waters can get 
quite muddy here because of the extent to which issues of historical justice can blur 
the lines between reason and emotion.   
 
 
Recognition and the Liberal State 
I have thus far attempted to demonstrate how cultural heritage poses problems for the 
manner in which historical justice is generally conceived by blurring the distinction 
between recognition and remembrance. I have argued that while certain objects and 
practices of cultural heritage (such as memorial days, monuments and plaques) may 
be designed and constructed with the aim of recognising certain historical injustices, 
their continued maintenance implies a shift from recognition to remembrance. In 
order to appreciate why this ambiguity is problematic it is necessary to accept the 
premise that recognition and remembrance are normatively different. In the previous 
section, therefore, I attempted to establish this premise and distinguished recognition 
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through its emphasis on acknowledgement and historical understanding, whereas 
remembrance was defined in terms of a more sustained emotional response to 
historical events. The shift in cultural heritage from recognition to remembrance is 
conceptually problematic for historical justice, therefore, fundamentally because 
although scholars have generally defended the value of recognition, it is unclear 
whether justice requires, or even permits remembrance. In this section of the chapter 
I attempt to prove part of this argument by exploring, evaluating and ultimately 
defending the value of recognising crimes against humanity.  
 
A liberal government must necessarily engage in recognition as a crucial part of 
achieving historical justice and atoning for historical wrongdoings. When it has been 
either actively involved in historical injustices or wilfully neglectful of specific 
actions or events, the government itself incurs a specific duty of recognition, 
whereby it ought to acknowledges the wrong that it has committed. Although these 
events may have occurred far in the past, it is crucial that they are recognised 
because letting these events go unacknowledged undermines the state’s commitment 
to justice and respect for other liberal values. This recognition, as I have noted above, 
manifests itself in the construction of monuments and commemorative objects, in 
ceremonies and speeches, as well as other ritualistic performances. Insofar as a 
liberal state does not consist of thick ties, however, it is not possible to assert that 
individuals have a political obligation to recognise such historical events as citizens 
of the liberal state by attending national memorial days and events, for example, or 
participating in moments of silence. While institutional continuity renders current 
governments culpable for the actions of previous governments, hence requiring that 
they recognise certain events, it is much more difficult to maintain that the same 
degree of cohesion exists amongst different generations within a liberal state that is 
characterised by diversity and different conceptions of the good. 
 
However, there are some crimes – often referred to as crimes against humanity – 
which arguably transcend the different ideas about the good life. These are instances 
where universal principles such as individual freedom and toleration for others have 
been grossly violated both in terms of degree and the number of people affected 
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These crimes are deemed abhorrent by anyone who respects human life and dignity, 
and arguably require recognition because of their significance for humanity. Indeed, 
knowledge of such crimes, their causes and consequences, reduces the likelihood that 
they will be repeated. Thus, despite their differences, all members of a liberal society 
– who are bound to respect individual autonomy and toleration - ought to recognise 
such events.  
 
Yet, although there are compelling reasons for states to endorse an obligation of 
public recognition, there are also powerful reasons to side against a general 
obligation of recognition. Recognition can manifest itself in a number of different 
ways, and not all of these are amenable to liberal principles. The complexities of this 
issue are perhaps best illustrated with regard to Holocaust denial. Holocaust denial or 
the refusal to recognise the Holocaust, and genocide in general, is considered a 
criminal offence in many European countries including, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Switzerland. By outlawing a denial of the Holocaust, 
these states effectively endorse a specific obligation of recognition and, in doing so, 
the state inevitably takes a stance on what it believes is the correct account of history. 
Yet, there is something deeply illiberal about outlawing and penalising deviations 
from this account. Indeed, while it may be important to recognise certain historical 
events (by outlawing deviations from the official account), this also compromises 
freedom of expression and opinion, which constitutes one of the cornerstones of 
liberal thought. As John Stuart Mill famously remarked:  
 
‘If all mankind minus one were of mankind were of one opinion, and only 
one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified 
in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified 
in silencing mankind.’441 
 
Although the denial of certain historical atrocities is deeply offensive both to victims 
and their descendants, outlawing particular opinions through obligations of 
recognition stifles freedom of expression and debate – both of which are crucial for a 
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liberal society. Indeed, this is also regarded as a universal right, enshrined by the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights which notes that:  
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers. 
 
Rather than outlawing deviations from the official account of the past, as Timothy 
Garton Ash writes, the best way to refute patently absurd conspiracy theories and to 
combat racism, as well as xenophobia, is to engage with such views by gathering the 
relevant evidence in free and open debate.442 Extreme views are unlikely to withstand 
the criticisms of public scrutiny. It is important for the liberal state to encourage 
freedom of speech and expression, as this is conducive to undermining such views, 
rather than simply outlawing them. Thus, while the recognition of certain atrocities is 
in one sense consistent with liberal values, the value of recognition is undermined by 
the fact that it threatens the central liberal value of freedom of speech and expression.   
 
Arguing that citizens do not have an obligation to recognise certain historical events 
in no way precludes them recognising events if they choose to do so. It may well be 
the case that, as Margalit et al have asserted, we have a moral obligation of humanity 
to recognise and accept certain events, tragedies and celebrations – yet liberal 
governments must take care to adopt a more nuanced approach to the issue of 
historical recognition. Confronted by the apparent incompossibility between the 
recognition of universal historical injustices and freedom of expression, I do not 
believe that it is desirable to decide unequivocally in favour of either – instead, a 
more balanced approach that appreciates the values and limitations of each is 
required.  
 
In the first instance, reiterating the value of freedom of speech does mean that 
individuals should be given complete authority over expressions about the past. It is 
an altogether different matter, for example, when an historian intentionally 
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misinterprets facts and uses their authority as an historian to propagate myths and 
incite violence. Furthermore, as Mill goes on to argue: 
 
‘Even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which they are 
expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to 
some mischievous act...Acts, of whatever kind, which, without justifiable 
cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely 
require to be controlled by the unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, 
by the active interference of mankind.’443 
 
Thus, an historian, attempting to make reasoned arguments about historical events 
and maintaining what Antoon de Baets calls a ‘moral attitude of intellectual 
integrity’444, should be free to draw and publish conclusions by relying on adequate 
source material. Additionally, individuals within the liberal state must be free to 
draw their own conclusions and opinions about the past. If it is found, however, that 
individuals are using conceptions of the past to intentionally mislead, to stir up harm 
and threaten certain individuals and groups, then – as so eloquently advocated by 
Mill – the right to freedom of speech may be revoked. Indeed, the issue arguably 
becomes more one of harm and violence – and protecting those who are being 
targeted, and less a matter of freedom of expression.    
 
Furthermore, although I have highlighted the dangers of recognition and of 
regulating understandings of the past, liberal states have additional reasons to support 
the universal recognition of such crimes because they also violate principles, such as 
respect for individuals and toleration, which lie at the heart of liberalism. The 
potential dangers to freedom of expression caused by laws that are intended to 
criminalise the denial of certain historical events do not, in any way, impede the 
construction of monuments and other objects and practices that are designed to 
recognise historical events. Indeed, there is powerful evidence which suggests that 
increased knowledge and understanding of these crimes can lead to their 
prevention.445 Thus, although I reject the view that liberal states ought to effectively 
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obligate its citizens to recognise specific events, I do, however, believe that 
recognition of historical injustices should play a role in civic education. Making 
recognition part of the educational curriculum places greater emphasis on historical 
understanding, and particularly about the complexity of the past by not moralising 
about winners and losers, or victims and perpetrators. Yet this form of education 
does not necessarily only take place in the classroom and in the study of books. 
There is a lot of room for alternate expressions on this past – for example, in 
museums, as well as artwork and performances and plays. I believe that this is 
consistent with the view that the recognition of universal injustices cannot be 
enforced by outlawing certain conceptions of the past because it is in the interest of 
freedom of thought and expression that a diversity of understandings of the past are 
allowed to take hold, and some occasionally rejected, within the liberal state. 
Incorporating the study of the great crimes of humanity and exploring these events 
from a variety of perspectives and approaches thus encourages a more complex 
understanding of the past and of the universal heritage of mankind. I shall discuss 
this form of recognition in greater depth in the final chapter. I now wish to turn to 
obligations of remembrance. 
 
 
Remembrance within the Liberal State 
As I have demonstrated above, conflating recognition and remembrance poses 
distinct problems for both the conceptualisation and implementation of historical 
justice. Recognition implies an acknowledgement and acceptance of certain 
historical events. In this sense it treats an engagement with the past as a form of 
knowledge that carries symbolic significance. Remembrance, on the other hand, 
requires recognition but places a much greater emphasis on sustaining a particular 
psychological or emotional response. Although I have accepted the value of 
recognition, the normative distinction between recognition and remembrance implies 
that if remembrance is a requirement of historical justice, separate and additional 
arguments are needed to demonstrate the value of sustaining this particular 
psychological state within liberal states. In this section I briefly explore some 
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arguments that have been put forth in defence of public duties of remembrance but 
ultimately reject the role of remembrance in liberal politics.  
 
From the outset it seems rather strange to endorse the view that we have a public 
duty to maintain a certain psychological state of regret or joy. An obligation, as 
citizens, to sustain a particular psychological state of sadness or joy and to 
acknowledge particular events on a regular basis, and especially for the state to 
enforce this, seems to run counter to a fundamental liberal freedom – namely, 
freedom of conscience. Indeed, in order for us to willingly circumvent this basic 
tenet of liberal thought, specific and much more powerful arguments need to be 
made in favour of sustaining remembrance. There are three theorists, however, that I 
wish to mention briefly who explicitly argue for the need to sustain remembrance. In 
The Moral Demands of Memory, Jeffrey Blustein argues that, ‘within limits and with 
respect to especially significant events, experiences, or people from the past, 
remembrance is an indispensible ingredient of a good life and necessary ingredient 
of civic health.’446 Thus remembrance is justified in terms of its value for the 
common good. Blustein articulates the existence of ‘imperfect’ moral obligations 
‘whose principles allow some freedom to choose which events will be remembered 
and which events will go unremembered.’447 Therefore, according to Blustein, 
particular communities must remember particular historical events as derived from a 
general, universal obligation of remembrance.448 James Booth, on the other had, 
finds that our history is tied to our identity and thus while we may not be able to 
choose our histories, we can choose whether or not to recognise them. For Booth to 
remember the past is to take responsibility for it.449 Drawing upon the political 
philosophy of Edmund Burke, he articulates an obligation to remember the past as 
intrinsic to the maintenance of a shared community identity across generations.450 
Specifically, Booth argues:  
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‘Not to recognise the fullness of our ledger, its debts and injustices, is itself a 
wrong of a special kind, a wrong by virtue of not bearing in mind one’s 
responsibility to the victims or of gratitude to one’s benefactors. It also, by 
attacking the bases of moral identity, undermines the possibility of trust by 
refusing to recognise the connection between past and present wills, which in 
turn weakens faith in the forward-directed power of the will to commit 
my/our future self.’451 
 
Conceived in these terms, historical injustices perpetrated by previous generations, 
become a burden that subsequent generations must bear. In order to sustain their 
arguments for remembrance, both Booth and Blustein rely upon a strong sense of 
intergenerational community and coherence and solidarity within the community, as 
well as a desire to sustain and project a certain identity within the community.  
 
The degree of social cohesion required by Booth and Blustein is something that 
Avishai Margalit is somewhat sceptical about. Margalit recognises that such 
obligations to remember necessarily presuppose the existence of what he describes as 
‘thick relations.’452 Thus the duty to remember as envisaged by Booth and Blustein 
relies upon the existence of specific ties as well as a certain degree of homogeneity 
with regard to conceptions of the good. In other words, there is an ethical imperative 
to remember. This obligation to remember might be feasible therefore within 
religious, ethnic, or national groups that are characterised by a certain amount of 
cohesion and homogeneity (indeed as discussed in Chapter 1, such groups may be 
defined in part by the remembrance of certain historical events), but it appears more 
suspect when advanced for a political community that is not necessarily characterised 
by such qualities. If there is an obligation to remember, this seems contingent on a 
certain standard of relations between individuals. A multitude of such affiliations do 
exist within the liberal state, but I believe it would be wrong to assert that the liberal 
state itself is characterised by the thick ties that are needed to justify a public duty of 
remembrance. Indeed, if anything, a liberal state grows out of a determination to 
accommodate (and occasionally placate) a multitude of these ties, by refusing – on 
principle - to promote any particular tie. Furthermore, a liberal public heritage which, 
by nature, is minimal, aims to be objectively balanced and reflexive stands 
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fundamentally at odds with the spirit of remembrance which, as Pierre Nora has 
noted above, demands loyalty and is characterised by subjectivity. 
 
A further reason for why liberal states cannot endorse a public duty of remembrance 
is because a public collective memory is likely to be biased, much like the rest of a 
public heritage, to a particular cultural (most likely, national group). Although public 
heritage is likely to reflect the experiences of the dominant group/nationality, what 
makes a public heritage liberal is that it places no particular normative significance 
on the content of this heritage insofar as it may draw upon a particular national 
identity (in fact, it actively tries to undermine this cultural bias). While I have 
conceded, out of pragmatism, that it is necessary to accept some cultural biases (in 
favour of the dominant group or nationality) in heritage on the basis that these do not 
necessarily harm other groups (or that the liberal state ought to remedy these harms), 
this particular bias cannot be justified – fundamentally because it also undermines 
the central liberal principle of freedom of conscience. As for whether the state ought 
to fund practices which are aimed at sustaining memory – such as public parades, 
rituals and memorial events - the response of the liberal state here must be consistent 
with its response on providing assistance to preserve cultures: that is, part of ensuring 
that individuals have the freedom to engage with their heritages as much or as little 
as they please also entails that liberal states refrain from interfering or funding such 
projects. It would also be unfair for the state to help sustain any particular historical 
memory whilst neglecting others. Though some, particularly liberal nationalists, 
might argue that a public duty of collective memory could be used to bind the 
various groups within the nation together, what distinguishes my view is that I am 
unwilling to accept any normative justification any existing cultural bias in public 
heritage – particularly if this bias, as I have noted above, violates a central liberal 
principle of freedom of conscience. 
 
Yet, although the liberal state cannot oblige its citizens to remember certain national 
moments of trauma or celebration, what about obligations of humanity? While 
Avishai Margalit is doubtful about the possibility of a general moral obligation to 
remember within the political community, when pushed to consider what humanity 
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ought to remember, he points to ‘the great challenges of humanity’ that includes 
universal crimes such as genocide, mass murder, torture, enslavement and mass 
deportations.453 Margalit provides what appears to be the most ‘liberal’ response to 
remembrance by virtue of the fact that we, as humans, are only obliged to remember 
universal injustices. Margalit does not therefore rely upon a particularly strong sense 
of cohesion or homogeneity. Indeed, unlike Booth and Blustein, Margalit does not 
situate this obligation within the political community. He is not advocating that these 
obligations ought to be enforced by national governments, nor that our obligations to 
remember arise out of our membership within a particular state. In asserting a duty of 
remembrance, Margalit’s explanation for why humanity ought to remember specific 
injustices is as follows: 
 
‘Why ought humanity to remember moral nightmares rather than moments of 
human triumph – moments in which human beings behaved nobly?...The 
source of the obligation to remember, I maintain, comes from the effort of 
radical evil forces to undermine morality itself by, among other means, 
rewriting the past and controlling collective memory.’454 
 
It is not clear whether Margalit has anyone specifically in mind when he speaks of 
the ‘radical evil forces’ that attempt to rewrite the past. Yet, it is true that some 
crimes undermine the existence of a common humanity by refusing to certain treat 
individuals as human beings. The difficulty with Margalit’s argument, and indeed 
other potential defences of remembrance, however, is that it ultimately also relies 
upon a certain standard of relations between individuals. Ironically, it is a lack of the 
very qualities that Margalit et al rely upon in order to sustain a general duty of 
humanity to remember that allow such atrocities to occur in the first place, i.e. were 
such relations of humanity to exist, there would be no need to remember great 
injustices because, presumably, these injustices would never have occurred. It is 
precisely the perception of difference that facilitates such crimes of humanity. We 
are presented with an argument in defence of humanity with a fundamentally, and 
seemingly contradictory, pessimistic view of human nature.  
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However, like Booth’s and Blustein’s, Margalit’s obligation to remember also relies 
to some degree on the need to sustain and reaffirm a certain identity – i.e. our 
common humanity; apart from respecting the past, Margalit believes that we also 
owe it to ourselves to remember. Indeed, although the loose bonds of citizenship 
within the liberal state preclude any obligations to remember national events, 
Margalit’s point, as we have seen above, is that the bonds of humanity still require us 
to remember the great traumas that have affected mankind. This obligation is also 
reflected, for example, in the fact that January 27th has been designated International 
Holocaust Memorial Day by the United Nations.455 Indeed, liberal states – as I have 
noted above - have an added reason to engage with this type of reasoning because the 
great crimes of humanity have also been severe violations of liberal principles.  
 
In keeping with liberal commitments, I believe that the role of the liberal state on 
such issues is fundamentally to allow remembrance to occur, without undermining 
freedom of conscience and expression. States often have a role to play in respecting 
and upholding universal values – as enshrined, for example, in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. However, because of the nature of remembrance, the 
state’s role in upholding obligations of remembrance must necessarily be minimal. 
The liberal state simply cannot force individuals to remember as this would seem to 
be deeply counterintuitive. Though some of humanity’s obligations can be enforced 
by states (e.g. by intervening in instances of genocide and violations of sovereignty), 
for pragmatic as well as liberal reasons the enforcement of remembrance is simply 
impossible. Individuals may well mourn tragedies that affect fellow nationals and 
other human beings, but this arises out of a common bond of nationality or, even, 
humanity – and not out of an obligation to one’s fellow citizens. Indeed, as I have 
noted above, there is something radically unfree about requiring individuals, as 
citizens, or states as institutions to sustain specific responses to specific events – to 
be happy on days on national celebration (such the anniversaries of the founding of 
the nation) and to be sad on days that mark national trauma (such as September or 
November11th). This is not to say that people ought not to remember, rather that any 
political requirement or obligation to remember is fundamentally inconsistent with 
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liberal values. Furthermore, as Blustein points out, remembrance is an ingredient of a 
good life – and a liberal state, is defined by abstaining from interference in such 
issues. Remembrance, in other words, has no place in liberal politics. 
 
 
Recognition and Remembrance in Practice 
I have thus far attempted to argue that, while it is difficult to defend a public duty of 
remembrance, liberal states ought to acknowledge certain historical injustices of 
humanity by subsidising a variety of mediums that can inform and educate the public 
about these atrocities. Liberal citizens, I have argued, are not required to recognise 
these events. They may study historical injustices in school and learn about a 
diversity of historical experiences through artwork, history museums and public 
monuments; however, they ought not be penalised for disagreeing with these public 
accounts of the past. I have thus attempted to present a more nuanced conception of 
recognition in this chapter. While I accept that the rejection of certain historical 
events may be insulting and deeply disrespectful and some may feel that I have set 
the bar too low here, I want to stress that this account of historical justice and cultural 
heritage is consistent with liberal values. Liberal states simply cannot require their 
citizens to recognise and remember certain events because this runs counter to the 
very basic premises of liberal thought. That said, it is very likely that a great many 
individuals living within the liberal state will remember and recognise certain events 
– but they do so not out of an obligation as citizens, but rather as a consequence of 
their own private wills.  
 
As I asserted at the beginning of this chapter, the long-term maintenance of certain 
forms of cultural heritage highlights a potential problem for the manner in which 
recognition and remembrance have generally been conceived. I have argued that 
recognition and remembrance are normatively different and yet I do not believe that 
this distinction is widely accepted by proponents of historical justice because many 
do not seem to consider how recognition is to be manifested in practice. As I have 
noted above, the construction of cultural heritage may be part of recognising an 
historical injustice. This recognition and acknowledgement of historical wrongs can 
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be just as significant as more substantive efforts to rectify historical wrongs (e.g. 
reparations). It is this meaningfulness which entails that recognition will often be 
highly symbolic in nature, that is, far from a simple and abstract expression of 
acknowledgement. Recognition may thus encompass memorial days, the 
construction of monuments, artworks, and plaques, as well as the creation of certain 
rituals (such as moments of silence). As I have demonstrated from the outset of this 
thesis, all of these objects and practices can be considered cultural heritage because 
they are recognised as capable of representing significant historical experiences and 
identities. It is clear that attempts at historical justice, therefore, have clear 
implications for the treatment, and specifically creation, of cultural heritage. Yet, 
given the symbolic nature of recognition, it is unlikely that monuments that are 
erected in acknowledgement of an injustice, for example, will immediately be 
demolished once the initial ‘phase’ of recognition has been completed. Indeed, states 
often choose to honour certain historical events more than once – e.g. September 
11th, Columbus Day, or Guy Fawkes Day.456 It is far more likely that the objects and 
rituals that are created out of a desire to recognise an historical event will continue to 
remain in place. However, this prolonged existence in public space indicates a shift 
from recognition to remembrance; it is only possible to ‘recognise’ the past a certain 
number of times before this repeated acknowledgement takes on the character of 
remembrance. While it may be clear that justice requires that the liberal recognises 
universal historical wrongs, I have attempted to demonstrate above why obligations 
of remembrance run counter to fundamental liberal values. So, what should be done 
about practices and objects that are initially designed for the purposes of recognising 
injustices but eventually also sustained in the long run within public spaces? 
 
It would appear that remaining faithful to liberal principles to some extent requires 
that governments ought to remove objects that are designed to recognise historical 
events and only observe days of commemoration for a certain number of years. Yet, 
to destroy objects that have been constructed with the intent of recognising and 
honouring certain events undermines the initial intent behind their construction – 
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indeed, it is almost a kind of iconoclasm. I shall discuss iconoclasm and the liberal 
state in greater depth in the next section. However, while I do believe that the 
practical implementation of recognition and the existence of cultural heritage should 
force some theorists to reconsider their views of historical justice and recognition, I 
do not believe that liberal states ought to necessarily destroy objects or cease 
observing memorial days once a ‘sufficient’ period of recognition has ended. This is 
a particular issue where it is necessary to deviate from ideal theory and principles. 
Instead, liberal governments can maintain such objects and practices but this is on 
the condition that they also carefully control how these things are framed by placing 
greater emphasis, for example, on their educational value by encouraging individuals 
to form their own opinion about these events and experiences, and depriving these 
events and objects – to the greatest extent possible, of subjective and emotive 
content.  
 
Throughout this thesis I have stressed the importance of creating a space for 
individuals to engage with their pasts and cultural heritage meaningfully. This has 
meant that while the state will inevitably promote some experiences over others, it 
ought not prohibit certain practices that it may deem abhorrent or, for that matter, 
impose practices and rituals that reflect the identity of a dominant group, on 
marginalised groups. First and foremost, however, are the two central liberal values 
of individual liberty and toleration which also act as a guide for action when there is 
a clash between a dominant and minority culture. Thus, while the liberal state cannot 
impose a duty of remembrance or require that citizens accept the public account of 
history, it is similarly important for the liberal state to nevertheless help create and 
sustain a space for learning as well as allowing individuals to meaningfully recognise 
and remember events by promoting toleration and respect for individual liberty. Let 
us take Columbus Day as an illustration of this. The US and some countries in South 
America celebrate October the 12th to mark the arrival of Christopher Columbus in 
the Americas, as a crucial part of American heritage. The arrival of Christopher 
Columbus is undoubtedly an event that altered the course of history. Yet, it also 
precipitated violence and slavery to the extent that Columbus’ legacy as a hero is 
seriously thrown into doubt. This is clearly a meaningful date and it would be 
7. Cultural Heritage, Recognition and Remembrance  
 
235 
 
impossible to ignore its significance. However, a liberal response to this is to 
recognise the diversity of attitudes towards this public holiday by refraining from 
framing it with a particular moralising narrative of winners and loser and, instead, 
allowing individuals to derive their own meanings from this event. It is equally 
important to present the many sides to this story in public schools. Thus while the 
state necessarily takes a stance on public heritage by naming Columbus Day as a 
public holiday, it refrains from endorsing a particular narrative for this day. Of 
course, it is not inconceivable that with time, the significance of objects and practices 
may change and take on more general meaning (as opposed to being tied to a specific 
historical narrative), and appreciated more for their aesthetic or antiquarian value, at 
which point, governments may reconsider whether such objects and practices should 
continue to be observed publicly.  
 
 
Destruction, Iconoclasm and the Liberal state 
Although one of the primary aims of this chapter has been to distinguish recognition 
from remembrance, in practice, it is quite difficult to draw a line identifying where 
recognition ends and remembrance begins. Indeed, doing so might also seem most 
tactless, undermining the symbolic significance of recognition. Thus, pulling down 
or destroying objects and monuments (once a ‘reasonable’ period for recognition has 
elapsed) that are constructed in recognition of historical events is clearly 
counterintuitive; and sometimes a waste of time and resources. Though it is 
important that liberal governments do not endorse remembrance, I do not believe that 
this in any way allows for the permissibility of iconoclasm. Sustaining or preserving 
such objects out of obligations of remembrance runs counter to liberal commitments, 
as outlined above – this, however, this does not justify destruction. Indeed, having 
argued that liberal governments do not have an obligation to preserve cultural 
heritage, it is worth considering the permissibility of iconoclasm and the destruction 
of heritage more generally.  
 
It is important to remember that I have defined cultural heritage in terms of its 
significance for cultural identity. Cultural heritage can thus be distinguished from art 
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and antiques, which tend to be analysed in terms of their aesthetic value or age. I 
therefore rejected a general obligation to preserve cultural heritage for liberal 
governments because liberal states have a duty not to promote any particular 
conception of the good life – and cultural heritage, it must be remembered, by 
definition, reflects and represents particular, cultural conceptions of the good. 
Individual liberty and cultural heritage are, instead, best served by liberal states 
refraining from intervention. The only instances where intervention in cultural 
heritage may be justified are 1) to uphold individual liberty, 2) to promote tolerance, 
3) to maintain a necessary, but minimal, liberal public heritage. Of course, asserting 
that liberal governments do not have any obligation to preserve cultural heritage does 
not mean that such objects will not be preserved for other reasons. As I pointed out in 
Chapter 1, objects that are recognised as heritage may also be appreciated on 
aesthetic grounds and regarded as art or antiques. For example, objects that are 
readily discarded during times of conflict or revolution are often smuggled out of the 
country and happily bought up by art connoisseurs across the globe. Thus, while the 
liberal state may is not obliged to preserve cultural heritage, this does not preclude 
the possibility of some objects (which might reasonably be regarded as heritage) 
from being preserved on other grounds.457 
 
With its inherent scepticism of tradition and rejection of any particular conception of 
the good life, challenging existing ideas lies at the very heart of liberal thought. In 
this regard, liberalism is inherently iconoclastic. However, while liberal governments 
do not have an obligation to preserve cultural heritage, this does not give them a 
general right to destroy cultural artefacts. Indeed, destroying objects because of their 
symbolic, cultural value runs counter to the basic premise of liberal thought, which is 
not to promote any particular conception of the good life. While the liberal state 
ought to refrain from promoting its own ideals – it similarly remains bound to not 
reject or deny conceptions of the good, or artefacts which represent conceptions of a 
good that it disagrees with. Thus, the principles of liberalism stand fundamentally at 
odds with iconoclasm.  
 
                                                       
457 Indeed, while I have argued that there is no obligation to preserve cultural heritage, a convincing 
case might still be made for public art subsidies. 
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There are limits to this restriction on destroying objects, however. It is important to 
bear in mind that there may be instances where limited resources - financial, spatial 
and temporal - necessitate the removal or destruction of certain forms of cultural 
heritage. It would be quite naive to suggest that the interests of cultural heritage 
should always trump other concerns, but equally so to find that other concerns, such 
as redevelopment, should always trump heritage considerations. In other words, it is 
very difficult to come up with a principled response to heritage that is threatened by a 
need to redevelop or make other policy changes. Prudence, however, suggests that in 
such instances, when it may be necessary to destroy heritage, for example, to build 
public facilities such as a hospital, school or reservoir, it is important to balance the 
ramifications of the loss of this heritage with the value of the public work being built, 
or public money gained or saved from the destruction of heritage. Liberal 
governments should also make efforts to consult with citizens to understand the 
range of positions on each instance. There is no general ‘right’ answer in such 
instances where heritage is challenged by development needs; rather the most 
suitable outcome should be determined on a case-by-case basis.   
 
Finally, certain icons, symbols and objects can cause serious offense to others and 
this too places restrictions on the above rule on iconoclasm. While the liberal state 
does not possess a general right to challenge and destroy cultural symbols and 
objects (I have argued above and in previous chapters that it is obliged to refrain 
from intervention in most situations, with some exceptions), it is important to 
distinguish between the iconoclasm of individuals and of the state. On this issue, 
once again, the orthodox liberalism of John Stuart Mill provides us with a suitable 
response: namely, that freedom of thought and expression are crucial to a liberal 
society, but that even this freedom can be undermined when nefarious and harmful 
motives can be detected. For instance, swastikas or SS symbols might reasonably 
form part of an exhibition on the Second World War or military history. They take 
on a rather different meaning and character when used at a rally that advocates the 
deportation or extermination of racial minorities. While liberal governments do not 
possess a general right to destroy or challenge cultural symbols and ideas, these 
expressions lose their immunity when they are used to incite harm and violence 
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toward others (just as an individual freedom to challenge existing cultural beliefs and 
symbols is also limited by this harm principle). Yet, even in these contexts care must 
be exercised when deciding on the permissibility of iconoclasm. Unless it can be 
shown convincingly that the symbols themselves are being used to promote violence 
and harm, freedom of expression must be protected. I shall discuss this aspect of 
iconoclasm in greater depth in the final chapter of this thesis. 
 
 
Iconoclasm and Historical Justice 
Although liberal states do not possess a general right to destroy cultural artefacts, it is 
true that the collapse of hated regimes has often been officiated by pulling down 
statues of rulers and their symbols. Yet, as we have seen at the beginning of the 
chapter, while this may ultimately be justified as a matter of historical justice on the 
basis that the previous regimes have no right to maintain a continued presence in 
public spaces, there are further liberal reasons for not destroying all such objects. The 
story of Henri Grégoire provides a good starting point to this discussion on liberalism 
and iconoclasm, for Grégoire’s response to the destruction caused by the French 
Revolution was possibly the first expression of what has become modern public 
policy on cultural property. The revolutionary government in France had 
commissioned a report on the cost of damage caused by the iconoclasts and Grégoire 
used this opportunity to draw attention to a previously unexplored issue for public 
policy: why should the preservation of artefacts concern the nation, especially when 
these items represented the skeletal remains of a hated regime?458 Fundamentally, 
Grégoire sought to look beyond the patronage of such items and focus instead on 
their creator. Grégoire argued that the preservation of such artefacts was a necessary 
condition for liberty. Liberty, he argued, could only be realised when the talents and 
creative energies of the individual were permitted to flourish, and it was only where 
tolerance for difference and respect for creativity existed that flourishing could 
occur. To throw away knowledge because this had been accumulated under the 
wrong regime was a celebration of wilful ignorance; ignorance that liberty had to 
                                                       
458 Sax (1990): ‘Heritage Preservation as a public duty’, (Michigan law review, 88:5), p.1145. 
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repudiate.459 What is most significant about this story is that by basing his defence on 
the value of liberty, Grégoire succeeded in linking the preservation of cultural 
heritage with specific political values. For Grégoire, cultural policy, in this case the 
treatment of France’s heritage, provided a litmus test for civilized values.460 Thus by 
preserving aspects of culture the revolutionary government in France could 
demonstrate its appreciation of creativity, of toleration, and indeed of liberty itself.461  
 
Although governments do not possess a general right to destroy or outlaw cultural 
artefacts and practices, this does not mean that any object that exists in public space 
must continue to do so in perpetuity. Indeed, as I have noted, governments do not 
have a general obligation to preserve cultural heritage and in the aftermath of unjust 
previous regimes, liberal governments and citizens may wish to distance themselves 
from an unhappy past. However, the story of preservation in revolutionary France 
highlights the value of not destroying all of these objects – the treatment of such 
artefacts ultimately reflects the liberal state’s attitude toward toleration, knowledge 
and creativity. Thus, while liberal governments may deem it fair to destroy many, if 
not most, of the monuments, artefacts and practices of a previous regime, it also has 
strong liberal reasons for maintaining some of these. These objects do not need to be 
in situ, and might more properly be maintained in a national museum or other locale. 
Budapest’s Momento Park, which contains a collection of the previous communist 
regime’s monuments, is a good example of how the remnants of a previous regime 
can be used in a creative and educational manner. Ultimately, however, the value of 
maintaining some objects cannot be characterised as an obligation to preserve 
because (as discussed in previous chapters) no such obligation (to preserve cultural 
heritage) exists, and the crimes of the previous regime may have been so great as to 
warrant a refusal by a general population to have their monuments maintained in 
general public spaces. Yet, there appear to be strong liberal reasons for preserving 
some of such objects.   
 
                                                       
459 Ibid., p.1156-1158. 
460 Ibid., p.1161. 
461This entire paragraph draws upon R.Tsang (2007): ‘The cuckoo in the historian’s nest: 
reconceptualising cultural heritage as a political resource.’ Master’s dissertation submitted to the LSE, 
in September 2007.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to clarify a number of issues pertaining to the relationship 
between historical justice, recognition, remembrance and cultural heritage. A key 
argument that I put forth in this chapter is the importance of distinguishing between 
remembrance and recognition: remembrance requires continued or sustained rituals 
or performances of collective memory - implying a certain type of emotional 
response of joy and celebration or regret and mourning; recognition, on the other 
hand, is an acknowledgement of an event – undoubtedly with some emotion – but not 
requiring a sustained emotive response. Indeed, I have attempted to place greater 
emphasis on historical understanding within recognition. While a liberal state can 
and should endorse the recognition of certain historical events, its response to 
cultural heritage cannot include obligations of public remembrance. Indeed, 
obligating liberal citizens to remember and even recognise historical events runs 
counter to the basic liberal commitment to freedom of conscience. Citizens within 
the liberal state must be free to engage with their histories and cultural heritage as 
much or as little as they desire. This means that the denial of certain historical events 
or specific interpretations of history cannot always be regarded as illegal. Denial, 
however, does become subject to intervention when it is geared toward purposely 
inciting harm or violence toward others.  
 
Thus, while liberal states are not obligated to sustain memory or preserve cultural 
heritage – indeed, they ought to refrain from doing so in the interests of remaining 
neutral toward a diversity of goods - they ought to abstain from acts of iconoclasm. 
While it may be tempting to destroy all the monuments and artefacts of a hated 
previous regime, I have argued that there is educational value in keeping some 
remnants, for example, by building up archives, maintaining monuments in a 
national park or displaying certain historical artefacts in a national museum. 
Knowledge of crimes against humanity decreases the probably that they will be 
repeated again, and keeping objects such as these can enhance and enrich the 
learning process.  
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Much as individuals must be free to recognise, remember or forget, they must also be 
free to express their cultural heritages in a multitude of different ways. Indeed, the 
only exception to this norm is in instances where symbols, objects and practices can 
reasonably be demonstrated to cause harm to others, such that concerns about justice 
and individual welfare take priority over cultural expression. The consequence of the 
arguments presented in this chapter is that a liberal public heritage may not draw 
upon remembrance or actively seek to cultivate a specific interpretation of historical 
events. Nor is it acceptable for a liberal state to destroy or prohibit objects and 
symbols that challenge the dominant national heritage. Indeed, while a public 
heritage is likely to draw upon specific national events, in practice, it is crucial that a 
liberal state distinguishes itself by ensuring that there is space for a multitude of 
narratives and interpretations of historical events to exist. Artefacts of historical 
memory must be kept to a minimum. While the liberal state may inevitably draw 
upon a collective national memory, it is obliged to make active efforts to undermine 
the particularity or exclusiveness of this memory and make room for other collective 
accounts of the past.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Cultural Heritage and the Liberal State:  
Some practical cases 
 
 
 
In the preceding chapters I have outlined and defended the principles behind a liberal 
response to cultural heritage. In Chapters 3 to 6, I defended the view that individuals 
ought to the greatest extent possible be free from interference in engaging with 
cultural practices and objects. I therefore argued that liberal states do not have a 
general obligation to preserve cultural heritage (be this a national heritage, or the 
heritage of any minority group) as this fundamentally undermines individual freedom 
to engage with cultural heritage. This means that governments are not under any 
particular duty, for example, to sustain indigenous practices, to preserve artifacts or 
divert public funds to maintain old buildings, monuments and other structures.462 In 
fact, I argued, such interventions undermine the freedom to make our own decisions 
about heritage and history. But, discussing destruction and iconoclasm in Chapter 7, I 
also pointed out that this does not give states the general right to destroy cultural 
heritage either. A respect for liberal values necessarily negates the permissibility of 
iconoclasm: although a government may not be sympathetic to certain ideas and 
                                                       
462 Note that while I have argued that there is no particular obligation to preserve certain objects of 
cultural heritage, states may well choose to preserve certain buildings or artefacts not as a matter of 
cultural heritage, but rather out of an aesthetic or antiquarian appreciation. 
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ways of living, this does not give it a right to destroy or damage any cultural artifacts 
and objects (unless the objects themselves actively incite violence or harm to others) 
as it pleases, because doing so would necessarily violate the liberal proviso to abstain 
for interfering in conceptions of the good. A liberal response to cultural heritage is 
guided by a norm of non-intervention, which finds that interventions can only be 
justified in order to uphold toleration or autonomy. When issues of urban 
development (and other similar matters) arise, however, I argued that it is necessary 
to decide the outcome for cultural heritage on a case-by-case basis.  
 
However, I have also pointed out that it is in the liberal state’s interest to maintain 
some objects of cultural heritage as these have instrumental value in fostering an 
understanding of the shared political community and respect for liberal values. 
Indeed in Chapter 4 I argued that all states – liberal or otherwise – necessarily 
maintain certain objects or practices that may also be regarded as cultural heritage, 
such as a national anthem, language, public holidays, symbols, etc. This public 
heritage is likely, however, to reflect a bias toward the experiences of a dominant 
(national) group. In Chapter 6, I reiterated that the liberal state is obliged to ensure 
that this cultural particularity is minimised (but not eliminated) and supplemented 
with liberal values of toleration, respect for diversity, and autonomy and a respect for 
individual choice. Therefore, although a liberal response to cultural heritage is 
fundamentally characterized by non-intervention such that individuals are free to 
engage (or not engage) with a heritage that is meaningful to them, any intervention in 
cultural heritage (be this to promote a public heritage or to intervene in ‘private’ 
heritages) must be for the purposes of upholding liberal values. Accepting the de 
facto bias in public heritage, to a certain extent, represents a departure from ideal 
liberal theory, but this is necessary in order to ensure that this response to cultural 
heritage retains relevance for contemporary liberal nation-states. The liberal response 
that I have outlined thus attempts to sustain liberal values whilst remaining mindful 
of contextual issues such as power relations between groups and the necessary 
constraints of contemporary nation-states.  
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In this final chapter I shall discuss the principles outlined in the previous chapters by 
applying them to some practical cases. This, I hope will not only clarify my 
arguments but also help to sustain them. Furthermore, as I demonstrate in this 
chapter, when issues of cultural heritage do arise in policy or public discourse they 
are often framed quite differently and normative issues concerning heritage (and 
particularly the heritage of minority groups) can become quite distorted. In addition 
to exploring some practical controversies of cultural heritage, this chapter also 
highlights the importance of carefully unpackaging the different arguments and 
issues that used to present these heritage controversies.  
 
While the previous chapters have generally been structured around different 
responses to cultural heritage, this chapter is divided into four thematic sections: the 
cultural landscape; official narratives and knowledge; languages; oaths and rituals. 
Although the aim of this chapter is to explore and reinforce the liberal response 
defended thus far, I nevertheless also occasionally reflect upon the positions rejected 
in previous chapters. In the first section, therefore, I consider a liberal response to the 
built environment which includes buildings and monuments, but more specifically 
the construction of (particular) cultural structures within the physical landscape. I 
consider how the liberal state should respond to potential challenges to liberal values 
and what a liberal response may be when cultural objects and structures appear to 
explicitly challenge the legitimacy of the liberal state. In the second section I turn to 
discuss official knowledge and narratives which encompasses a broad spectrum from 
a public school curriculum, to citizenship tests, to the content of national museums. I 
examine the permissibility of ‘official’ narratives within the liberal state and what 
this might reasonably contain. In the third section I examine languages; more 
specifically, national languages and the treatment of minority languages. I will assess 
language requirements for citizenship and what obligations the liberal state has, if 
any, toward minority languages. Finally, I turn to the issue of oaths and rituals and 
will discuss the permissibility of certain public oaths (such as oaths of allegiance) as 
well as rituals that clearly challenge existing liberal beliefs.  
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It is, of course, impossible to cover every single issue of cultural heritage that arises 
in public policy but it is hoped that, in addition to clarifying any existing ambiguities 
from the previous chapters, the themes discussed here provide a response to many of 
the issues of cultural heritage that are the subject of controversy. One issue that is 
noticeably missing, however, is the question of the hijab. While I do find this topic 
very interesting and relevant to this research, a lot has been written about the subject 
within the West in recent years. I also believe that the implications of the arguments 
that I have provided in Chapter 3 are relatively clear463: so long as educational, social 
and welfare resources exist (providing meaningful options for exit, discussion and 
dissent), individual choice must be respected. Thus women who opt to wear the hijab 
or niqab must have the freedom to engage with their culture in a manner that is 
meaningful to them, and the liberal state and other individuals are obliged to tolerate 
this.  
 
 
The Cultural Landscape 
The role that the physical environment and landscape plays in shaping conceptions 
self and community should not be underestimated. A city, for example, that makes 
concerted efforts to preserve its 17th and 18th Century facades and roads is clearly a 
place that attaches great significance to its history and heritage. In contrast, constant 
redevelopment and a lack of buildings over 50 years old indicates that tradition and 
the past are not all that important – to the government, at least. As mentioned at the 
outset, architecture, monuments, flags, public squares and so on, all play an 
important role in constructing a local cultural identity both in terms of our everyday 
experience of the physical landscape and in marking extraordinary moments. Flags 
present a particularly interesting example because they are used in all manner of 
occasions and locations – marking solemn national events and ceremonies, as well as 
being hung outside of homes and businesses, sewn onto t-shirts, backpacks and 
wallets, and used to cover the coffins of those who died serving the nation. In this 
section I shall explore the implications of principles set out in the previous chapters 
by focusing on the permissibility of a diversity of expressions in the physical and 
                                                       
463 See, in particular, the section on ‘Culture and Autonomy’, p.77-83. 
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cultural landscape. Whereas old buildings denote a specific appreciation of history, a 
multiplicity of cultural forms in the urban landscape can also say a lot about 
multiculturalism and diversity within the political community.  
 
Although I believe that the implications of the preceding chapters should be 
relatively clear, it is worth spelling out the consequences of these principles for the 
built environment within the liberal state, particularly because practical issues of 
cultural heritage are rarely framed as neatly (or presented as clearly) in public 
discourse (as they are in ideal theory). The physical landscape – public and private – 
cannot be neutral in the sense of avoiding cultural particularity because this is simply 
impossible. I have argued in Chapter 4, that a public heritage is likely to reflect the 
experiences of a dominant group. Similarly, public land and buildings are likely to 
reflect a particular cultural bias – for example, a public square may contain 
monuments that represent historical figures or events associated with the dominant 
national group. However, I also argued in Chapter 6 that, within a liberal state, it is 
important that these cultural biases are kept to a minimum and, where possible, 
reconceptualised for a broader appeal. Allowing individuals to engage with their 
cultural heritage without inference also has clear consequences for the physical 
landscape.  Liberal principles entail that individuals and groups must be free to build 
and construct cultural landmarks within their own private space and land. Yet, such 
expressions of cultural identity are not always kept behind closed doors: many 
private cultural expressions, much to the distaste of others, can still be seen by all. In 
this section, I therefore examine two specific controversies and use these to highlight 
and reinforce general principles: the recent minaret controversy in Europe allows me 
to discuss the presence of cultural or religious buildings; and flag burning, which 
enables me to consider attempts to challenge the dominant national narrative by 
desecrating a national flag. 
 
 
The Minarets Controversy in Europe 
The response in recent years to minarets in Western Europe presents an interesting 
case study because of the sheer level of hostility that was leveled at these expressions 
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of minority cultural identity within broadly liberal states. (Despite this hostility, 
however, there is surprisingly little scholarship on the issue.) As mosques and 
minarets are, in part, assertions of Muslim identity in public space, the controversy 
surrounding them also presents questions about who has the right to control and 
define public space.464 As noted, all of the countries that were involved in these 
controversies were broadly liberal, with a respect for individual rights and cultural 
diversity – as indeed enshrined within the European Convention for Human Rights. 
Yet, this respect for liberal values, in fact, became part of the problem as the 
minarets were viewed as symbols that challenged liberal values. This presents an 
interesting problem for a liberal theory of cultural heritage because, while the liberal 
state may be committed to respecting cultural diversity and allowing different 
cultural groups to construct their own heritages within the built environment in 
principle, it is not immediately clear how liberal governments should respond to 
cultural heritage when it is perceived to challenge to these very values. Should liberal 
governments tolerate such challenges or attempt to undermine them? 
 
In order to understand the minaret controversy, Todd Green argues that it is 
necessary to situate it within a broader context of secularization within Europe. The 
presence of particular religious structures within public spaces does not in itself 
explain the controversy as the minarets are strongly outnumbered by cathedral towers 
and church steeples.465 However, he notes:  
 
‘…Many Europeans have learnt how to reconcile the presence of Christian 
structures with secular identity. In the case of minarets, what we have is not 
simply the presence of religion in the public sphere but the presence of a 
particular religion, deemed foreign, oppressive and inherently incapable of 
respecting western values.’466 
 
Though more present in the physical landscape, churches are thus symbols that 
connect many Europeans to Europe’s past and cultural heritage – they lack ‘the taint 
of foreignness’ and their presence is justified because Christianity’s ‘natural’ home is 
                                                       
464 Green, T. (2010): The resistance to minarets in Europe’ in Journal of Church and State, (Vol. 52 
no. 4), p.630.  
465 Ibid., p.621. 
466 Ibid., p.622. 
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on European soil.467 This is in contrast to minarets, which are symbols of 
‘foreignness.’ 
 
Before discussing the controversy itself in greater depth, it is interesting to note that, 
although many view minarets as clear expressions (or even assertions) of difference, 
Muslim communities have in fact employed a number of strategies to ensure that the 
presence of mosques is less ‘problematic’. As Green notes, these strategies operate 
on the assumption that it is the visibility and distinctive presence of mosques in 
public space that is the real problem.468 While in Pforzheim, Germany, a minaret is 
only permitted if it is lower than the steeple of a local church, in Cologne, this same 
initiative came from the architect and sponsoring Islamic association.469 Green 
demonstrates how Muslims will agree to relocate the mosque to another part of town 
that is less visible or accessible to non-Muslims.470 Furthermore, in many cases, 
Muslims rely on architectural mimicry so that mosques blend in more with 
surrounding buildings, by eliminating the domes, crescent moons, or minarets, and 
by avoiding the ‘oriental’ architecture more commonly found in the countries of 
origin.471 Green even writes that mosques are occasionally designed to more closely 
resemble a church.472 In most places the adhan, or call to prayer, is not permitted, 
and yet Green argues that this is due more to a fear of what is on the horizon – as 
opposed to current practice, because many Islamic communities in fact rely upon 
alternate methods such as light, text messages or even short wave transmitters to call 
followers to prayer.473 He notes: ‘the key point is that Muslims find some success in 
alleviating concerns over mosques if those features that make mosques distinctly 
religious (read Islamic) are missing. Absence, architecturally, enables Muslims to be 
present in a less threatening way.’474 These efforts at ‘camouflage’ are significant 
because they demonstrate a commitment to cultural heritage whilst making clear 
efforts at integration within the cultural and physical landscape. 
                                                       
467 Green: op cit., p.630. 
468 Green: op cit., p.627. 
469 Green: op cit., p.632.  
470 Green: op cit., p.627. 
471 Ibid. 
472 ibid. Emphasis added. 
473 Green: op cit., p.633-4. 
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Despite these attempts, however, there has been a strong reaction to minarets within 
Western Europe. Green writes how, in 2000, following the mayor’s decision to grant 
a plot of land for the purposes of building a mosque, a local branch of Italy’s 
Northern League ordered a protest in the town of Lodi. Representatives from the 
league argued that ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ was incompatible with Italian values 
and participants of the protest were invited to sprinkle the proposed site with pig 
urine.475 In Cologne, Germany, Pro Koln, a radical-right wing citizen’s association 
strongly rejected the construction of what would be Germany’s largest mosque a 
mere two miles from the city’s famous Catholic cathedral. A Pro-Koln leader, 
insisted that the mosque would wrongly ‘reflect a parallel Islamic society and further 
encourage the subjugation of women.’476 Most famously, Switzerland, following a 
national referendum in 2009, banned the construction of minarets. Final results 
indicated that 57.5% of voters (1 534 054 citizens) had approved the proposals to ban 
minarets, out of a 53.4% turnout; only 3 cantons out of 23 had rejected the 
proposals.477 This came as a surprise to politicians and scholars alike. But, Green 
notes, ‘the ban was all the more surprising in light of the fact that Switzerland only 
has four minarets and none of them are used for adhan, the Islamic call to prayer. 
Switzerland did not appear to have a real minaret ‘problem.’478 
 
With four official nationalities and a history of necessary compromise between 
different religious beliefs, the conceptualization of the minaret issue in Switzerland is 
interesting because advocates of the ban presented minarets (and indeed Islam) as a 
political challenge to liberal values. Green quotes Ulrich Schuler, one of the major 
figures behind the initiative, who responded to a reporter’s comparison of a church 
steeple to minaret by insisting that the religions represented by the two structures 
stand for two very different things. Schuler noted, “ I think Christianity is an attitude 
of freedom, of recognizing different meanings, of tolerance. Islam has nothing to do 
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with tolerance.”479 Indeed, a press release for the initiative noted that minarets are 
‘nothing more than a religio-political claim to power and domination’; they are 
visible ‘symbols of an unconditional religious claim and intolerance connected with 
that.’480 Another advocate from the initiative went on to note: minarets function as 
‘flags that generals place on strategic military maps to identify a conquered 
territory.’ 481 Indeed, the publicity materials for the initiative illustrated precisely 
this: the Swiss flag covered with minarets made to look like missiles, with a woman 
covered up in a niqab in the background.  
 
Framing the minaret controversy as a political issue presumably meant that banning 
further construction of minarets could mask the cultural issues at hand – though, of 
course, many – including UN experts – would still find that it violated human 
rights.482 More importantly, however, arguments describing minarets as a political 
threat – though largely without merit – seemed to imbue the initiative with greater 
legitimacy. I have argued that the liberal state should strive toward cultural and 
political neutrality (even though it may never achieve it), however, it is important to 
consider how it ought to respond to perceived political and cultural challenges to 
liberal authority. A public (national) heritage is geared toward, and can be justified 
on the grounds of, promoting an awareness of difference and respect for liberal 
values. In this sense it is a preventative measure for upholding social and political 
unity. Is the liberal state, however, justified in pursuing more aggressive (or 
defensive) strategies in addition to this – such as banning the construction of more 
minarets?  
 
In such instances it is of paramount importance, first of all, to assess the extent and 
credibility of the threat or challenge that is being posed. In the case of the Swiss 
minarets, it is clear that Switzerland did not exactly have a minaret ‘problem’ as 
there were very few existing minarets and there were no plans for a significant 
increase in minaret construction. The credibility of the challenge, however, was even 
more suspect: it was one thing to recognise how minarets can alter the identity of the 
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physical landscape, but it was a huge step from this to asserting that these (four) 
structures directly threatened the value of tolerance in Swiss society. Indeed, the 
manner in which the minaret controversy has been framed highlights the importance 
of carefully distinguishing genuine facts and concerns with exaggerated rhetoric. 
Clearly minarets had become a proxy for a number of fears and (mis)conceptions 
about Islam more generally. In previous chapters I have stressed that in order for 
toleration to be sustained meaningfully across the political community, it important 
to foster an understanding of diversity partly through a public heritage. Thus, had 
there been a greater general understanding of Islam, Islamic practices and the role of 
minarets, it is unlikely that the referendum would have been successful. In a later 
section of this chapter I discuss the role of education and official narratives in greater 
depth. 
 
Let us assume, however, that this controversy arose in a state without a culture of 
public referendums, where the issue was left to the government to decide. I have 
argued in Chapters 3-6 that the liberal state, to a certain extent, is justified in its 
attempts to foster some shared conception of unity because this is broadly in the 
interest of sustaining peace and stability and, hence, largely in individual interest. 
However in Chapter 5 I also demonstrated that liberalism itself sets limits on what 
the liberal state may do to ‘defend’ itself from alternate conceptions of the good. A 
public heritage and a liberal state’s response to cultural heritage cannot be geared at 
fostering or upholding loyalty to the state, and this is what distinguishes a liberal 
response to cultural heritage from liberal nationalism and constitutional patriotism. A 
respect for individual freedom and toleration ultimately tempers the liberal state’s 
right to self-defence. Even if alternate views are perceived to be challenges to the 
authority of liberal values, the state – or more specifically, the dominant group - a 
liberal state is not justified in quashing these points of view because this violates a 
fundamental liberal commitment to neutrality between conceptions of the good. This 
issue is examined further in a study of flag burning. 
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Iconoclasm and the Permissibility of Flag Burning 
While the minaret controversy has helped to highlight the importance of assessing 
the credibility of claims which assert that certain practices challenge liberal values 
and the state, it is worth examining whether the state may intervene in challenges to 
alternate conceptions of the good and more explicit (and genuine) cultural 
repudiations of the state.  In the previous chapter I argued that the state cannot 
engage in acts of iconoclasm because this is an explicit rejection of a particular 
conception of the good. It is crucial that individuals are free to challenge and reject 
ideas within the liberal state as fundamental to freedom of both conscience and 
expression – but how far does this right extend? As we have seen, the construction of 
minarets has been interpreted as a challenge to liberal values – yet the authenticity of 
this claim is suspect. It is by no means clear that the physical structures of minarets 
challenge liberal values and there is little evidence to support this view. It is for this 
reason that flag burning and desecration provide an interesting further case study for 
a liberal response to cultural heritage because no other object reflects the authority of 
the state as universally as a national flag. Burning or desecrating a flag is therefore a 
clear challenge to the state and it is for this reason that such actions are deemed 
illegal in so many countries.483 
 
 Nowhere has the debate about the permissibility of flag burning been more 
controversial than in the United States. Daniel Pollitt describes the first instance that 
ignited this controversy as follows: 
 
‘During the afternoon of June 6, 1966, Mr. Street, a resident of Brooklyn, 
heard the news reports that a sniper in Mississippi had shot James Meredith, 
the first African-American to enroll at the University of Mississippi. Street, 
also an African-American, took his United States flag from a drawer, went to 
the street corner, and set the flag on fire. He told a police officer, "We don't 
need no damn flag.... If they let that happen to Meredith we don't need an 
American flag." Street was convicted under a New York law making it a 
misdemeanor to "publicly mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or 
cast contempt upon either by words or act" any flag of the United States. The 
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Harlan, reversed Street's conviction, 
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holding the New York statute unconstitutional because it permitted 
punishment "merely for speaking defiant or contemptuous words about the 
American flag."'484  
 
In a number of widely publicised cases, the Supreme Court has in fact continually 
upheld the right to desecrate the American flag (despite the rulings of regional 
courts) in accordance with the Bill of Rights that guarantees a right to freedom of 
expression. As Senator Terry Sanford of North Carolina, who was against the 
proposed amendment to outlaw flag desecration, noted in a speech to the Senate:  
 
“Those who insult the flag, those who set fire to it, earn the wrath and 
condemnation they get from the rest of us, but the flag flies on-splendidly and 
easily prevailing over insult and injury. The flag is the symbol of freedom, 
and it glorifies the Bill of Rights, the full text of freedom. We do not mutilate 
the flag. Misguided people do. We must not mutilate the Bill of Rights. That 
would violate the very soul of liberty.”485 
 
The permissibility of flag burning is a test for liberal states. Outlawing deliberate 
damage to the national flag represents a clear limit on the freedom of expression. 
Whereas allowing intentional damage demonstrates a liberal state’s commitment to 
upholding liberal values, above the institutional interests of the state.     
 
The permissibility of damaging a national flag has bearing on the treatment of other 
conceptions of the good more generally, as well as the treatment of national artefacts. 
Does upholding an individual right to this kind of iconoclasm, however, mean that 
individuals are free to damage the cultural artefacts from conceptions of the good 
that they disagree with? Not at all. As noted in the previous chapter and to reiterate 
J.S.Mill’s point, it is important to distinguish between free expression and incitement 
to harm and violence. Similarly, a right to express opinions does not excuse criminal 
damage. Indeed, commenting on a flag-burning verdict, Justice Stevens noted that,  
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‘Had Johnson chosen to spray-paint or perhaps convey with a motion picture 
projector his message of dissatisfaction on the facade of the Lincoln 
Memorial, there would be no question about the power of the Government to 
prohibit his means of expression. The prohibition would be supported by the 
legitimate interest in preserving the quality of an important national asset.’486 
 
Although individuals must have a right to reject conceptions of the good through 
cultural expression, such expressions can still be wrong for all sorts of other reasons. 
In Switzerland, for example, individuals are free to damage a flag – so long as it is 
their own private flag – and not attached to a national building or monument. 
Similarly, setting a flag alight is, in principle, permissible within the liberal state – 
but creeping into someone else’s garden or climbing onto a public monument or 
building in order to set a torch to their flag, is certainly not. Within a liberal state, 
individuals possess a right to challenge beliefs and ideas so long as this does not 
incite harm or damage public or other private property.  
 
A right to freedom of expression in the cultural landscape is necessary within a 
liberal state, but not sufficient. In the aftermath of the unsuccessful amendment, it is 
disappointing to note that the state representative and former Ku Klux Klan Grand 
Wizard, David Duke, in Louisiana introduced a bill which effectively declared open 
season on anyone who desecrated the flag by cutting back the punishment for battery 
from a six-month jail term and a $500 fine to no more than a $25 fine and no jail 
time if the victim of the assault had desecrated the flag.487 The village trustees of 
Romeoville, Illinois went further than this by reducing the penalty for assault of a 
flag-burner to $1.488 These developments were all the more tragic because they 
occurred, not in the 60’s as one might expect, but in the 1990s. What this outcome 
illustrates is that in order for this right to be meaningful it also needs to be given 
sufficient protection. In Chapter 3, I argued that individuals must have the freedom to 
engage with their own cultural heritage without intervention from the state. However, 
along with David Jones, I also found that the liberal state has a role to play in 
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upholding this freedom and ensuring that toleration for a diversity of cultural beliefs 
is sustained. The cultural and physical landscape within the liberal state is 
characterized by a diversity of cultural expressions – some of them sympathetic to 
the state, others not. This diversity, however, must be protected because it, in turn, 
helps to foster respect for liberal conceptions of toleration and autonomy.  
 
 
Official Narratives  
The official narratives covered here can be loosely defined as the body of knowledge 
that is accepted and, in some cases, promoted by the state. Official narratives are a 
significant part of a public cultural heritage which, within a liberal state, I have 
argued in previous chapters, is geared toward promoting respect and understanding 
for diversity, freedom and toleration. Official narratives fit into a category of 
necessary interventions and encompasses (among other things) knowledge embodied 
in state school curricula, in citizenship tests and in national museums.489 Though the 
necessity of state funding for these three institutions can be open to scrutiny, I largely 
take their subsidisation for granted. Indeed, I view the provision of state education up 
to the age of 18 as a necessary good. Citizenship tests also provide new citizens with 
the opportunity to learn about fundamental issues and processes necessary for living 
within a liberal state. Finally, national museums – as discussed in an earlier chapter – 
have become prerequisites for contemporary states, alongside national flags, anthems 
and symbols.  
 
However, though the liberal state fundamentally aims to be neutral, it is – as we have 
seen – not always possible to remain as such. Indeed, in the previous chapters I have 
acknowledged the fact that some objects of cultural heritage are likely to reflect a 
bias toward certain dominant groups within the liberal state. In this section I 
therefore explore the general content of official narratives by considering the 
implications of approaches that were discussed (and rejected) in the previous 
chapters. Studying the consequences of different approaches (to cultural heritage) on 
education and official narratives only serves to highlight further problems with these 
                                                       
489 Necessary both in terms of their role for contemporary sovereign statehood and for promoting 
cohesion and respect for liberal values. 
8. Cultural Heritage and the Liberal State: Some Practical Cases  
 
256 
 
positions. In this section I examine a number of different narrative strategies that are 
geared at 1) fostering loyalty and assimilation, 2) a ‘politics of difference’, and 3) a 
difference-blind account of citizenship, as well as discussing the official narratives 
endorsed by the liberal state outlined in this thesis.  
 
 
The Purpose of a Liberal Narrative 
One might be tempted to ask why teach a liberal narrative at all? Why not, for 
example, simply teach school students about ancient history, thus largely avoiding 
any difficulty in terms of bias toward particular cultural goods, and abolish 
citizenship tests altogether? I have already argued in previous chapters that a liberal 
heritage can help to promote understanding of a diversity of ways of living, 
promoting cohesion and stability. Yet, beyond protecting interests in peace and 
stability, a public narrative is inherently valuable because it teaches children and 
immigrants about the values (or, more specifically, of the diversity of values) and 
norms within the liberal state. Official knowledge, as manifested in the school 
curriculum and citizenship tests, enables individuals to be aware of and exercise their 
rights such that they are able to engage with their own conceptions of the good, and 
capable of questioning, rejecting or even exiting from their cultures, should they 
choose to do so. Given these aims of promoting an understanding of liberal values, 
official narratives within a liberal state are geared at imparting knowledge that, 
though perhaps not necessary, is valuable for living within the liberal state, thus 
serving the goal of facilitating peaceful existence between groups and respect for a 
diversity of lifestyles. In this sense, the official narrative promotes a liberal form of 
civic virtue. Liberal values are taught in terms of their ability to facilitate coexistence 
between individuals and a diversity of groups and, in this regard, safeguard an ability 
to engage with one’s own conception of the good.  
 
Given the aims and purpose of a liberal public heritage and narrative, therefore, the 
content of a liberal narrative must necessarily be minimal. Amitai Etzioni has 
outlined two conceptions of citizenship tests that prove useful in defining the ‘civic’ 
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content of a liberal public narrative. He describes a ‘libertarian’ citizenship test 
wherein: 
 
‘…Tests are not only limited in scope but also largely cognitive; that is, they seek 
to establish people's knowledge of how to vote, what taxes are due and the 
content of basic laws, but little else. In short, such `thin' citizenship requires but 
thin tests and relatively little preparation.’490 
 
‘Liberal’ citizenship tests, however: 
 
‘…Determine whether future citizens are aware of their right to free speech, and 
that it cannot be denied. They seek to ensure that citizens know that they are free 
to form any associations as they wish, practice their religion and so on…Because 
immigrants are often unaware of their rights and what is to be done when these 
rights are violated, preparation for liberal citizenship needs to be quite 
extensive.’491 
 
This distinction between liberal and libertarian citizenship lies largely in the efforts 
made by liberal governments to remind citizens of their rights. I believe that the 
liberal narrative defended thus far would include practical knowledge (as envisaged 
in Ezioni’s libertarian citizenship test) – such as how and when to vote (assuming 
that this is a liberal democratic state) and how to pay taxes – but also blend in more 
normative information (from the liberal citizenship test) about various freedoms and 
how these are enshrined in the law. It is worth exploring the strategies that underlie a 
national narrative in greater depth, however. The liberal state could reasonably 
pursue a number of different narrative strategies and this is important because, in 
addition to achieving a particular outcome, a specific strategy also largely determines 
the content of an official narrative. 
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The Content of Official Narratives 
In A Key to Dutch History, a volume which justifies the need for a Dutch Canon, Van 
Oostrom writes:  
 
‘The canon was the reason why the Council argued that education should 
fulfil a socialisation task and that its social responsibility be strengthened. 
The integration problem observed by the Council played a clear role in this 
vision. Certainly given the large number of children of foreign origin, the 
council regarded the proper teaching of Dutch history and culture at schools 
to be even more important.’492 
 
The canon itself focuses on key moments in Dutch national history, as opposed to 
describing the various cultural groups within the Netherlands. It is a resource that 
clearly aims at integrating children and ‘new-comers’ within a Dutch national 
narrative. Indeed, van Oostrom notes that the canon is also aimed at providing 
newcomers with ‘sorely-needed insight into (and feeling for) the country in which 
they live.’493 William Galston has attempted to provide a normative justification for 
this type of policy by asserting that, 
 
‘Few individuals will come to embrace the core commitments of liberal 
society through a process of rational inquiry. If children are to be brought to 
accept these commitments as valid and binding, the method must be a 
pedagogy that is far more rhetorical than rational…civic 
education…requires a nobler, moralizing history: a pantheon of heroes who 
confer legitimacy on central institutions and are worthy of emulation.’494 
 
Though Galston’s proposal  to openly ‘noblise’ history has been ridiculed by many, 
Robert Fullinwinder makes the valid point that all history favours some interests 
over others.  Fullinwinder therefore dismisses what he describes as indifferent or 
‘accurate’ history arguing that, ‘there is no guarantee that historical truth supports 
lessons in the love of truth. A comprehensive survey of the human ash pile may 
reveal that lies have served most human interests better than truth has.’495 
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Fullinwinder therefore advocates the teaching of patriotic history to ‘elicit 
commitments, to inculcate values, and to create citizens.’496 Yet, such lessons in 
patriotism do not only manifest themselves in history classes within primary and 
secondary schools. Discussing the newly redesigned US citizenship test in 2010, 
Alfonso Aguilar, Chief of the United States Office of Citizenship, explained, “[by] 
study[ing] the fundamentals of [American] history and civics, they will also identify 
with them and become attached to our country.”497 
 
This type of narrative strategy can fit into a broader framework of liberal 
nationalism, which was discussed in Chapter 5. Exploring the consequences of this 
strategy thus not only reveals inherent problems with liberal nationalism (and, 
indeed, other potential approaches to cultural heritage) but also sheds light on an 
appropriate liberal response to official narratives. There are two main problems with 
this approach: firstly, it projects a false homogeneity and marginalises the 
experiences of diverse groups; and secondly, it aims to promote a loyalty to the state 
that liberal values cannot allow. I shall deal with each of these issues in turn. 
 
 
Accounting for Diversity in Official Narratives 
By promoting certain aspects of a national history, Fullinwinder, Galston and David 
Miller, necessarily overlook the heritage, experiences, practices and preferences of 
marginalised groups. In Chapter 5, I argued that this placed such groups at an unfair 
disadvantage. In Chapter 6, therefore, I explored the politics of difference. This 
strategy also has distinct outcomes for official narratives and education. 
 
As opposed to promoting a single national mode of education, recent years have seen 
the growing popularity of diversity schooling that is aimed at promoting differences 
in culture, ethnicity and religion. In the UK for example, almost one third of schools 
are faith schools. While there is a long and established precedent of ‘Church of 
England’ schools in England, rather than choosing to roll these back in recent years, 
state schools catering to religious minorities were set up instead. Although the 
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national curriculum is identical across all state schools, faith schools have the 
freedom to shape their own religious studies. Ironically, while racial discrimination 
remains illegal in the UK, discrimination on religious grounds within faith schools is 
permissible. Similarly, Amy Gutman writes about the teaching of ‘Afrocentrism’ in 
US state schools:  
 
‘…some of the historical revisionism in Afrocentrism possibly constitutes an 
important challenge to established historical understandings, but a troubling 
account of Afrocentric history can at best be considered mythology and at 
worst fabrication…the chief problem..is not inaccuracy but discrimination. Its 
cultivation of a reverse racial mythology and sense of racial superiority 
makes Afrocentrism an uncivic ideology.’498 
 
Thus, the inherent problems with the politics of difference are manifested more 
clearly when applied to the specific issue of official narratives and education. This is 
not a necessary outcome of the politics of difference but rather indicates what can 
happen when the politics of difference is taken to an extreme. In Chapter 6 I rejected 
the politics of recognition and difference on the basis that it has the potential to 
increase balkanisation and tensions between groups. In many regards, these types of 
national curricula and systems for education, though mindful of diversity and 
difference, end up reinforcing boundaries and segregation between groups. In doing 
so, they promote cultural difference over dialogue, cohesion and toleration. This runs 
counter to the aims of a liberal heritage, which is ultimately justified on the basis that 
it defends liberal values of toleration and autonomy.  
 
A third approach to official narratives, one which may be perceived as remaining 
most faithful to liberal ideals of neutrality and blindness to difference, side-steps the 
problems with recognising diversity by not acknowledging any cultural particularity 
at all. This approach echoes some of the sentiments of constitutional patriotism, 
which aims to ‘de-ethnicise’ the public realm, as well as what I have described in 
Chapter 3 as the ‘orthodox’ approach to liberalism. Yet, although the liberal state is 
not obliged to preserve a diversity of minority heritages, it is crucial for the state to 
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recognise existing particularities within its own traditions and national heritage, 
rather than projecting its views as universal – and hence, equally applicable to all. 
Again, some of the existing theoretical problems with attempts to ignore or overlook 
cultural particularity manifest themselves more clearly when applied to a specific 
scenario. In his discussion of the American citizenship test, Julian Park writes about 
how such approaches to an official narrative can be inherently distasteful. Park 
argues that the newly redesigned citizenship test positions immigrants and non-
whites as antithetical to democratic values and, as a consequence, the state requires 
that these individuals relinquish their ‘otherness’ in order to assimilate into the 
community; this vision of citizenship does not therefore advance a universalist 
ideology but, in fact, ‘masks an exclusionary construct.’499 Park supports this claim 
with reference to the treatment of ethnic minorities within the citizenship test 
syllabus: 
 
‘In the current test, citizenship means membership in a community that is 
predominantly white and male. There is no mention of the Native Americans 
living in America before the Pilgrims arrived, only reference to Native 
Americans helping the Pilgrims…Question 45 asks who Martin Luther King 
Jr. was, but the answer (“a civil rights leader”) and the longer explication 
make no mention that he was a black civil rights leader, or more importantly, 
that he worked for racial equality…the new test excludes an Hispanic or 
Asian figures, related legislation, or historical events, even though Hispanics 
and Asians comprise the two largest ethnic groups who take the exam and are 
currently naturalised.’500  
Park goes on to argue: 
 
‘Martin Luther king can be known as a civil rights leader, but not as a black 
civil rights leader because this excludes other minority groups, which, it is 
assumed, can only identify with their own groups. Thus, minorities, such as 
Hispanics and Asians, are paradoxically excluded from the citizenship test 
despite making up the majority of test-takers…Non-whites are cast out of the 
citizenship construct because they threaten the common ground of American 
citizenship. What is behind USCIS’s (the United States office of Citizenship 
and Immigration Office) inclusive rhetoric is the assumption that race is 
antithetical to citizenship – that being coloured somehow inhibits 
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identification with common civic values. Of course, one racial group is clearly 
not excluded: the white majority remains the normative group defining 
citizenship. Thus a principle-centred citizenship is necessarily a white 
citizenship presupposed to be somehow colourless and universal…in short, 
whiteness provides the normative model for a principle-based citizenship 
promoted as being inclusive of all races.’501 
Though I have been critical of an educational curriculum that promotes differences 
through segregation, it is crucial that official narratives do not paint a false 
homogeneity, and for liberal governments to recognise their own cultural 
particularity. Indeed, although individuals primarily engage with culture outside of 
the public realm, as Anthony Appiah notes, it is crucial that liberal states educate 
their citizens about the diversity of cultural experiences that exist within the state. 
Appiah goes on to argue: ‘because they have a great deal of impact on our relations, 
in communities and in the political life of the state, we are all the better prepared for 
life in this nation if we know something of the cultures and identities of others and if 
we learn to engage in respectful discourse with them.’502 Crucially, this approach 
should not be confused with the promotion of a diversity of cultures: diversity is 
taught as a fact and not as something of inherent moral value.503  
 
 
Inculcating Loyalty in Official Narratives 
A second problem with the approach to official narratives suggested by Galston, 
Fullinwinder et al, is that it seeks to inculcate loyalty to political institutions. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, however, it is morally and politically untenable for a liberal 
state to engage in such deliberate and unapologetic strategies for inculcating political 
loyalty – especially in its school curriculum. A national heritage may aim at fostering 
a shared understanding and knowledge of diversity and liberal values but it may not 
cross the line into attempting to garner loyalty to these values themselves. To 
reiterate, a liberal heritage is distinguished from constitutional patriotism and liberal 
nationalism partly because it does not attempt to foster loyalty towards liberal 
institutions. It is true that a liberal ‘narrative’ also acts as a preventative measure for 
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maintaining peace and order but I do not believe that this is the same as inculcating 
loyalty. Indeed, as Harry Brighouse points out, a crucial aspect of a liberal education 
is the teaching of ‘critical scrutiny’ toward the very values being taught.504 Brighouse 
is sceptical about liberal education because of the extent to which it undermines 
individual autonomy and the legitimacy of the state. He writes: 
 
‘If the state helps form the political loyalties of future citizens by inculcating 
belief in its own legitimacy, it will be unsurprising when citizens consent to 
the social institutions they inhabit, but it will be difficult to be confident that 
their consent is freely given, or would have been freely given.’505 
 
This issue raises a clear problem for proponents of patriotic education such as 
Galston and Fullinwinder (discussed above), but also for the legitimacy of the state 
as envisaged by liberal nationalists and constitutional patriots, whose views were 
discussed in Chapter 5. Brighouse, however, also points out that the liberal state 
generates its own legitimacy in all sorts of other ways, through official reports, 
histories, national holidays and practices but also by publicly guaranteeing rights, it 
conditions support.506 Each of these clearly limit the extent to which a liberal 
government – indeed any government – can be objectively legitimated. Yet, as I have 
attempted to demonstrate, many of these things – such as flags, holidays, etc – are 
necessary features of contemporary statehood. With this in mind, it is even more 
crucial, therefore, that a liberal narrative remains inherently sceptical and teaches 
children and new citizens the value of questioning and challenging accepted and 
inherited beliefs or what Eamonn Callan refers to as ‘serious and independent ethical 
criticism.’507 As Parekh points out, the way in which a curriculum is taught also has 
significant bearing.508 Thus, scepticism affects the way traditional academic subjects, 
such as history, are taught. As Parekh writes: 
 
‘Each event has not one but several overlapping histories and is amenable to 
different narratives, all of them partial and biased though some more so than 
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others. Since events and institutions are multifaceted, so is the truth about 
them, and a balanced judgement on them can only be formed in conversation 
between different perspectives. One of the central aims of education should 
be to equip the student to participate in such a conversation and, thereby, to 
broaden her sympathies and get her to appreciate the complexity of truth and 
the irreducible diversity of interpretations without nervously seeking for a 
final answer.’509 
 
This kind of scepticism, as Brighouse proposes, must be accompanied by what he 
describes as ‘autonomy-facilitating education’ – which, within the liberal state that I 
have envisaged, translates into the promotion of choice and outlining the option of 
exit. It is also worth pointing out that Galston and Fullinwinder’s proposals bear an 
unfortunate semblance to what Nietzsche described as ‘monumental history’ in 
which, ‘some great era of the past is erected as an idol and zealously danced 
around.’510 Nietzsche, rather famously, went on to argue that such history 
 
‘is the masquerade costume in which their hatred of the great and powerful of 
their own age is disguised as satiated admiration for the great and powerful of 
past ages, and muffled in which they invert the real meaning of that mode of 
regarding history into its opposite, whether they are aware of it or not, they 
act as though their motto were: let the dead bury the living.’511 
 
Incorporating scepticism and adopting a more nuanced approach to official narratives 
thus also ensures that such subjects can retain relevance for future generations and 
does not devolve into a stagnant veneration of the past. 
 
A charge often levelled at this form of civic education, however, especially if it 
encourages critical reflection and scepticism, is that it harms certain cultural groups 
(and more conservative traditions) by encouraging members to challenge their 
authority. This view is fundamentally based on the assumption that if people are 
taught to challenge existing beliefs, then these beliefs are unlikely to survive. Yet, it 
also makes a further assumption that people generally follow traditions for rational 
reasons, and that they only hold beliefs that can withstand rational scrutiny. I do not 
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believe that there is much evidence that supports either of these assumptions. 
Nevertheless, groups that respect autonomy and toleration fundamentally have 
nothing to worry about, as the liberal state is obliged to refrain from interfering in 
their cultural affairs.  
 
A final point on education concerns the arguments that I made in the previous 
chapter about acknowledging universal historical injustices. Although I rejected the 
view that liberal states ought to enforce the remembrance or recognition of crimes of 
humanity in Chapter 7, it is worth reiterating that knowledge of these events should 
nevertheless form part of a liberal education. Indeed, crimes such as genocide 
represent the ultimate conflict between cultural groups and, as such, learning about 
these crimes is a vital part of learning about cultural differences. There is also 
growing evidence for the existence of indicators that can act as warning signals for 
an impending genocide.512 While such knowledge may form part of the school 
curriculum, it should be noted that this does not, in itself, constitute a violation of 
freedom of expression or, indeed, conscience. As part of a liberal education, students 
remain free to hold and express their own opinions about these events.  
 
Official narratives within the liberal state – be they part of the school curriculum, a 
citizenship test, or exhibits within a national museum - fundamentally aim to equip 
citizens with the skills and knowledge that are of value in coexisting and functioning 
as citizens within the liberal state. The content of these narratives ranges from basic 
information on voting and taxes; to the significance of various rights, freedoms and 
values; to learning about the diversity of cultural experiences within the state and the 
importance of critical scrutiny. Rather than viewing this knowledge as a condition to 
becoming a citizen, emphasis should be placed instead on the value that this 
knowledge has on being able to engage meaningfully with one’s own conception of 
the good and coexist alongside other citizens within the liberal state. As Parekh 
writes,  
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‘Multicultural education is an education in freedom, both in the sense of 
freedom from ethnocentric prejudices and biases and freedom to explore and 
learn from other cultures and perspectives.’513 
 
Fundamentally, official narratives within the liberal state aim at breaking down 
boundaries – be they social, ethnic, linguistic, or religious – because that, after all, is 
surely the point of any good education. 
 
 
Languages 
Of all the heritage issues engaged with by political theory, it is language that 
probably receives the most attention. Indeed, the scope of language concerns that 
arise within the liberal state is relatively broad. Such concerns range from issues such 
as official languages and the language used by the courts, government and other 
public services; to the medium of instruction within state schools (whether the state 
is obliged to teach minority and ‘heritage’ languages or whether it should force 
schoolchildren to ‘assimilate’ linguistically); in addition to the permissibility of 
language requirements for individuals seeking naturalisation; but also whether the 
state has any obligations toward making linguistic concessions in the services and 
information that it sponsors. It is possible to outline four general responses to 
minority languages: 1) active rejection and penalisation of any use; 2) indifference; 
3) partial support; 4) ascription of official status.514 By attempting to undermine the 
significant disadvantages that cultural minorities place and diminish the dominance 
of certain cultural groups, the liberal response outlined here ultimately supports a 
combination of the latter three options. In this section I shall consider a number of 
approaches before outlining my own position on a number of different language 
issues. 
 
Given the attention that language has received, a broad array of different responses to 
it can be found within studies of minority rights and multiculturalism. Chandran 
Kukathas, whose work has been cited in earlier chapters, asserts: 
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‘The stance of benign neglect suggests not that nothing needs to be done but 
rather that there is, in more cases, no determinate solution that will conform 
to an ideal of equality. Such solutions as might be reached will have to be 
compromises. All that can reasonably be assured to all groups is the freedom 
to pursue their aims to secure or promote their languages… what the ideal of 
benign neglect suggests is that in the process of searching for compromise, 
special weight not be given to the idea of securing an outcome which honours 
the ideal of equality of groups. It cannot be attained. What is worth 
considering, however is how to make the potential for conflict over such 
issues as language less troubling and potentially damaging.’515 
 
Because the ideal of equality cannot be achieved, Kukathas believes that the best 
strategy with regard to the treatment of languages, and indeed, minorities in general, 
is for the liberal state to abstain from any kind of intervention thereby assuring the 
freedom of groups to promote and preserve their own languages as they desire. The 
beauty of this idea is its simplicity – there is no point in striving towards a goal that 
can never be met and in doing nothing, the liberal state also upholds freedom. One 
might perhaps be tempted to apply this logic to liberalism more generally. Indeed, 
the ideal liberal state is unlikely to ever materialise, so why bother?  
 
Similarly, Brian Barry rejects the notion of separate language rights, offering a 
scathing critique of decisions within Wales that require school-children to learn and 
public office holders to be able to speak Welsh. Barry writes, ‘creating an artificially 
protected labour market in order to motivate acceptance of compulsory 
instruction…is simply to compound one abuse of state power by another.’516 Unlike 
Kukathas, however, Barry adopts a more hands on approach with a commitment to 
equality of opportunity:  
 
‘When we say then that equality of opportunity is a criterion on which an 
egalitarian liberal society can be properly judged, this must be taken to mean 
that everybody should have an opportunity to acquire the country’s language, 
to achieve educational success in that language, and to gain employment…in 
contrast, the provision of genuine equality of opportunity without linguistic 
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assimilation by immigrants would be, if not absolutely impossible, almost 
unimaginably burdensome.’517 
 
This is a view that I am broadly sympathetic towards because while I have rejected 
the promotion and preservation of minority cultures (and languages), I do believe 
that the liberal state should attempt to address the significant inequalities that certain 
individuals face as a result of their cultural affiliation. I believe that Barry’s view 
here suitably accounts for the costs faced by certain individuals both of being unable 
to communicate and work without knowledge of the dominant language, as well as 
the costs for the state at managing this. I discuss this approach, however, in greater 
depth in subsequent sections. 
 
Will Kymlicka’s response to this issue is that while national minorities should be 
given language rights, immigrants receive no such concessions.518 Kymlicka, it must 
be remembered places great significance on the value of a national identity – 
particularly for indigenous national minorities – and language rights play a crucial 
role in the maintenance of a national identity. As he and Patten note: 
 
‘Debates over the status of a regional language are also debates over 
nationhood. For the minority language group, recognition of its language is 
seen as a symbol of recognition of its nationhood. For the minority group, 
official multilingualism is desired in part because it is a symbol of, and a step 
towards, acceptance that it is a multination state….’519 
 
While I have noted my sympathy towards Barry’s position, the argument that I wish 
to defend here also takes account of significant minorities – with some reservations, 
however, as we shall see.  
 
Before I can outline my own position on this issue, however, I wish to briefly 
examine the concept of ‘linguistic human rights’ and provide this issue with a bit of 
context. Although this is a concept that has resulted in some rather extreme views, I 
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do believe that the fundamental premises of linguistic human rights possess 
reasonable merit.  
 
 
Linguistic Human Rights 
The right to a minority language is in fact well represented within existing treaty 
legislation. The preamble to the European Charter for Regional and Minority 
Languages, states that,  
 
‘The right to use a regional or minority language in private and public life is 
an inalienable right conforming to the principles embodied in the United 
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and according 
to the spirit of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.’ 520 
 
The preamble, however, also goes on to note that: 
 
‘…Stressing the value of interculturalism and multilingualism and 
considering that the protection and encouragement of regional or minority 
languages should not be to the detriment of the official languages and the 
need to learn them.’521 
 
As Skutnall-Kangas and Phillipson note, depriving individuals of their linguistic 
human rights may also prevent them from enjoying other human rights, including fair 
political representation, access to education and information, a fair trial, freedom of 
speech and the maintenance of their cultural heritage.522 
 
For Skutnall-Kangas and Phillipson, linguistic human rights (LHR) imply a positive 
duty on the part of states to provide individuals with the means to learn the official 
language within their country of residence. It also, however, means the right to learn 
their mother-tongue, minimally in basic education, and for the right to use this 
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language in official contexts.523 Restrictions upon these requirements are to be 
regarded as an infringement upon fundamental LHR. Indeed, they note that only a 
few of the world’s 6-7000 languages have any kind of official status and as such, it is 
only the speakers of these official languages who enjoy the full range of LHR.524 
Skutnall-Kangas and Phillipson also go on to note that, 
 
‘Most linguistic minorities seem reluctant to grant ‘their’ minorities rights, 
especially linguistic and cultural rights, because they would rather see their 
minorities assimilated…but this antagonism towards linguistic minorities is 
based on false premises, and in particular on two myths, that monolingualism is 
desirable for economic growth and that minority rights are a threat to the nation 
state.’525 
 
From this, very particular point of view, Skutnall-Kangas has gone on to assert that 
formal education is, in fact, one of the main killers of languages that are not used as a 
medium of instruction, and this is a form of, what he describes as, linguistic 
genocide.526 Intriguingly, Skutnall-Kangas points to the preparatory documents of the 
International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide to demonstrate how the killing of language (as a form of cultural genocide 
that) was originally considered alongside physical genocide, before being struck out 
of the convention by some of its signatories.527 The documents defined cultural 
genocide as: 
 
‘Any deliberate act committed with intent to destroy the language, religion or 
culture of a national, racial or religious group on grounds of national, or racial 
origin or religious belief, such as: 
1) Prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in 
schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of 
the group. 
2) Destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical 
monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of 
the group.’528 
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Though this preparatory documentation provides fascinating insight to the drafting of 
the Genocide Convention, it is quite a significant jump from outlining a right to 
speak minority languages to asserting that education in other languages constitutes 
linguistic genocide, however.  
 
It is important to take the notion of linguistic human rights serious, but also not to 
take this concept too far. Indeed, Stephen May has highlighted a key criticism of 
LHR arguments in that advocacy of language rights for minority groups ‘inevitably 
essentialises the languages and groups concerned, fixing them eternally at a 
particular (usually long-past) point in time when their historically associated 
language(s) was widely spoken.’529 It is important therefore to acknowledge that 
linguistic differences do not always correspond to ethnic differences – furthermore, 
May stresses, membership within an ethnic group ‘does not necessarily entail an 
ongoing association with a particular language.’530 This, in fact, mirrors one of my 
earlier arguments; unless a group is held specifically and only together by a certain 
practice, we cannot say with any certainty that an inability to perform this practice 
will lead to the dissolution of the group or culture. Indeed, May also points out that, 
‘more than one ethnic group can share the same language while continuing without 
difficulty to maintain their own distinct ethnic (and national) identities.’531 There is, 
in fact, a growing consensus within social theory and linguistics that language is at 
most only a contingent feature of identity; in other words, our specific language is 
not what defines us.532 Citing Brutt-Griffler, May notes that decisions about which 
language to speak can be made more often on the basis of social class rather than 
ethnicity.533  
 
These arguments are particularly damning for those, such as Skutnall-Kangas and 
Kymlicka, who wish to assert that language is intrinsically tied up with identity – 
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particularly national identity. May demonstrates the importance of ensuring that 
language policy does not become another parameter along which minority groups are 
essentialised and discriminated against, as well as maintaining a healthy degree of 
scepticism towards arguments that hinge on the significance of language for a 
particular cultural identity. May, however, argues that contrary to essentialism, 
language rights can and should provide for a more diverse and open ended 
interpretation of language and identity, with the ‘opportunity or potential to hold 
multiple, complementary cultural and linguistic identities at both individual and 
collective levels.’534  
 
 
Language Policy Within the Liberal State: Official Languages 
As May writes, ‘the establishment of state mandated or national languages is, in 
almost all cases, an inherently deliberate political act and one, moreover, that clearly 
advantages some individuals and groups at the expense of others.’535 Much like 
public holidays, official languages clearly reflect the dominance of certain cultural 
groups within the state and, thus, conferring official language status upon a minority 
language is also a form of political recognition.  
 
In the previous chapters, however, I was sceptical about the consequences of political 
recognition and this scepticism is also compounded by the evidence, provided by 
Stephen May, that language is not necessarily crucial to a particular cultural, ethnic 
or national identity. Much like Kukathas, therefore, I do not believe that it is entirely 
possible to arrive at an outcome for language policy in general that squarely meets 
liberal ideals – because, given the ambiguous relationship between cultural identity 
and language, it is not immediately clear what liberal ideals are when it comes to 
language policy. Unlike Kukathas, however, I believe that rather than ‘benignly’ 
neglecting language, this conclusion implies that the liberal state ought to make 
efforts, 1) to minimise the detrimental effects of being unable to communicate in an 
official language but also, 2) for decisions about language policy to be guided 
fundamentally by utility. Language policy in this sense cannot be geared at 
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sustaining a heritage language, but rather at ensuring that policy and practice reflect 
the interests of most, if not all, individuals. This solution thus meets liberal ideals by 
focusing on individual welfare. Therefore, without distinguishing between 
indigenous nationals and immigrant groups, official language status should only be 
conferred upon languages that are spoken by significant proportions of the political 
community. It is difficult to provide a concrete definition of ‘significant’, but 
common sense dictates that it would be very difficult to manage more than four 
national languages.  
 
 
Language within Schools 
Much like official language policy, the medium of instruction within state schools is 
likely to reflect a bias toward dominant groups. Yet, it is worth considering the 
purpose of education within the liberal state before jumping to conclusions about the 
injustice of this. Fundamentally, I believe that a liberal education aims to equip 
children with the skills and knowledge necessary for functioning – through 
employment, relationships and other social activities – within society. There are 
some issues and contexts where it is important to incorporate minority identities and 
experiences, in national museums or in the history curriculum as I have noted above. 
Education, however, is primarily instrumental. If we ask ourselves, therefore, why 
children ought to learn the dominant, as opposed to minority or heritage, languages – 
the response is because learning these languages is most likely to enable them to 
function and thrive within a liberal society.  
 
Is this, however, as many might argue, a policy of assimilation? To some extent, in 
obliging school children, within publicly funded schools, to conform to the dominant 
languages, it is. Yet, as Iris Marion Young notes, ‘few advocates of cultural 
pluralism and group autonomy…would deny that proficiency in [the official 
language] is a necessary condition for full participation in society.’536 Nevertheless, 
unless the liberal state is characterised by a single dominant language and a vast 
multitude of minority languages, state schools should offer instruction in a number of 
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the dominant/official languages. Furthermore, it is important for schools to also 
provide secondary language classes in the other dominant languages, as well as 
options for students to learn ‘heritage’ languages – provided these are not 
compulsory – ensuring that students are competent in a diversity of languages, hence 
preventing segregation. Thus, to some extent this is a policy of assimilation, but on 
the other hand, children and their parents still have a relatively broad variety of 
language options to choose from. As Pogge notes, it is necessary to balance out the 
importance of adult minority members being able to communicate with their children 
with the prevalence of language in question.537 Yet, even this statement is in some 
ways misleading and open to misinterpretation (as May indeed has done), because 
although the primary medium of instruction is restricted to dominant languages 
within state schools, there is nothing that prevents parents from speaking to their 
children in their language of choice (or indeed sending their children for foreign 
language classes) outside of school. Furthermore, as Joseph Carens also points out:  
 
‘It is one thing to say that immigrants (and especially their children) can 
reasonably be expected to learn the language of the country they enter and 
that their life choices will be affected by their formal legal rights and 
freedoms. It is quite another to claim that their entire context of choice is or 
ought to be determined by the social practices and cultural meanings made 
available by the culture of their new land.’538 
 
Ultimately, however, within a liberal state, parents are given a significant amount of 
choice on the matter of how they wish to have their children educated and what 
medium they wish to converse with their children in outside of school. As Kukathas 
notes, ‘people will have to make assessments of what risks to take, to decide how far 
they wish to integrate into the mainstream.’539  
 
In response to this, some might argue that this is a strategy that only allows the 
wealthy, who can afford to pay for private education that may cater toward minority 
languages, to engage meaningfully with their own languages. Yet, in response to this, 
it must be asked whether any child within the liberal state – other than the relatively 
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wealthy – can afford not to be educated in the languages of the state? Unless this 
child grows up to find a job that does not require any interaction with individuals 
outside of their own culture or can afford not to seek employment at all within the 
state, not learning a dominant language sets strict limits on the child’s future life 
opportunities, placing the child at a distinct disadvantage amongst their peers. As it 
cannot be said that a child who only learns their own (marginalised) language is 
completely deprived of meaningful future employment opportunities, this 
disadvantage is not so severe as to warrant government intervention. However, it 
does indicate why learning one of the dominant languages is valuable. 
 
 
Language Requirements for Citizenship 
A similar logic to the one outlined just now regarding the medium of instruction in 
state schools applies to language requirements for citizenship: naturalisation within 
many states includes language requirements and an ability to communicate – albeit 
usually at a basic level – in one of the official languages. This is not an ideal liberal 
position because language requirements represent enforcements of a particular 
conception of the good life. Yet, as I have noted above, with regard to language – 
given the complex relationship between language and identity – it is not always 
immediately clear what an ideal liberal position should be. This doesn’t mean, 
however, that the state should abstain from any language requirements of its new 
citizens – indeed, if all new citizens were unable to speak the official languages, this 
would come at a substantial cost to the liberal state. In choosing not to intervene on 
language requirements, the state would incur a huge cost in ensuring that these 
citizens had access and public information on services such as legal aid, 
unemployment benefits, voting materials and guidance on various duties, such as 
taxes, in their own language; not to provide access and information under these 
circumstances would constitute discrimination. We might also, quite reasonably, 
have concerns about how they intend to find employment.  
 
One easy solution to this issue would be to only provide citizenship tests in official 
national languages – thus ensuring that all new citizens possess an understanding of 
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these languages. Yet there is quite a difference between being able to communicate 
in a language on a basic level and being able to pass a rather complex test in that 
same language. A better response might perhaps take the form of either completing 
the citizenship test in an official language or providing documentary proof that 
reasonable efforts have been made to learn and establish a basic standard at an 
official language. Individuals seeking naturalisation would, presumably, have been 
residing within the state for a significant amount of time and so this requirement 
would not be completely unreasonable. The documentary evidence would 
demonstrate a willingness to learn the official languages but would also mean that 
the liberal state is likely to incur lower costs for those who are not fluent speakers. 
This policy could also be justified on the basis that it is indicative of a willingness on 
the part of newly naturalised citizens, not necessarily to integrate, but rather to get 
along or at least be able to communicate with members of the community outside of 
their own linguistic group.    
 
 
Maximising Linguistic Inclusion 
The language requirements set out above might appear to run contrary to liberal 
values of abstaining from interference in conceptions of the good life. Indeed, 
official languages, limited mediums of instruction in state schools and language 
restrictions on naturalisation seem clearly biased toward very particular conceptions 
of the good life and very particular cultural groups. These are difficult situations, 
however, and it is not always possible to stick to principle – especially as, when it 
comes to languages, it is not immediately clear what liberal principles may require. 
As Stephen May has argued above, the link between language and particular ethnic 
and national identities is somewhat ambiguous as more than one ethnic/national 
group may speak a particular language, whilst many members of that same group 
may choose to speak a different language for reasons completely unrelated to 
ethnicity.  
 
Ensuring that all languages spoken within the liberal state are equally catered for – in 
terms of schooling and other public services – would not only be expensive but also 
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utterly impossible. The language provisions that I have sought to outline here 
fundamentally seek to provide individuals with access to a dominant language in the 
interests of enabling them to function within the state, without hindering their ability 
to maintain connections to different languages of their choice. This, I believe is the 
best means of adhereing to liberal principles. While I am in agreement with Brian 
Barry that businesses are not obliged to provide for a diversity of languages540, as 
part of their duty to undermine instances where individuals are placed at a significant 
disadvantage because of their culture, states also have an obligation to provide 
information in a diversity of languages. Although I fundamentally disagree with the 
language provisions outlined by Skutnall-Kangas, proponents of linguistic human 
rights make a convincing case, as we have seen above, about how the lack of access 
to certain information undermines individual freedom. Therefore, liberal 
governments should also aim to provide individuals with access to certain vital 
information (e.g. voting ballots, legal advice, information about taxation and public 
utilities). As mentioned in Chapter 3, although this is an instance of significant 
overlap, this strategy is ultimately distinguished from the promotion of diversity 
(through the preservation of minority heritages)  by the fact that primary strategy of 
the state lies in improving access to an official language and thus such translations 
must be regarded as an intermediary measure in achieving the long term goal of 
maximising access to an official language.  
 
 
Rituals and the Liberal State 
In this final section of the chapter I shall address the issue of social rituals within the 
liberal state. In previous chapters I have argued in principle that, so long as 
individual autonomy and toleration are respected, individuals must be free to engage 
in their own rituals without interference from the state. While this may seem simple 
enough in principle, in practice, there are still important issues and problems that 
need to be resolved. For instance, I have defended a minimal liberal public heritage 
for the purposes of broadening understanding of diversity and liberal values, and so it 
is important to consider whether some ‘liberal’ rituals – such as citizenship 
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ceremonies, and voting – should be made compulsory. Indeed, even if the state is to 
abstain from this kind of intervention, the establishment of public holidays alone is a 
type of de facto ‘compulsory’ ritual. Furthermore, despite the liberal state’s 
commitment to toleration, is it really obliged to tolerate certain minority rituals that 
clearly challenge the authority of the liberal state or practices that run counter to 
dominant, ‘liberal’ values?  
 
Before it is possible to weigh in on these issues, it is worth setting out a conceptual 
framework of rituals. Steven Lukes has defined a ritual as, ‘a rule-governed activity 
of a symbolic character which draws the attention of its participants to objects of 
thought and feeling which they hold to be of special significance.’541 Social rituals, 
secular and otherwise, thus help to forge social unity. Indeed, as we have seen, many 
cultures are held together in part through the observation of certain symbolic 
practices – be it going to church on a Sunday, wearing certain clothing and 
ornaments, mourning on certain days, or adopting dietary rituals – but also in voting 
in elections, or watching national sporting events such as ‘Superbowl Sunday’, or 
dressing up for Halloween. Randall Collins, for example, has written about national 
solidarity and the rituals that were able to generate solidarity following the attack on 
the Twin Towers in September 2001. Collins argues:  
 
‘Solidarity is produced by social interaction within the group, not by the 
conflict itself as an external event. What creates the solidarity is the sharp rise 
in ritual intensity of social interaction, as very large numbers of persons focus 
their attention on the same event, are reminded constantly that other people 
are focusing their attention by the symbolic signals they give out, and hence 
are swept up into a collective mood.’542 
 
Though recent years have seen a surge of academic interest in rituals, particularly 
within sociology and anthropology, scholars of ritual continue to draw upon 
Durkheim’s theory of ‘collective effervescence.’ Amitai Etzioni has summarised 
Durkheim’s ‘functional’ approach towards rituals as follows: 
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‘(a) Profane (secular), routine, daily life, the conduct of instrumental activities 
at work, and carrying out household chores, tend to weaken shared 
commitments to beliefs and social bonds, and to enhance centrifugal 
individualism. For societies to survive these centrifugal, individualistic 
tendencies, they must continuously “recreate” themselves, by shoring up 
commitments to one shared (“common”) set of beliefs and practices. 
 
(b) Rituals provide one major mechanism for the recreation of society, one in 
which the members of a society worship shared objects and in which they share 
experiences that help form and sustain deep emotional bonds among the 
members. 
 
(c) The specifics of the rituals, and the objects that are being worshipped or 
celebrated in these rituals, be they colored stones or woodcuts or practically 
anything else, have no intrinsic value or meaning. It is the society that imbues 
these objects with significance, and, thus endowed, they become the 
cornerstones of the integrative rituals built around them.’543 
 
 
Public Holidays 
The liberal state – for better or worse – necessarily has its fair share of public rituals 
in the form of public holidays. It is holidays that in fact provide the clearest 
indication of the existence of an official narrative that reflects or is, at least, biased 
toward the experiences of the dominant group. Public holidays which mark the 
celebration of Christmas (over Hanukkah), for example, or of New Year in the 
Gregorian calendar (over New Year according to the Lunar, Hindu, Islamic or Jewish 
calendar), show clear partisanship toward Western and, in particular, Christian values 
– despite the supposed secularisation of Western Europe. As Kukathas notes, ‘when 
public holidays are declared, or not declared, all are affected – particularly when 
government offices close, or remain open on days that are culturally significant for 
some minorities.544 While holidays will serve to bind some individuals closer 
together, they can heighten feelings of exclusion for those who do not subscribe to 
the values of the holiday. It is for this very reason that Will Kymlicka, as mentioned 
in an earlier chapter, suggests ‘replacing existing public holidays and work weeks 
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with more ‘neutral’ schedules for schools and government offices’ and having ‘one 
major holiday for each of the largest religious groups in the country.’545 
 
Issues of funding and organisation aside, would such an initiative be likely to have 
much success, however? Amitai Etzioni in fact argues, somewhat counter intuitively, 
that religious holidays can be more easily redesigned, without losing their legitimacy, 
than secular holidays.546 He points to the Soviet Union, arguing that:  
 
‘…Continuous, systematic, and deliberate efforts were made to secularize 
holidays. Christmas and Easter were abolished in 1920, and November 7 (the 
anniversary of the founding of the Bolshevik government) and May 1 (the day 
celebrating the unity of labor) were introduced as holidays. In 1929, Sunday was 
abolished to make a six-day work week. Gift exchanging was moved to New 
Year’s Eve, and a secular “Father Frost” replaced Santa Claus. These efforts 
were widely resisted. Religious holidays continued to be observed by millions, 
often though not always in secrecy. Sunday was restored in 1940. And while the 
Soviet regime did not survive, the celebration of religious holidays did.’547 
 
A liberal state is unlikely to have much success in redesigning or reallocating its 
public holidays, nor are such measures likely to be terribly popular. Given the low 
probability for their success, these measures simply come at too great a cost - both 
financially and in terms of the discontent and disruption they are likely to cause. 
However, given the social value of holidays, it is important that beyond setting the 
dates of existing public holidays, liberal states should largely abstain from funding or 
promoting particular public holidays. I am thus broadly in agreement with Kukathas 
on this particular issue: it is impossible to resolve the general problems that arise 
with specific work weeks and public holidays with reference to overriding principles 
or justice and equality.548 Though some changes can be made, ‘when there are 
different minorities living in a society, some will often have no choice but to 
conform or adjust to their circumstances.’549 The same, however, cannot be said for 
all rituals within the liberal state. 
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Liberal Rituals I: Citizenship Ceremonies and Oaths of Allegiance 
Within the UK there is growing support for citizenship ceremonies as rituals that 
mark and celebrate the entry of new members to the liberal state.  Mark Rimmer of 
Brent County, who conducted the first citizenship ceremony in the UK, provided the 
following rationale for citizenship ceremonies as part of Lord Goldsmith’s 
Citizenship Review: 
 
‘Prior to the implementation of ceremonies the application process for 
acquiring citizenship was conducted entirely by post. The aspiring citizen 
filled out an application and sent it back with supporting documentation. 
Once a favourable decision was reached a hard copy of the Oath of 
Allegiance was sent to the applicant with instructions for it to be sworn 
before a person legally authorised to witness it. After it was returned to the 
Home Office the nationality certificate was dispatched by post – and that was 
counted as the point at which nationality was conferred…The process was 
purely bureaucratic and impersonal…The idea behind the introduction of 
ceremonies was that they would give added significance to attaining 
citizenship and provide an occasion at which the applicant, their family and 
close friends could celebrate a life defining moment…It would also provide 
the local authority with an opportunity to welcome their new citizens into the 
community and encourage participation in the democratic process…The only 
element of ceremony content that was prescribed in the legislation was the 
making of the Oath of Allegiance to the Sovereign and a new Pledge of 
Commitment to the United Kingdom. A number of other elements were set 
out in guidance but the overall feel and content was very much left to the 
local Council to determine.’550 
 
While the liberal state should not make such rituals compulsory, I do believe that the 
state should offer citizenship ceremonies to new citizens as a means of welcoming 
newcomers to the community. This is an important social ritual that not only marks 
entry into liberal society but also provides new citizens with a sense of belonging and 
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reinforces equality amongst all citizens. There is great social value in citizenship 
ceremonies. 
 
Although I do believe in the value of offering citizenship ceremonies (but not making 
these compulsory), whether these should include an oath of loyalty is a separate issue 
that warrants further attention. As we have seen, an oath of loyalty to the reigning 
sovereign and the state forms a crucial part of the British citizenship ceremony. 
Indeed, this kind of oath for new citizens is also compulsory in the United States. As 
Sanford Levinson writes, 
 
‘Loyalty oaths have been part of American history from its (English) origins 
in the seventeenth century. The Puritan settlers of New England had agreed 
even before leaving old England to prohibit settlement of those "not 
conformable to their government," and by 1634 local governments measured 
conformity in part by a citizen's willingness to take an oath of loyalty 
pledging, "by the great and dreadful Name of the Everliving God," to be "true 
and faithfull" to the government of the commonwealth. This entailed, among 
other things, a commitment to "yield assistance and support thereunto," not to 
mention "submitting myself to the wholesome Laws and Orders made and 
established by the same." Perhaps most interesting (or ominous) is the 
promise that "I will not plot or practice any evil against it, or consent to any 
that shall do so; but will timely discover and reveal the same to lawfull 
authority now here established, for the speedy preventing thereof." And the 
very first item printed, in 1639, by the first printing press in the English-
speaking colonies was this loyalty oath.’551 
 
To this day, millions of schoolchildren, in America and in American schools outside 
of the US, pledge allegiance to the American flag on a daily basis.552 Yet, as 
Levinson points out this kind of ritual runs counter to liberal beliefs that the state has 
no business in inquiring (and essentially determining – for compulsory oaths) the 
political views held by its members.553 However, Levinson also goes on to argue that 
a compelling case can be made for citizenship oaths on the basis that this forms a 
crucial part of the liberal tradition – namely, consent: new citizens (irrespective of 
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how long they have lived in the US as foreign residents) can give their explicit 
consent to liberal government through the citizenship oath, whereas indigenous 
citizens presumably – by virtue of birth – give tacit consent.554 
 
Ultimately there is something distasteful from a ‘disinterested’ liberal point of view 
that some groups are forced to give consent and pledge their allegiance to the 
‘liberal’ state, while others are exempt from this ritual. Indeed, the writings of Justice 
Jackson, following the Supreme Court’s reversal of West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnett (in which a child member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses was 
punished for refusing to pledge allegiance to the flag), have become one of the most 
frequently cited sentences in constitutional law: 
 
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein."555 
 
A liberal state cannot force or oblige its citizens to pledge allegiance to it because 
this fundamentally undermines liberal freedoms of conscience and expression. 
Similarly, compulsory prayers – much like oaths of allegiance – have no place in 
state schools. These rituals do not generate consent. To echo Brighouse’s position 
on liberal education which was cited above, compulsory oaths seriously undermine 
the legitimacy of the liberal state. Rather than inculcating loyalty, the liberal state is 
obliged to teach scepticism alongside liberal values. Consent – if the liberal state 
wishes to rely upon it for legitimation - needs to be freely given and as such the state 
does itself a disservice by forcing citizens to swear allegiance or providing a 
platform for such oaths.  
 
To return to the issue of citizenship ceremonies: while these must not include an 
oath of allegiance to the state or any ruler within the state, the ceremony itself might 
reasonably include a statement of knowledge and respect for liberal values of 
toleration, autonomy and other basic liberties. This would, however, merely reflect 
                                                       
554 Levinson: op cit., p.1460. 
555 As cited in Levinson: op cit., p.1451. 
8. Cultural Heritage and the Liberal State: Some Practical Cases  
 
284 
 
the knowledge accumulated for the citizenship test. One might argue that this also is 
susceptible to a problem of legitimacy – because the liberal state arguably embodies 
these values. However, while it is true that the liberal state is charged with 
maintaining and upholding these values, they are also broadly manifested within the 
public sphere. A condition of liberal citizenship is knowledge and respect for values 
such as toleration and autonomy, but this knowledge is also complemented by a 
healthy scepticism. 
 
 
Liberal Rituals II: Compulsory Voting 
Voting is arguably the central ritual within liberal-democratic states. As Steven 
Lukes argues, this is partly because of the fundamental role that voting plays within 
the ideology of a liberal-democratic state, but also because of the high level of 
participation that they involve.556 Much like an oath of allegiance, Lukes notes, 
elections can be interpreted as an affirmation of the political system, legitimating and 
perpetuating political paradigms.557 Indeed, voting is so crucial to the liberal-
democratic state that we might ask whether it should, in fact, be mandatory. Voting is 
compulsory in a number of states that might broadly be regarded as liberal, such as 
Australia, Belgium, France and Luxembourg.558 I have thus far been careful not to 
presume the existence of democracy within the liberal state; however, it is worth 
asking how consistent compulsory voting is with liberal principles. 
 
Justine Lacroix’s argument for compulsory voting within a liberal state is as follows: 
the duty to vote, far from undermining individual freedom, in fact promotes it and, 
according to Lacroix, is a necessary condition for the full exercise of equal liberty.559  
Compulsory voting is thus conceived as a ‘positive’ liberty, enabling people to 
exercise control over the political community. There are also, according to Lacroix, 
favourable implications for liberal legitimacy. In most elections, Lacroix argues, it is 
the more educated segments of society that actually vote and thus, when voting isn’t 
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compulsory, a government is not truly representative. 560 Furthermore, by 
encouraging all citizens, even the least motivated among them, to be informed and 
voice their opinions, compulsory voting would undermine bias towards dominant 
groups and oblige political parties to pay heed to the more marginalised electors and 
groups within the state.561 A government elected through compulsory voting is 
therefore able to be fully representative and, hence, legitimate. 
 
Lacroix and Bart Engelen also argue that, strictly speaking, compulsory voting does 
not force people to vote: they are merely obliged to come to the polling station on a 
specific day.562 Lacroix proudly notes:  
 
‘The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the obligation to vote did not 
go against article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights – relative to freedom of thought, conscience and religion – and to Article 
3 in the First Additional Protocol that establishes ‘the right to free elections’. In 
its ruling, the European Court declared that the citizen’s freedom of conscience 
was preserved because they could always cast a blank vote. Besides, the notion of 
‘free elections’, as stipulated in the First Protocol, does not mean ‘elections in 
which voting is not compulsory, but elections in which the act of voting is free’ 
(Ruling on 22 April 1965).’563 
 
This last point, however, seems to be largely a trivial one and yet proponents of 
compulsory voting place a huge emphasis on it – ultimately citizens are compelled to 
polling stations for no other purpose than voting. Furthermore, as Level notes, it is 
unclear whether there really is a moral duty to vote and if this duty is sufficient to 
justify legal compulsion.564 Lever goes on to note:  
 
‘Low turnout, and political alienation by the young, the poor and the 
uneducated are of genuine concern. Being forced to turn out is unlikely to 
cure alienation; nor is it much of a cure for political inequality, as voters only 
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get to choose from a range of candidates and platforms that have already been 
decided.’565  
 
Ultimately, as Lever points out, compulsory voting promotes an engagement with 
politics – arguably, a particular conception of the good life. While the liberal state 
can perhaps use resources to encourage people to vote, forcing people to turn up at 
the polls, when many of them may have no interest or meaningful opinion on 
politics, at best results in a lot of spoiled ballots and, at worst, politicians who have 
come to power based solely on good looks or height566; rendering the entire ritual 
farcical. 
 
In general, therefore, forcing citizens to engage with liberal rituals runs counter to 
basic liberal commitments. Voting should be a matter of choice, much like 
citizenship ceremonies. People should, however, be free to swear allegiance to 
whomever they please – even the liberal state – but the liberal state cannot provide a 
platform for this. It is true that public holidays are in some sense ‘forced’ rituals for 
schoolchildren attending state schools and employees within the public sector. It is 
worth pointing out, though, that a multitude of alternatives exist outside these state 
subsidized institutions. Ultimately, resolutions within such contexts need to balance 
out the relative importance of rejecting existing public holidays and the costs 
incurred in doing so. 
 
 
Rituals that Challenge 
In his essay on flag burning, discussed above, Pollitt tells the story of nineteen year-
old Yette Stromberg who, in 1931, was a summer camp counsellor and member of 
the Young Communist League.567 Yette led a daily ceremony in which the camp 
children would raise a red flag, salute it, and recite a pledge of allegiance to the 
‘worker's red flag and to the cause for which it stood.’568 Stromberg was tried and 
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convicted in a local court, and her conviction was affirmed on appeal to the 
California District Court of Appeal.569 It was only when the case reached the United 
States Supreme Court that the ruling was reversed. The United States at the time, it 
must be remembered was gripped by a mass hysteria and fear of communism – as far 
as many were concerned, Yette might as well have been encouraging the children to 
pledge allegiance to the devil. Much like the issue of flag burning, this case, 
however, raises the question, once again, of the permissibility of rituals and practices 
that deviate and indeed – often stand diametrically opposed to – liberal values.  
 
In the preceding chapters I have argued that the liberal state is obliged to exercise 
tolerance when confronted with practices that it deems abhorrent. Indeed, all too 
often, liberal states forget that they do not occupy an entirely neutral position and 
that the liberal values they espouse can be linked back to specific historical 
experiences and particular groups. It has therefore been my aim in this thesis not to 
universalize or neutralise these values (as constitutional patriots are wont to do) nor 
to encourage ‘deviant’ cultures to integrate within this history (as advocated by 
Liberal Nationalists), but instead, to attempt to reduce cultural bias by recognizing it 
and making sincere efforts to minimise this bias where possible. In order for 
tolerance to be meaningful, therefore, it is necessary for the liberal state to accept 
‘abhorrent’ cultural practices – because these practices are only abhorrent when 
viewed through particular cultural lenses. However, and this is a significant however, 
the liberal state should only accept practices that run counter to liberal values when it 
is clear that tolerance and autonomy are being respected by the cultural group and 
practice in question, and the liberal state has a fundamental duty to ensure that these 
values are being respected. In instances where there is an irresolvable clash of ideas 
on different ways of living, when autonomy or toleration are difficult to establish 
(e.g. foxhunting or whaling, as well as arranged marriage) or when there are no legal 
provisions or precedents, in Chapter 3 I maintained that it is necessary to assess both 
the centrality of the practice to a particular culture’s way of life as well as the 
potential harm that restrictions on the practice can cause to a cultural group. 
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It might be argued that the view defended here places a great – indeed too great – 
emphasis on the value and existence of meaningful choice. I have defended toleration 
out of respect for individual freedom and choice. Given societal constraints and peer 
pressure, however, some might ask, when is a choice ever genuine? Though it is 
difficult to provide a definitive response to this question, I believe that the liberal 
framework that I have set up in this thesis provides ‘genuine’ choice with a very fair 
chance to flourish. Educational mechanisms outlined here and in Chapter 5, for 
example, not only emphasise the value of autonomy and of skepticism, but they also 
highlight the existence of alternative ways of living and encourage individuals to 
learn more about them. Additionally, in Chapter 3, I stressed the importance of 
devoting resources to setting up health, welfare and social mechanisms to support 
individual choices about cultural heritage. Such mechanisms are geared at those who 
may choose to question or reject their culture’s practices – ensuring that dissent and 
exit really are viable and meaningful options – but they are also devoted to 
undermining intolerance of those who may wish to pursue cultural practices that are 
generally shunned by the dominant group.  
 
 
Conclusion 
With the aim of clarifying and reinforcing arguments in previous chapters, this final 
chapter has sought to discuss these principles by applying them to some practical 
cases. I explored how liberal principles of upholding tolerance and autonomy apply 
to difficult issues such as language provisions and official narratives, and found that 
while the liberal state necessarily takes a stance on such matters, by designating 
official languages and designing citizenship or school curricula, individuals still have 
a significant amount of freedom to make their own choices about language and are 
encouraged to form their own opinions about public histories and other official 
narratives. Indeed, I also discussed how the liberal state ought to respond to rituals 
and practices that are perceived to challenge the state and indeed liberalism itself. A 
study of the minarets controversy highlighted the importance of assessing the 
credibility of such threats and the value of public culture in promoting toleration and 
a better understanding of different cultural norms and practices. Yet, even when 
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challenges are genuine or more explicit (as in instances of flag burning), a liberal 
response to cultural heritage suggests that individuals must have the freedom to 
express dissent on ideas and cultures in the built environment as well as in practices 
and objects, so long as this does not result in the destruction or damage of others’ 
property or is found to incite harm or violence.  
 
While a liberal response to cultural heritage is fundamentally aimed at sustaining 
liberal values, the state inevitably enforces certain rituals through the provision of 
public holidays. In such difficult cases, it is important to consider the feasibility of 
alternatives by balancing out the costs of such measures against the costs incurred 
(with the existence of these public holidays) by minority groups. Liberal states must 
make efforts to undermine instances of cultural bias, but it is not always possible to 
do so. Nevertheless, while the liberal state cannot resolve all cultural dilemmas, it 
can ensure that freedom and toleration are sustained, for the most part, by minimising 
state interventions in cultural heritage. The liberal state is many things, but 
fundamentally it is distinguished by a willingness to accept people’s life decisions 
(so long as these do not harm others) – be they ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ 
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Conclusion 
 
 
When writing about cultural heritage for my Master’s dissertation, my colleagues 
referred to my work as the research on ‘buildings and monuments.’ In my 
dissertation as in this thesis I hope to have demonstrated that while cultural heritage 
can encompass buildings and monuments, it also includes a much broader spectrum 
of objects and practices such as languages, narratives, knowledge, rituals, modes of 
dressing and adornment, symbols, artefacts, dietary habits, social interactions, habits, 
gestures, fine and performing arts, music, decoration and so on. These objects are 
defined as cultural heritage through their recognition as being able to reflect and 
represent some meaningful aspect of a culture’s history and experience. 
 
Inspired by the experiences of my homeland, Hong Kong, where cultural heritage 
has been a constant subject for discussion since the city’s return to China a decade 
and a half ago, I have sought to outline a reasoned response to cultural heritage. As a 
student of political theory, I have been particularly interested in determining the 
general principles that underlie such an approach. When initially researching this 
issue, however, I quickly learnt that within the rapidly expanding field of heritage 
studies, the central question is not merely whether or not to preserve heritage, but 
also how to best protect heritage, and indeed, whose heritage. In many contexts 
where heritage issues arise, practitioners need to respond to often competing 
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narratives of cultural heritage. Thus, heritage scholars are beginning to engage with 
issues such as multiculturalism, diversity and human rights, and yet I was surprised 
to see that very few of the works that cover such topics ever engage with political 
theory. Much of contemporary political theory and particularly recent works on 
liberalism deal with these very same questions of how to respond to a diversity of, 
occasionally conflicting, cultural goods and so it seemed clear to me that liberal 
theory, with its commitment to individuals and not preferring any particular 
conception of the good life, is a clear contender for providing crucial theoretical 
insight into these normative issues for cultural heritage. Yet, while many 
contemporary political theorists are engaged with questions of culture, identity and 
diversity, very few scholars have engaged with the issue of cultural heritage at any 
great length. By responding to the fundamental question of how liberal states ought 
to respond to a diversity of cultural heritages, I therefore hope to have filled this gap 
within the literature in heritage studies as well as political theory. 
 
Yet, some might ask, why cultural heritage and not simply culture? The objects that I 
have referred to as cultural heritage are just as easily referred to simply as ‘culture.’ 
This is broadly correct. However, by engaging with heritage as opposed to merely 
culture, I hope to resolve one of the key criticisms that is often levelled at 
contemporary liberal theory. When responding to cultural claims of a right to 
continue a particular practice because ‘they have been doing this for years’, liberal 
theorists such as Brian Barry like to respond: ‘well, perhaps it’s high time you 
stopped doing it.’570 While it is true that liberalism, by nature, remains sceptical of 
tradition and inherited beliefs, this type of response is unlikely to resonate with more 
conservative cultural groups. My point here is to highlight the fact that liberalism has 
frequently been accused of being insensitive to the weight of history and historical 
experiences and, in doing so, largely remains ignorant of the historical particularity 
of its own supposedly neutral beliefs. The liberal state, as much as it would like to 
claim neutrality, is biased by its own particular context and historical experiences. 
By engaging with cultural heritage (as opposed to simply culture), I therefore hope 
not only to have provided a liberal response to an existing problem for cultural 
                                                       
570 Barry, CE, p.249 
Conclusion 
 
292 
 
heritage, but also to have provided a solution to a particular problem within 
liberalism. ‘Heritage’ thus marks a commitment to taking diversity of historical 
experiences and liberalism’s own cultural particularity seriously. While difficult 
decisions about culture will inevitably result in occasional prohibitions of certain 
cultural practices, liberals ought to be more sensitive to the harm that this does to the 
identity of the cultural group as well as their own cultural particularities. The 
solution provided here is not the liberal solution to culture and cultural heritage, but 
rather, more modestly, a liberal solution to these particular problems. Indeed, the 
liberal response to cultural heritage outlined here is also a particular liberalism.  
 
Cultural heritage can manifest itself in grand monumental structures, in buildings, 
physical structures and extraordinary moments of celebration or national mourning, 
but cultural heritage most significantly impacts upon everyday life; in the practices 
and daily rituals that individuals follow. Individuals may choose to make their 
heritage matter a lot – by following cultural protocol to the letter – or their cultural 
heritage may matter very little; what is important, from a liberal point of view, is that 
individuals must have a choice to determine the content as well as significance of 
their own cultural heritage. Given the significance that cultural heritage has on 
personal identity and freedom, therefore, a liberal state’s response to cultural heritage 
is necessarily one that is characterised fundamentally by non-intervention. 
Individuals must be free to engage with cultural practices and beliefs largely 
unobstructed by the state. As a consequence, there is no general principle to preserve 
cultural heritage, partly because any intervention is likely to undermine individual 
choices about their own heritage, but also because liberalism does not provide any 
indication of whose heritage ought to be preserved. Conversely, the liberal state does 
not possess a right to destroy or prohibit cultural artefacts when these offend the 
sensibilities of the majority. Indeed, a liberal state that is defined, in principle, by its 
agnosticism towards competing conceptions of the good, would be in breech of its 
most basic proviso by interfering in a particular cultural heritage. 
 
Yet, while states should not interfere in cultural heritage on principle, I have also 
acknowledged the reality of existing biases within public culture. Indeed, for as long 
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as political communities remained structured around the concept of a nation-state, 
necessary public heritage – in the form of a national flag, anthem, languages, 
symbols etc. – is likely to reflect the experiences of a dominant, national group. My 
acceptance of an inevitable cultural bias within the liberal state does perhaps 
undermine the cultural neutrality of the liberal theory outlined here, but at the same 
time, I hope that it has also rendered this theory more robust and applicable to states 
outside of the realm of ideal theory. It is true that a public heritage undermines a 
liberal state’s claims to cultural neutrality, yet I have attempted to demonstrate why 
liberal governments ought to place greater emphasis instead on political neutrality. In 
other words, it is true that public culture may reflect the experiences of certain 
groups, however, this is not ultimately what matters to the liberal state. While the 
two concepts of neutrality are not mutually exclusive, political neutrality focuses on 
the moral and political status of individuals, not cultures. Thus, while a liberal state is 
committed to not interfering in cultures, some interventions on cultural heritage can 
be justified on the basis of upholding liberalism’s commitment to individuals. 
Specifically, I have argued that interventions may be justified to uphold toleration in 
instances where individuals may be prevented from engaging with their heritage due 
to the fact that other, possibly more dominant, groups deem these practices to be 
abhorrent; and intervention may also be justified to uphold autonomy – that is, in 
situations where an individual’s choice about their cultural heritage is not being 
respected by their own or other cultural groups. Indeed, it may also be necessary to 
intervene in situations where heritage is used to cause harm or incite violence against 
others to uphold these values. Frequently presented at loggerheads, I have attempted 
to demonstrate how strong toleration and autonomy can in fact be reconciled in 
liberal theory. A liberal state, in short, may only interfere with cultural heritage in 
order to uphold liberal principles. 
 
Nevertheless, a public heritage that is likely to reflect the experiences of a dominant, 
national group, sits rather oddly with a commitment to upholding liberal values. 
Though it may be tempting to assert that liberalism requires interventions in order to 
promote the heritages of minority groups alongside that of the dominant nationality 
in order to achieve some sort of cultural balance, I have argued that such efforts are 
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likely to be in vain because they may in fact serve to heighten the division between 
groups and, more importantly, undermine individual freedom to engage with 
heritage. Indeed, liberalism’s underlying commitment to upholding toleration and 
autonomy ensures that unfair public cultural prejudices are eradicated. This 
eradication can be achieved partly through the interventions in specific cases, but it 
also entails a general strategy of undermining cultural dominance in the form of 
rationalising official languages, symbols, the school curriculum, official rituals etc. 
to ensure that minority groups are not placed at an undue disadvantage because of 
their cultural orientation. While some public culture will inevitably reflect the 
experiences of dominant groups (e.g. public holidays), it does not necessarily place 
minority groups at a significant disadvantage. Indeed, public culture within the 
liberal state is aimed at promoting an understanding of diversity and liberal values of 
autonomy, toleration and scepticism.  
 
This last point about scepticism is crucial, and a key point in distinguishing the 
public heritage defended here from the public culture imagined by liberal nationalists 
and constitutional patriots. While I accept the necessary existence of certain forms of 
public cultural heritage, I do not believe that the liberal state can justifiably use this 
heritage to foster political loyalty to the liberal government and its ideals. In its 
willingness to allow individuals to follow certain practices that the vast majority of 
the population may deem utterly abhorrent, the liberal theory outlined here places a 
great deal of significance on individual choice. Thus, teaching scepticism within the 
school curriculum and in citizenship tests not only addresses some of the moral 
concerns that we might have about a public culture and liberal legitimacy, but also 
helps to ensure that choice is made meaningful within the liberal state. A further 
strategy for supporting cultural choices within the liberal state comes in the form of 
ensuring that there is a network of support mechanisms to assist individuals should 
they choose to resist the pressures to conform to cultural practices and, possibly, exit 
from their cultural group. 
 
The liberalism defended in this thesis thus fundamentally resists the view that all 
cultural symbols and practices fall outside the realm of political theorising. Although 
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accepting the existence of nation-states and the potential dominance of national 
identity undoubtedly represents a departure from the ideal liberal state, I believe that 
the theory offered here is able to present a principled response to cultural heritage 
nevertheless. Of course, there are many issues where a principled response might not 
be of much help. Indeed, I have noted that in situations of conflict between two 
competing conceptions of heritage and when the dictates of toleration and autonomy 
are not immediately clear, it is necessary to evaluate cultural beliefs by considering 
both the significance of a cultural practice to the group’s identity as well as the 
potential harm that prohibition may cause. Cultural heritage can be deeply significant 
to personal identity but this does not mean that concerns about cultural heritage 
should always trump other issues such as development or environmental concerns. 
Indeed one significant area for further potential research is the role of natural 
heritage and wildlife, and examining what obligations, if any, might we have toward 
these objects. Similarly, while I have considered some inter- and intra-group 
conflicts about cultural heritage, I have not considered the international ramifications 
of heritage and what political morality and justice require when two states clash over 
the same cultural heritage. Thus, while I hope to have answered many questions 
about cultural heritage, there are still many others that remain unanswered.  
 
Cultural heritage goes far beyond ‘buildings and monuments.’ It has significance for 
contemporary politics, historical justice and, most vitally, individual and group 
identity. Yet in order to ensure that cultural heritage does not become a tool for 
oppression and the essentialisation of cultural identity, it is important that liberal 
states ensure that individuals possess the freedom to engage with their cultural 
heritage meaningfully. In this thesis I have therefore provided a response to cultural 
heritage which attempts to sustain liberal values whilst remaining cognisant of 
contextual constraints. Whether liberalism can always provide the most desirable or 
even the most viable course of action in such contexts, however, is an entirely 
different matter.  Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the past maintains its 
contemporary significance largely at our own discretion. Heritage never simply is; it 
always can be. When history was being re-written and yet another fallen comrade 
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was airbrushed out of a photo by Stalin’s apparatchiks, there was a saying among 
Soviet citizens: The future is certain, it is the past that is not yet clear.571 
                                                       
571 As quoted in Smith (2006): ‘Hong Kong tries to save a bit of its storied past’, (International Herald 
Tribune, June 1st 2006) http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/31/news/prison.php?page=2. 
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